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THEMATIC ARTICLES – IDENTITY, INTEGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

Immigrant Integration: Acculturation and Social Integration

Astrid HAMBERGER

Abstract. This article tackles the concept of “immigrant integration” as it is analyzed by different authors in the international migration field. In this article, I will use the terms “refugee” and “immigrant” as equivalent to each other due to the interchangeable character of these concepts throughout the integration literature. First, the article brings into discussion the definitional and conceptual battle around the concept of immigrant “integration”, and second, it will describe and analyze cultural and social integration with their presupposing processes.

Key words: *immigrant, refugee, acculturation, integration*

What is immigrant integration?

The literature surrounding the immigrants’ reception into host society is to some extent characterized by contradictory positions, a diversity of definitions, and conceptual puzzlement. Throughout immigration studies, researchers use different concepts and definitions to express the same type of process which embodies the “consequences of immigration.”¹ Following Adrian Favell, researchers use various terms, which differ in their clarity: they are “vaguer” concepts like, “absorption”², “accommodation”, “toleration”, “adaptation”³ or “adaption.”⁴ Favell argues that

¹ Adrian Favell, “Integration nations: the nation-state and research on immigrants in Western Europe, The multicultural challenge”, *Comparative Social Research* 22, Elsevier Science (2003): 13-42.

² S.N. Eisenstadt, *The absorption of immigrants* (Greenwood Press, 1975), 11-12.

³ Rainer Baubock, Agnes Heller, Aristide R. Zolberg, *The challenge of diversity. Integration and pluralism in societies of immigration* (European Centre Vienna Averbury, 1996)

some are “too technically precise” like “incorporation” which, in the end will be “swallowed” by integration, or “too descriptive” which do not reveal any political intervention like “assimilation” or “acculturation.”⁵

By looking through studies dealing with immigrant integration, one becomes aware of the fact that there is no satisfactory core definition of the concept of “integration” despite what Favell called “numerous national and cross-national projects.”⁶ What can be noticed is that researchers are referring to this term using expressions like “a strange term”⁷, “a difficult to define concept”⁸, “a treacherous metaphor”⁹, “a long and winding road”¹⁰ or phrases like “the entire subject is a miasma, a minefield, which one would be well advised to be wary to enter.”¹¹

Regarding the definitional battle, some use integration as an umbrella term that subordinates other dominant concepts like assimilation and multiculturalism.¹² Others see it as an end in itself¹³ while some view it as one type of adaptation¹⁴, and still more may see it as the middle-way between assimilation and multiculturalism.¹⁵ Moreover, the literature on immigrant integration is sometimes confusing because researchers use the same terms to refer to different processes

⁴ Rivka Weiss Bar-Yosef. “Desocialization and resocialization: The adjustment process of immigrants”, *International Migration Review* 2, No. 3 (1968): 27-45, pp. 29

⁵ Favell, “Integration nations: the nation-state and research on immigrants in Western Europe, The multicultural challenge”, 15

⁶ Idem 6

⁷ Christina Boswell, *European Migration Policies in Flux. Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion* (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Blackwell, 2003)

⁸ Favell, “Integration nations: the nation-state and research on immigrants in Western Europe, The multicultural challenge”, 15

⁹ Banton (2001) in Adrian Favell, *Assimilation/Integration, in Immigration and Asylum: From 1900 to the Present* (edited by Matthew Gibney and Randall Hansen, Santa Barbara, CA: Clio, 2005); available at <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/soc/faculty/favell/Clio.htm>

¹⁰ Kloosterman et al. (1998) in Favell, “Integration nations: the nation-state and research on immigrants in Western Europe, The multicultural challenge”

¹¹ Apthorpe, in Peter Quentin Reinsch, *Measuring Immigrant Integration. Diversity in a Dutch City* (Netherlands School for Social and Economic Policy Research (AWSB), 2000)

¹² Boswell, “European Migration Policies in Flux. Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion” 75, Favell, “Integration nations: the nation-state and research on immigrants in Western Europe, The multicultural challenge”, 15

¹³ Andreas Kamm, the Director of the Danish Refugee Council, 2006

¹⁴ Baubock, Heller, Zolberg, “The challenge of diversity. Integration and pluralism in societies of immigration”

¹⁵ Boswell, “European Migration Policies in Flux. Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion” 75

that deal with immigrants' reception. For example, they use "integration" and "assimilation" as being the same and one term: "European research continues to treat 'integration' and 'assimilation' as nearly identical. The 'well integrated' migrant is the one who has assimilated functionally into ways of speaking, thinking, and behaving in the host society."¹⁶ The constant definitional battle and the lack of criteria for measuring this process, make this term even blurrier than it is.

Short history of the term

The Chicago School of Urban Sociology popularized the term "integration" together with "assimilation" in the early twentieth century before becoming familiar terms in public policy debates about consequences of immigration. These two concepts have been mostly developed in the USA (assimilation) and Western Europe (integration) and both refer to "the process of settlement, interaction with the host society and social change that follows immigration."¹⁷ But due to the powerful critiques brought to assimilation, and since "assimilation" is perceived as "undesirable"¹⁸ or a "negative term"¹⁹, integration is the preferred term in Western Europe, even though in practice some Western European countries tacitly advocate for assimilation (like Denmark).

Comparing other terms like "adaptation", "incorporation", "assimilation", or "acculturation" with the one of integration, Favell argues that neither of these concepts comprises the "social engineering of integration." Integration is viewed, in his perspective, "an ideal end-goal for society as a whole" which, "on paper looks extremely difficult and improbable" because this definition implies "the construction of a successful, well-functioning, multi-cultural or multi-racial society."²⁰ Christina Boswell takes into consideration the "difficult and

¹⁶ Carl-Ulrik Schierup and Aleksandra Ålund, "Introduction. From 'birds of passage' to ethnic minorities" in *Will they still be dancing? Integration and ethnic transformation among Yugoslav immigrants in Scandinavia* (Umeå: University of Umeå, 1986)

¹⁷ Favell, "Assimilation/Integration, in *Immigration and Asylum: From 1900 to the Present*", 1

¹⁸ Belinda-Ann Steen, *Varieties of the Tamil Refugee Experience in Denmark and England*, (Minority Studies, University of Copenhagen, The Danish Centre for Human Rights Copenhagen, Copenhagen 1993)

¹⁹ Favell, "Assimilation/Integration, in *Immigration and Asylum: From 1900 to the Present*", 1

²⁰ Favell, "Integration nations: the nation-state and research on immigrants in Western Europe, *The multicultural challenge*", 15-16

improbable”²¹ characteristic, arguing that the receiving societies are characterized by national and ideological variations as how far immigrants are expected to adapt to the receiving society. Therefore, in some cases, integration can take the shape of assimilation, multiculturalism or segregation. In the next section I will focus the discussion on the two dimensions of integration I am dealing with in this article: cultural integration or acculturation and social integration.

Dimensions of integration

Researchers measure integration in the host society through four dimensions: cultural, social, economic and political. These are the classical dimensions of integration, which in Boswell’s terms gather all aspects of an immigrant’s life²²:

Cultural (knowledge of the host country’s language, some understanding of its society and respect for its basic norms)

Social (insertion into education and welfare systems)

Economic (access to the labor market, employment)

Political (is equated with the final stage of integration - the right to vote and to stand for election, usually acquired through naturalization).

These four classical dimensions of integration have been developed by Rinus Pennix under a typology of migrant integration policies based on inclusion or exclusion which centers on the concept of “citizenship.” In his view, in order to understand the European countries’ present integration policies and their differences, we need to answer one question: “how basic democratic values can and should be combined with the two essentials of any integration policy: cultural and religious diversity on the one hand and socio-economic equality on the other?”²³ Consequently, Pennix develops three dimensions of citizenship, which, in his terms, can be used in the national and local analyses of integration, and can also

²¹ Boswell, “European Migration Policies in Flux. Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion”, 75

²² Idem 21

²³ Baubock (1994); Baubock et al. (1996); Brubacker (1989, 1992); Hammar (1990); Kymlicka (1995); Soysal (1994); Young (1990) in Rinus Penninx, “Integration of migrants. Economic, social, cultural and political dimensions”, *Background paper for the European Population Forum 2004, Population Challenges and Policy Responses* (12-14 January, Geneva, 2007), 7; available at: www.unecce.org/ead/pau/epf/penninx.pdf

be used to construct typologies/ideal types of integration policies²⁴:

Legal/political = “whether immigrants are regarded as full-fledged members of the political community”; it refers to the immigrants’ political rights and duties, if they (easily or not) acquire national citizenship and access to the formal political system, to the secure residence rights they have or not have.

Socio/economic = described by social and economic rights, irrespective of citizenship: industrial rights and rights related to institutionalized facilities in the socio-economic sphere (the same rights as indigenous workers, access to unemployment benefits and insurance, social security facilities – social housing, social assistance, welfare, care facilities

Cultural-religious rights = do immigrants “have (equal) rights to organize and manifest themselves as cultural, ethnic or religious groups?”

In his perspective, if we attribute at least two qualities to each dimension (for example positive quality (+) which means policy support for that dimension or negative quality (-) which means negative support for that dimension) we can create a typology, which he calls “ideal types”, of possible forms of integration policies.

Therefore, he makes a difference in integration policies based on their inclusive or exclusive character. He argues that the inclusive policies are those which grant at least legal/political rights to the newcomers. Further on, his analytical frame suggests that if states grant both legal/political and socio/economic rights, but do not grant the right to cultural/religious expression then, the outcome of their policy is defined as assimilation. For example, Denmark is considered to have an inclusive policy toward immigrants based on assimilation. Denmark grants both legal/political and socio/economic rights, but does not grant the right to cultural/religious expression. In contrast, Sweden grants both legal/political and socio/economic rights and also the right to cultural/religious expression which translated into multiculturalism.

Cultural integration or Acculturation

The most basic definition of acculturation or cultural integration is that in

²⁴ Penninx, “Integration of migrants. Economic, social, cultural and political dimensions”, 7

this subprocess immigrants experience cultural change.²⁵ In Alba and Nee's review of Gordon's work, acculturation is defined as "the minority group's adoption of the cultural patterns of the host society"²⁶, a subprocess that comes first and is also, in Gordon's view, inevitable. Milton Gordon described acculturation as when members of an ethnic group begin to take on the cultural elements of the receiving society: language, style of dress, diet, religion, values, and taste of music.

According to Charles Jaret this subprocess is characterized by a transitional stage in which immigrants adopt the elements of the new culture, while preserving elements from their own/old culture.²⁷ Hence, there are intrinsic and extrinsic cultural traits.²⁸ The intrinsic cultural traits are those that are "vital ingredients of the group's cultural heritage" – religion and musical traits, while the extrinsic traits are "the products of the historical vicissitudes of the group's adjustment to the local environment", meaning that the minority group is more ready to surrender them as they become less central to group identity.²⁹ The supposition is that in time, while the assimilation process advances, the immigrants will abandon their intrinsic cultural traits.

Another important point is supported by Rinus Pennix who argues that the most important two elements of the cultural-religious domain are language acquisition and religious manifestation in the public sphere.³⁰ In his view, compared to multicultural ideologies like Great Britain, Sweden and The Netherlands, the homogenous countries like France, Germany, Austria, Denmark, do not create many premises for cultural or religious manifestations in the public sphere. In this assimilationist model, the society's culture is taken as "given" and the newcomers are expected to adapt at least to the public institutions of the host society.

Summarizing the process of acculturation, Milton Gordon characterizes it as "minor modifications in cuisine, recreational patterns, place names, speech,

²⁵ Charles Jaret, *Contemporary racial and ethnic relations* (Harper Collins College Publishers, 1995), 360

²⁶ Richard Alba and Nee, Victor, "Rethinking assimilation theory for a new era of immigration", *International Migration Review*, 31, Special Issue: "Immigrant Adaptation and Native-Born Responses in the Making of Americans", (1997): 826-874, p. 827

²⁷ Jaret, "Contemporary racial and ethnic relations", 360

²⁸ Milton Gordon, 1964, in Alba and Nee "Rethinking assimilation theory for a new era of immigration", 827

²⁹ Alba and Nee, "Rethinking assimilation theory for a new era of immigration", 829

³⁰ Pennix, "Integration of migrants. Economic, social, cultural and political dimensions", 10

residential architecture, sources of artistic inspiration and perhaps few other areas” or a process of “change at the margins” process, which could take place in an isolated form, without being followed by other forms of assimilation.³¹ Moreover, other social science theorists argue that, even if first generation immigrants acculturate fairly quickly, they will never adjust completely to the new country of settlement, thus, assimilation will never occur in their case.³²

One of the first steps toward immigrants’ and refugees’ acculturation is learning the language of the host society. In the next part I will present the advantages of learning it as well as the barriers that hamper language acquisition.

a) Language acquisition

One of the most important elements toward integration is the acquisition of the receiving society’s language. Language acquisition is a part of the cultural domain of citizenship³³ or acculturation.

The language of the destination country is a prerequisite for successful integration in every other aspect.³⁴ Chiswick, Lee and Miller also argue that language skills are one of the most important aspects for immigrant inclusion into the labor market. For example, proficiency in the destination language has been shown, from an economical perspective, to be an important determinant of earnings among immigrants in Australia, Canada, Germany, Israel and the United States.³⁵

Arnold Rose also considers the link between cultural, social and economical integration arguing that language is a prerequisite for social contacts and employment in the receiving society. She emphasizes the indispensability of the destination language knowledge in every aspect of the immigrant’s life: “for understanding work orders, following safety rules, expressing oneself to the employer and to fellow workers, knowledge of language is essential; so it is for talking to neighbors, making acquaintances, claiming rights from the authorities

³¹ Gordon (1964:100) in Alba and Nee, “Rethinking assimilation theory for a new era of immigration”, 830

³² Mary C Waters, Tomas R. Jimenes, “Assessing immigrant assimilation: new empirical and theoretical challenges”, *Annual Review of Sociology* 31(2005): 1051-125

³³ Penninx, “Integration of migrants. Economic, social, cultural and political dimensions”, 10

³⁴ Ministry of Interior, *The integration of foreigners in the Danish Society. The Think Thank on integration in Denmark* (2001): 8

³⁵ Barry R. Chiswick, Lee Yew Liang, Paul W Miller, “Immigrants’ Language Skills and Visa Category”, *International Migration Review* 40, (2006): 419–450, p. 1

and seeking advantage of recreational opportunities (including radio and TV)."³⁶

But all these above mentioned theories regarding language acquisition, which, in my perspective are written from the host society's point of view, are obstructed by subjective elements that refugees and immigrants encounter when they must learn the host society's language.

b) *The main five barriers in language acquisition*

Chiswick et al. argue about five important aspects that place a major importance on the refugees'/immigrants' acquisition of the destination country's language: the time spent in the host society, the immigrant's education, the age at the time of immigration, the linguistic distance and the geographical distance.³⁷

As regards to the time spent in the host society they posit that "destination-language skills are greater the longer the duration in the host country and among the better educated."³⁸ This theory is completed by the variable "exposure" which is measured through three dimensions: exposure prior to migration, time units of exposure in the destination country and the intensity of exposure per unit of time in the destination country.³⁹

A problematic aspect of learning the language of the destination country is, what Husted et al.⁴⁰ identified, the "small-area-languages" which is only spoken on a very limited territory and to which not many have access to. For example, the Danish language is only spoken by six million people in the world and exposure to Danish language is quite reduced in Europe and other countries.

Another theory regarding language acquisition is that the highly educated refugees/immigrants are generally used to language structure, and, through their work, have come in contact with other languages and cultures

³⁶ Arnold, M. Rose, *Migrants in Europe. Problems of acceptance and adjustment* (The University of Minnesota Press, 1969): 71

³⁷ Barry R. Chiswick, Lee Yew Liang, Paul W Miller, "Immigrants' Language Skills and Visa Category", 420

³⁸ Idem 43

³⁹ Barry R. Chiswick, Lee Yew Liang, Paul W Miller, "Immigrants' Language Skills and Visa Category", 424

⁴⁰ Husted, Leif, Helena Skyt Nielsen, Michael Rosholm, Nina Smith, "Employment and wage assimilation of male first-generation immigrants in Denmark", *International Journal of Manpower*, Bradford 22 (2001): 2

(through schools, training, tourism, reading), thus learning the destination country's language is easier.⁴¹ I will add that knowledge of other foreign languages eases the learning of the destination country language.

Husted et al. also bring into discussion the length of the refugees' expected stay as having a major importance on language acquisition. When the length of expected stay is short, refugees/immigrants might not invest in language acquisition or other human capital in the country of destination.⁴²

Moreover, Chiswick et al. contend that language acquisition varies within the "geographic distance"⁴³ between the destination country and the country of origin. They posit, in accordance with Messina and Lahav that the greater the distance between them, the lower the expectations of return migration and the greater the investments in destination-specific skills⁴⁴, including language acquisition. When we speak of refugees, this statement holds true because refugees are expected to stay put in the receiving country. They cannot choose between host safe countries because "asylum is a necessity and not a luxury"⁴⁵ and they cannot go back to their home countries. Therefore, in my perspective, refugees are investing a bigger amount of their resources in the destination country than other types of immigrants.

Moreover, efficiency in the destination country's language is also measured through the "linguistic distance" between the immigrant's mother tongue and the language of the host society.

Regarding the age at the time of immigration, Chiswick et al. argue that immigration at an older age is associated with lower proficiency in the language of the destination country.⁴⁶ Consequently, I will add that immigration at a young age is associated with higher proficiency in the language of the destination country and this aspect is not dependent on the immigrants'

⁴¹ Rose, "Migrants in Europe. Problems of acceptance and adjustment", 37

⁴² Leif Husted, Helena Skyt Nielsen, Michael Rosholm, Nina Smith, "Employment and wage assimilation of male first-generation immigrants in Denmark", *International Journal of Manpower*, Bradford 22 (2001): 39, p. 3

⁴³ Barry R. Chiswick, Lee Yew Liang, Paul W Miller, "Immigrants' Language Skills and Visa Category", 423

⁴⁴ Anthony M. Messina and Gallya Lahav, *The migration reader: Exploring Politics and Policies* (Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. 2006): 16-17

⁴⁵ A.G., Romanian refugee in Denmark

⁴⁶ Barry R. Chiswick, Lee Yew Liang, Paul W Miller, "Immigrants' Language Skills and Visa Category", 424

education level.

Waters and Jimenez bring into discussion the “three-generation model of language assimilation”⁴⁷ which I find relevant to mention. According to this model, the first generation of immigrants makes some progress in learning the language of the destination country, but remains dominant in their native tongue; the second generation is bilingual; and the third generation speaks only the language of the destination country. Thus, complete assimilation will never occur in the case of first generation refugees/immigrants.

c) Cultural factors in integration

Researchers also differ in their opinions to what importance we should give to cultural factors in the process of integration.

William Bernard argues that the cultural considerations and thus the culture type is not a major factor in integration because there is no cultural, national or racial superiority in the field of integration.⁴⁸ In contrast, Arnold Rose argues that the similarity of cultures between the country of emigration and the country of immigration along with the openness of the society and the degree of attachment immigrants feel to their home country⁴⁹ are of major importance in the integration process. Schwartz also argues that “integration problems” appear mostly due to traditions in a culture.⁵⁰

A reconciling opinion on this issue is brought by Schierup and Ålund who argue that different groups respond to their immigrant situation in different ways because they arrive in the destination country with different socio-cultural backgrounds and cognitive frames of reference.⁵¹ Thus, integration is not a group phenomenon, but there is variation and different adaptation patterns depending on the individual immigrant and his/her human capital which the receiving society should take into consideration.

⁴⁷ Mary C Waters, Tomas R. Jimenes, “Assessing immigrant assimilation: new empirical and theoretical challenges”, 110

⁴⁸ William S. Bernard, “The integration of Immigrants in the United States”, *International Migration Review* 1 (1967): 23-33, p. 29

⁴⁹ Rose, “Migrants in Europe. Problems of acceptance and adjustment”, 33

⁵⁰ Jonathan Schwartz, “On the representation of immigrants in Denmark: retrospective” in Røgilds, Flemming (ed), *Every cloud has a Silver Lining. Lectures on everyday life, cultural production and race* (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag 1990): 48

⁵¹ Carl-Ulrik Schierup and Aleksandra Ålund. “Introduction. From ‘birds of passage’ to ethnic minorities”, 15

Structural assimilation

What comes to complete the process of acculturation, is in Gordon's terms, structural assimilation, defined as the entrance of a minority group "into the social cliques, organizations, institutional activities and general civic life" of the society.⁵²

For Milton Gordon structural assimilation occurs in two stages. The first stage of this subprocess presupposes activities that create friendships and personal associations, frequent home visiting, common worship and shared recreational activities among people of different racial-ethnic groups. According to Gordon, in this stage, the racial-ethnic groups already in the "social mainstream" co-mingle in the same residential neighborhoods and become a part of the same primary groups as: social clubs, religious congregations, friendship networks, and (through intermarriage) kinship groups."⁵³

The second stage of structural assimilation is described by Gordon when the newcomers become a full-fledged citizen by participating in "activities of the general civic life which involve earning a living, carrying out political responsibilities, and engaging in the instrumental affairs of the larger community."⁵⁴ This means that immigrants should make use of their opportunities to become full-fledged citizens by participating in the political and occupational fields and by using the facilities and institutions accessible to the entire general public (parks, hospitals, school, theatres). This is what Boswell describes to be social integration: insertion into education and welfare systems⁵⁵.

Moreover, Pedraza-Bailey sees structural assimilation as "full integration of the immigrants and their descendants into the major institutions of the society (educational, occupational, political) and into the social cliques and clubs that lead to intimate primary relationships, including intermarriage" or "taken up and incorporated."⁵⁶

⁵² Gordon (1961: 248) in Jaret, "Contemporary racial and ethnic relations", 360

⁵³ Jaret, "Contemporary racial and ethnic relations", 360-361

⁵⁴ Idem 58

⁵⁵ Boswell, "European Migration Policies in Flux. Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion", 75

⁵⁶ Silvia Pedraza-Bailey, "Immigrant research: A conceptual Map", *Social Science History*, 15 (1990): 43-67, p. 45-46

The first stage of structural assimilation or social integration

The first stage of structural assimilation presupposes activities that create friendships and personal associations, frequent home visiting, common worship and shared recreational activities among people of different racial-ethnic groups.⁵⁷ Because I am focused on individual and not group integration, I will take Schierup and Alund's theory and use it at the individual and not the group level. They state that different groups respond to their immigrant situation in different ways because they arrive in the destination country with different socio-cultural backgrounds and cognitive frames of reference.⁵⁸ Conversely, I argue that individual refugees and immigrants respond differently to their immigrant situation due to their different socio-cultural backgrounds and cognitive frames of reference. Therefore, one of the main concepts of this section is the refugees' /immigrants' human capital.

a) Human capital

A central aspect that immigrants bring along with them in the receiving society and is vital in their integration is their human capital. Human capital, Bourdieu notes, is formed by economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital. In short, economic capital is described as the material goods, knowledge and skills of an individual; the cultural capital refers to the individual's pattern of norms and values, while social capital addresses the individual's contacts and ties within influential others.⁵⁹ Another type of capital is the symbolic capital which "exists in the eyes of the others." With the symbolic capital the other types of human capitals are recognized as legitimate.⁶⁰

In social sciences, the opinions regarding the importance of human capital in the immigrants' integration are dichotomized. Some researchers affirm that the human capital an immigrant possesses and brings with him/her in the new

⁵⁷Gordon (1961: 248) in Jaret, "Contemporary racial and ethnic relations", 361

⁵⁸ Carl-Ulrik Schierup and Aleksandra Ålund, "Introduction. From 'birds of passage' to ethnic minorities",

⁵⁹ Reinsch, "Measuring Immigrant Integration. Diversity in a Dutch City"

⁶⁰ Bourdieu (1990: 134-135) and Caglar (1994) in Bulent Diken. "Strangers in Denmark – In between underrepresentation and overvisualisation", in *The multicultural neighbourhood*, Nævnet for Etnisk Ligestilling (1997): 68.

settlement is an important factor toward a successful integration, some argue that the immigrant's previous education and skills are insignificant. Chiswick contends that human capital which consists of "schooling, professional qualifications, language proficiency, and the like" facilitates the incorporation of immigrants.⁶¹

In contrast, Zimmermann et al.⁶² and Rachel Friedberg⁶³ argue that this pre-immigration characteristic – the education in the country of origin or the economic capital – is not, in all cases, considered important in the immigrants' integration in the host country.

In order to create a better integration path for first generation migrants, Zimmermann et al. propose that policy makers should create different integration policies for both men and women where a broad focus should be on strengthening the post-immigration educational policies, like the recognition of their education or its actualization with the new labor market requirements.⁶⁴ The immigrants' self-identification perspective emphasizes the subjective experiences of integration in contrast to other researches, which define integration from the receiving societies' point of view.

b) Education

An aspect that Lerner et al. bring into discussion is that the educational resources immigrants/refugees bring along with them are less valued in the host society⁶⁵, therefore they are more vulnerable to labor market discrimination.

In the first stage of their arrival, immigrants differ from natives in

⁶¹ in Caroline B Bretell and, James F. Hollifield, *Migration theory. Talking across disciplines*, (Routledge, 2000): 16)

⁶² Laura Zimmermann, Klaus F Zimmermann, Amelie Constant, "Ethnic Self-Identification of first Generation Immigrants", *International Migration Review* 41(Fall 2007): 769-781

⁶³ Rachel M. Friedberg. "You Can't Take It with You? Immigrant Assimilation and the Portability of Human Capital", *Journal of Labor Economics* 18 (2000): 221-251

⁶⁴ Laura Zimmermann, Klaus F Zimmermann, Amelie Constant, "Ethnic Self-Identification of first Generation Immigrants", 11

⁶⁵ Miri, Lerner, Gila Menahem, Robert D. Hisrich, "Does government matter? The impact of occupational retraining, gender and ethnicity on immigrant's incorporation", *Journal of Small Businesses and Enterprise development* 12 (2006): 192-210, p. 194



demographic and skill levels.⁶⁶ First, the natives' skill level differs from the refugees'/immigrants' in "school quality." Rachel Friedberg argues that usually immigrants from developed countries can return to and use their education acquired abroad since the education in developed countries is associated with higher quality than education in developing countries, thus they can easily integrate. He continues the comparison between natives and immigrants, evidencing that natives have country-specific skills and information that immigrants lack at the time of their arrival which, at least in the beginning, makes their integration arduous.

Second, human capital acquired abroad sometimes differs in its "compatibility" with the skills required in the host society. This "compatibility" of human capital can be surpassed when the country of origin and the destination country are close in terms of "economic development, industrial and occupational structures, institutional settings, and so forth" (Friedberg, 2000: 6).

Friedberg also emphasizes that integration is a process that entails time, arguing that the host country-specific knowledge can be acquired and improved as more time is spent in the host society.

Facing this situation, refugees and immigrants go through a "cognitive disorganization"⁶⁷ situation, which creates an emotional disequilibrium exemplified by frustrations, feelings of insecurity and anxiety: "the migrant may be said to live through the process of migration in an unstructured, incompletely defined field and cannot be sure how his various aspirations and expectations can be realized."⁶⁸

For example, in Denmark, the moment when the issues of the refugees' educational backgrounds have started to be taken into consideration in the Danish immigration discourse was 1998 once with the report of the Danish Refugee Council on the Assessment and Recognition of Refugee's Qualifications in the European Community that meant to stimulate reflection and action toward this subject. In the summary of this report, the Danish Refugee Council argued that the refugees' education and recognition of their studies "have not yet, as a rule, given rise to political discussions" even though immigrants' education has been one of

⁶⁶ Friedberg, "You Can't Take It with You? Immigrant Assimilation and the Portability of Human Capital", 3

⁶⁷ Bar-Yosef, "Desocialization and resocialization: The adjustment process of immigrants", 34

⁶⁸ S.N. Eisenstadt, "The absorption of immigrants", 6

the most important factors toward their success in the labor market.⁶⁹ Despite the alarm signals drawn by the Danish Refugee Council, which mentioned that an unsuccessful transferability of the refugees' educational background in the destination country will hamper the refugees' road toward integration, today's attitude toward the refugees' educational backgrounds is still not taken into consideration.

c) Vocational training

One way to align the refugees' education with the receiving country's labor market requirements are the vocational trainings.

Vocational trainings are a part of the structural assimilation and are a successful strategy to include refugees and immigrants into the labor market. They represent, along with learning the host society's language, the first step to enter "the social cliques, organizations, institutional activities and general civic life" of the society.⁷⁰ The vocational trainings, along with language training, can provide the basis for cultural, social and economic integration.

Vocational training is described by Arnold Rose as regular courses offered by a country (by both Government and private firms) for all citizens or special courses designed for immigrants that last for a period of three to eight months. During that time workers receive an allowance.⁷¹ In the Danish integration, vocational training, in conjunction with the immigrants' higher education is jointly defined as "vocational qualifying education."⁷²

For example, in Denmark, vocational training have two targets with two different methods of action: the unskilled immigrants who lack a previous qualification in whose case vocational training append an extra education or offer education and practice within a fieldwork from the ground up which they use in their future economical integration, and the skilled immigrants. Usually, the skilled immigrants need an "up-date of their education in order to be able to compete for a job."⁷³

Speaking of immigrants with relatively high human capital imported from

⁶⁹. Humelgaard et al. in Klaus F Zimmermann, *European Migration. What do we know?* (Oxford University Press 2005), 75

⁷⁰ Gordon (1961) in Jaret, "Contemporary racial and ethnic relations", 360

⁷¹ Rose, "Migrants in Europe. Problems of acceptance and adjustment", 66

⁷² Think Thank on integration in Denmark (August 2001), 9

⁷³ Idem 77

the society of origin, Friedberg contends that the retraining programs are an important step toward the “adaptability and transferability”⁷⁴ of the immigrant’s human capital to the host society, moreover, toward their “self-actualization.”⁷⁵ In their view, adaptability and transferability is what makes the difference between more or less successful immigrants.

Immigrants can bring their human capital acquired abroad or they can build it all domestically by enrolling in education institutions in the destination country (Friedberg, 2003:6). Following this statement, Zimmermann et al. arrive, through their research on German immigrants, at the conclusion that both types of immigrants who have no education or have acquired higher education in Germany feel more attached to Germany and are more likely to identify themselves as integrated.⁷⁶ Therefore, they consider that any kind of investment in the country of destination creates a powerful bond between immigrants and the host society.

Husted et al.⁷⁷, in accordance with Zimmermann⁷⁸ note, referring to the Danish immigration context, that “having a formal education, either vocational or theoretical, improves the employment probability considerably for immigrants as well as for Danes.” In agreement with the above researchers, Lerner et al. emphasize the importance of occupational training in the immigrants’ integration: “participating in programs that improve human capital, such as occupational retraining, contributes to increasing the probability of finding a job, achieving a higher occupational status and improving the economic benefits (salaries) of immigrants from their positions.”⁷⁹

But despite the numerous vocational courses offered to refugees and immigrants with high level qualifications, quite a high number still end up in unskilled jobs.⁸⁰ This is because they do not get formal recognition of their

⁷⁴ Friedberg., “You Can’t Take It with You? Immigrant Assimilation and the Portability of Human Capital”

⁷⁵ Pedraza-Bailey, “Immigrant research: A conceptual Map”

⁷⁶ Zimmermann, Klaus F Zimmermann, Amelie Constant, “Ethnic Self-Identification of first Generation Immigrants”, 777

⁷⁷ Leif Husted, Helena Skyt Nielsen, Michael Rosholm, Nina Smith. “Employment and wage assimilation of male first-generation immigrants in Denmark”, 7

⁷⁸ Zimmermann, “European Migration. What do we know?”, 78

⁷⁹ Lerner, Gila Menahem, Robert D. Hisrich. “Does government matter? The impact of occupational retraining, gender and ethnicity on immigrant’s incorporation”, 194

⁸⁰ Think Thank on integration in Denmark (August 2001), 11

education and their education is not transferable or adaptable to the new labor market requirements. The Think Thank on integration in Denmark recognizes that a successful integration is not accomplished only when the immigrants' employment rate rises to the level of Danes, but when foreigners maintain jobs that are equivalent to their education.⁸¹

d) Consequences of vocational training – networking

Referring to the immigrants in Israel, Lerner et al. bring into discussion an important aspect of these vocational training: “networking”⁸² or “a reference person.”⁸³ According to Zimmermann et al., “participating in the programs may have provided these immigrants with opportunities to interact with representatives of the host society’s agencies on a regular basis, and to acquire know-how and wider their networks with immigrants from other republics (given that typically they tend to socialize with their own co-ethnics.”⁸⁴ Together with family and friends, these “local ties, old associational membership or the partly institutionalized party bosses and influential voluntary associations”⁸⁵ are seen as necessary steps in the immigrants’ adjustment to the new set of mores they must internalize.

The opposite perspective is brought by Diken who, defining social capital as networks and relationships, argues that most of the immigrants in Denmark have a severe deficit because even if immigrants/refugees have access to their dense ethnic enclaves, most of them do not have access to Danish networks.⁸⁶

Conclusions

I consider that the concept of “immigrant” is an umbrella term that encloses the many types of migrants that exist: refugees, economical migrants, internally displaced people, and so on. Therefore, in this article I have used the terms “refugee” and “immigrant” as being the same because the literature on

⁸¹ Idem 85

⁸² Lerner, Gila Menahem, Robert D. Hisrich. “Does government matter? The impact of occupational retraining, gender and ethnicity on immigrant’s incorporation”

⁸³ Zimmermann, “European Migration. What do we know?”, 78

⁸⁴ Zimmermann, “European Migration. What do we know?”, 206

⁸⁵ Bar-Yosef, “Desocialization and resocialization: The adjustment process of immigrants”, 39

⁸⁶ Diken, “Strangers in Denmark – In between underrepresentation and overvisualisation”, 67



integration rarely deals with a certain group of migrants in particular. My only objection to this approach is that refugees need a particular attention compared to other types of migrants, as refugees are people who have dealt with many physical and psychological injustices and they need special treatment in their integration.

The cultural and social integration are the first steps toward integration when we speak of refugees. This article has tried to expose the different perspectives on integration as this concept is seen as a “difficult to define concept” throughout the migration literature. There are many definitions and many interpretations of this term that is why sometimes it is difficult to grasp, analyze and generalize.

Second, the article moved the discussion further and deeper into the cultural and social dimensions of migration, trying to reveal the many aspects that these separate processes presuppose. The language is the first step toward cultural integration. Often, language is associated with cultural integration. Usually, language acquisition is seen as unproblematic. But barriers in acquiring the language like the linguistic distance between the refugees’/immigrants’ native language and the language of the receiving country, the exposure to the language of the refuge country, the age of the immigrants’ at the time of emigration, the education of the immigrants’, the geographic distance between the country of origin and the destination country are often overlooked by researchers. Many researches present the objective point of view on integration, without taking into consideration the subjective point of view, more exactly, the one of the immigrants’ themselves.

The human capital is of utmost importance in the immigrants’ integration. The problem is that this baggage is ignored by most of the representatives in the destination countries. Refugees and immigrants represent a massive amount of human capital from which we should all benefit. States should be aware of each immigrant’s education and training and instead of thinking about them in stereotypes, they should take advantage of the human capital and educational background immigrants bring along with them. Thus, we should also take into consideration the immigrants’ human capital, not only on paper, but also in practice.

Moreover, we should do more studies and find out the barriers of integration from the point of view of the immigrants themselves. There are a multitude of studies which present integration from a macro perspective. We

should also ground our findings into the micro perspective from where the real solutions arise: “We need more studies to compare a small number of immigrant experiences in depth along a couple of key variables – what Robert Merton called “theories of the middle range.”⁸⁷

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⁸⁷ Pedraza-Bailey, “Immigrant research: A conceptual Map”, 61



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From an “Internationalist Woman” to “Just another Asian Immigrant” : Transformation of Japanese Women’s Self-Image before and after Permanent Settlement in a Western Country

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Abstract. Young middle class Japanese women who speak English identify themselves as career-oriented “internationalist women.” They hold positive self-images; however, their self-images become convoluted with negative images as they experience changes in their lives. When they marry white males and become permanent residents in Western countries, their self-identities transform into “just another Asian immigrant” out of many. Many Japanese wives of white husbands deny their association with their compatriots when they actually do associate with other Japanese immigrant women. They also deny racial factors in their attraction to their white husbands. I argue that these behaviors are harnessed to redevelop a self-identity by renouncing the stereotypical images of Eurocentric Japanese women. This paper will describe the transformation of Japanese women’s self-images before and after permanent settlement in a Western country and the process of their redevelopment of self-identity.

Keywords: *Japanese immigrant women, internationalist, self-identity, interracial marriage, Eurocentrism*

1. Introduction

1.1 Who Are Internationalist Japanese Women?

The typical Japanese “internationalists” are career-motivated middle class young females. “Internationalist” is a translated word for “*Kokusaijin*,” which is associated with Japan’s national project of internationalization.¹ Marilyn Ivy explains internationalization as a process of “domestication of the foreign and the

¹ Kelsky, Karen. *Women on the Verge: Japanese Women, Western Dreams* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), 5.

dissemination of Japanese culture throughout the world."² Internationalization "represents a distinct project from these women's vision of a Japan transformed according to Western liberal values."³

Internationalist women express feelings of inadequacy in Japan and search for a place of belonging.⁴ However, these feelings seem to be the result of their self-evaluation, in which they are special and different in an awkward way that is mostly positive. They speak their opinions, and therefore they conflict with the stereotypical image of obedient Japanese women. Bilingual Japanese women claim that they can be themselves when they speak English. By utilizing the English language, they develop a new self-identity that is "cosmopolitan" or "internationalist". The confidence, vitality, and high hopes of these young Japanese internationalist women are expressed in literature.⁵ However, their positive self-images become more convoluted with negative images that they observe in other Japanese immigrants as they experience life changes, especially when they become permanent residents in Western countries.

Many Japanese wives of white husbands deny racial factors in their attraction to their husbands. Karen Kelsky analyzes that Japanese women's denial inevitably accompanies their desire⁶ for white men and white men's attraction for Japanese women as proof of their non-racism.⁷ In addition to Kelsky's analysis, I argue that this denial is a way for Japanese wives to redevelop a self-identity in a foreign country. Many intermarried Japanese wives deny not only their attraction for white men but also their association

² Ivy, Marilyn, *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995),3.

³ Kelsky, Karen. *Women on the Verge*, 5.

⁴ For example, see Matsui, Machiko. "Gender Role Perceptions of Japanese and Chinese Female Students in American Universities." *Comparative Education Review*, 39 (3) (1995): 356-78., Yamamoto, Michiko. *America Gurashi no Ikikata Bijin: Kyukutsuna Nihon ni Sumanai Onnatachi* (Lifestyle beauties who lives in America: The Women who do not live in Oppressive Japan) (Tokyo: Aki Shobo, 1993)., Yamamoto, Michiko. *Deyoka Nippon, Onna 31 sai: America, Chugoku wo Yuku* (Should I leave Japan? A 31 Year Old Woman Travels America and China) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993)., Tanabe, Atsuko. *Onnna ga Gaikoku deHataraku Toki* (When women work abroad). (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1993).

⁵ Yamamoto, *America Gurashi no Ikikata Bijin.*, Yamamoto, *Deyoka Nippon*, Tanabe, *Onnna ga Gaikoku deHataraku Toki*.

⁶ Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 147.

⁷ Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 230.

with their compatriots when they actually do associate with other Japanese immigrant women. I also claim that by denying association with other compatriots, intermarried Japanese wives are renouncing the stereotypical images of Eurocentric Japanese women. This paper will describe the transformation of Japanese women's self-images before and after permanent settlement in a Western country by employing literature content analysis, participant observation, and in-depth interviews.

1.2. Why Do They Migrate to Western Countries?

Utilizing Weber's ideal types, Nana Oishi describes the reasons for female emigration from developing Asian nations. They include mothers and daughters who send remittances to support their families and women who escape extreme poverty or abusive relationships in their home countries.⁸ Among these women, Oishi calls one particular group of females "adventurous women."⁹ They seek new experiences in a foreign country to escape their mundane lives. Being from the lower middle class and having moderate education, they engage in a limited range of occupations such as store clerks or teachers in a host country. Oishi's ideal type of adventurous women may be the closest comparison to Japanese migrant women; however, well-educated middle to upper-middle class young Japanese internationalist women are not interested in limited career mobility. They believe that Western countries offer equal opportunity and career potential. Therefore, these ideals create a desire in career-oriented females to settle in Western countries.

There is no doubt that Japan is a strongly male dominated society, especially when it comes to gender discrimination at work. A tea server is probably one of the most famous female occupations in, and even outside of, Japan. Linda Lindsey describes:

Highly educated women serve tea or are secretaries of male superiors with less education or training... cultural values about the proper roles of men and women in Japan remain largely intact.¹⁰

⁸ Oishi, Nana. *Women in Motion: Globalization, State Policies, and Labor Migration in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

⁹ Oishi, Nana *Women in Motion*, 112-124.

¹⁰ Linda, Lindsey. L. *Gender Roles: A Sociological Perspective*. (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005), 152.



Almost all internationalist Japanese women express that discrimination in the workplace is their main motivation to study abroad. Kelsky analyzes that Japanese women use gender discrimination in Japan to “justify their turn to the foreign.”¹¹ Japanese women anthropomorphize Western countries as fairytale rescuers who save women from unjust Japanese male domination. To this extent, Japanese women have “eroticized desire [of] the white man as emblem of Western modernity in women’s larger imaginary of the emancipatory West. [sic]”¹² In other words, Japanese single internationalist women see white men as their ideal future plan to obtain both career opportunities as well as their romanticized personal fulfillment in a Western country. To live in a foreign country with a white husband is the means and the end in itself for young single Japanese internationalists. To be rescued by a fairytale prince is the solution for the Japanese career-oriented princess. “Green Card Cinderella”¹³ is a term for a Japanese woman who has found a foreign fiancé.

1.3. Happily Ever After?

Although the Japanese living overseas are seen as “contaminated” by the foreign culture, it is undeniable that Japan has historically held a notion of the superiority of Western nations.¹⁴ Therefore, marrying white men is seen to be a form of upward international social mobility. This does not necessarily guarantee their financial gain or economic status, but Japanese women increase their social status by separating themselves from the “average Japanese women who can ‘be satisfied with’ Japanese men.”¹⁵ Marrying a white man can be considered to be a part of their personal and career life plan to “move up”. From these perspectives, the following questions should be answered: Do Japanese Green Card Cinderellas realize their dreams in Western countries where equal career opportunities are supposedly offered? Will they also maintain their positive image of an internationalist woman in this host country?

¹¹ Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 87.

¹² Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 87.

¹³ Yamamoto, *Deyoka Nippon* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993).

¹⁴ White, Merry. *The Japanese Overseas: Can They Go Home Again?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

¹⁵ Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 153.

2. Japanese Women's Labor Participation

2.1. Statistics

Contrary to what is expected, Japanese wives do not participate in the labor market after obtaining permanent residence status. India, Taiwan, Iran, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Japan, Korea and China have an above U.S. average of college graduates.¹⁶ Both Japanese and Philippine women's rates of interracial marriage are the highest among all Asian women.¹⁷ However, Japan has the lowest rate of participants in the labor force (54.2%) while the Philippines has the highest (76.3%).¹⁸

The percentage of female immigrants from Japan (62.6%) to the U.S. is the second highest rate, with Germany (64.6%) being the highest.¹⁹ The college graduate rate for German immigrants is only 19.1%, however, they have about the same rate of labor participation as Japanese immigrants in the U.S. labor force.²⁰ The median age of German immigrants is 53 years old while the Japanese median age is 38 years old.²¹ In other words, more than three fifths of immigrants from both countries are female. Also older German immigrants with less education and younger college educated Japanese have similar rates of labor participation.

From these statistics it could be assumed that well educated, possibly career-oriented, Japanese females are staying in their home and performing a traditional gender role in the U.S. household. This is a vivid contradiction to their initial and ostensible reason to emigrate, which was to learn English and build a better career. It is ironic that Japanese internationalist women are supposed to hold Western liberal values to realize gender equality. That was their initial reason to migrate to a Western country, but the employment issue becomes less important once they marry and live in a host country.

¹⁶ Rumbaut, Ruben. "Origins and Destinies: Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in Contemporary America." in Silvia Pedraza, and Ruben G. Rumbaut (eds), *Origins and Destinies, Immigration, Race and Ethnicity in America* (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1996), 36.

¹⁷ Hwang, Sean-Shong, Rogelio Seanz, and Benigno E. Aguirre. "Structural and assimilationist explanations of Asian American intermarriage" *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 59 (1994):758-772.

¹⁸ Rumbaut, *Origins and Destinies*, 36.

¹⁹ Rumbaut, *Origins and Destinies*, 34.

²⁰ Rumbaut, *Origins and Destinies*, 34.

²¹ Rumbaut, *Origins and Destinies*, 34.



2.2. Why Not Work?

It seems that a Japanese wife's main factor to decide to work or not to work is irrelevant to gaining gender equality or keeping traditional gender roles, but it is relevant to their pride as "internationalists." The fact is they cannot find jobs equal to their professional ambitions or abilities. There is a conflict between their actual abilities and their pride as an "internationalist" woman. The jobs are either too "low skilled" or "too high skilled" to compete with native English speakers with higher education or specialized knowledge. If a job offers "good enough" status for an internationalist, she will take it. If the job is not as desirable, she does not have to take it, unlike other Asian women who need to send remittance to home countries. Japanese wives can choose the job because they can depend on their husbands' earnings.

One Japanese woman, who has been married to a white American man for 20 years, expressed that she wants to find a full time translator position in Colorado, as she was a professional full-time translator in Japan. In California, Japanese-English bilingual jobs may be available, but in Colorado, such jobs are almost nonexistent. Even though she understands this fact, she is still determined to find a full time translator position in Colorado to live up to her pride by saying, "But why should I be a lunchroom lady with other immigrants? I am not that desperate." Reflecting on this, she laughed and said, "I have no job skills with too much pride." This self-mocking comment illuminates how Japanese wives view themselves in comparison to immigrants from other developing nations. The connotation of her comment is that only the "desperate" people like "immigrants" work in a manual labor job and her pride is too vast to put herself in that position. A translator is considered a highly desirable profession in Japan. This former translator would not have any problems finding a regular job, but she would not take it unless she can find a job that is either bilingual or offers the same occupational status as a translator in Japan.

Takeyuki Tsuda reports that Japanese people think permanent Japanese emigrants are somehow abnormal.²² They are either too intelligent to realize their potential in a narrowly closed society such as Japan or they are just incapable to live in their homeland. Japanese internationalists, who became Green Card

²² Tsuda, Takeyuki. *Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

Cinderellas, want to keep the positive side of the two extreme images of emigrants. They were these women with “too much ability...to realize their potential.”²³ They don’t have immediate economic needs to take a manual labor job and in their view it is better to be a stay-at-home wife/mom with their white husbands’ earnings rather than ruining their reputation of internationalist. Their pride as internationalists is deeply related to their self identity.

2.3. English Proficiency

The initial purpose to emigrate to English speaking countries for young single Japanese internationalist women was to master English. However, a large number of Japanese immigrants (25%) describe that they don’t speak English well or at all, while only 2% of German immigrants gave the same response.²⁴

The Japanese language is fundamentally different from the Indo-European languages. In addition, people think it is somehow charming to have European accents.²⁵ The positive recognition of their accent would not hurt European immigrants’ confidence to use English proactively. Since Japanese immigrants do not have the charming accent in their English, it is not surprising to see only 16% of Japanese immigrants say they speak English only, while 41% of German immigrants answered with the same response.²⁶

When one cannot be confident with his/her language skills, it is difficult to have a strong self-confidence to apply for a professional job. Many Japanese stay-at-home wives want to find a job, yet, they are reluctant to even apply for one. In the interviews conducted for this study, they expressed repeatedly that their English is not even sufficient enough for the application process. When they say “not sufficient”, they mean “perfect English with no accent” which is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for most immigrants who were born and raised in a foreign country. When Japanese people engage in international business in Japan, speaking English is their precious business tool to compete against their colleagues. However, once they settle down in an English speaking country permanently, they quickly realize that speaking English is not “sufficient enough” to compete with the

²³ Tsuda, *Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland*, 106.

²⁴ Rumbaut, *Origins and Destinies*, 34.

²⁵ Derwing, Tracey M. and Murray J. Munro. “Putting Accent in Its Place: Rethinking Obstacles to Communication” *Language Teaching*, 42(3) (2008):1-15.

²⁶ Rumbaut, *Origins and Destinies*, 34.



native speakers when applying for a prestigious position. A few exceptions would be the areas that have a historically strong connection with Japanese companies and businesses in places such as Los Angeles or San Francisco. In the rest of the country, speaking English is just a prerequisite of living in a host country. The Japanese-English bilingual skill is not as admirable or desirable in the U.S. as it is in Japan. Japanese wives get discouraged by the reality, which certainly influences their decisions in terms of their employment.

3. Status Change

3.1. From an "Internationalist" Woman to "One of Asian Immigrants"

Single internationalist women have a distinguished yet positive self-image. English-Japanese bilingual skills give permission to Japanese women to be assertive and special. Japanese people think English speakers are civilized and superior to other non-English speakers.²⁷ Even a Japanese student who spent only a year in a foreign country would be asked to speak something in English by their friends. A simple English sentence can be enough to impress other non-English speakers in Japan. Internationalist women want to keep the image of having "too much ability to realize their potential in Japan."²⁸ However, the women with "too much ability" soon have to face the reality of living in a Western country after becoming Green Card Cinderellas. Gender discrimination, racism, and ageism in a Western country are as real as experienced in their homeland. They also have to realize how naïve or even immature they were to believe that Western nations are the fairy tale rescuer from the unjust Japanese male dominated society.

On top of the disappointment, the women "with too much ability" observe fellow Japanese compatriots' peculiar behaviors such as putting up with foreign men's poor behaviors that would not be tolerated in Japanese men. Takako Day reported about Japanese women who end up supporting their foreign husbands financially as convenient servants.²⁹ Some Caucasian men even confess that they

²⁷ For example, see Oishi, Shunichi. *"Eigo" Ideorogi o Tou: Seio Seishin to no Kakuto* (Questioning the ideology of "English": Struggle with a Western mind). (Tokyo: Kaibunsha Shuppan, 1990)., Tsuda, Yukio. *Eigo Shihai no Kozo* (Structure of English domination) (Tokyo: Daisan Shokan, 1990)., Nakamura, Kei. *Eigo wa Donna Gengo ka* (What is the English language?). (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1989).

²⁸ Tsuda, *Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland*, 106.

²⁹ Day, Takako. "America de Jiritsu o Mezasu Nihon Joseitachi no Yume to Genjitsu: Hakuuin Dansei no "Yasashisa" ga "Fugainasa" ni Kawaru Toki (The dream and reality of

marry (or want to marry) Japanese women because they know they have no chance to find a Caucasian wife due to their undesirable attributes such as being divorced, reaching old age, dealing with bankruptcy, or even having a STD.³⁰ They think Japanese women are more tolerant than white women and are willing to take care of their husbands regardless of these undesirable situations. In a sense, these Anglo men are saying that they are not good enough to find a white partner, but they are still good enough to find an Asian wife who can also be an affectionate servant. It is hard not to notice some white male-Japanese female relationships are disrespectful for “Japanese women’s personhood.”³¹

Through these observations, the confidence of internationalist women declines especially when they realize they are no longer students with a temporary or work visa. When young single internationalists were in Japan, they could dream about working in a foreign country. When they were students in a host country, they still had high hopes to do something positively special in their lives. As soon as they become a permanent resident in an area where there is little Japanese business connections, the reality hits. They are, in fact, one of many immigrants with heavy accents in a host country. This bitter experience of declining status is common among many immigrants from various countries. Transformation from the positive self-image, (outgoing, assertive, smart Japanese-English bilingual internationalist) to a negative self-image (immigrants of heavy accents) is too harsh to internalize. It creates their heightened pride which skews their views of themselves and other immigrants in a host country. It is the counter reaction to their declined status. The pride which they use to hold as an internationalist emerges in their behaviors such as not taking regular jobs or differentiating themselves from the “other” immigrants.

For example, one of my female Japanese informants asked me how I was doing with my part time weekend job at a major bank, where 50% of the section was filled with first generation immigrants. I answered, “It’s fun to work at the bank by mingling with other immigrants.” The rest of the Japanese women with white husbands laughed hysterically. It was funny to them because I was referring

Japanese women who seek independence in America: When white men’s “kindness” turns to “unreliability”” *Asahi Journal* (2 August, 1991): 20-23.

³⁰Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 200, 242.

³¹Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 200.



to myself as one of the "immigrants." This episode indicates that it did not occur to these women that Japanese wives with American husbands are, in fact, "immigrants" in this country. Since the image of immigrants is perceived so negatively, these women could not associate the word "immigrant" with "a Japanese woman."

Tsuda reports Japanese descendent Brazilians in Japan "frequently refer to themselves collectively as '*os dekaseguis*'. "³² Most *dekaseguis* (temporary immigrant workers) are also educated middleclass people in Brazil, but the obvious difference is that they know they are going to stay in a host country for a short time in contrast to Green Card Cinderellas who become permanent residents. Considering the fact that declined social status may stay with Green Card Cinderellas forever, accepting their declined social status must be harder for permanent residents than temporary ones. This might be the reason for the permanent residents holding a heightened pride to differentiate themselves from the "other" immigrants when, in fact, they are immigrants themselves.

3.2. Denying Stereotypical Images and Their Association with Compatriots

Yen Le Espiritu and Diane Wolf describe Asian Americans' feelings of marginalization as:

excluded from the collective memory of who constitutes a "real" American, Asians in the United States, even as citizens, are expected to remain the "foreigner within" — the non-American.³³

Alienated feelings of Japanese internationalists are no different from other Asian immigrants. They will never be totally assimilated to the main stream, Anglo society, due to their physical appearance. However they are certainly not typical traditional Japanese women either. Many immigrants recognize their true national identity from their native countries, while some immigrants develop transnational identities. Tsuda describes how some transnationalized people "see most of their experiences in nationalized terms" in his study of Japanese Brazilians in Japan.³⁴

³² Tsuda, *Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland*, 179.

³³ Espiritu, Yen Le and Diane L. Wolf. 2001. "The Paradox of Assimilation: Children of Filipino Immigrants in San Diego" in Ruben. G. Rumbaut and Alejandro Portes (eds), *Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America* (Berkeley: CA University of California Press, 2001),171.

³⁴ Tsuda, *Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland*, 247-248.

Contrarily, internationalist Japanese women see their life and experiences in comparative terms. They compare and contrast themselves with the “other” Japanese wives — their imaginary reference group to define who they are. In other words, they see the imaginary reference group with negative connotation in their compatriots. By recognizing their limitation on total assimilation and by denying being a part of this imagined community, Japanese internationalist women become alienated.

Denying the association with people from their ethnic homeland is a common process among the second generation immigrants. For example, Nazli Kibria reported indifferent attitudes and disassociation of second generation Asian American women with the first generation immigrants because the second generation thought the women from their ethnic homeland reify the stereotypical quiet obedient images or “a reputation for staying in their own little group and not being very outgoing.”³⁵ Japanese wives of white husbands in a host country are the first generation immigrants, but they show very similar psychological distance. The only difference between Japanese wives and the second generation Asian American women Kibria reported is that Japanese wives have more ambivalent feelings and attitudes toward their compatriots. Japanese wives are not physically cutting off the connection with other compatriots, but psychologically separate themselves. Thus they have contradicting behaviors. Huping Ling introduces a Japanese housewife in Colorado. This Japanese woman confesses that making Japanese friends are not easier than making Caucasian or other Asian friends. She is “not around many Japanese people.”³⁶ She emphasizes her cosmopolitanism by saying that she makes “friends with all kinds of people.”³⁷ However, she still likes to talk to her Japanese friend, Mitsu, because they have a similar life. This woman says, “Mitsu knows other Japanese women, but I do not really know any others.”³⁸ This woman’s answer is a typical example of Japanese wives response, when they are asked about their association with their compatriots.

Japanese immigrant women critically observe their fellow compatriot’s Eurocentrism and Western worship. They feel they want to prove that they are not

³⁵ Kibria, Nazli. *Becoming Asian American: Second Generation Chinese and Korean Ameircna Identities* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University press, 2002),89.

³⁶ Ling, Huping *Voices of the Heart: Asian American Woman on Immigration, Work and Family* (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2007), 145.

³⁷ Ling, *Voices of the Heart*, 145.

³⁸ Ling, *Voices of the Heart*, 146.



the Green Card Cindelleras who are actually the servants for their white husbands. They also have to prove that they are, in fact, well educated and used to be career-motivated women. They have to prove that they are nothing like the rest of the white worshipping Japanese women in a foreign country. It is important to separate themselves from "other" Eurocentric, self devaluating, degraded Japanese wives. It is especially important when they cannot find any significant differences in their past and their life course compared to "other" Eurocentric Japanese wives. When I was searching for an apartment in a new state on the Internet bulletin board, I received a message from a Japanese woman. Her messages illuminate the view of Japanese immigrant women. I did not receive any information or comments about the apartment, however, this Japanese woman invited me to join the regular gatherings of local Japanese people. She wrote in Japanese:

Hello, I am living in [...Arizona] with my French husband and my hobby is reading in English. Are you a wife of an American or wife of *Chuzaiin* (Japanese elite business men in a foreign country)? A student? Or do you have a new job in Arizona? Are you in an international marriage? We have many Japanese wives in interracial relationships and wives of *Chuzaiin* here in ...Arizona. We gather regularly to have lunch and dinner. The members are from the youngest of 5 years old and the oldest of 55 years old. Please join us. (2007 August 13).

This e-mail was very indicative in many ways to describe intermarried Japanese wives in a foreign country. First of all, her priority was to manifest the existence of her French husband and her language skills. Then, she wanted to find out my marital status and the categories of my partner. I replied to this message with my name, marital status, and the reason for my relocation in a polite but brief manner. Her immediate lengthily reply was:

Oh, you must have a very interesting study subject because you quit your job and move from Colorado for your study.... I also work in Japan for 3 months every year, leaving my husband behind because I cannot stand to put myself in the life of Japanese wives all the time, especially among *Chuzaiin* wives. I will also start schooling next month and when I finish the course with a good grade, I am promised [by the school?] that I will get a job. ... I have my Blog The key word is international marriage, reading in English, and married couples with no kids. ... I hope you visit my [Blog] page and join next Wednesday's gathering.... (2007 August 16).

As a permanent resident internationalist, she cannot stand to associate with Japanese wives all the time, especially with *Chuzaiin's* wives. At the same

time, she is organizing gatherings and parties with Japanese people. The sender of the e-mail claims that she goes back to Japan to work for three months every year to escape from other Japanese wives. She also mentions her plan to get a job in Arizona after finishing her schooling. The connotation of this message is the competition with me (or with the image of generalized Japanese women) in terms of her independence, career, and her special position among the other Japanese wives. As the sender of the e-mail, most Japanese say that they do not like to be in a Japanese community or circle because of their tight nit gossip circles. Japanese informal communities predominately consist of female immigrants and/or *Chuzaiin's* wives. Therefore, negative images of a Japanese community are associated with negative generalized female characteristics.

3.3 *Chuzaiin's* Wife, Intermarried Wife, and Different-ness

Several publications are dedicated to disclose the fabulous yet notoriously closed, luxurious life of *Chuzainins* and their wives in a foreign country. Some of the publications are not necessarily academic publications; however, there must be some validity when most authors agree with the same points. For example, it is said that the social ranking of *Chuzaiins'* wives is determined by the prestige of their husbands' companies.³⁹ Since most of them do not stay in a foreign country long enough to master the language, their association is limited with other *Chuzaiins'* wives.⁴⁰ *Chuzaiins* receive high social status, salary, and various kinds of compensations from their companies and organizations to build business relationships in foreign countries.⁴¹ Therefore, the wives of *Chuzaiins* are believed to be arrogant as well. The intermarried Japanese wives can feel superior to *Chuzaiins'* wives because of their advanced language skills. *Chuzaiins'* wives can feel superior to intermarried Japanese wives because of their high status and life style that intermarried Japanese wives do not have. Thus, their bilateral mocking is created and perpetuated as an actual byproduct from these images.

Merry White illustrates a typical image of a *Chuzaiin* and his wife with the

³⁹ For example, see Fukada, Yusuke. *Nihon Akusai ni Kanpai* (Cheers to Japanese Bad Wives). (Tokyo: Bungeishunjuu, 1981)., Satou, Katsuki. *Mainichi ga Amerika* (Everyday is American). (Tokyo: Bungeisha, 2001).

⁴⁰ Fukada, Yusuke. *Nihon Akusai ni Kanpai*., Satou, Katsuki. *Mainichi ga Amerika*.

⁴¹ Kusaka, Yoko. *Taniya no Shakaigaku, Settaik kara Baishuun made Bankou Chuzaiintachi no Seiiki* (Sociology of Taniya: Entertainment to Prostitution; The Sanctuary of Japanese Businessmen in Bangkok) (Tokyo: Mekon, 2000).

example of one particular couple who are not only well educated, but also from the families of pedigree.⁴² White writes; "[the wife] may be best described by the American phrase 'a real lady'."⁴³ She made no strong attempts to make German friends when they were in Germany. She belongs to a group of Japanese women who attends cultural events together. After returning from Germany, she is able to readjust back into the Japanese lifestyle. She does not speak of Germany often because she knows how other women, especially after returning from the U.S., are excluded in Japan because they are seen "to be flaunting their different-ness."⁴⁴ This woman's attitude, upbringing, and remarks make a clear contrast with comments and attitudes of career-oriented middle class internationalist women who emphasize their "different-ness."

For example, Toshiko Marks shows the significant attitudes of "different-ness" in her book, *Country of Weak Men and Ethereal Women; Japan*.⁴⁵ In this book, Marks states the real purpose of studying in England for Japanese women is to find an English boyfriend. Marks also chastises that Japanese women are ethereal because they have no sense of reality. For instance, Japanese women buy name brand goods with their "new money" without having the real social status, history, or personal quality to match the goods. Once Japanese women start using a particular name brand, the image of the brand goes down so badly that real upper class European people would refrain from the name brand. Marks published several other, but similar, books full of admiration for England and criticisms of Japan.⁴⁶

Marks criticizes strong propensity of Japanese women for name brands and white men, but Toshiko Marks is a Japanese woman who was married to an English Baron, that is the ultimate "name brand" white man to obtain in a Western country. In her publications, she includes not only her academic background and

⁴² White, Merry. *The Japanese Overseas: Can They Go Home Again?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

⁴³ White, *The Japanese Overseas*, 30.

⁴⁴ White, *The Japanese Overseas*, 32.

⁴⁵ Marks, Toshiko. *Hiyowana Otoko to Fuwafua Shita Onna no Kuni Nihon* (Country of Weak Men and Ethereal Women; Japan) (Tokyo: Shisousha, 1997).

⁴⁶ For example, see Marks, Toshiko. *Otonanokuni Igrisu to Kodomono Kuni Nihon* (England, Country of Adults, and Japan, Country of Children) (Tokyo: Shisousha, 1992)., Marks, Toshiko. *Yutori no kuni Igrisu to Narikin no Kuni Nippon* (England, the Rich, and Japan, the Nouveau Rich) (Tokyo: Shisousha, 1993)., Marks, Toshiko. *Tondemonai Hahaoya to Nasakenai Otokono Kuni Nippon* (Japan, the Country of Ridiculous Mother and Pathetic Men) (Tokyo: Shisousha, 1999).

occupational titles, but also her English nationality and her formal name with the title of nobility. She even published a book about how she became a British aristocrat.⁴⁷ Her publications give an inevitable impression that well-educated Lady Toshiko wants to distinguish herself from the rest of “ethereal Japanese women,”⁴⁸ thus demonstrating her different-ness.

4. Realization

Many intermarried Japanese wives, former internationalists, and/or Green Card Cinderellas try to differentiate themselves from “other” Japanese because they know that “white men are viewed as erotic commodities linked to social upward mobility.”⁴⁹ They know it because they participated in it. The idea of Western worship by Japanese people is real. It is not even necessary for the educated Japanese women to be indicated by the researchers; however, their pride will not admit their own participation in Western worship and self-devaluation. That is the reason for intermarried Japanese women to claim that they refrain from their own compatriots. The negative image of Japanese communities is too strong; it reminds them of their declined status too vividly.

When Kelsky tried to explain why it is valuable to study Japanese women’s preference for white men, a Japanese female activist was deeply offended. She had a white husband. She said, “Well, I am part of that group, and I don’t like that at all ...because each person...”⁵⁰ The Japanese female activist lost her words with anger, then, she makes a cynical comment, “So you’re going to make some general theory about it?”⁵¹ Kelsky recalls that moment:

I was facing an invisible, unspoken code — a code that actively resisted critical scrutiny — about the “rightness” and necessity of the alliance between Japanese women and the West.⁵²

The ambivalent self-image of Japanese women with white husbands oscillates between their personal experience in the past and the generalized

⁴⁷ Marks, Toshiko. *Eikoku Kizoku ni Natta Watakushi* (I Became a British Aristocrat). (Tokyo: Shisousha, 1986).

⁴⁸ Marks, Hiyowana Otoko to Fuwafua Shita Onna no Kuni Nihon..

⁴⁹ Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 156.

⁵⁰ Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 237.

⁵¹ Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 237.

⁵² Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 238.



negative image they have seen today. Japanese female immigrants are not only geographically and culturally isolated from their mother country, but also psychologically alienate themselves from the rest of the compatriots in a host country. Whether they actually keep distance from the fellow Japanese immigrants or not is inconsequential. Their pressure and desire to separate themselves from the "rest of the Japanese wives" is more important than their actual association with them. They see their own Eurocentrism and their shattered Western dreams in other fellow Japanese wives. They have to prove they are not "one of them" by claiming that they don't associate with other Japanese wives.

Japanese women with white husbands use "It Just Happened To Be a [White Man] argument."⁵³ These Japanese women immediately deny the racial factor of their attraction for the white partners, while Japanese women with black males admit that they love their partners "because he is a *brother*."⁵⁴ Kelsky analyzes this "insistent refusal to countenance race as an element of attraction [for white men] is a form of the denial that inevitably accompanies desire."⁵⁵ Kelsky also analyzes the intermarriage fantasy as:

the same fantasy that has propelled Amy Tan and Jung Chang novels to best-seller status as feel-good parables for a multicultural age in which white men are under growing pressure to prove their non racism.⁵⁶

Japanese female immigrants in Western countries are also under growing pressure to prove their cosmopolitanism, ability to succeed, as well as overcoming their Western worshipping and white supremacy. They are trying to prove all of the above by marrying white men and by denying the racial factor as the element of their attraction for their relationship at the same time. In other words, Japanese internationalists manifest their pressure to be a non-racist career woman in a form of psychological alienation, without admitting their internalized white supremacy.

5. Conclusion

The attempt of Japanese wives to differentiate themselves from "other" Japanese immigrants is a twisted form of denial that inevitably accompanies their

⁵³ Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 146.

⁵⁴ Ieda, Shoko. *Ore no Hada ni Muragatta Onnatachi* (The Women Who Flocked to My Skin) (Tokyo: Shodensha, 1991), 41.

⁵⁵ Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 147.

⁵⁶ Kelsky, *Women on the Verge*, 230.

own Eurocentrism and white supremacy. For Japanese wives with white husbands, denying their association with “other” Japanese wives is also their attempt to redevelop their new identity as a true cosmopolitan or internationalist. However, their new identity cannot be very positive and well-rooted since they define themselves based on what is “not” who they are.

It is unpleasant for anyone to admit his/her internalized white supremacy because it means admitting one’s own inferiority. However, admitting their white supremacy and own inferiority could be a good start to transform themselves from a rootless internationalist to a true cosmopolitan. “Instant” internationalists struggle with their rootless self identity when their pride relies on the superficial factors such as bilingual skills or the place they live. On the other hand, “true” internationalists/cosmopolitans would have a deeper source of self identity and understanding of their lives. It could be one’s self confidence and reliance to overcome her ethnic inferiority or superiority no matter what country she lives in or what language skills she possesses. Transforming oneself from an instant internationalist to a true internationalist/cosmopolitan could mean finding her entity and confidence in a host country.

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Rethinking EU Citizenship: Towards the Postmodern Ethics of Citizenship

Sanja IVIC

Abstract. The concept of EU citizenship reflects EU politics of (fixed) identity, which guarantees rights only to the homogenous groups (and individuals as representatives of these groups). Hence, it leaves room for marginalizing, othering, excluding and other forms of discrimination, by creating binary oppositions: we/they, citizen/alien, EU/non-EU and so forth. EU citizenship is based on the modernist ethics of priority of right over the good. It is created to promote European idea, so it has only instrumental value. On the other hand, the politics of affinity leads to the substantive EU citizenship founded on multiple identities. The politics of affinity requires a new ethics which will lead to transformation of the main concepts of EU legal discourse.

Keywords: *Europe, citizenship, identity, right, good*

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this inquiry is to show that the EU politics of identity which determines EU citizenship has to be replaced by non-universalist and non-essentialist politics. Essentialist and exclusive conceptions of citizenship still exist as a dominant paradigm of EU citizenship. The concept of EU citizenship should not be based on exclusive conception of identity, which implies homogenization.¹ The essentialist conception of citizenship may lead to Euro-nationalism. Political and cultural pluralism together with the different affinities of every individual based on multiple identities, require breaking with homogeneity and sameness.² The concept of EU citizenship should not be perceived as fixed by territory and residence. On the other hand, the idea of European identity should not be tied to a certain

¹ Carl F. Stychin, "Desintegrating Sexuality: Citizenship and the EU", *Citizenship and Governance in the European Union*, ed. by Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh, Continuum, London and New York, 2001, p. 112

² Hall (1996) and Delanty (2000) argue that every identity is built on some kind of exclusion.

religion or culture. Carl F. Stychin refers to this less essentialist politics as to politics of “affinity”.³ “A politics of affinity differs from one centered on a fixed identity in that affinity suggests that the fictions of a homogeneous and totalizing group attribute have been rejected in favor of a recognition that a shared characteristic and experience - which may lead to (or require) common endeavors – cannot overwhelm the differences that exist between the members of the group.”⁴ The politics of affinity requires the new ethics of citizenship which will not give the priority to the essentialist and rationalist notion of right over the contingent and particularistic notion of good. This new ethics of citizenship will embrace a fluid concept of identity.

1. EU’s POLITICS OF IDENTITY

1.1 *The Idea of European identity*

In the following lines, it will be shown that the concept of EU citizenship is based on the determined conception of European identity, which is mostly defined by territory and residence⁵ and the “common heritage” of European people.⁶ However, the nature of this “common heritage” is mostly understood as homogeneous.

“European identity” is established and promoted by the *Declaration of the European Identity* of the Nine Member States of the Community in 1973 in Copenhagen. In 1995, the *Charter of European Identity* is established. In this Charter, European identity is described as based on “unity in diversity and common values for all citizens.”⁷

European identity is also described as being a question of education, not birth. However, these two statements seem to be contradictory. “European

³ Carl F. Stychin, “Desintegrating Sexuality: Citizenship and the EU“, p. 112

⁴ Ibid, p. 113

⁵ As it can be perceived from the article 17 of the *Maastricht Treaty*, which establishes EU citizenship.

⁶ The common heritage and values of European people are emphasized in the *Declaration of the European Identity* of the Nine Member States of the Community in 1973 in Copenhagen. It is also emphasized in the *Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe* (Granada, 30 October 1985), the *European Convention on the Protection of the Archeological Heritage* (revised) (Valleta, 16 January 1992), etc.

⁷ *Charter of European Identity*, “Towards a European Identity“, <http://www.eurit.it/euritplace/diba/citta/cartaci.htm>

values” are defined as built on historical roots in classical antiquity, Christianity, Renaissance, Humanist movement, Enlightenment and further in the development of democracy, rule of law and human rights.⁸ European values are perceived as cultural and historical unity. This understanding leaves room for distinguishing between European values and non-European values, between Europeans and others. The consequence of this point of view is exclusion and marginalization of a number of people in the EU. “Without significant exceptions, the universal speeches of modern Europe assume silence about the non-European world. There is incorporation, inclusion; there is direct rule, there is coercion, but, rarely, there is recognition.”⁹

On the other hand, understanding European identity as a homogeneous concept based on European values which are derived from “European” history and “European” culture, “makes invisible the (...) contributors of non-European origin to the economic, cultural and social life of Europe.”¹⁰ Subsequently, the statement that the question of Europeaness is a question of education seems contradictory to other definitions and descriptions of Europe, European values and identity described in the *Charter of European Identity*.

In the *Charter of European Identity*¹¹ it is argued that “fundamental European values are based on tolerance, humanity and fraternity.”¹² Concepts

⁸ Ibid, “Europe as a Community of Values“

⁹ Said, E. W, *Culture and Imperialism*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1993, p.58

¹⁰ Kofman, E. and Sales, R, “Towards Fortress Europe“, *Women’s Studies International Forum*, Vol. 15, part I, 1992, p. 24

¹¹“In the speech of the European Parliament on March 8th 1994, the poet Václav Havel [former] President of the Czech Republic, indicated the need for the Charter of European Identity. The idea was taken up by Europa-Union Deutschland which, at its 40th Congress held in Bramen on 5.11.94 decided to undertake the work of producing such a Charter. For this purpose a working group met on 17-19 February in Cusdore (Thuringia) with the task of drawing up the first draft. After the publication of this draft in the *Europäische Zeitung* and the public presentation of the text at a symposium held in the House of Deputies, Berlin, on May 6th, 1995, wide-ranging discussions took place inside Europa-Union, in which the European Federation for Education and Science and members of the European Union of journalists were also involved. During the process more than 500 draft amendments were submitted. The working group then held a second meeting in Bonn on September 9th, 1995, to study these suggestions and work on their second draft of the Charter. (...) This draft was then debated once again at the 41st Congress of Europa-Union Deutschland in Lübeck, October 27-28th and passed in October 28th 1995, with only two votes against.“

¹² *Charter of European Identity*, “Europe as a Community of Values“, <http://www.eurit.it/eurplace/diba/citta/cartaci.htm>

of “humanity” and “fraternity” are perceived as defined by nature, and, thus, universal. Humanity is considered as based on human nature, which is the same for all human beings, while fraternity is perceived as a fixed concept defined by “natural blood tie”.

According to Derrida, both concepts are founded on a fixed conception of identity, on which the entire Western tradition is based.¹³ Those concepts have their origin in the American and French Revolutions. *Declaration of American Independence*¹⁴ asserts that rights it declares are “evident”. Thus, they are inherent. The rights granted by the *Declaration of Man and Citizen*¹⁵ are considered as universal and natural. According to the Article 1 of the *Declaration of Man and Citizen*: “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only upon the general good.”

In those documents identity is understood as free of difference. The politics and culture are created as a set of homogeneous groups in which individuals realize their identities.¹⁶ In his *Politics of Friendship*, Derrida argues that natural fraternity does not exist. Fraternity and humanity are both constructed terms constantly open to different interpretations.

Václav Havel, former President of the Czech Republic, who indicated the need for a *Charter of European Identity*, claims that European identity is based on European values, which origin from the antiquity and Christianity. He argues that European values have “obvious metaphysical roots”.¹⁷ Indeed, it can be argued that European values and heritage as homogeneous categories derive from Western metaphysics, which according to Heidegger ended with Nietzschean philosophy.¹⁸ Western metaphysics is the metaphysics of

¹³ Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, Verso, New York, 2006

¹⁴ It is established by Continental Congress on July 4, 1776.

¹⁵ It was adopted on 26/27 August in 1789 by the National Constituent Assembly, during the period of the French Revolution, as the first step toward writing constitution of France.

¹⁶ “Derrida observes that all claims to cultural and national identity have homogenizing logic, that they level out differences, create imaginary and purified forms of identities, and eliminate the non-identical and the differed from their midst.” (Seyla Benhabib, “Democracy and Difference: Reflections on the Metapolitics of Lyotard and Derrida”, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Volume 2, Number I, 1994, I-23, p. 20)

¹⁷ From the speech made by former President of the Czech Republic to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on March 8th, 1994, www.europa-web.de/europa/02wwwwww/203chart_gb.htm

¹⁸ However, this argument can be called into question, because there are many contemporary thinkers who still employ metaphysical categories, which are usually ascribed to modernist thought. On the other hand, there are some parts of Nietzschean philosophy which can be

representation which aimed at giving a true picture of reality governed by the law of reason.¹⁹ However, it succeeded only to create an artificial picture estranged from the real, based on the essentialist and universalist discourse.²⁰

The consequence of this form of thinking is homogeneous picture of European heritage, as one of the foundations of European identity. However, there are different perspectives on “European heritage” and “European values”, but they all presume unity. “The *European Convention* rejected inclusion of a reference in the proposed *European Constitution* to Christianity and/or God. (...) This compromise text has not satisfied those who want to see European identity defined as Christian, and Christian values included in the *European Constitution*. German chancellor Angela Merkel reopened the issue in 2006, supporting the campaign of Pope Benedict XVI to include reference to a specifically Christian heritage. In his controversial speech in Regensburg in September 2006, Pope Benedict emphasized both the European nature of Christianity and the Christian nature of Europe.”²¹

European heritage and values are also perceived as defined by common cultural and historical experience. It is also considered as based on tolerance, the rule of law and human rights.²²

Postmodernist authors criticized modernist metaphysics arguing that discourses and concepts are not determined, but fluid.²³ Postmodern authors argue that everything differs from everything, and therefore, there is no permanence, and thus, no identity. Subsequently, the self and identity can be considered as narrative constructions continuously reinterpreted into different affinities, characters and drives. From a postmodern point of view, Europe, as well as European identity can be perceived as narrative constructs. Lowenthal states that even Europe can be perceived as a “mental construct”, it does not

read as postmodern (for example, Nietzsche’s account on “the self“ represented in his Will to Power), although historically his philosophy does not belong to this stream.

¹⁹ See Thomas Bridges, *The Culture of Citizenship: Inventing Postmodern Civic Culture*, State University of New York, 1994,

²⁰ This is argued by a number of poststructuralist and postmodernist authors.

²¹ Pan-European Identity, www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Pan-European_identity

²² Recently, it started to be perceived as a “mental construct“ by many authors, but this perspective is not acknowledged by European law.

²³ The importance of the postmodern thought for the transformation of the concepts of EU citizenship and European identity will be explained in the second part of this paper.

represent reality, but the construction.²⁴

European identity may be perceived as a metanarrative²⁵ founded on the myth which creates European values. This metanarrative is based on the idea about common European history and culture, which include Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome, Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and liberalism and presuppose democracy, tolerance and the rule of law. However, this point of view ignores the fact that blood conquest, violence and intolerance dominated European history and, thus, can be considered as the foundation of European heritage.

1.2. The idea of fluid identity

The conception of citizenship based on fixed identity constructs a public sphere which does not embrace the difference. Williams argue that “identity has been used as a focus for gathering people together under the banner of some unifying notion or characteristic (...) The development of collective identities in this way has always been fundamentally concerned with acts of power.”²⁶ According to Hall, identities are based on “the unchanging oneness” that overcomes “superficial differences”.²⁷

However, European identity and citizenship should embrace the idea of a fluid identity, which represents dynamic, hybrid and changeable category. The modern idea of identity is based on the Cartesian idea of the unitary subject. Descartes employs the “method of systematic doubt” to examine all knowledge in order to get firm and certain knowledge. He states: “I noticed that, during the time I wanted this to think that everything was false, it was necessary that I, who thought this, must be something. And noticing that this truth – I think,

²⁴ Lowenthal, “European Identity: Emerging Concept“, *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, vol. 46, No. 3, 2000, p. 314

²⁵ Metanarrative is a totalizing idea which gives a comprehensive explanation of knowledge, historical events and different theories. It is based on a fixed notion of an identity because it unifies different human experience, by postulating universal explanations and values. Many authors argue that it represents the act of power, because it ignores heterogeneity of human existence. On the other hand, some authors argue that the critique of a metanarrative represents a particular kind of metanarrative itself. However, this argument is not valid, because the critics of metanarratives argue that the meaning is constructed, and, therefore, always open for reinterpretations.

²⁶ Williams, A, *EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony*, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.184

²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 185

therefore I am – was so firm and so certain that the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were unable to shake it, I judges that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.”²⁸

Descartes makes a distinction between the mind and body, which produces binary oppositions: self/other, objective/subjective, and so forth.²⁹ He emphasizes the difference between the rational, conscious, unified and knowing subject, on the one hand, and an object, on the other hand. However, the idea of fluid identity does not embrace a stable, unitary, conscious and self-identical subject. Fluid identity is based on the assumption that the subject is produced by discourse. Consequently, identity is shifting, fragmented and multiple. It cannot be considered as rational and it is always in the process of reconstruction.³⁰ This approach emphasizes that meaning is not fixed, it is deferred and represents an interplay between two opposites. Thus concepts such as “identity”, “difference”, “equality”, “nature”, etc. are always open to different interpretations.

The idea of the European Union requires the notion of fluid identity. Thus, “the developments in the European Union have brought forth the possibility of membership in various overlapping and strategically interacting political communities on supranational, national and subnational levels and have unleashed the potential of rethinking citizenship, community and identity.”³¹

According to Kostakopolu, the idea of EU citizenship should be based on the assumption that citizens have multiple identities. It should not be based on the foundationalist notion of the community or the essentialist conception of identity.³² The values of political pluralism and cultural multiplicity require breaking with homogeneity and sameness.

²⁸ Descartes, R, *Discourse on Method and Meditation on First Philosophy* (D. A. Cress, Trans.), Hackett, Indianapolis, 1993, p. 19

²⁹ According to Derrida, Descartes was not the first to produce these binaries which can be found in the entire Western metaphysics from Plato’s philosophy.

³⁰ “Rather than viewing self as an objectifiable, cognitive essence, poststructuralists argue that identity processes are fundamentally ambiguous and always in a state of flux and reconstruction.” (David Collinson, “Rethinking Followership: A Post-structuralist Analysis of Follower Identities“, *The Leadership Quarterly*, 17, 2006, p.182

³¹ Kostakopolou, T, “Towards a Theory of Constructive Citizenship in Europe“, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Volume 4, Number 4, 1996, p. 344

³² *Ibid*, p. 344

1.3. The concept of EU Citizenship Inside the Framework of European Legal Discourse

The concept of EU citizenship is defined by Article 8 of the *Maastricht Treaty*³³, “Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.”³⁴ According to the Article 49 of *Maastricht Treaty*, every European country founded on principles of democracy may apply for the membership in European Union. However, it is not defined what “European” means and whether this concept is defined by geography, history, culture, or belief. Some authors argue that *Maastricht Treaty* is about the states of Europe, not peoples.³⁵

Maastricht Treaty clearly defines who are and who are not EU citizens and creates binary oppositions: we/they, citizen/alien, EU/non-EU, and so forth. Some authors argue that European citizenship should be attributed to all residents in the European Union, not only to the nationals of the Member States.³⁶ This definition causes a lot of paradoxes and it creates inequality and discrimination, especially for the individuals who come from the “third” countries³⁷. In some states these individuals would become European citizens by getting nationality, while in other they would not.³⁸

In the *Amsterdam Treaty* (1997) it was emphasized that national citizenship is complemented and not replaced by EU citizenship. “In the *Treaty of Amsterdam* there was added a new light: the right to use any recognized Community language and to have answer in the same language; EU citizens and any natural or legal

³³ I.e. the *Treaty on European Union*.

³⁴ The definition of EU citizenship is broadened by *Amsterdam Treaty*. It is emphasized that “citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.”

³⁵ Nicoll, W, “Maastricht Revised: A Critical Approach of the Treaty on European Union”, *The State of the European Community: Maastricht Debates and Beyond*, Longman, Colorado, 1993

³⁶ Lehning, Percy B, “European Citizenship: Towards a European Identity?”, *Law and Philosophy*, Kluwer Academy Publishers, Volume 20, No.3, May 2001

³⁷ This concept is part of the international and European legal discourse. However, it is discriminative and should be changed. If all individuals should be treated as equal, which is asserted by international human rights instruments, they should all be perceived as citizens of one world.

³⁸ “German nationality was denied to a third generation Turk, although he/she and his/her parents were born in Germany, meanwhile it was granted automatically to any ethnic German coming from the old Soviet Union, although he/she didn’t know anything about German language or culture. In other countries, as France, this same person would have already acquired the French nationality and, in consequence, the European citizenship.” (The History of European Union, The European Citizenship, www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/ciudadident.htm)

person residing or having a registered office in a Member State now have access to Parliament, Council and Commission documents in specified conditions.”³⁹

Although the concept of EU citizenship has developed from *Maastricht Treaty* to *Amsterdam Treaty*, there is no substantive change in this concept. Downes emphasizes that *Amsterdam Treaty*⁴⁰ does not provide a more substantive rights.

On the other hand, “the possession of the formal status as a national is decreasing in importance as a requisite to the enjoyment of certain key citizenship rights, including the right to remain in a territory of a particular state. This can be illustrated by the position taken by the European Court of Human Rights in *Beldjoudi v France*.”⁴¹

In *Beldjoudi*, the European Court of Human Rights “found that an Algerian national who had spent his whole life in France could not be deported from France because he was in possession of ‘effective nationality’ of the country, meaning that all his friends and immediate family resided there and he was clearly connected to French, not Algerian Society. Even the fact that Monsinour Beldjoudi lacked the formal status of a French citizen was unable to convince the Strasbourg Court that he could be deported without violating of Article 8 of the *European Convention on Human Rights*. A right to remain in the country and not to be deported, can thus belong both to persons in possession of a formal citizenship status and to those possessing ‘effective nationality’.”⁴² However, this case does not represent a substantive change of the idea of EU citizenship. According to Kochenov, EU citizenship remains “purely derivative”⁴³ and dependent on the nationality of a Member State.

On the other hand, *Grzelczyk*⁴⁴ “is an important judgment because it

³⁹ Santiago, M.B, *Union Citizenship: The Long Path of a Concept*, February, 2009, p. 5

⁴⁰ The main objective of the *Amsterdam Treaty* was to modify certain regulations of the Treaty of European Union, the constituent treaties of the European Communities (Paris and Rome) and of some acts related to them.

⁴¹ Kochenov, D, “European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship Between Status and Rights“, *Columbia Journal of European Law*, Vol. 15, No.2, 2009, p. 176

⁴² *Ibid*, p.176,177

⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 183

⁴⁴ “*Grzelczyk* was the first judgment which dealt with the right of economically inactive persons to reside in another Member State. The case concerned a French national who, for three years had studied in Belgium and had worked there to pay for his studies. In the fourth and last year of his studies he stopped working in order to concentrate on his studies. He applied for the minimum subsistence allowance (the so-called “minimex”), but did not fulfill

recognizes expressly that EU citizenship allows nationals of other Member States who are lawfully residing in that Member State access to social benefits⁴⁵ beyond existing secondary Community law.”⁴⁶ However, according to Van der Mei, cases of Sala⁴⁷ and Grzelczyk⁴⁸ do not represent a substantive change of the exclusionary nature of the EU citizenship. “Economically inactive can still be required to present proof that they will not become a burden on the host of State’s social assistance schemes. Grzelczyk does not imply recognition of a general unconditional right to freedom of movement. The ruling merely implies that Union citizens who have initially convinced the host State’s authorities that they are able to provide for themselves but who, contrary to initial expectations, become temporarily in financial need do not automatically lose their right to reside. Secondly, Grzelczyk does not necessarily imply that Community students can actually claim social assistance in the host state. The ruling merely implies that Community students can claim social assistance benefits where, and under the same conditions as, national students have right to such benefits. National social assistance laws, however, may contain eligibility criteria, which students often are not able to meet (...) Further, Article 12 (1) of EC Treaty does not object to national rules which make entitlement to social assistance and other minimum subsistence benefits subject to requirements of habitual residence or domicile on the national territory.”⁴⁹

EU citizenship is still not perceived as an independent right to move and

the condition set by Belgian law (to be a Belgian or a worker). (...)ECJ considered that the condition which had been imposed, by reason of not being imposed on Belgian nationals too, discriminated on grounds of nationality. ECJ found that articles 12 and 18 EC Treaty precluded entitlement to a non-contributory benefit, such as the minimex, from being made dependent on a condition that did not apply to nationals of the host Member State as well. “ (Rudy Grzelczyk, *EU Case Law (2001)*, <http://www.eucaselaw.info/rudy-grzelczyk-2001/>)

⁴⁵ “The revolutionary case of saga about European citizenship starts in the decision of European Court of Justice C- 85/96 *Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern* [1998] ECR- I -2691. Martinez Sala was greeted as potential bridge between the orthodoxy of economic rights for economic migrants and the new horizons lit up by comprehensive rights to equal treatment of Union citizens.” (Hamernik, P, *On EU Citizenship in the Light of Objective Justification of National Rules in the ECJ Case-Law*,

www.enelsyn.gr/papers/.../Paper%20by%20Pavel%20Hamernik.pdf)

⁴⁶ *Rudy Grzelczyk, EU Case Law (2001)*, <http://www.eucaselaw.info/rudy-grzelczyk-2001/>

⁴⁷ C-85/96 [1998] ECR-I-2991

⁴⁸ C-184/99 [2001] ECR-I-6193

⁴⁹ Van Der Mei, P, *Free Movement of Person within European Community* , p. 150 in Hamernik, P, *On EU Citizenship in the Light of Objective Justification of National Rules in the ECJ Case-Law*, www.enelsyn.gr/papers/.../Paper%20by%20Pavel%20Hamernik.pdf

reside inside the framework of the EU. This is confirmed by Article 8a of the *Maastricht Treaty*: “Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect.”

Thus, rights from EU citizenship are not unconditional. This can be perceived in the case of Mr. de Cuyper.⁵⁰ “Mr. de Cuyper was Belgium citizen who was granted unemployment allowances and also was exempted from the condition to be subject of control procedure, however, only if he stays resident in Belgium to monitor his employment and family situation.”⁵¹

Kostakopolou argues that EU citizenship should be based on domicile, not on nationality. Consequently, third country nationals would be granted the rights and the protection that is guaranteed to all Union citizens.⁵² “A paradigm of citizenship based on domicile could also lay the foundations for an inclusive European identity and for the formation of a ‘heterogeneous’ democratic European public. In such a public, individuals can participate as individual citizens and members of communities and groups which have equal status in the public sphere.”⁵³

It can also be argued that the rights guaranteed to the EU citizens by *Maastricht Treaty*⁵⁴ are based on some metatheoretical presuppositions, such as young/old, educated/non-educated, citizen/foreigner and so forth. The right to free movement mostly adheres to academic, educational and political field.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ C-406/04, 18.07. 2006

⁵¹ Hermenik, P, *On EU Citizenship in the Light of Objective Justification of National Rules in the ECJ Case-Law*, www.enelsyn.gr/papers/.../Paper%20by%20Pavel%20Hamernik.pdf

⁵² Kostakopolou, “Towards a Theory of Constructive Citizenship in Europe”, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Volume 4, Number 4, 1996, p. 345

⁵³ *Ibid*, p. 346

⁵⁴ The rights guaranteed to the EU citizens are: right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (Article 8a); “the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in which he resides under the same conditions as nationals of that state “ (Article 8b), “the right to petition the European Parliament in accordance with Article 138d“ (Article 8d), the right to “apply to the ombudsman“ (Article 8d). “Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of the third country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authority of any Member State on the same conditions as nationals of the State.“ (Article 8c)

⁵⁵ See Dirk Jakobs and Robert Mair, “European Identity: Construct, Fact and Fiction“ in Gastelaars and Ruijter (eds.), *A United Europe: The Quest for a Multifaced Identity*, Shaker, Maastricht, 1998, p. 13-34

Getting a job in other European countries is mostly an option for young citizens.⁵⁶ This points to another binary hierarchy – young/old.

According to Balibar, *Maastricht Treaty* excludes “third” country residents.⁵⁷ Thirteen millions of “third” country inhabitants, who are also contributors of European culture and civilization have a status of the second class citizens, although they have a long-term or permanent residence in Europe.⁵⁸ According to Hansen, third countries nationals are mostly granted social and economic rights inside the legal order of the European Union. However, they are not granted the political rights. They “face a double limitation: in most cases they lack the right to work in EU countries other than one in which they reside, and they lack the rights of political citizenship in their country of residence: the right to run for office, to vote and to work in the public service and in some professions.”⁵⁹ Consequently, another dichotomies arise: nationals/non-nationals, us/them, EU/non-EU immigrants⁶⁰ and so forth.

The *Treaty on European Union* or *Maastricht Treaty* established the citizenship of the European Union to make European identity stronger. “In comparison with citizenship of the state, citizenship of the Union is characterized by rights and duties and involvement in political life. It is designed to strengthen the ties between citizens and Europe by promoting the development of a European public opinion and European political identity. This concept comes under the first pillar of the Treaty on European Union.”⁶¹ European Parliament also emphasizes the connection between citizenship and identity, by asserting “practical measures

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Étienne Balibar, *Nous, citoyens d'Europe? Les frontières, l'État, le peuple*, Éditions la Découverte, Paris, 2001

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Hansen, R, “A European Citizenship or a Europe of Citizens? Third Country Nationals in the EU”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol. 24, No. 4, October 1998, p. 751, 752

⁶⁰ “In countries as Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Britain and the Netherlands, the foreigner is most frequently regarded to be Turkish, Arab or Asian (...) although in reality most non-nationals are often of European nationality. In addition these non-European foreigners are disliked more than European foreigners. It seems that the identification with the European project remains marginal but that at the same time the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are drawn between natives and immigrants from other EU-countries on the one hand, and immigrants from outside Europe and especially from ‘non-white countries’ on the other hand.” (Dirk Jakobs and Robert Mair, “European Identity: Construct, Fact and Fiction” in Gastelaars and Ruijter (eds.), *A United Europe: The Quest for a Multifaced Identity*, Shaker, Maastricht, 1998, p.15)

⁶¹ Citizenship of the Union: Introduction, <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/123001.htm>

capable of contributing to the development of a European Community consciousness.”⁶²

EU citizenship can only be perceived as a tool of promotion of EU identity. However, even understood in this way, it still represents the product of the policy of the fixed identity defined by residence and borders. It does not embrace the possibility of identity without sharp borders. It can also be argued that this conception of citizenship is imperialist.

There are a lot of authors who equate European citizenship with EU citizenship, which makes another problem. For example, Jones argues that it can be doubted whether EU citizenship exists. He argues that the entities to which notion of “EU citizenship” can be applied are equally problematic. Jones argues that Europe is not a city nor a town, and that is why the notion of “European citizenship” is problematic. According to Jones, it is mostly argued that the concept of European citizenship refers to a new EU polity. He emphasizes that the notion of “polity” is also vague.⁶³ However, the main problem with this perspective is that it equates European with EU citizenship. Europe consists of the number of countries and peoples who are not part of the European Union. If European and EU citizenship are equated, the existence of these peoples as citizens of Europe is denied. They are perceived as non-existent as well as the states who are not the members of EU, since equation of European with EU citizens reduces Europe to European Union.

According to Šlosarčik, there are three interpretations of EU citizenship that can be recognized. Firstly, EU citizenship can be perceived as an effective tool which can create a more integrated European “supranational organization”.⁶⁴ Secondly, EU citizenship can be read as an establishment of EU population, which consists of Member States’ nationals, which create body of the sovereignty in the EU. EU population will, together with the EU and Member States, govern the process of broadening of the European integration. And, thirdly, EU citizenship can be an effective tool of improving lives of the Member States’ citizens.

It can be argued that EU citizenship only represents an instrumental good (

⁶² Andrew Williams, *EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony*, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.181

⁶³ R. J. Barry Jones, “The Political Economy of European Citizenship“, *Citizenship and the Governance in the European Union*, ed. by Richard Bellamy and Alex Warleigh, Continuum, London and New York, p.143

⁶⁴ Ivo Šlosarčik, “Governance and the Influence “, www.Ise.ac.uk/collections/EPIC/documents/IC2000.htm

a means to an end). It has a clear purpose and it is not defined as good in itself (a substantive good). EU citizenship is established to promote European project - European identity and economic integration of the European Union.⁶⁵ Consequently, the rights guaranteed to the EU citizens also represent an instrumental good. “For example, the original justification for sexual equality rights – fundamental to European rights discourse – was not a broad-based concern with participation by women on equal terms in the public sphere, but a desire to ensure a level playing field in the most of factors of production between the member states of the European Economic Community.”⁶⁶ On the other hand, as a fixed concept, EU citizenship excludes great number of EU citizens, and thus the rights it provides are not substantive.

According to Percy B. Lehning, the distinction between objective and subjective EU citizenship can be made:

“Objective citizenship is the extent to which the rights extended to individuals within the EU by the EU amount to the creation of an EU ‘citizenship’, and the extent to which the necessary political institutions, which make participation in a common set of political institutions possible, have been institutionalized.”⁶⁷

“Subjective citizenship is the extent to which individuals actually conceive themselves as ‘citizens’ of the EU and have a sense of ‘belonging’ to that supranational Union.”⁶⁸

For the empirical setting of the EU citizenship the objective citizenship is enough. EU citizenship does not require subjective citizenship. On the other hand, subjective citizenship is not sufficient condition for getting the status of EU citizen. EU citizenship has only instrumental value because objective citizenship, defined by treaties and many other EU political institutions, does not necessarily include individuals’ feeling of belonging to European Union. On the other hand, European identity, which is regarded as the foundation of European citizenship, does not embrace an identity based on the individual’s interpretation and reconstruction of European history. The main paradox that arises from this point of view is that from

⁶⁵ According to a number of authors, in the Treaty of European Union, rights are guaranteed to the “market citizens”. However, the conception of “market citizenship” also represents the policy of identity, because it is based on the homogenous group. In this way, citizens who do not belong to this group are excluded.

⁶⁶ Carl F. Stychin, “Desintegrating Sexuality: Citizenship and the EU“, p.109

⁶⁷ Percy B. Lehning, “European Citizenship: Towards a European Identity?“, *Law and Philosophy*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Volume 20, No.3, May 2001, p. 273

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 274

the EU citizenship are included many who do not consider themselves Europeans, while many individuals who feel this way are excluded.

2. THE POLITICS OF AFFINITY – TOWARDS A NEW ETHICS OF CITIZENSHIP?

2.1 *The Postmodern Ethics of Citizenship*

In the recent studies the distinction between ethics of justice which is based on the principle of the priority of right over the good, on the one hand, and ethics of care which is based on empathy is made. The ethics of justice is based on reason, which is considered the same for all human beings, while the ethics of care embraces contextuality and feeling. In the following lines it will be argued that the modern liberal political thought is mostly based on the ethics of justice, while the postmodern thinkers, may be considered as representatives of the ethics of care. The ethics of justice emphasizes equality, impartiality, objectivity and decision-making based on universal rules.⁶⁹ On the other hand, the ethics of care is often described as based on contextual and holistic approach. It emphasizes the uniqueness of each ethical situation.

However, the postmodern ethics of citizenship based on the idea of the fluid identity should embrace both ethics. This was implicitly argued by Derrida who rejected all kinds of binary distinctions such as: right/good, reason/feelings, universality/particularity and so forth, because they create exclusion and equality.

According to Thomas Bridges, an instrumental notion of citizenship origins from the ethics based on the principle of priority of right over the good.⁷⁰ The right is perceived as a universal, rational concept which is independent of any particularistic conception of good. Bridges argues that the whole modernist liberal thought is influenced by this conception of justice.⁷¹ Modernist liberal political thought is based on universalist conception of reason which is immanent to all human beings. Notions of “freedom”, “equality” and “rights” on which the concept of citizenship is built are considered as developed from human rationality.⁷² They

⁶⁹ Botes, A, “A Comparison Between the Ethics of Justice and the Ethics of Care“, *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 32 (5), 2000, p. 1072

⁷⁰ Thomas Bridges, *The Culture of Citizenship: Inventing Postmodern Civic Culture*, State University of New York Press, 1994, www.cvrp.org/book/Series01/I-26/contents.htm

⁷¹ Bridges emphasizes that the modernist liberal political theory is influenced by European Enlightenment.

⁷² The notion of European citizenship evolved from the French revolution which was influenced by Enlightenment.

are perceived as absolute truth, which transcends any particularistic, contingent conception of good. According to Bridges, the postmodern liberal thought requires a new ethics of citizenship, which would be built on the concept of good, which will include different particularistic and cultural values. Hence, citizenship will be understood as contingent cultural (or narrative) construct.

Bridges argues that Rawls introduces postmodern conception of liberal doctrine in his *Political Liberalism*. However, Rawls also advocates the principle of right over the good, which was not recognized by Bridges. On the other hand, Rawls's conception of justice which is based on the principle of priority of right over the good, does not completely exclude the domain of good and in some cases the "right" and "good" interweave.

Bridges correctly identifies the problem that arises with modernist political theory based on the principle of the priority of right over the good. In this way a number of binary oppositions is created: right/good, universal/particular, necessary/contingent, etc. In the modern thought the first principle is regarded as dominant, because it was considered as based on reason. However, founding the postmodern ethics on the reverse order and arguing about the priority of good over the right, would establish hierarchies that existed in the modern thought. They would just have a different order. In this way, discrimination and exclusion that exist in the origin of the modern thought, which is often emphasized by postmodern thinkers, would not be resolved. Therefore, postmodernist ethics should reject dichotomies by establishing the principle in which the right and the good intertwine.

According to Rawls, the principles of right are the product of collective choice, while the principles of good are based on the choice of the individuals. Every individual has a right to choose her own principles of good, her metaphysical, religious or philosophical doctrine, and, thus, her conception of good life. But while the "good" individual can choose, the principles of "right" are established by public reason. However, in Rawls's theory of international justice, the public reason is not fixed. It is not specified by any comprehensive doctrine or political conception. The idea of public reason contains a form of public political deliberation.

Sandel argues that it is impossible to separate the "right" from the "good" or political from moral sphere.⁷³ He emphasizes that in order to decide what the right is, a certain conception of good must be included. Therefore, moral questions cannot be separated from the political questions, because in many cases they interweave.

⁷³ Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Cambridge University Press, 1982

It seems that Rawls's answer is that peoples governed by public reason can make a consensus about the rights, but still the different interpretation of the role those rights play will remain. Consequently, different individuals and peoples do not need to be in moral agreement on the justification of the principles of justice, just on the principles themselves. In this way, the "right" and "good" interweave.

On the other hand, by defining public reason as a non-fixed term, Rawls leaves room for the new conception of citizenship. This conception of citizenship challenges the old one, and redefines the notions of "identity" and "membership". By transforming these notions it avoids marginalizing, othering, stigmatising and other forms of discrimination. Consequently, it creates new forms of political creation.

According to Rawls, the perspective of citizenship cannot be understood in a minimalist way. Instrumental citizenship cannot provide the foundation for an effective civic culture. In his *Political Liberalism*, Rawls argues that citizenship is a substantive good, desirable in itself.⁷⁴

The postmodern ethics of citizenship will not deny a particular conception of good founded on the particular way of life. EU citizenship is composed of many narratives and different world views. It is a dynamic category, which continually changes, which cannot be reduced to membership or a territory. Hence, EU citizenship should be multiple citizenship based on the multiple identities. Bridges argues that the postmodern ethics of citizenship should not only explain what it means to be a citizen, but also to make clear why it is good to be a citizen. This is the main difference between ethics based on the priority of the principle of right (which gives only a normative standpoint of citizenship) and the ethics in which the right and the good intertwine (which also promotes the difference, and thus gives a substantive standpoint of citizenship). This ethics is based both on justice and care. It applies rule accompanied with empathy, i.e. care. "Social and moral phenomena are bound in terms of interpersonal relations, context and values, and are multifaced and dynamic in nature."⁷⁵

The postmodern ethics of citizenship in which right and good interweave rejects false dichotomies between "rationality" and "irrationality", "reason" and

⁷⁴ The politics of the individual in Rawls's political philosophy is a moral conception. According to Rawls, moral personality has two powers: the capacity for a sense of right and justice (the capacity to be reasonable) and the capacity for a conception of the good (the capacity to be reasonable). The reasonable and the rational are complementary ideas.

⁷⁵ Botes, A, "A Comparison Between the Ethics of Justice and the Ethics of Care", *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 32 (5), 2000, p. 1073

“emotion”, “objective” and “subjective” and so on. It rejects the picture of law as rational and neutral instrument of justice. Young argues that ethics based on the principle “one size fits all” should be rejected. “Equal treatment requires everyone to be measured according to the same norms, but in fact there are no ‘neutral’ norms of behavior and performance. (...) This implies that instead of always formulating rights and rules in universal terms that are blind to difference, some groups sometimes deserve special rights.”⁷⁶ The law and judicial reasoning should also include empathy. This is necessary because every case is unique and particular. This idea was expressed by many feminist theories. “They have seen the ‘objectiveness’, ‘rationality’ and emotional distance that judges are supposed to inhabit not only as unattainable, but also as not to be aspired. For example, Lynne N. Henderson has called for empathy in judicial reasoning, arguing that legality gives judges a way to escape responsibility, and Carrie Menkel-Meadow has called for an inclusion of ‘ethics of care’ in the judicial processes.”⁷⁷ Applied to citizenship, this ethics does not recognize borders, and exterminates othering and stigmatizing.

2.2 The Politics of Affinity

The postmodern ethics of citizenship can be based on the Derrida’s critique of essentialist and universalist conception of identity. Derrida emphasizes that the entire Western discourse is based on the concept of identity. “Because our metaphysical tradition teaches that man is identical to himself, a coherent personality free from internal difference, we have been encouraged to seek our identities through membership in undifferentiated, homogenizing groups such as families, friendships, classes and nations.”⁷⁸ According to Derrida, the politics of identity, which privileges unity represents dangerous ethics and politics.⁷⁹ Derrida rejects identity based on totality and unity as an illusion. He argues that language, cultural and national identities are different from themselves. On the other hand, the person is being different from itself.⁸⁰ “Once you take into account this inner and

⁷⁶ Young, I. M., “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship”, *Ethics* 99, 1989, p. 269, 270

⁷⁷ Ivana Radacic, “What is Feminism and Feminist Jurisprudence?”, www.zenska-mreza.hr/Izjave/feminist_legal_theories.doc

⁷⁸ Mark Lilla, “The Politics of Jacques Derrida”, *New York Review of Books*, No 11, June, 1998, p. 39

⁷⁹ John D. Caputo, *Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida*, 2006, p. 13, <http://books.google.com>

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13

other difference, then you pay attention to the other and you understand that fighting for your own identity is not exclusive of another identity, is open to another identity.”⁸¹

In the contemporary civilization, the binary opposition we/they is still employed in the legal discourse, and that is why some authors regard contemporary world as “barbaric”.⁸² Barbarian⁸³ is traditionally defined as a foreigner whose language, customs and culture differ from the language, customs and culture of a “civilized citizen”. The barbarian is perceived as civilized citizen’s other – inhuman, cruel, rude, etc. Thus, the question whether we are moving toward greater freedom or greater barbarianism can be asked.⁸⁴

Derrida introduces the concept of “différance”, which overcomes the fixed identity of “difference”, and is open to different meanings and reinterpretations.⁸⁵ Consequently, heterogeneity and dissociation are promoted. He argues that the concepts of borders, nations, culture, citizenship, etc. do not have fixed meaning. According to Derrida, the meaning is a free interplay between two opposites.⁸⁶ Thus, it is always open to different interpretations. It must be emphasized that Derrida’s idea was not to make new binary oppositions in which the difference will have priority over an identity, heterogeneity over homogeneity, dissociation over association, etc. He argues these concepts have to be rewritten and not perceived as

⁸¹ Ibid, p.13

⁸² Stjepan G. Meštrović, *The Barbarian Temperament: Toward a Postmodern Critical Theory*, Routledge, London and New York, 1993

⁸³ The peoples who were non-Greek, non-Christian and non-Latin, were regarded as barbarians in Western history.

⁸⁴ Stjepan G. Meštrović, *The Barbarian Temperament: Toward a Postmodern Critical Theory*, p. 56

⁸⁵ “Derrida moves from the Saussurean focus on speech to a concern with writing and textuality and replaces the fixed signifieds of Saussure’s chains of signs with a concepts of différance in which meaning is produced via dual strategies of difference and deferral. For Derrida, there can be no fixed signifieds (concepts) and signifiers (sounds and written images), which have identity only in their difference from one another (...) Signifiers are always located in a discursive context and the temporary fixing of meaning in a specific reading of a signifier depends on this discursive context. “ (Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory*, Blackwell, Cambridge, 1987, p. 25)

⁸⁶ Derrida rejects logocentrism which he considers as the main characteristic of the Western thought. Logocentrism associates discourse with logos and creates the philosophy of identity, which establishes binary oppositions: identity/difference, speech/writing, signified/signifier, etc. The first term is considered as dominant because it represents values of western thought and discourse, while the other is perceived as subordinated and defined only through the negation of the first term,

fixed.⁸⁷ In this way, the concept of citizenship would be considered as unbounded. It will embrace various identity possibilities. Subsequently, states and nations are also not fixed entities. “The concepts by which people define who they are – in which they articulate their sense of identity – are all of them concepts without sharp borders, and hence cannot provide a basis for sharp demarcations such as political boundaries between states.”⁸⁸

With the development of information society, the new perspectives of citizenship arise. The citizenship can be viewed as a state of mind. It need not be tied to borderlines. “The map may well be a mental one, however, and its geography may well be one of the imagination. People are always their own cartographers, moving about in a world arranged according to their needs for affiliation and their senses of affinity.”⁸⁹

Derrida does not argue that all forms of unity and gathering need to be overcome.⁹⁰ He rejects the politics which grants rights to the homogenous groups based on fixed identity. This essentialist politics marginalizes and excludes a number of peoples, which is also argued by representatives of the politics of affinity.

The politics of affinity rejects the concept of a fixed identity and the idea of homogeneous groups.⁹¹ Peoples’ identities are multiple and represent a fluid concept always open to changes and refiguration, which results from one’s affiliations and development. Therefore, their particular notion of a good life should not be denied. The politics of affinity leaves room for individuals and groups “for whom the disciplinarity of a singular and totalizing identity is increasingly untenable.”⁹² “Rather, a politics of affinity assumes the existence of cross-cutting cleavages which will pull in different directions on any political subject with respect to most issues of controversy

⁸⁷ “Reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed and on which our discourse lives, not in order to see the opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that each of the terms must appear as difference of the other, as the other differed and differed.” (*A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds*, ed. by Peggy Kamuf, Columbia University Press, New York, 1991, p. 61)

⁸⁸ Onora O’Neil, “Justice and Boundaries”, *Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives*, ed. by Chris Brown, Routledge, London, 1994, p. 78

⁸⁹ Rob Kroes, *Them and Us: Questions of Citizenship in a Globalising World*, University of Illinois Press, 2000, Urbana & Chicago, p. 23

⁹⁰ John D. Caputo, *Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida*, 2006, p. 13, <http://books.google.com>

⁹¹ E. T. A. Hoffman, German XIX century writer, is one of the first known authors who argue about dissociation and difference as the main characteristic of identity. He expresses this idea in his story “Princess Brambilla” and in a number of other stories.

⁹² Carl F. Stychin, “Desintegrating Sexuality: Citizenship and the EU”, p. 119

(for example, gay Catholics).”⁹³ Therefore, politics of identity does not neglect the difference in favor of a unity and it requires refiguration of the concept of identity employed in European legal discourse.

While the identity politics is based on sameness, the politics of affinity is based on difference. It embraces different models of identity. The core idea of the politics of affinity is “deliberation amongst people who may form an affinity because they have something in common, but who may not consider themselves as sharing an identity, because they do not have that much in common.”⁹⁴ On the other hand, the concepts that politics of affinity employs are continually reconstructed and reinterpreted.

The idea of the politics of affinity is not to completely replace and reject the politics of identity, because in this way it would create binary opposition affinity/identity, where affinity would dominate over identity. If this would be the case, another kind of the politics of identity would be created. The aim of the politics of affinity is to encompass a broader concept of identity which would include different affinities and encounter the difference. Consequently, the term “other” would also be broadened and would not be considered as fixed term. It would be compatible with broadened concept of identity which include different identities which constantly change and depend on the context.

CONCLUSION

Substantive EU citizenship cannot be accomplished by increasing the number of rights or by their transformation in non-economic manner. It can be realized only by the transformation of the rights discourse and the conception of EU citizenship itself. This transformation requires a new ethics of citizenship which is not based on the essentialist and exclusive notion of identity. This, postmodern ethics of citizenship offers a fluid concept of EU citizenship which is not founded on the homogeneous groups of rights based on the principle of priority of (universal) notion of right over the (particular) notion of good. It creates fluid identity of EU

⁹³ Ibid, p. 119

⁹⁴ Carl F. Stychin, *Governing Sexuality*, p. 19

citizenship, which is open to different interpretations and values and leaves room for “Other”.

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RESEARCH ARTICLES

Educational Attainment of Second Generation Immigrants¹

Anna Di BARTOLOMEO

Abstract. This paper aims to study the determinants of the educational gap between children of immigrants and natives. In particular, by comparing the performances of the first and second generation of immigrants with natives we aim to verify if there is a specific effect related to the generation status. Thus we control our dataset for the most common determinants of school performance and verify (as residual) to what extent generation status exerts an independent effect on early school performance net of economic resources, cultural capital background, pupils' aspirations and ethnic school segregation. We analyze and compare the cases of three countries, which mainly correspond to three different stages of immigration of developed European economies. We confirm the importance of the traditional determinants. In Italy, the gap mainly depends on school-segregation dynamics and socioeconomic differences, but the second-generation status is also per se a determinant. In France, the second-generation status has no additional effect and school segregation dynamics are the most important factor in explaining the gap. On the contrary, in Germany, the traditional determinants are not able to fully explain the raw disadvantages of second generations; here, the main determinants in reducing the observed gap are cultural-capital background and language skills.

Keywords: *educational attainment, second-generation immigrants, international comparison*

1. Introduction

The integration of migrants from all parts of the world into the host society has become one of the greatest challenges of highly developed countries. An important role in the integration process is played by the educational system as, e.g., human capital accumulation is considered a fundamental precondition for the integration of migrants by representing the point of departure for labour market

¹ Special acknowledgment is given to Patrick Simon for his comments on a previous draft.

success.

Education in fact has long been considered as a way of social advancement for immigrant families. For the majority of migrants who come to a new country with low skills, without an established family business, an accumulated wealth and long-standing local social networks, the education system represents a unique opportunity for social mobility with respect to the next generation (Brinbaum, Heath, 2007). Success in the education system would allow their children to obtain higher paying and higher status jobs with a contemporaneous rise in the family's social standing.

The literature uses educational attainment to capture progression in the human capital accumulation up national education systems. By comparing the students' performances emerges that, notwithstanding the strong incentives, in industrialized countries immigrants' children do not perform as well as others students (Marks, 2005). This problem becomes particularly relevant when we consider the trajectories of the second generation of immigrants, who were born, socialized and educated in the host country and thus who are supposed to share the same opportunities within the same social context of natives. This issue is particularly related to the so-called "new second generation," the children of recent migrants who came to Europe and North America in the second half of the 20th century, who are now completing their education and entering the labour market. They represent, in fact, a crucial challenge for social cohesion in western societies: "Will they experience an upward mobility by reducing the existent gap with their native counterparts or, at the contrary, will they reproduce the social stratification in terms of integration in the subaltern positions in the society as their parents?" (Meurs, Pailhe, Simon, 2006).

Literature highlights several factors in explaining the educational gap between children of immigrants and natives. Along this line, the aim of this paper is to study the determinants of this educational gap and, in particular, by comparing the performances of the first and second generation of immigrants with natives we aim to verify if there is a specific effect related to the generation status. Thus we control our dataset for the most common determinants of school performance and verify (as residual) to what extent generation status exerts an independent effect on early school performance both conditional and unconditional economic resources, cultural capital background, pupils' aspirations and school segregation dynamics.

As the integration process, as well as the related problems and policies, may be strongly affected by its nature, e.g. the problems of early immigration countries are rather different from those arising in countries with a consolidated story of immigration, we analyze and compare the cases of three countries (France, Germany and Italy). We chose them since they broadly correspond to three different stages of immigration of developed economies. France may represent the case of the countries with a strong colonial history; Germany can be associated to countries with post-war labour recruitment; and Italy is a typical case of new countries of immigration. On this respect our study is particularly relevant for policymakers as our cases together fully represent the development of the immigration process and integration. In particular, we aim to verify if the different stage plays any role in the educational gap by comparing the cases of the three observed European countries.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on the main literature on the determinants of immigrants' children educational gap; section 3 deals with the research hypothesis, the dataset and the methodology adopted; section 4 presents the main results; section 5 concludes.

2. The determinants of the educational gap: literature review

In order to assess the educational attainment two kinds of measures are normally adopted: a) test scores, which directly deal with the scholastic performances; b) educational outcomes, which represent the continuation rates into upper secondary and tertiary education when the compulsory school is concluded and students can choose whether or not to continue or to enter the labour market. Scholars argue that the determinants of the educational gap of the immigrants' children may differ or play a different role whether educational attainment is measured by test scores or continuations rates. Since in our project we measure the educational performance of pupils in terms of the former, the following part is mainly dedicated to their peculiar determinants even if continuation rates will be also discussed.

In analyzing the educational gap between natives and children of immigrants, sociologists of education have tended to focus on class inequalities by developing two broad families of explanations: the "structural" and the "cultural" one respectively. Their common feature relies on the Bourdieu and Passeron's

(1970; 1990 [1997]) cultural and social reproduction theory, which assesses that the unequal distribution of power resources (social, cultural and economic capital) between classes are transmitted over generations.

The “structural explanations” thus argue that the weaker performance of immigrants’ children is largely due to socio-economic factors (mainly indexed by parental occupation). On the one hand, these factors are directly connected with continuation rates, since inequalities in material resources make more costly for children from working-class origin continuing in education beyond the period of compulsory school (Brinbaum, Heath, 2007); on the other hand it is also reasonable to link the parents’ economic conditions and the lack of material resources to test scores’ performance.

The “cultural explanations” instead consider cultural capital as the most important form of capital for children at school. In its most general form, cultural capital consists of familiarity with the dominant culture in society, dominant culture which corresponds to the culture found at school. Like many forms of capital, cultural capital is inherited by children from their parents. Thus, according to this theory, the weaker performance of immigrants’ children can be related to their weakest cultural capital background. It can be indexed by several proxies, i.e. the educational level of parents, but also their familiarity with the hosting culture, as well as parental skills in helping children with their schoolwork (and thus the importance of language skills) and knowledge about how to deal with the educational system (Van de Werfhorst, Hofstede, 2007). The negative effect of this cultural dissonance showed by immigrants’ children is also called by sociologists the *primary effect* of stratification on educational attainment measured by test scores².

Starting from these “traditional” explanations other kind of theories were developed emphasizing the role of decision-making process. Among others, Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) and Goldthorpe (1996) provide the relative risk aversion theory, which assesses that according to the mechanism of relative risk aversion, the primary goal for each member of the society is to avoid downward social

² There is also another dynamics related to stratification, called the *secondary effect*. Stratification may be an advantage (instead of a disadvantage) when continuation rates’ measures are considered. In fact, many immigrant groups are positively selected for their ambitions and high aspirations and this may likely bring to ambitious choices of their children in continuing the school after the compulsory period.

mobility with respect to their parents' trajectories. While this determinant is surely related with continuation rates, including it as explanatory factor of educational achievement measured by test scores is a controversial issue. In fact, if children wish to avoid downward mobility they will probably continue higher schools, but at the same time they do not automatically turned into better learners. Some scholars identify this issue as an "issue of causality" between school performance and mobility concerns and conclude that mobility concerns are a consequence of school performance and not the contrary (Van de Werfhorst, Hofstede, 2007). In other words, they state that badly performing students get more concerned about class maintenance as a result of their performance and not that the anxiety in mobility concerns can cause negative effects on performance.

Another kind of explanation focuses on schools characteristics. In most countries ethnic minorities are often concentrated in particular areas, typically economically disadvantaged, so that in local schools there are high proportions of immigrants' children. As a matter of fact, these deprived neighborhoods are often associated with poorer schooling, characterized by difficulties in attracting and retaining suitable teachers (higher teacher turnover) or by parents who have less time and resources to contribute to the school. Many scholars (Rumberger, Willms, 1992; Portes, MacLeod, 1996; Wang, Goldschmidt, 1999) found evidence of the strong association between school segregation and the weaker performance of ethnic minorities.

3. Research hypothesis, data and methods

As shown in the previous section, researchers have highlighted several factors in explaining the gap between children of immigrants and natives. Along this line, our research addresses one basic question: "to what extent does generation status exert an independent effect on early school performance net of economic resources, cultural capital background, pupils' aspirations and ethnic school segregation dynamics?" In other words, we suppose that each of these determinants plays an important role in explaining the educational gap between immigrants' children and natives; further, we are interested at looking if a residual differentiation is still found after controlling for these traditional explanatory factors.

Data have been taken from the OECD Program for International Students

Assessment (PISA, 2006), a triennial survey of the educational attainment of 15 years old students, which consists of a sample of more than 400.000 students from 57 countries. The focus of PISA 2006 is on science topics, but the assessment also includes mathematics and reading. Moreover, three questionnaires are provided, aimed to collect data on students, parents and institutional factors that could explain differences in performance.

Our sample is composed by more than 30.000 observations (69,8% Italy; 15,2% Germany; 15,0% France). Any comparison of the three countries patterns with respect to the contextual average is made with those European countries, which have a minimum of 3% of immigrant students on the total scholastic population (16 countries).

For our purposes, we divided immigrants' children in:

a) first-generation pupils, who were born outside the receiving country and whose parents were also born in a different country;


b) second-generation pupils, who were born in the receiving country but whose parents were born in a different country. In this sub-group we include also pupils who were born outside the receiving country and who are emigrated in the pre-scholar age, the so-called 1.5 generation. The inclusion of these pupils is justified by the fact that both the second and the 1.5 generation of pupils share the unique position of having experienced the whole period of "secondary socialization" in the receiving country³.

As we mentioned before, comparing the performances differences between the first and the second generation of pupils with natives may give some insight into the effectiveness of countries' school systems in developing immigrants' children scholastic skills. First generation pupils typically spent only part of their schooling in the receiving country and may have had very different schooling experiences before they arrived there. The level of achievement they have reached at age 15 can therefore only partly attributed to the school system of the receiving country. Their relative performance may serve as a rough baseline for the potential immigrants' children bring with them when they enter the different

³ Sociologists identify the "primary socialization" as the socialization children experience in the first years of their life, during which the family assumes a fundamental role. Further, in the "secondary socialization", other social agents assume relevance, which often impose very different values from those elaborated during the primary socialization. In particular, in the secondary socialization the school assumes the most important role in driving the choices and the attitudes of children.

receiving countries. In contrast, the achievement of the second-generation pupils is largely determined by the receiving country’s school system (although it will also be affected by the student’s background) and, thus it is supposed to be close to the natives’ one. The gap in performance between first-generation and second-generation pupils may indicate the extent to which the different school systems succeed in supporting immigrant pupils’ learning (OECD, 2006). As expected, the presence of second-generation immigrants is higher in the European countries with a long history of immigration, while the first one is mostly represented in the new countries of immigration.


Figure 1 - Proportions of immigrants’ children on the scholastic population by generation status and receiving country (European countries with at least 3% of children of immigrants).



Source: PISA, 2006

By comparing figure 2a and 2b we can see as the distribution of the two generations in each country show nearly similar proportions to its reference group (respectively European countries with colonial history for France, post-war labour recruitment for Germany and new countries of immigration for Italy) allowing us to consider these three countries as representative of the three European patterns of immigration.

Figure 2 - Proportions of immigrants' children on the scholastic population by generation status and group of country (a) and single country (b) (%).




Source: PISA, 2006

Regarding our methodology, we perform such models of logistic regressions by entering subsequent blocks of covariates, where the response variable is represented by the performance in test scores in order to analyze the probability of achieving high performance in test scores. To build this variable, we take into account the classification made by Pisa' staff of experts which divide the science educational attainment of pupils in six levels⁴. By looking at the distribution of pupils in these levels (figure 3), we decided to build the response variable by assuming that levels 6, 5, 4 and 3 represent high achievement in test scores, while levels 2, 1 and below 1 denote low achievement. In particular, figure 3 shows the starting point of this analysis: an evident gap in educational attainments is observed among generations. While the natives perform better in each country, higher proportions of children of immigrants are observed in the "low performance levels". Moreover, there is a decreasing trend in performance with respect to the three considered generations (starting from the 1G, followed by the 2G and the natives). An exception is observed in the German context, where a more similar pattern is shown by the two generations and where a consistent part of the first generation is concentrated in the first level.

⁴ Level 6 denotes a "very strong engagement in explaining and applying related knowledge and ability to conceptualize and generalize"; level 5 corresponds to a "very strong engagement in explaining and applying related knowledge"; pupils which are in the 4th level are characterized by a "strong engagement in applying related knowledge"; in level 3 pupils are "able in describing issues related to the specific knowledge"; in level 2 "only literal interpretations are performed"; at last, level 1 denotes only a "limited knowledge of the subject restricted to such familiar contexts".

Figure 3 - Distribution of pupils by proficiency levels, generation status and receiving country



Source: PISA, 2006

In order to understand where does this gap derive from and which are the weights of such determinants in explaining this differential pattern, several models have been performed. In particular, we run five different models for each country:

1. In the first one, we consider only the effect of the key covariate represented by generation status (“natives” as reference category);

2. In the second model, we add the socio-economic status indexed by the highest job status of parents (“white collar high skilled” as reference category). Can immigrant socio-economic background explain alone the educational gap that immigrants face? This question is of great relevance: in case immigrants’ achievement differs to that of natives only due to their lower economic background, educational policies would not need to address immigrants’ special needs. Otherwise, migrants’ disadvantage could be then decreased with policies providing additional support for all children with a disadvantaged family background.

3. Cultural capital background’s impact is inserted in the third model to observe whether the economic and cultural explanations are able to explain alone the gap. It is indexed by a) language spoken at home (“national language” as reference category); b) highest educational level of parents, considered as a measure of “institutionalized” cultural capital and measured in accordance with the ISCED – International Standard Classification of Education (“ISCED 5 or 6” as reference category); c) index of cultural possessions (“more than 10 cultural possessions” as reference category).

4. Further, we control also for students’ aspirations and motivations to test the risk aversion theory by building an index composed by measures of a) interest

in science topics; b) future-oriented motivation to learn science; c) science related activities (“high aspirations” as reference category). Nevertheless, this index can only be considered as a proxy of social mobility’s attitudes since it does not provide a direct comparison between pupils’ aspirations and the current socio-economic conditions of parents.

5. The last covariate is represented by the proportion of immigrants’ children in each school in order to verify ethnic school segregation’s mechanisms (“below the mean value observed in each country” as reference category)⁵.

4. Empirical results

In this section we present the main results of the logistic regressions run for each country considered.

In the French case (see Table 1 in Annex) after taking into account of socio-economic status of parents, cultural background, students’ aspirations and ethnic school segregation, the educational disadvantage disappeared for the second generation, while it tends to persist with respect to the first one.

As expected, the socio-economic status and cultural capital background have a strong impact on reducing the gap even if they are not the only barriers for immigrants’ children to reach the achievement scores of their native counterparts. It is worth to noticing that the language spoken at home does not have any significant effect. A possible explanation could be found in the colonial history and assimilation policy, which make the linguistic issues less constraining for the children of immigrants in France. However, we have also to underline that our measure is probably limited to fully capture the effect as in the questionnaire there is not the possibility to take account of pupils who use to speak both the national language and the language of origin; a larger information could probably lead to a more reliable measure particularly in the French context. Many scholars have in fact underlined that a bilingual environment may bring benefits in educational achievement (Bialystok, 2001); although others (Schmidt, 2001) stress that using two languages could instead affect negatively pupils’ performance due to a high confusion, reflected in the scholastic context. An additional interesting result is that

⁵ In the case of Italy, we use an arbitrary limit value of 10% of immigrants’ children per school to build the response variable because of the high presence of schools where immigrants’ children are not present at all. In this case the proportion of schools with more than 10% of immigrants’ children is around the 30%.

after adding the index of students' aspirations and motivations the educational gap tends to augment instead of diminishing. Thus, it seems to have its effect not only on the risk of achieving a high performance but also on the ethnic origins by causing an additional effect of differentiation between children of immigrants and natives. In fact, being children of immigrants and personal aspirations seem to be strictly related.

At last, model 5 in which ethnic school segregation dynamics are considered shows the strongest impact on the ethnic gap whether the second generation's effect disappeared. These results support the findings of numerous French studies that have continually emphasized the importance of considering ethnic spatial segregation as a important determinant in affecting negatively the integration trajectories of immigrants and their children and have also pointed out the inadequacy of current public policies addressed to avoid these dynamics (Simon, 1998; Felouzis, Liot, Perroton, 2005). Nevertheless, a disadvantage position of the first generation of pupils continues to be observed even after controlling for all these determinants.

By contrast, in Germany (See Table 2 in Annex), the raw disadvantages of the first generation of pupils are wholly explained by the parental socio-economic positions and cultural capital background. A partial explanation of this pattern is found in the sample composition. In fact, the major part of first generation students in Germany is composed by pupils from the former Soviet states, who may probably be affiliated to *Spät-Aussiedler* in-migration flows, which reached between 1988 and 2005 a total of three million people entered Germany. *Spät-Aussiedler* are ethnic Germans, so-called repatriates, who are characterized by good levels of education and language skills who may probably face less problems in the scholastic context (Ozcan, 2007).

Otherwise, the determinants taken into account cannot explain the consisting gap between the second generation of migrants and natives, which tends as obvious to strongly decrease but not to disappear. The main part of this reduction of differences is provided by the model 3, where cultural capital background is inserted. In effect, some authors give great importance to the role of parents and above all to the familiarity with the German scholastic system, which is really complex and where the parental role seems to assume great importance. For example, in certain federal states parents are institutionally entitled to select among primary schools. Such studies (Kristen, Granato, 2007) have demonstrated

that a part of parents of children of immigrants simply don't know this regulation and may probably enter a school which offers with respect to its student composition a less favorable environment. From this perspective also ethnic school segregation represents, as demonstrated by these results, a strong factor in reducing the gap. Nevertheless, even after controlling for it the gap between the second generation and natives remains.

Furthermore, in the Italian case (see Table 3 in Annex) even after taking into account of socio-economic status of parents, cultural background, students' aspirations and ethnic school segregation, the educational disadvantage both of the first and the second generation persists.

Socio-economic status and cultural capital background are able to strongly reduce the ethnic gap. Nevertheless, as in the French case, language spoken at home doesn't show any significant effect on the observed decrement. A possible explanation of this pattern could be found in the fact that, since 10 years, a growing number of Italian schools is providing the figure of the so-called intercultural mediator who represents a specific employee in the scholastic personal aimed to deal with any kind of additional needs of school and students related to multicultural issues, in particular with linguistic problems. Nevertheless, the Italian results show that the traditional determinants are far to explain the scholastic gap between immigrants' children and natives suggesting us that a deepen analysis is required.

5. Concluding remarks

Notwithstanding the strong incentives for children of immigrants, often, in most industrialized countries, immigrants children do not perform as well as others. The problem become particularly relevant when we consider the trajectories of the second generation of immigrants, who were born, socialized and educated in the host country and thus who are supposed to share the same opportunities within the same social context of natives. By using PISA data this paper aimed to investigate to what extent does generation status exerts an independent effect on early school performance both conditional and unconditional to socioeconomic resources, cultural capital background, pupils' aspirations and school segregation by trying to assess a comparison three European countries, which represent the three different European patterns of in-migration

flows. We used logistic regressions by entering subsequent block of covariates in order to analyze the weight of the different determinants from which depends the implementation of political strategies addressed to improve the scholastic performance of immigrants' children. Nevertheless, one important limitation is present in this analysis linked to the used dataset: such participating countries (i.e. France) refused to ask for details concerning the specific country of origin of pupils and parents. This constraint did not allow us to investigate on the effect of national origins which was demonstrated by the majority of scholars to provide different trajectories in immigrants' children integration (Portes, Rumbault, 2001; Glick, Hohmann-Marriot, 2007 among others).

However, some relevant findings come out from this analysis, which can be resumed by the following results. We found evidence of the fact: net of socio-economic status, cultural capital background, pupils' aspirations and ethnic school segregation dynamics, both the first-generation and the second-generation of immigrants face additional barriers for succeeding in their educational performance. Interesting exceptions came from the second generation of pupils in France, where ethnic school segregation plays a fundamental role and from the first one in Germany, probably due to the composition of the sample. Further, we are interested in which kind of additional barriers may constrain immigrants' children to achieve at least the same educational performance of their native counterparts. Possible explanations may be related to macro variables, which refers to the national educational systems in which pupils are inserted, i.e. early selectivity processes, the implementation of scholastic policies directly addressed to multicultural issues, institutional mechanisms of discrimination, and so on.

For all these reasons and thanks to the large number of countries in the survey, a multilevel approach seems to be the more appropriate methodology which may allow us to deepen this analysis by focusing on several levels (pupils, schools and countries) in order to investigate on the effects of the overall national educational systems. Thanks to this approach, more evidence may probably come out in understanding also the differences among countries.

Summarizing, most European countries are facing an increasing number of immigrants and from this pressure, new socio-economic problems emerge. Among them one of the most important is that of integration, especially the integration of the second-generation. The integration of second-generation is strongly related to the education and the school system that is the first place of comparison among

them and natives and the first source of human capital accumulation. We find that, overall, the immigrants' child status (whether or not the pupil was born in the country of reception) is *per se* a factor of relatively low human capital accumulation within (compulsory) education, i.e., the immigrants' child status is *ceteris paribus* most likely associated to a worst educational performance. Reception of children from different origins poses thus new challenges to educational institutions both in terms of adapting themselves to cultural diversification of their school population and in terms of adapting their teaching and learning methods to different cultural connotations and meanings of education, teaching and learning. The issue is searching for the best policies, which may avoid the so-called "segmented assimilation" (Portes, 1996; Portes, Rumbault, 2001; Zhou, 2001) which assesses that just a fraction of children of migrants has access to the mainstream of the society, while the majority of them entered and remained at the bottom of the society, into the underclass.

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APPENDIX

Table 1 – Logistic regression results: odds ratio of achieving high performance in test scores, France.*

FRANCE	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Generation status					
Natives (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1
Second generation	0,53***	0,69***	0,79*	0,70**	n.s.
First generation	0,34***	0,37***	0,39**	0,30***	0,34***
+ Socio-economic status					
Highest parental job status					
White collar high skilled (ref.)		1	1	1	1
White collar low skilled		0,33***	0,46***	0,45***	0,45***
Blue collar high skilled		0,23***	0,38***	0,36***	0,36***
Blue collar low skilled		0,13***	0,22***	0,22***	0,22***
+ Cultural capital background					
Language spoken at home					
Language of receiving country (ref.)			1	1	1
Other languages			n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Highest parental education level					
ISCED 5 or 6 (ref.)			1	1	1
ISCED 3 or 4			0,84**	n.s.	n.s.
Below ISCED 3			0,67***	0,72**	0,72**
Cultural possessions					
More than 10 (ref.)			1	1	1
From 7 to 10			0,33***	0,37***	0,37***
Less than 7			0,14***	0,15***	0,15***
+ Risk aversion theory					
Index of pupils' aspirations					
High aspirations (ref.)				1	1
Low aspirations				0,39***	0,39***
+ Ethnic school segregation					
% of imm.' children per school					
≤ the mean value (≤12,1%) (ref.)					1
> the mean value (>12,1%)					0,71***

Legend: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05.

* Controlled for sex.

Table 2 – Logistic regression results: odds ratio of achieving high performance in test scores, Germany.*

GERMANY	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Generation status					
Natives (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1
Second generation	0,31***	0,43***	0,61**	0,62**	0,71**
First generation	0,34***	0,40***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
+ Socio-economic status					
Highest parental job status					
White collar high skilled (ref.)		1	1	1	1
White collar low skilled		0,38***	0,46***	0,46***	0,47***
Blue collar high skilled		0,34***	0,45***	0,45***	0,46***
Blue collar low skilled		0,25***	0,40***	0,40***	0,41***
+ Cultural capital background					
Language spoken at home					
Language of receiving country (ref.)			1	1	1
Other languages			0,51***	0,51***	0,53***
Highest parental education level					
ISCED 5 or 6 (ref.)			1	1	1
ISCED 3 or 4			n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Below ISCED 3			0,29***	0,31**	0,32**
Cultural possessions					
More than 10 (ref.)			1	1	1
From 7 to 10			0,46***	0,50***	0,50***
Less than 7			0,28***	0,29*	0,29*
+ Risk aversion theory					
Index of pupils' aspirations					
High aspirations (ref.)				1	1
Low aspirations				0,57***	0,56***
+ Ethnic school segregation					
% of imm.' children per school					
≤ the mean value (≤13,2%) (ref.)					1
> the mean value (>13,2%)					0,67***

Legend: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05.

* Controlled for sex.

Table 3 – Logistic regression results: odds ratio of achieving high performance in test scores, Italy.*

ITALY	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Generation status					
Natives (ref.)	1	1	1	1	1
Second generation	0,47***	0,55***	0,62*	0,62**	0,68*
First generation	0,31***	0,39***	0,47***	0,45***	0,53***
+ Socio-economic status					
Highest parental job status					
White collar high skilled (ref.)		1	1	1	1
White collar low skilled		0,68***	0,80***	0,80***	0,80***
Blue collar high skilled		0,36***	0,54***	0,54***	0,54***
Blue collar low skilled		0,37***	0,55***	0,55***	0,55***
+ Cultural capital background					
Language spoken at home					
Language of receiving country (ref.)			1	1	1
Other languages			n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Highest parental education level					
ISCED 5 or 6 (ref.)			1	1	1
ISCED 3 or 4			n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Below ISCED 3			0,64***	0,66***	0,66***
Cultural possessions					
More than 10 (ref.)			1	1	1
From 7 to 10			0,49***	0,51***	0,51***
Less than 7			0,21***	0,23***	0,24*
+ Risk aversion theory					
Index of pupils' aspirations					
High aspirations (ref.)				1	1
Low aspirations				0,67***	0,68***
+ Ethnic school segregation					
% of imm.' children per school					
≤ 10,0% (ref.)					1
> 10,0%					0,49***

Legend: ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05.

* Controlled for sex.

ESSAY

A Few Considerations upon Romanian Literary Exile in America

Anamaria CÂMPAN

Abstract: The delusion of the American mainland, or in other words *the American Dream*, as it is known in the entire world, has conquered Romania as well, penetrating almost all the domains, and culture in general, but literature particularly – because the latter is the subject of the present paper – hasn't made an exception.

Keywords: *Romanian writers, English language, exile, America*

An unknown situation in the Romanian history, but met in other cultures, neighboring ours, because the literary exile doesn't start with the Romanian one, an important number of Romanian writers live today in U.S.A, being in the same time present by their new books, in the literary and culturally environment of their mother country. Most of the culture people, and I'm referring here especially at writers, emigrated in the last decade of the Communist ruling when, as the studies made after the Revolution in December 1989, show the biggest „cultural and literary bleeding in Romanian history”¹ took place.

Monica Spiridon², analyzing the experience of a few Romanian writers, who managed to impose themselves over the Ocean, remarks that “America remains the only place where you can be an immigrant without being as well an exiled [...] leaving your native country being equivalent with a symbolic spacing which is going to prove itself as auto-revealing and catalyzer for creativity”. The essayist remarks also in the discourse of the exiled from over the Ocean a series of common features as it is the problematization of their own, dual condition – that of a Romanian on one hand, and that of an immigrant on the other, in a world different from the native one – or the

¹ Iorgulescu, Mircea – Departures, Returns, Presences – in 22 Review Year XIV (715) Bucharest, 20 – 24 November, 2003

² Spiridon, Monica – The Defence and the Illustration of the Criticism , Didactical and Pedagogical Printing House, Bucharest, 1996

consciousness of belonging to two different cultural systems.

Moreover “for a lot of the Romanian expatriates, the arrival in the New World doesn’t represent a displacement in space, but mostly a jump in time which is anticipating the future development of Europe”³. We can mention here Mirela Roznoveanu, Carmen Firan, Alexandra Târziu, Mircea Săndulescu or Andrei Codrescu.

For some writers, as Monica Spiridon says, the exile is a kind of therapy for “the inner schizophrenia” to which they were sentenced by Communism “In America , the two halves of the cracked identities are put into accordance, remaking thus the inner balance[...] as an identity catalyzer, and mostly as a form of fulfillment through reaction towards the native background as well to the adoptive one”.⁴

Gabriel Pleșea through his work *Romanian Writers in New York*, dedicated to the Romanian diaspora concentrated around the American metropolis, makes a personal selection of writers, starting from “ the desire to demonstrate to the ones in the country (as well as to the ones from the Romanian communities in exile in America or wherever) that the writers who settled here continue to function as writers – writing, publishing, participating in the cultural life of the Romanian community and as each is capable being ambassadors of Romanian culture”.⁵

The writers comprised in the volume mentioned above, settled themselves in New York within 1976-1991, leaving their country by emigrating, self exile, scholarships, visits followed by applications for political asylum. The volum’s aim is to point out “the effort of these expatriates to continue their concerns which defined them as writers before they came in the United States. The truth is, that in spite of the fact that they had to adapt themselves to the new socio-cultural environment – being forced to “recycle” themselves, by taking up again studied, changing or varying the professional profile [...] continued their work over the Ocean, writing in Romanian and publishing in the country their literary products, especially after 1990.” A common feature that can be found at all the analysed writers is the predilection to national themes: “Even in the singular case of professor Constantin Virgil Negoită, who wrote prose only in English , the subjects are deeply rooted into a Romanian world”.⁶

Most of the critics who started to analyse Romanian literature, written in

³ idem 2

⁴ ibidem 3

⁵ Pleșea, Gabriel – *Romanian Writers in New York*, Vestala Printing House, Bucharest , 1998

⁶ idem 5

English, in exile on the American mainland remarked a common feature, positive for the artistic act, synthesized very well by Tania Radu: “It is very interesting what happens to our novelists transposed into the American literary space. Most of them suffer a positive transformation, they “lack laden”, they simplify their way of writing. Writing in other geographical and social backgrounds, they approach without any complexes the themes of reality, without fearing facility and thus manage to find much easier the sincerity of their tone.”⁷

The Genetics demonstrated that each human being is unique, not even one is the same as another, not even one person thinks or feels the same as an other, and thus the perceptions of each person upon the surrounding reality is different.

The exile, as a phenomenon of the exterior reality was and still is perceived by everyone in a different manner, no matter if we speak from the point of view of the person who is in such a situation, chosen or imposed, perceived physically or mentally or from the point of view of the ‘spectator’.

As Laurențiu Ulici remarks in his essay dedicated to exile, the first manifestation of the imposed exile is due to the social or political conditionings brought by the Communist regime: “the exile of the Romanian writers represented, morphologically speaking, a run, an option and a denial, and was determined by political reasons: the persecution of the Communist regime, in its Stalinist phase, against anything which represented the «bourgeois-landlord past» including the literature creators raised in that «past» and the hostility of the same regime, in the phase of Ceausescu’s dictatorship of nationalist essence, towards any attempt of free ideological expression.”⁸

If the reason for leaving is probably the same for all the writers we talk here about, the critic distinguishes a certain category of emigrants, for which the exile meant something else besides a simply liberation or relieving from the Communist regime namely the retrieval of the lost land: he refers here to the Jews returned into Israel.

In the foreword signed by Alexandru Paleologu to Georgeta Filitti’s volume – *The Voices of the Exile*⁹, he makes a few essential remarks regarding the perception of exile. In order to illustrate exile in its best shape, he gives the example of the first

⁷ Radu, Tania – *The Sweet Abused Happiness*, in 22 Review, no. 795/2005

⁸ Ulici, Laurențiu – *The Avatars of Ovidius*, in the review 20th Century, no. 10-12/ 1997, 1-3/1998, 391-396

⁹ Filitti, Georgeta – *The Voices of Exile*, Enciclopedic Printing House, Bucharest, 1998

great exiled of the Latin world, the illustrious poet Ovidius.

The example is very interesting because, as Paleologu sais, it presents exactly the opposite what exile meant in the Communist era. Ovidius was outlawed, at the borders of the world, on the shore of a hostile and unfriendly sea, lacking current navigation, into an isolated and barbaric world, while the exiled writers in the Communist regime dealt with the opposite situation. From the cultural medium, flat and ideologically contaminated by the Communist doctrine of the working class, where the intellectual and culture were desconsidered up to humiliation and even annihilation, to the liberating exile, which for most meant the rescue from a certain death.

We can find an illustration of this idea in the novel *Life on the Run* by Mirela Roznoveanu. It is certain, the critic concludes, that this doesn't mean that the „bread of exile” isn't still bitter, and the dislocations and the changes of destinies, the familial or professional fractures, the nostalgies and other inner feelings are less painful.

Thus the liberation from the Communist terror brought the freedom of thinking, but for many also a great inner sufferance, the handicap of not adapting to a new culture, the homesickness due to all that has been recorded in the matrix of Romanian soul, namely the attributes of the homeland which are impossible to replace or simulate.

Because this paper is referring to writers, we have to point out that most of them have published at least one book in Romania, before they chose the way of exile, and less of them managed to follow the path of the literary history, imposed to the Romanian writers who stayed in the country to resist the system. This thing was due to the fracture that took place, the distance and probably the new culture to which they had to adapt too.

A part of the exiled writers managed to adapt succesfully and and overrun their condition, becoming famous and well-known, even if in the country they couldn't get the success they gained in the adoptive country. We mention here : Petru Popescu, Carmen Firan sau Andrei Codrescu.

In the same context we have to notice that a part of the Romanian exiled writers on the American continent, abandoned any contact with the native country, some made that for fear, others were relieved because they had managed to escape from a nightmare, with which they didn't want to meet ever in their lives. The two worlds which are so different, give the impresssion that they exclude themselves,

and Tocqueville's sentence is not an unusual one, but one that simply asserts the antagonistic realities: „ When you cross from a free country into one which is not, you are struck by an extraordinary show: there everything is movement and activity, here all seems calm and immobile.”¹⁰

The inner fuss, the characteristic movement of the free world brings with it the disturbance of the soul, the search, and the relation of the individual with the present in which he lives is probably not the most comfortable. This is the point when solitude or inner loneliness associated with the idea of exile occurs.

An interesting affirmation regarding the ontology of exile is pointed out by Laurențiu Ulici : „this thing, apparently non important, has an important significance, considering the ontology of exile . You can run from a hostile medium, you can run from political or economical pressures, but you can't run from yourself. Whoever knows that, can choose to run from oneself, which is not a paradox if we report to the run from yourself; it is just homeopathy.”¹¹

The quote brings into the discussion the interiority of the individual, the one through which the exile is perceived. Thus, for some the exile has a physical or geographical materiality, for others we can speak about the inner exile.

Starting from the idea that the exile is not an attribute of the modern world Adrian Paul Iliescu, speaks about the inner exile.¹² He starts of course with the Antiquity, and continues with all the essential stages, pointing out the meanings of the term exile. What the author remarks is the fact that as we come closer to modernity the shape of exile changes, seldom transforming itself into an autoexile: „If exile doesn't distinguish modernity, autoexile is in fact a postmedieval project, which once initiated, follows permanently the individual modern way. Not only that the modern exile is itself a form – direct or disguised – of autoexil, but even from the experience of a 'tout court' exile it is distilled in post-renascentist Europe, through the retorts of the sensibility of an auto-exiled, in the measure in which a certain auto-banishment comes to define the moral profile of the modern individual, the way of reaction in front of the accidents happening in the public life and his report with the institutional

¹⁰ De Tocqueville Alexis - De la Démocratie en Amérique, în Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres, papiers et correspondance (tome I-XIII), édition définitive publiée sous la direction de J.-P. Mayer, tome I, vol. 1, p. 252.

¹¹ Idem 8

¹² Iliescu Adrian Paul – Exil, exil interior, modernitate în revista Secolul 20, nr. 10-12/1997, 1-3/1998, 391 - 396

or spiritual communities to which he/she is exposed to”.¹³

The explanation goes on, revealing the idea according to which not the actual exile, would give a specific note to modernity, but the interiority of exile. The withdrawal into internalness is seen as an appanage of modernity, potentated by the new promoted values and the new imposed social rules.

The need of the contemporary man of what the Americans call „privacy” is with every day more acute, penetrating all the life’s compartments. The man tends nowadays towards individualism, wanting to be self sufficient, because he/she is not ready to confront any obstacle in his/her search for the long dreamed happiness . Thus the modern man wants to achieve happiness individually, without depending on others or without being conditioned by the contribution or participation of another individual. If this kind of selfishness primes, it is obvious that the moral and existential auto-exile is impossible to surpass.

In these conditions even if auto-exile may seem a secure land in which the individual is protected – because there is no one around who could threaten his/her status – he/she doesn’t find what he/she is looking for, doesn’t find the happiness he/she is dreaming about, and the road he/she is travelling on is not an easy one, because the enemy he/she is fighting with is not a real, palpable and material one, but a hidden one, unknown and maybe abstract: the self interiorness, revealed only in parts and full of surprises.

The author of the article above cited speaks about the aspiration towards interior exile due to „the thirst for decisioness” exemplified with authors like Montaigne, Machiavelli, Descartes or Berkeley. This thirst can be translated for the modern man by stating his own truth. A personal, intimate truth belonging exclusively to an individual. In this stage appears the idea of the exile into a selfmade world. If the individual is capable of creating a personal, intimate truth, then he/she is able to create in the same time his/her own world, his/her own reality, but where he/she wakes up alone, in other words exiled. Going on with the idea launched in this article I already mentioned we can say that the writer is able to auto-exile himself/herself in his/her own reality, created in his/her artistic attempt, through which he /she states his/her own truth.

¹³ Idem 12



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BOOK REVIEWS

Esin Bozkurt, *Conceptualizing “Home”. The Question of Belonging Among Turkish Families in Germany*, University of Chicago Press, 2009, 244 pages, ISBN 978-3-593-38791-8

Review by Cristina MATIUTA

The book of Esin Bozkurt, *Conceptualizing “Home”. The Question of Belonging Among Turkish Families in Germany*, represents, in our opinion, a careful and deeply analysis insight the Turkish community living in contemporary Germany, emphasizing how the members of this immigrant community reconstruct their home away from their homeland. It discusses the question of belonging among Turkish people by examining their relations with the residential places in Germany (with a special reference to their daily experiences, living circumstances, opportunities and limitations, socio-economic and cultural resources), and by conceiving them not only as a part of an ethnic minority, but also as members of a family, influenced by family roots, experiences, representations, discourses and intergenerational communication.

Based on in-depth interviews with Turkish people from three generations (grandparents-the first generation; their children- the second generation; grandchildren- the third generation), the analysis captures the processes of home-making among men and women in light of their generation specific motivations, experiences and hopes.

The volume is organized in seven chapters. The first one deals with the core concept of this book- the concept of *home*- providing the lexical definitions of home and homeland in three languages (English, German and Turkish) and discussing the multi-referential understandings of home in the context of migration, the multiple facets of belonging in the relocation process and home-

making away from the homeland. Thus, “home is more than merely a roof with four walls. It is a multi-dimensional and dynamic concept that refers to emotional, spiritual, social, cultural, territorial and political self-location over time and space” (pp. 25).

The broad framework provided in the first chapter is narrowed down in the second one, which is focused on the ways Turkish people living in Germany position themselves and refer to home and homeland. Also, the author explores the key literature on Turkish migrants and their children in Germany and this review is continuing in the third chapter of the book through the gender perspective. The literature on gender in migration studies from the last three decades demonstrates that there are differences in the way men and women experience migration, negotiate between home and host cultures and deal with conflict. While man is firstly the guardian of home/woman, the woman is perceived as homemaker and “ethnic actor”, protecting home against outside influence and handing down the national, cultural and religious values and affiliations to young members of the family.

The review of the literature on Turkish people in Germany is used in the next chapters as a solid basis for comparing the literature and the findings of the research on which this book is based. The author explores the understudied dimensions of migration and adaptation process and enriches the generation perspective with the inclusion of a third generation, enabling comparisons across three generations and combining the perspectives of gender and generations in a family context.

The next chapters discuss, with different focuses, the narratives of the participants to this study, originated from six Turkish families with different orientations, views, convictions and environments, reflecting in fact the diversity of the Turkish immigrant families and communities in Germany. Thus, chapter 5 presents the profiles, experiences and affiliations of participants from the first, second and third generations in relation to each other. In chapter 6 gender differences in the conceptualization and (re)construction of home are presented on the basis of comparisons between couples and general frameworks for men and women are drawn in their reference to home. Finally, chapter 7 combines gender and generation perspectives, discussing the gendered structure of intergenerational communication within and across Turkish families in the sample.

The results of the research demonstrate significant generational and

gender differences in the conceptualization of home among Turkish people in Germany. As the author says, “the reference of the first generation to the metaphors of *heaviness* and *lightness*, the second generation to *breathing* upon arrival and departure, and the third generation to the sense of *incompleteness* in Germany constitute complementary findings to the literature on Turkish people in Germany” (pp. 210). The research demonstrates that family discourses and intergenerational communication have a significant impact on the sense of belonging of individuals and this influence is weakened or strengthened by certain factors such as living circumstances, socio-economic placements, institutional contexts, cultural resources, daily experiences (particularly exclusion, stigmatization and marginalisation), individual motivations and aspirations as well as the relations with reference groups in Turkey and in Germany.

The book reveals the changing profile of Turkish people in Germany, the diversity of their origins, training, occupations, language skills, relations with the majority within society and the ethnic and religious community, experiences in the homeland and in Germany, which makes generalizations impossible and necessitates sensitivity to individual differences. But, despite the variety of profiles, certain experiences are shared by the majority of Turkish men and women, influencing their sense of belonging and self-positioning. Almost all participants to the interview belonging to the three generations complain about their socio-economic marginalisation, which disable the identification with Germany. The feeling of exclusion reveals the desire to maintain the unity of home and the need to protect it from “over-foreignisation”. These protection efforts and the closure to one’s family/community/nation could be discussed not only with reference to immigrants’ individual or collective attempts, but also with reference to the majority in the society and its self-closure and rejection of other ethnics.

The book emphasizes the necessity to include the non-native residents in education, training, labour market and social services, to support them for access to resources, services and benefits provided by state institutions and stresses the need to provide the equal chances to all members of society in order to acquire and develop their competences.

Remus Gabriel Anghel and István Horváth (coord), *Sociology of Migration: Theories and Romanian Case-Studies* [Sociologia migrației: teorii și studii de caz românești], Iași: Polirom, 2009, 310 pages, ISBN 978-973-46-1304-5

Review by Marius I. TĂȚAR

Transnational migration as a complex global phenomenon has important influences on both host countries and countries of origin. Worldwide, there are about 191 million migrants and displaced persons and some 30-40 million unauthorized migrants, according to OECD figures published in 2009¹. Moreover, data on international migration to OECD countries emphasize an important trend: the number of migrants has steadily grown between 1990 and 2000, a net average of 2.5 million migrants moved from the less developed to the developed regions of the world every year². In addition, more countries are involved in the global mobility process and this trend increased along with the liberalization and democratization processes that occurred in the last 20 years in Europe and other parts of the world. The importance of these developments is also reflected in the

¹ See the OECD study: *The Future of International Migration to OECD Countries*, OECD, 2009, 281 p., available at:

http://www.oecd.org/document/2/0,3343,en_2649_33707_43483586_1_1_1_1,00.html

² Contrary to these figures, Thomas Faist argues, in his contribution to the book reviewed here, that although the absolute number of migrants increased, the percentage of migrants compared with the total population of the World remained more or less the same, in the last 50 years. The conclusion drawn by Faist is that of a relative immobility on a global scale which contradicts the view of a growing mobility worldwide. However, the data provided by Faist indicates a steadily increase of the percentage of migrants in the population of developed countries: from 3.4 percent in 1960 to 9.5 percent in 2005. Basically this means that in developed countries there are three times more migrants relative to the total population of these countries, than were 50 years ago. The implications of these figures are that transnational mobility is unevenly distributed among regions, with developed regions (especially North America and European Union) facing increased numbers of migrants coming from several less developed regions. This inter-regional trend might be obscured, if we look only at the global level.

growing number of studies and analyses concerned with migration from Central and Eastern Europe to other regions of the world and especially to countries of the European Union.

The book *Sociology of Migration: Theories and Romanian Case-Studies* coordinated by Remus Gabriel Anghel and István Horváth is a recent illustration of researchers' increasing interest in understanding European migrations. In their *Introduction* to the book, the coordinators explicitly emphasize the migration of Romanians as one of the main migration processes from the eastern to the western part of the continent. In order to provide and synchronize a variety of perspectives and topics, the editors have selected various contributions of academics, researchers and PhD students both from Romania and abroad. Basically, the book is a collection of studies grouped into four sections (Theories of Migration, Ethnic Migration in Romania, Models of Romanian Migration and Global Dynamics, Effects of Migration) which aim to introduce the reader in the complexity of migration phenomena, by providing a dialog between theories and case studies. The book starts with a review of the main theories of migration, followed by an overview of the migrations from Romania in the last fifty years. In the second section it explores the first migrations from Romania after 1989, which were mainly ethnically based. The book continues then with an analysis of the massive migration of the Romanian workers to Italy and Spain especially in the last decade. The last section of the book evaluates the effects of migration and remittances on developing tourism in certain areas of Romania and the influences of migration on economic development, social change and social learning of democratic attitudes, values and norms. This last section comprising two articles is explicitly named *Effects of Migration*, although an evaluation of the effects for different categories of actors is present in each of the case studies presented also in the other parts of the book.

Probably the main contribution this volume brings to a better understanding of the complex phenomena of contemporary migrations rests especially in pointing out the puzzle like picture of Romanian migration, contextualized within the broader framework of Europeanization, globalization, trans-nationalism and social changes' theories. The complexity of this picture and the variety of analytical approaches is enriched by the professional and academic background of the contributors (sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, geographers, researchers in international institutes and organizations dealing with migration issues) which contributes to the interdisciplinary character of this book.



Even if different authors speak on different voices and from different theoretical and methodological perspectives, the volume still keeps a certain degree of coherence and logic. Moreover, it provides a series of valuable case studies, useful for disentangling the meaning of various types of Romanian migrations in different periods.

Even if this book brings a valuable contribution to the understanding of different patterns of migrations from Romania, I believe it has two main shortcomings. The first one regards the lack of some basic migration data. For instance, one interested in Romanian migration would legitimately expect in a book on this topic to find some answers to such questions as those raised actually by Sorin Antohi in his *Afterword* to this book: how many Romanians migrated abroad in the last two decades? How many have returned to Romania? In this respect, the editors only assert, in their *Introduction*, the scale of migration in the Romanian society by pointing out that “*millions of Romanian citizens had relatives with shorter or longer migration projects*” [italics mine] (p.9). The second shortcoming refers to the relatively retrospective approach, which the structure of this book seems to ensue. Even if the editors acknowledge in the *Preface* the potential reversal of migration trends in Romania, from emigration to immigration, there is no article in the book explicitly dealing with the potential of Romania to become a host society for external migrants. How prepared (institutionally, socio-economically, culturally and politically) is Romania to revert from sending to host country and to accept/integrate the new potential external migrants? These questions approach migration as a dynamic process and point to a prospective analysis of the new migratory challenges Romania faces. I believe that even tentative answers to such questions could have increased our understanding of the unfinished migration story told in this book.

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