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TABLE OF CONTENTS

THEMATIC ARTICLES – EXPERIENCES OF MIGRATION.....	2
Belonging out of Context: the Intersection of Place, Networks and Ethnic Identity among Retired British Migrants Living in the Costa Blanca, <i>Anya AHMED</i>	2
The Concept of the Self in Explaining Post-1989 Bulgarian Physicians’ Emigration, <i>Stefaniya BEKYAROVA</i>	20
Co-creating Transnational Social Spaces: Researching Poles’ Migrations across Time and Space, <i>Łukasz KRZYŻOWSKI</i>	43
RESEARCH ARTICLES	61
Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration Policy in United Kingdom, <i>Viviana ANDREESCU</i>	61
Ethnicity, Strategic Mobilization and Voting in the Romanian Parliamentary Elections of 2008, <i>Marius I. TĂȚAR</i>	86
Why Do We Feel European? Social Mechanisms of European Identity, <i>Geetha GARIB</i>	108
BOOK REVIEWS.....	125
Keith Jacobs, <i>Experience and Representation: Contemporary Perspectives on Migration in Australia</i> , Surrey: Ashgate, 164 pages, ISBN 978-0-7546-7610-2 (hardcover), review by <i>Marius I. TĂȚAR</i>	125
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS	128

THEMATIC ARTICLES – EXPERIENCES OF MIGRATION

Belonging out of Context: the Intersection of Place, Networks and Ethnic Identity among Retired British Migrants Living in the Costa

Blanca

Anya AHMED

Abstract. Intra-European migration is now a well-documented phenomenon among older people and for UK retirees, Spain is the most popular choice. ‘Belonging’ is particularly important when attempting to understand experiences of migration since often people become aware that they need to belong precisely when they realise that they do not. However, although belonging is a recurrent theme in identity and migration discourse it is rarely defined. This paper explores the concept of belonging in relation to the experiences of a group of retired women living in the Costa Blanca in Spain and considers its multiple and overlapping representations. The myriad forms of belonging that these ‘lifestyle migrants’ construct through narrative in relation to place, networks and ethnic identity and the central intersecting role of language are considered and discussed.

Keywords: *retirement migration, belonging, place, networks, ethnic identity, language, narrative*

Introduction

‘The ability of people to move within the EU has caused new social and economic circumstances that can either test traditional notions of belonging or revitalise a sense of group identity in the face of a new and unfamiliar ‘other’ (Marsh et al 2007 p. 21).

It is estimated that 5.6 million British nationals live abroad permanently, with a further half a million living abroad for part of the year (Finch et al 2010), significantly outnumbering the 2.9 million foreign nationals living in the UK (Srisankarajah and Drew 2006). Although in the UK, the political and media focus

has always been on the impacts of immigration and particularly the lack of integration of minority ethnic groups, there is evidence that retired British migrants do not integrate well into the countries they move to (Sriskandarajah and Drew 2006; Hardill 2006). Belonging is a recurrent theme in identity and migration discourse (Marsh et al 2007; Tamang 2010). It is particularly important when attempting to understand experiences of migration since often people become aware that they need to belong precisely when they realise that they do not (Anthias 2006).

However, although the concept of belonging is often used, it is rarely defined¹: as Anthias (2006) states, 'Belonging and identity are words overused and under-theorised in the context of population movements' (Anthias 2006 p. 19). This paper explores the concept of belonging in relation to the experiences of a group of retired women living in the Costa Blanca in Spain and considers its multiple and overlapping representations through place, social networks and ethnic identity. The central role of language is also considered in terms of how it reflects and sustains ethnic identity out of context and how it underpins and links these different forms of belonging. The paper begins by contextualising UK retirement migration to Spain and then outlines the method and methodological rationale for the study. It then goes on to further discuss the importance of belonging when attempting to understand migration experiences, or being out of context. Finally, findings and analysis from narrative interviews conducted in Spain are presented and discussed in relation to the central role of language for belonging and the intersection of place, networks and ethnic identity.

Contextualising UK retirement migration to Spain

'Displacement has become the most powerful imagery for the modern world' (Anthias 2006 p. 17).

Intra-European migration is now a well-documented phenomenon among older people. (King et al 2000; Ackers and Dwyer 2002; Stalker 2008;

¹ See for example, Smith's (2005) study of children's sense of belonging in the UK. Jayaweera and Choudry (2008), although highlight that migrants to the UK say discrimination undermines 'belonging', do not define what belonging is. O'Reilly (2003, 2007a) refers to belonging in relation to experiences of belonging to social contacts and friendships in the Costa del Sol but she also does not define it

Gustafson 2009; Casado Diaz 2009). In Europe, retirement migration has been mainly movement from north to south – usually not for economic reasons - although lower cost of living is an issue, but for leisure opportunities and quality of life issues such as an equitable climate and availability of amenities. Often migrants have spent time in the place and are familiar with the lifestyle (Casado Diaz 2006). For UK migrants, Spain is the most popular choice for retirees. Born during the mid 20th century, this demographic group – often referred to as ‘baby boomers’² - would have benefited from the increased opportunities associated with growing up in a time of post-war affluence and being in good health. They also experienced a mass consumer revolution; benefits from capital accrued from owner-occupation and the opportunity to retire early (Phillipson et al 2008). People born at this point in time were also the first generation to experience the benefits of foreign travel and cheap air fares. Spain would have been a popular holiday destination from the 1960s and previous experiences of tourism shaped retirement options in later life since ‘Migrants develop a taste for a particular way of life while on holiday in an area and subsequently they decide to migrate, encouraged by their imaginings of the place as offering a better lifestyle’ (Benson and O’Reilly 2009 pp. 613-614).

Migration to the Costa Blanca on the South East coast of Spain has a relatively short history compared to migration to the Costa del Sol (see O’Reilly 2000, 2003, 2007), spanning the last twenty years (Ackers and Dwyer 2002; Casado Diaz 2006, 2010, Hardill 2006)). This migration has been facilitated by the speculative private development of *urbanizaciones de turistica* which are effectively purpose built residential areas for northern European migrants or ‘residential tourists’ (O’Reilly 2003). Some of these properties are purchased as second homes while others become permanent residences. In the main these *urbanizaciones* are on the outskirts of established settlements and are marketed by international estate agents to different European countries which create concentrations of nationalities in particular areas. This study focuses on an area on the outskirts of the Town of Torrevieja³.

O’Reilly (2007b) describes the operation of a mobility enclosure dialectic for intra-European migrants. This denotes both freedom of movement

² The term ‘baby boomers’ generally refers to people born during the mid 20th century in affluent Western countries.

³ This was based on a study undertaken for a doctoral thesis in 2010.

within the EU and the continued significance of nation state borders in terms of access to health care and other services which can make national identity ambiguous. The central focus of this paper however, is on a different kind of physical enclosure within isolated communities remote from the host population and how this shapes experiences and constructions of belonging.

Methods and methodology

The fieldwork for this study was undertaken during 2003 and early 2004 and narrative interviews were conducted with a sample of retired British women in the Costa Blanca in Spain. I had access to a group of women through pre-existing contacts in the area; therefore this was a convenience sample which effectively ‘snowballed’ when people became aware of my study. In this sense the research was in part inspired by my personal experience as a visitor to the area. However, it was also timely since it resonated with wider social trends and themes as migration to Spain had reached unprecedented levels as I suggested earlier. I had met several of the women I interviewed in social situations before engaging them in the research and the sample embodied a range of theoretically appropriate characteristics as follows: living in Spain full or part-time; migrating alone or with partners; and intending to remain in Spain or return to the UK.

Table 1: list of research participants (names are pseudonyms)

Research participant	With partner or alone	Age ⁴	Length of time in Spain ⁵	Education	Employment before retirement
Celia	Married	58	3 years	Secondary school	Retail industry
Cynthia	Married	54	5 years	Secondary school	Retail industry
Vera	In a couple with Deidre	59	2 years	Higher Education	Professional
Deidre	In a couple With Vera	62	2 years	Further Education	Professional
Phyllis	Married	77	2 years	Secondary school	Retail industry

⁴ This denotes the women’s ages on the date of interview.

⁵ This denotes time lived in Spain on the date of interview

Research participant	With partner or alone	Age ⁴	Length of time in Spain ⁵	Education	Employment before retirement
Mabel	Widowed	83	1 year	Higher Education	Professional
Agnes	Married	69	2 years	Secondary school	Retail industry
Agatha	Married	60	Years	Secondary school	Retail industry
Olive	Divorced	57	2 years	Further Education	Retail industry
Myra	Divorced	60	6 months	Secondary school	Retail industry
Margot	Divorced	60	1 year	Secondary school	Retail industry
Lillian	Married	61	2 years	Secondary school	Retail industry
Joy	Married	54	5 years	Secondary school	Homemaker
Jenny	Married	56	3 years	Secondary school	Retail industry
Viv	Married	54	3 years	Did not finish secondary school	Homemaker
Bernice	Married	62	3 years	Secondary school	Retail industry
Enid	Married	57	2 years	Higher Education	Professional

Although all of the women were retired, their ages ranged from between 53 and 83 with the average being just under 62 years. Since this work is qualitative, representative sampling or sampling as ‘synecdoche’ (Becker 1998) was not necessary. Instead, my sampling strategy was governed by selecting respondents who would maximise theoretical development (Gilbert 1997). My approach was by necessity partially ad hoc and opportunistic but there was a rationale for this: key characteristics were selected within the identified context and my decisions were guided by a combination of theoretical and empirical logic rather than claims of direct representation of the wider population. There is however an issue concerning how I can make claims from the sample I have chosen. The data

generated from my interviews with the women in Spain has wider application or 'generalisability', the findings from my research can be applied to settings other than Costa Blanca or Spain. The underlying goal of both qualitative and quantitative research is to develop and modify theory and transfer knowledge, although the means of determining this is different for each approach (Morse 1999). While in qualitative inquiry the samples are usually small as indicated above, they are selected purposively for the contribution that they can make to emerging theory. Although there will be statements I cannot make since I do not have the profile in my sample, any knowledge generated is relevant beyond the sample regardless of its demographic profile because: 'The knowledge gained is not limited to demographic variables...it is the knowledge that is generalized' (Morse 1999 p. 5).

As I explained above, I carried out research with women partly because I had access to a group of women through my contacts in Spain; therefore this was a convenience sample. However, for the purposes of my research I focused on their lives and experiences of migration as recounted through narrative rather than looking specifically at their gender. The quote below from Stanley and Wise (1990) is useful to explicate my position: 'A defining assumption of feminism is that 'woman' is a necessary and valid category because all women share, by virtue of being women, a set of common experiences. These shared experiences derive, not causally from supposed 'biological facts' but women's common experience of oppression. That is, 'woman' is a socially and politically constructed category, the ontological basis of which lies in a set of experiences rooted in the material world. However, to say that women share 'experiences of oppression' is not to say we share the same experiences' (Stanley and Wise 1990 p. 21.)

Although gender specific migration experiences are important since migration is not gender neutral (Boyd and Grieco 2003), this is not the focus of my research⁶. Women do not constitute a homogeneous group: there are divisions within gender and gender itself also intersects with other social divisions, for example ethnicity (Anthias and Cederberg 2006). Although being a woman was part of what my participants discussed, my study shows that different aspects were privileged in their narratives. I now discuss the value of a narrative approach to gaining knowledge of people's experience of belonging while out of their original country of origin.

⁶ There is a large body of literature on the topic of gender and migration (see Bokert et al 2006, Zlotnick 2003, Anthias and Cederberg 2006, Ryan and Webster 2008).

Narrative is described as constructing identities and opening up a plurality of stories (Wood 1981) Temple (2008) argues that: 'In constructing who we are, we also construct who is 'other' to us' (2008 p. 3). Narratives simultaneously reflect and construct belonging and examining women's narratives was useful to understand how retirees made sense of their lived experiences, particularly in relation to belonging (Anthias 2002 and Riessman 2008). Moreover, how people construct belonging through narrative illuminates how they see themselves in relation to place, networks and ethnic identity. Women's narrative identity therefore, is their construction and presentation of their experiences and themselves through their narratives. Narrative analysis is suited to looking at the presentation of identity since 'When we narrate we both describe and construct who we are: we produce and present identities' (Temple 2008 p. 3). Although there are numerous 'identities' which one could feel and think one is, ethnic identity was privileged for these migrants, gender was not something that was focused on in their accounts. This suggests that out of context this aspect of identity is the most important and that needs to be negotiated (Healy 2010). It is worth noting however, that this type of 'lifestyle migrant' (Benson and O'Reilly 2009) is not a persecuted or disadvantaged minority although arguably, retirees are still struggling to survive in marginalised circumstances. Throughout this paper the term 'British' is used as to denote the women's ethnic identity. Women in the study used the term English and British simultaneously, although 'ambiguity often characterises the boundaries between an English and a British identity' (Cohen 1994 p. 7). It is not within the remit of this discussion to engage with the debate surrounding the intricacies of Britishness and Englishness⁷. Instead, the focus is on ethnicity as a representation of identity and form of belonging.

Belonging out of context

Anthias (2006) is one of few writers who articulate what belonging means, defining it as 'the sense of being accepted or being a full member' (2006 p. 19). Another way of understanding belonging is to conceive of it as 'a sense of intimacy with the world' (Boym 2001 p 251). Yuval Davis (2006) defines belonging as being 'about feeling 'at home' and ...about feeling 'safe'' (2006, p. 2). Marsh et al (2007) refer to 'a sense of belonging' (2007 p. 7) and argue that 'The idea of belonging is

⁷ See Baucom 1999

central to our understanding of how people give meaning to their lives'. Therefore belonging is often multi-dimensional, particularly if those people are displaced, since: 'Immigrants form groups on the basis of common ethnicity and settlement experience, but also according to place of origin, spiritual adherence, cultural and social differentiation and enhanced social capital.' (Lalich 2008, p. 52). Sometimes dislocation is used as a contrasting concept to belonging (Davidson and Khun-Eng 2008) and for migrants, being out of their original context – or dis-located – on the margins can mean an ambivalent status in the host country (O'Reilly 2007b).

Belonging also 'Involves an important affective dimension relating to social bonds and ties' (Anthias 2006 p. 21). This can be understood to relate to networks. Marsh et al (2007) assert that 'social identity' (2007, p. 4) is important since it provides an indicator of social change, that is, of different permutations of belonging. What people feel to be a sense of belonging at a particular time says something about how they see themselves in relation to the immediate - or micro - and wider – macro - contexts in which they are placed in the world. For the purposes of this study social identity relates to 'ethnic identity'. Further, 'Ethnic categories are forms of social organisation, postulating boundaries with identity markers' (Anthias 2002, p. 498) and 'ambiguity often characterises the boundaries between an English and a British identity' (Cohen 1994, p. 7).

The concept of boundaries is frequently discussed in conjunction with belonging (Cohen 1985; Yuval Davis 2006), in that boundaries symbolically mark beginnings and endings. In terms of physical location and boundaries, there is a geographical finiteness to place, both in terms of shared country of origin and shared current environment in Spain; for networks, those involved in them mark this boundary by who is included (identifying insiders and outsiders); and for shared ethnic identity, there are characteristics (real or imagined) which demarcate self and other (see Hall 2000). However, often these different forms of belonging overlap, and are difficult to discuss in isolation from one another as I address below.

The role of language

Language as human agency constructs and sustains the social world (Gergen, 2001, Riessman 1993, 2008 and Temple 1997) and for women in the Costa

Blanca, speaking the English language reinforced similarity with their own ethnic group and difference from other groups. In many ways, white British people have effectively been 'de-racialised' in discussions of ethnicity, while visible⁸ minority ethnic groups have been 'over-racialised' (Nayak 2003). The women in this study were part of an isolated expatriate community which bonded due to outside forces, and not speaking the language of their hosts compounded their isolation. The fact that these migrants were retired reinforced their segregation, since there was little opportunity, and indeed reason, to integrate with Spanish people, which highlights the links between place, networks and ethnic identity. The concept of a British identity embodying a de-racialised norm was most apparent around the issue of language where there was an expectation, although acknowledged to be unrealistic, that other nationalities would (or should) speak English as the examples below illustrate.

Deidre for example, was unable to speak Spanish and expected others to speak English. She cast speaking English as the norm as in her talk, and when asked whether she had any contact with Spanish people she replied: "No, no not really because there are only three families that live nearby; one next door and these two over here and basically they speak no English whatsoever". Here the subtext was that rather than feeling that she should learn how to speak Spanish, the expectation was that 'others' – the Spanish - should speak English. Vera also presented her ethnic identity as a norm but demonstrated an awareness of the contradictory nature of the label foreign by saying: "What I call foreigners - the non English - but that's the wrong word to use is foreign, because we're all foreigners here". All other ethnic groups or nationalities were therefore positioned as 'foreign'. This is also reflected in the language used by the Spanish Government and estate agents when marketing properties in Spain since Europeans are often described as residential tourists, while non-Europeans are described as immigrants (O'Reilly 2003).

It was clear that being able to speak Spanish was regarded as important by the research participants and there were pragmatic and moral reasons for doing so. However, the majority of retirees in the Costa Blanca did not learn the language and were unable to use even basic conversational phrases. Arguably, they had limited contact with Spanish people, therefore few opportunities to practise. However, there was also a reticence to learn Spanish and the research participants

⁸ This refers to 'non-white' ethnic groups

put forward a number of reasons to explain this. There were a number of complex factors which contributed to migrants not learning Spanish (see Hamberger 2009). It was evident that some of the women lacked confidence and perhaps the aptitude to learn the language since the majority had not been educated beyond secondary school. Some were unwilling, apathetic or thwarted by obstacles, while others appeared relieved that they did not have to learn since it was possible to speak only English in the areas in which they lived. Some women experienced difficulty in accessing lessons and age was also put forward as a prohibiting factor. It was also suggested that Spanish was a difficult language to learn and that the education system in the UK was to blame since it inadequately prepared people to learn other languages. It was clear that many of these women expected to pick up the language by virtue of simply living in Spain, but the language skills of Spanish people thwarted them as Bernice suggests: “When you try and speak Spanish here they answer you back in English”.

Britain’s ‘imperial legacy’ was seen by some as an obstacle to learning other languages as Cynthia posited “We think because we had the empire that everyone should speak English”.

To some degree, the research participants seemed embarrassed about their lack of language. It is worth noting that the Spanish supermarkets and restaurants servicing the areas where these people lived usually had English speaking staff in them, and that there were a number of British owned shops, restaurants and bars. Being unable to speak Spanish also operated as a limiting factor, perpetuating migrants’ confinement to English speaking areas of Spain as Bernice illustrates: “Most people round this area, you can get by, they understand a bit of English but if you go out, stopping off in different places, you know it’s really really Spanish and nobody could speak any English, and you do need it then”. Here, ‘getting by’ was predicated on Spanish people being able to speak English rather than British people speaking Spanish and ‘they’ were the Spanish and ‘most people’ and ‘you’, representing a substitute for the first person were British. This reinforces the link between place - that is where the British lived in the Costa Blanca -, the networks they belonged to, and which ethnic groups were included. Here, the importance of language in terms of identity for defining us and others is also apparent. However, not all women were sanguine about this. Vera acknowledged the British legacy of only speaking English but also expressed surprise and disappointment that British people had not made more effort to speak Spanish

when living in Spain. She emphasised her discomfort that British people did not speak other languages by saying: “The English are notoriously lazy at learning languages. We, we’re absolutely shocking, the worst on the planet, but by virtue of the fact that we’re actually living in another country, I thought actually, people might make an effort here”.

Speaking English therefore, re-constructed a British ethnic identity. This illuminates the dual role of language, both in terms of constructing belonging to an ethnic group, and also how shared language is part of belonging and ethnicity. Further, women’s reluctance to change language could also be related to maintaining their ethnic identity since ‘Which language people speak and the act of changing language can ...be important in how people see themselves’ (Temple 2008 p. 5). The group in this study largely demonstrate ‘a classic scenario’ (Smallwood 2007 p. 129) where they arrive in the receiving country, full of good intentions to learn the language but then find that they can live the lifestyle without actually mixing with their hosts. Retirees in the Costa Blanca were not integrated into Spanish society, living on the margins as a result of their retired status and this compounded their isolation and reinforced the mono-cultural nature of their social networks as I now discuss further.

The intersection of place, networks and ethnic identity

Networks emerged as being central to women’s experiences of belonging in Spain and individuals’ interaction with others can sometimes be better understood in the context of social, rather than physical environments (Gilchrist 2000; Clark 2007). A sense of belonging through networks could engender a feeling of safety away from home, or out of context. Although both belonging and safety were both intangible and elusive – or imagined - they were also simultaneously experienced as ‘real’ and used pragmatically when necessary as Vera’s quote illustrates: “We all need a feeling of safety and security. The sense of belonging, that safety net aspect of it, the feeling of being part of something, or the feeling that maybe there’s something there, even if you don’t need to use it all the time”. Social contact was almost exclusively with other migrants from the UK and although it was evident that this was disappointing, there were structural as well as personal reasons for this. As indicated above, the location and design of the urbanisation were seen as the main cause since migrants from the UK lived on the

margins and were not part of Spanish society. Very few Spanish people lived in the urbanisations and only a very small number used them as holiday homes and so contact tended to be on a very superficial level due to language issues. Social capital (Putnam 2000) is now commonly used to understand connections between individuals. There are three types of social capital: bonding, which involves ties between people in similar situations; bridging social capital which involves making links outside of the immediate group and linking social capital (Woolcock 2001) which relates to much more distant ties. Women in this study primarily used bonding social capital since they were limited by their language skills.

In such diasporic circumstances, it was pragmatic to seek out and create social networks. Since women in Spain were away from family and networks in the UK there was a shared experience of being out of context and Celia articulated this view by saying: “We’re all here with no family and the people we meet are either like, going to be be friends and I think then, and feel that we’re in the same boat being here. And you get to meet people and you might need people and you have to get on with it. You don’t know when you’re going to need any help”. Celia’s metaphorical use of ‘the same boat’ referred to retirees in the Costa Blanca sharing the same circumstances and needing to develop social networks. To a degree then, social contact in Spain can be understood to be directed by necessity rather than choice as there were limited options available to migrants since they tended only to speak English. Vera’s quote illustrates this further: “In Spain your social contacts tend to be really on the basis of necessity rather than choice. Some of the people you meet in Spain, you wouldn’t necessarily be friends with in England”. Therefore, it appeared that these women had social contact with other migrants from the UK by default and there was an assumption that they were friends due to shared language and culture, although not the same values (Sherlock 2002).

For the women in this study, further evidence of belonging to networks being determined by ethnic group is exemplified by Joy’s comment: “I feel part of a small expat community, but that’s it”. Belonging to networks reinforced ethnic identity and ethnic background and speaking English shaped the kinds of networks people were part of. Being away from the UK meant that migrants from the UK tended to gravitate towards their own ethnic group. This in turn reinforced their ethnic identity and cultural practices. Joy’s comment about the kind of community she felt a part of in Spain betrayed the fact that social contact was limited to ‘her own kind’ that is, other migrants from the UK with whom she socialised and whom

she related to due to shared language and background. Celia was also disappointed that she did not live a more Spanish life or interact with Spanish people as this quote illustrates: “Well that’s the sad thing, it I really did think, that’s another thing, when I came to live here, that I thought I would be living in such an English community. Yes I really hoped that ...there would be Spanish people...I suppose, we could be back in the UK”.

Migrants from the UK were a minority and not part of the mainstream, living parallel lives to their hosts in ghetto like urbanisations. Although the term ‘ghetto’ was historically applied to describe disadvantaged neighbourhoods, with high levels of minority ethnic groups, some women in this study applied this term to where they lived. Vera, for example, referred to the areas where UK migrants lived in Spain as ‘ghettos’ since they were segregated along ethnic lines saying: “We do live in ghettos, there’s no doubt about it. Therefore, migrants from the UK continued to live a ‘British’ life in the Costa Blanca, in fact ‘It seems the British cannot escape their Britishness’ (O’Reilly 2007b p. 288). There were a number of reasons for this. First, the location of the urbanisations, away from established areas populated by the Spanish was significant. Second, the way that the properties were marketed and sold to Northern European migrants perpetuated such segregation; and third, the inability of the women to speak Spanish compounded this.

Being able to engage with culturally familiar customs, habits and those of the same ethnic grouping was presented as a positive aspect of life in Spain by some participants and by others as a disappointment. However, overall there was an acceptance of this. For some, for example Myra celebrated the fact that she was among compatriots, and felt safer and more at home because of the familiarity that this brought. She did not see anything wrong with this and when she says below ‘I don’t mind’ in relation to mixing with Spanish people she was conceding that it was their country. However, the fact that the area she lived in is so heavily populated with Britons allowed her to almost disregard this. She referred to English culture being imported by the English – in this part of Spain the British were the dominant group, this was apparent in terms of cuisine, provisions, culture and language. Myra talked about this as a positive thing whereas some of the others did not. Her use of ‘England in Spain’ below suggests that Britons had ‘claimed’ this part of Spain: “Out here it’s an English environment. I chose where I live because I thought there was [sic] English people around which would be more, well, you feel you’re a

bit safer. Not that I don't want to mix with the Spanish, I don't mind, it's their country, but it is England in Spain here really it is". Vera was less happy about this when she commented: "I think what I do is lead an English life in Spain...it's not for me the ideal thing. That's not the ideal. I wanted to be more integrated if you like with the Spanish. That's the way that people live, it's like with like tend to be happier with your own culture. We do tend to mix with English people, just because a lot of English people tend to have retired over here as yet". By saying 'that's the way that people live', she appeared critical of the 'Brits abroad' stereotype and wanted to disassociate herself from it.

Retired migrants living in the Costa Blanca constructed belonging to networks to provide a social context to their lives, although networks cannot be separated from place and ethnic identity. Women shared a sense of belonging with other people from the same ethnic group and they used their social capital to bond rather than bridge outside English speaking UK migrant networks. Networks are further connected with identity and place since location is significant in shaping group and individual identity. This in turn influences those groups and individuals with whom a sense of belonging is shared (Brah 1996; Temple 1995). Belonging to social networks therefore operates in multiple ways *out of one's context*. Women in Spain lived in an isolated diasporic community and ethnicity and language were all significant in structuring access to and engagement with networks.

Conclusion

Women who moved to the Costa Blanca benefited from fluid movement across national borders in the EU since 1992; that is mobility. However, once they settled in Spain, they found that they were effectively living in bounded settlements, almost exclusively with people from their own ethnic group. This 'enclosure' was compounded for these women by the fact that they lived in urbanisations which were marketed for specific nationalities. Their ethnic identity was effectively reinforced by their dislocation from their hosts, their inability to speak Spanish, and their diasporic status (Temple 1999, Anthias 2002). Significantly, retirement migration is different from migration among people of working age in two significant ways. First, since retirees are no longer working, their opportunities for participation in the host country are limited. Further, as noted previously, these women used bonding social capital which compounded this (Putnam 2000). They

were unable to 'bridge' to people outside of their ethnic group, unless they spoke English.

The women in this study were unable to assimilate with their hosts. They lived on the margins of Spanish society which maintained boundaries and influenced their sense of belonging. They generally did not perceive themselves as being foreign or as immigrants, but rather as the 'norm' and other nationalities and languages as 'other'. This demonstrates a high priority being placed on being British out of context and belonging represented as ethnic identity. A further complexity here was how the women talked of their status as 'foreign'. Many of the women talked of the Spanish as being the foreigners, even though they were the host population and in this sense being from the UK and speaking English was often positioned as an overarching norm, sometimes used to minimise the issues associated with not speaking Spanish.

The women in my study can be described as 'transmigrants' (Cronin 2006; O'Reilly 2000, 2003, 2007a) since they were from one place and of another. They reconstructed their ethnic identity in Spain, in part through networks with other migrants from the UK. Further, their isolation from the host population reinforced their British ethnic identity. This group are also a diaspora, which can be understood as an alternative way of thinking about transnational migration since the condition of 'diasporicity' is being *from* one place and *of* another (Anthias 1998). Within the concept of diaspora, ethnic bonds are a central, primary defining element, although identity formation is fluid and related to relationships with country of origin and individual and group consciousness (Ngan 2008). Although they were not forced to leave their homes, they were influenced still by the push and pull models of migration. They occupy spaces which are often separate from the host population and tend to network with their compatriots.

Being situated in 'diaspora space' (Brah 1996) on the margins in Spain highlights the significance of location in shaping any group and individual identity (Temple 1999) and provides further evidence of the links between place, networks and ethnic identity. Given that 'a sense of or concern with, belonging becomes activated most strongly when there is a sense of exclusion' (Anthias 2006 p. 21), focusing on how people experience belonging to places, networks and ethnic group can illuminate how they achieve intimacy with the world in the absence of that intimacy when they are out of context. Belonging therefore can be understood to represent being or feeling *a part of rather than apart from* which reflects both

intimacy and distance and encompasses places, networks and ethnic group. This denotes the multi-dimensional, complex and overlapping nature of different forms of belonging.

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The Concept of the Self in Explaining Post-1989 Bulgarian Physicians' Emigration

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Abstract. This article presents the results of the methodological and empirical efforts for exploring and understanding the emigration of Bulgarian physicians, after 1989. The study applies a biographical approach through a conceptual framework, which utilizes concepts from social theory and social anthropology. Using in-depth interviewing as the main research tool, complemented by a secondary data gathering technique, the study offers an explanation of the migration decision as generated in a conflict of the migrant's understanding of his/her self and of the desired relation of the self to society on one hand and the migrant's understanding of his/her society on the other. The concept of the self (self-identity, self-consciousness) proves effective in explaining the migration decision.

Keywords: *migration, Bulgarian physicians, biographical approach, self*

Introduction

The research question of the study to be presented, stated briefly, is 'Why do Bulgarian physicians emigrate?'. The application of qualitative methods would answer it successfully because they present effective tools for understanding unexplored migrations and for studying them in their depth and integrity. The aim of the paper is to give as complete as possible picture of the core findings of the study.

Approach and Conceptual Framework

Exploring Bulgarian physicians' migration in its depth and integrity could be achieved only through the application of an approach which main characteristics

are perceptive openness and non-selective sensitivity. That is why the biographical approach was chosen as giving good opportunities to grasp the multilayered nature of reality.

With regards to migration research in general the application of the biographical approach in the study would contribute to 'acknowledging the non-economic worlds of migration decision-making'¹ and overcoming the 'economisation of migration'².

The migration under study has a concrete positioning in time - after the year of 1989. This is a time of post-traditional order, of modernity. And as Giddens states, 'Modernity opens up the project of the self'³ understood as 'reflexively developing a coherent self-identity'⁴. In this way the functioning of contemporary social life brings to centre stage the individual's self-identity in understanding and explaining his/her behaviour. It is in this light that we could understand the following idea concerning the application of the biographical approach - to conceptualise migration as an expression of identity rather than behaviour⁵.

From the adoption of this perspective followed the formulation of the thesis of the present study - explanation of the migration decision of Bulgarian physicians should be searched for in the self-identity of the migrant in its human totality and not in one or several of its aspects.

In order to concretise the idea of self-identity as a basis of the conceptual framework of the study we deployed the advancements on this issue made by Anthony Cohen⁶.

According to Cohen⁷ 'any individual must be regarded as a multi-dimensional self' and self-identity is the 'symbolisation' of that self, a 'self-conception'⁸. Through the acquisition of experience the individual constructs

¹ Keith Halfacree, "A Utopian Imagination in Migration's Terra Incognita? Acknowledging the Non - Economic Worlds of Migration Decision - Making," *Population, Space and Place* 10 (2004): 239, doi: 10.1002/psp.326.

² Halfacree, "A Utopian Imagination in Migration's Terra Incognita", 247.

³ Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 196.

⁴ Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, 200.

⁵ Paul Boyle, Keith Halfacree and Vaughan Robinson, *Exploring Contemporary Migration* (New York: Longman, 1998).

⁶ Anthony Cohen, *Self Consciousness. An Alternative Anthropology of Identity*. (London: Routledge, 1994).

⁷ Cohen, *Self Consciousness*, 7.

⁸ Cohen, *Self Consciousness*, 29.

his/her world, building it up from his/her perceptions of his/her self, of the society with which he/she interacts and of his/her relationship to that society. And here follows the central to the present study statement of Cohen that the individual's world, imbued with meaning by him/herself, presents a point of departure for his/her behaviour. Or in Cohen's words⁹ – 'the self, located in time and space and subject to the subordinate forces of society and culture, constitutes his/her world as meaningful and *behaves accordingly*'.

Addressing this concept, for the purpose of the present study, would mean to search for explanation of the migration decision of Bulgarian physicians in their understanding of their selves, of Bulgarian society and of their relationship to it.

Data Gathering

In-depth interviewing was chosen as the appropriate qualitative method. The interview guidelines and the interviewing strategy took their final form with the help of two pilot interviews.

With regards to the format of the study – exploring migration using the data resources of the country of origin – the potential respondents present an 'invisible' group. There are no formal data sets allowing identification, finding and contacting Bulgarian physicians who have emigrated after 1989. That is why, as recommended in such cases, the sampling technique of 'snowballing' was applied. Thus through informal networks ten interviews were conducted. They were undertaken in Bulgaria in the period from March to November 2007 during a visit of the migrants to their home country. In the analysis process we also utilise the empirical material from the two pilot interviews - those aspects of their content that help better explore the problem under study.

The average duration of the interviews is 1.3 hours.

A second data gathering technique was sought in order to complement and elaborate the interview analysis. The chosen technique has a questionnaire format and uses the Internet¹⁰. The questionnaire form followed closely the interview guidelines and gave respondents as often as possible the opportunity to freely formulate their answer. As a result the questionnaire form could be characterised as quite detailed – its completion required one to two hours. Consequently, the

⁹ Cohen, *Self Consciousness*, 191. (*my emphasis*)

¹⁰ The questionnaire format is realised using an Internet site and e-mail.

adequate analysis of the empirical material is principally incompatible with the big number of respondents common to typical questionnaire surveys.

The legitimacy to use the questionnaire format in the context of the present study is partly based on the perspective that 'a biographic approach to the conceptualisation of human migration promotes (although *not exclusively*) a very in-depth qualitative methodological approach towards primary fieldwork'¹¹. And also on the fact that the empirical material gathered through the questionnaire format plays in the analysis a secondary, complementary role to the generated through interviewing material.

Respondents

All 37 respondents in the study, the two pilot interviewees including, are Bulgarian physicians¹², long-term migrants¹³ who have emigrated from Bulgaria in the years after 1989. The 37 migrations under study have a time span determined by the first in chronological order migration in 1991 and the last in 2004. In order to show the distribution of the 37 migrations in this time span, three relatively homogenous periods were determined with regards to political and economic conditions. The number of the studied migrations within each period is as follows: nine (9) for the period 1991-1995; twelve (12) for 1996-1999 and sixteen (16) for 2000-2004.

With regards to country of immigration the majority of respondents migrated to old EU member states and USA; South Africa, Australia, Jamaica, Israel and Turkey are presented by one respondent each. At the moment of taking the interview six of all interviewees are in their 30-ies, two – in their 40-ies, one – in their fifties, and one at the age of 65. Among all interviewees women have a smaller share – the ratio of male to female participants is 7:3. The two pilot interviewees are men in their thirties.

Among the respondents to the questionnaire women slightly prevail, taking 60%-share. With regards to age structure – the leading one is the group of 30-35 years of age (40%), followed by the 36-40 years of age (32%) and the 41-45 years of age (16%). At the last place are the aged below 30 and above 45 – with one representative each.

¹¹ Halfacree, "A Utopian Imagination in Migration's Terra Incognita", 241. (*my emphasis*)

¹² Bulgarian physicians – Bulgarian citizens who have graduated as MDs from a Bulgarian university and who were practicing their profession in Bulgaria prior to their emigration.

¹³ Long-term migrant – a migrant that resides outside his/her country of origin for more than one year.

Findings

In this part we are going to see the conceptual framework 'at work'. Due to the writing fallacy the three elements of the conceptual framework may resemble a static constellation but in reality they interact intensively. And it is in this interaction that we should look for the answer to the research question. The analysis revealed that it is the interaction between the element 'migrant's understanding of Bulgarian society' and the other two elements - understanding of one's self and of his/her relation to society - that presents the 'ferment' of migration decision-making because it turned out to be an 'arena' of serious for the migrant's self conflicts. In order to present this interaction in an explicit way given the limited volume of the paper the following presentation strategy is taken. A focus is selected the purpose of which is to give a more elaborate picture of the elements' interaction. This focus falls on the interaction of the element 'understanding of one's relation to society' and an aspect of the element 'understanding of Bulgarian society'. It is specially chosen because of its potential to preserve the other elements of the analysis implicitly present and in this way to allow the whole to be seen through one of its parts.

'Understanding one's relationship to society' and 'Understanding Bulgarian Society' in interaction

The picture of the desired relation to society builds on a number of aspects. Each of them is presented on its own as well as in interaction with social reality. Thus the points of conflict or discontinuity for the self with its reality are revealed and their role for the formation of migration decision is brought to light.

A. *Giving meaning to one's path of life.* This aspect revealed itself in two forms which are found independently as well as combined. Very strong is the presence of the first form – giving meaning to one's life through realisation of the inner impulse and need to be of help to people. The second form is striving for perfection of one's self. It is understood by some respondents as an integral development of the self while others understand it as a predominant development of *one* aspect of the self – professional identity. The former case is well illustrated by interviewee №10 for whom self-perfection is directed to acquiring worldly wisdom understood as true knowledge of one's inner and outer world. When acquired it brings emotional

orderliness and clarity and manifests as peacefulness. Interviewee №7 can be an example of the latter case. For him/her 'Life is full when you have aim every day. ... the struggle to achieve your goal is what makes your life – this is happiness.' At the same time it is professional goals that emerge as leading and predominant. Thus the understanding of self-development is significantly narrowed. A prerequisite for this narrowing is the understanding Bulgarian society and physicians traditionally hold of the medical profession and of the 'good doctor' – as exceptionally high level intellectual and moral practice. Interviewee №7 also shares this perspective: '[People] have always treated [physicians] with great respect – they treated us as individuals who are great persons.' From here it is very easy to pass on to automatic association and identification of the practicing of the medical profession with the integral and fulfilling development of the self. As a result of this narrowing, professional realisation is overloaded with the role of the main meaning giving activity in life. Thus in the moment of attaining the existing professional aims the potential for self-development is perceived as exhausted and the path of life as empty: 'You reach the top of your profession and from that point on – what?!' What follows is a deep life crisis – emptying and losing the sense for one's self: ' ... and you start to lose your individuality'. Feelings of melancholy, indifference and meaninglessness arise: ' ... to stay at the top and to feel dumb ... we felt depressed.' Making this crisis come faster and run deeper is the need and expectation professional aims to be determined from the outside – to be pointed at and demanded. Thus professional realisation as meaning giving activity is itself limited and dependent on existing formal professional opportunities.

As we can expect in these two different cases migration attains different existential meaning. For interviewee №10 migration provides new, unfamiliar context able to challenge the taken for granted and thus give him/her the opportunity to gain 'rich life experience', to 'better know myself' and to 'grow up faster through life experience'. Interviewee №9 takes a similar stance towards migration – aspiring to refine his/her behaviour and outlook on life. He/she perceives migration as offering the right context for change because 'when a person lives abroad it is common to acquire the qualities of the people that surround him/her.' While for interviewee №7 migration presents access to an elaborate system of formal rules for professional development and career advancement every stage of which leads to another that, even if final, offers an infinite spiral of requirements and opportunities. In this way migration gives

interviewee №7 the opportunity to satisfy his/her perpetual striving for new professional goals even if they differ only in context from those already achieved: 'And we don't let it go this empty way and always search for something new and new, and new ... And now I am at the very start [of my career] again.'

Points of conflict or discontinuity for the self with its reality. Interviewee №10 needs what he/she has taken for granted in his/her self to be questioned and challenged in order to strengthen his/her self-awareness and self-knowledge which to serve as ground for self-development. Interviewee №9 needs models that with their intensity of experience permeate his/her self and change it. Both of them need an outer trigger for inner change and according to their understandings of Bulgarian society they do not find it there. So what their selves face in Bulgarian society as they understand it is a point of discontinuity for the self that questions the desired way for self-development. And this opens up space for a different place - migration.

The example of interviewee №7 continues in the following way. According to his/her understanding of the functioning of the medical profession in Bulgaria there is no comprehensive system that can satisfy his/her aspirations for professional development and career advancement. There are no formal requirements: 'And nobody tells you "Why don't you write something? Why don't you discover something?" And even if somebody does, it is not in the system – nobody formally demands this from you.' There are insufficient opportunities for professional development: ' ... you take your specialty and training ends. From that point on – nothing.' There is poor network of professional positions: 'And there are only two possible positions here – physician and head of clinic. If you are to have an opportunity to become head of clinic, your head of clinic either has to die or to quit.' What becomes evident in this example is that the meaningful way for self-development collides with the self's reality. The result is a crisis in giving meaning to one's life which leads to perceiving one's lifetime as empty and wasted: 'And we felt dumb because our life went in going to work, patients, salary ... And you stay and waste your time.' And it is this conflict experienced by the self that generates a significant impetus for taking the decision to migrate: 'I have thought that I would never leave Bulgaria. This thought [for migrating] has never occurred to my mind, unless ... there was no light in the tunnel for our professional development.'

B. *Life goals.* Life goals stem from the way the self gives meaning to life and present concrete forms for its realisation. In this sense they reflect in each

respondent a definite idea for life satisfaction. The analysis brought out four groups of life goals which are presented according to their prevalence among respondents.

Life goals related to professional realisation among interviewees form a spectrum that starts with the more common aim to specialise in a preferred medical field and to receive good remuneration, goes through acquiring high quality training in a definite specialty and ends with the difficult and ambitious aims for gaining excellent professional reputation, acquiring one of the highest academic ranks and founding a modern centre for treatment of a socially significant disease.

Points of conflict or discontinuity for the self with its reality. Interviewee №4 serves as a good illustration of how the problematic status of this aspect can trigger a migration decision. The socialist policy of training physicians for export according to interviewee №4 and other respondents has been still valid in the first years of the transition period in Bulgaria. This overproduction of medical doctors interviewee №4 sees as an important problematic aspect of the functioning of the medical profession and names it as 'the unnecessary graduates'. Logically overproduction leads to unemployment and impossibility for specialization. Here are the words of interviewee №4 that show how such a life situation is lived through. It is interesting to mention that this quote is taken from six consecutive minutes of the interview. Interviewee №4: 'We were unnecessary. We were all unnecessary graduates [1993]. We were unnecessary to Bulgaria. ... And here I say again we were unnecessary graduates. We were kicked out almost from everywhere. ... We were unnecessary ... we were all unnecessary graduates. ... The senior physicians insisted to show us that we were unnecessary. ... We were unnecessary to Bulgaria.' What is more than evident in these words is the feeling of being unneeded. Its destructive influence on the self is painfully experienced and is clearly present. The feeling of being unneeded and the objective fact of being redundant and unemployed are experienced as cul-de-sac: '... we were driven to the wall. All of us were driven to the wall.' And a way out is migration: '... "The absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously." And this was my case. ... I did not have any choice – I had to do it [migrate].'

Among *life goals related to family life* stand out those focused on children – their education, prospects for success in life, way of life. These three aspects emerge as connected – giving good education to children secures them better chances for success in life and for better way of life. Actually, the main aim of these migrant parents is to keep this connection real for their children – they want just

social logic. As interviewee №7 informs us 'I wanted my child to live in a just society. ... to be equal to those on her level ... get what she deserves.'

Points of conflict or discontinuity for the self with its reality. As a result of corruption the child of interviewee №7 studied together with children who have not passed the secondary school entry exams. This fact was known to both parents and children and had destructive effects especially on educational achievements. Such is the messed up social logic from which interviewee №7 wants to take his/her child out through migration and which he/she determines as 'one of our main motives'. The migration of interviewee №4 is also a response to a similar perverse social logic. It imposes itself on the children in their everyday life and weakens the value of the parents' professional choice. Thus, the desired intergenerational professional succession is hindered: 'It was a problem for me to explain to my children why they should become physicians. This is a very good profession. Provided, however, that they saw the children of *'mympume'*¹⁴ whose needs were satisfied more than enough and whose parents had almost no education. How can I convince a child that the medical profession is good and at the same time tell it that chocolate is bad for health because of calories while I do not have the money to buy it?!' Interviewee №4 reveals another problematic aspect. Of very high significance for him/her is that his/her communication with his/her children is of full value: '... this is the fundamental thing that is important.' And here is the social reality with which interviewee №4 confronts in this respect: [because of insufficient income] '... I had to work in [city X] while my family was in [city Y]. In this way I lost three years in which I could not watch my children grow. ... It was here that the full-value communication with my children was threatened.'

Material well-being as a life goal is understood by respondents as independent meeting of one's own and family vital needs excluding superfluity and wastefulness. Material support to close relatives is also present - explicitly for some respondents or implicitly for others. The meaning of migrants' words on material well-being - 'descent income', 'to be able to live normally', 'financial independence', 'to earn one's money without being dependent on somebody' - is undoubtedly relative but it becomes clearer when looked through the social reality of the migration decision.

¹⁴ Read as [mutri] and literally translated as 'mugs'. A social phenomenon of the transition period - usually low educated persons conspicuously consuming income from grey economic activities. (Emiliya Pernishka, Diana Blagoeva and Siya Kolkovska, Dictionary of the New Words and Acceptations in Bulgarian Language. (Sofia: Nauka & izkustvo Ltd., 2003), 178. (in Bulgarian).

Points of conflict or discontinuity for the self with its reality. The experience of three of the interviewees serves as good illustration to this aspect. The income they received did not guarantee subsistence for them and their families. It was not sufficient for providing the needed for subsistence food. And here are the words of two of the interviewees in no need of comment: '... absurd. With what I received as remuneration it was absolutely impossible to do it [provide one's subsistence] ... If under subsistence it is understood to have one bread and a yoghurt per day, maybe it was possible. But I do not think that these are the normal living needs.' (interviewee №10); 'It is not about some sort of a standard of living for the family – we are not going to discuss such a thing at all. We are talking simply about food. There were periods [2001 - 2004] when the situation was so tragic that we could not afford to have wholesome food – bread, beans and some other things. Words are failing me ...' (interviewee №2).

An example of *life goals related to the perfection of one's self* presents interviewee №10. Through his/her migration decision interviewee №10 sought to bring desired changes to his/her self – 'to become more active' in life – and to gain confidence in the veracity of the understanding he/she holds of his/her self by testing and 'proving' it.

C. The meaning behind the choice of the medical profession. A common characteristic for all respondents is the presence of their concept for a meaningfully living self in the idea they hold of the medical profession. As a result of this identification the medical profession is perceived as an opportunity to bring to reality the concept of the self, i.e. as an opportunity to be oneself. This can be seen in the words of interviewee №7 for whom the idea of not being a physician is extremely destructive to the self: '... the psychological moment of not being a physician anymore ... is killing.' The identification takes two directions. The leading one is that of putting into the choice of the medical profession the meaning that fills one's path of life. In this sense some of the respondents perceive the practice of the medical profession as an opportunity to be of help to people and others – to develop one's self through enriching one's understanding of human nature and being. The words of interviewee №9 illustrate this point well. From the meaning that fills his/her life – 'to have the opportunity to be of help to people' – grows his/her choice of the medical profession – '... and I have always perceived my profession as an opportunity to be of help to people ... with my work, with my approach.' The second direction presents the medical profession as an opportunity

to fully realise one's inherent intellectual potential and natural aptitude. Attractive features of the medical profession like its prestige, internationalisation, security and good income have come out as secondary in importance as they were mentioned by few respondents and explicitly criticised and rejected by a considerable share of interviewees.

Points of conflict or discontinuity for the self with its reality. The striving of respondents to practice the medical profession as an opportunity to be of help to people takes part in some major collisions with reality. One of them is generated by a structural change in the healthcare system – the introduction of financial incentives in the physician-patient relationship. The core of the conflict is clearly seen in the words of interviewee №1: 'The physician should cure the ill in order to cure them ... He/she cannot cure a patient in order to take money from him/her ... because compassion and the desire to profit materially are mutually exclusive.' Interviewee №6 reveals the conflict mechanism - the change has led to replacement of the central to the medical profession motivation – to cure: ' ... becoming managers of their own enterprises [physicians] have to pursue definite economic interests. ... they are more and more forced to put in the centre of their work their own interests and just after that the interests of the patients.' For two of the interviewees the consequences of this conflict have significant effect on the generation of the migration decision.

The second conflicting aspect of reality comes from low incomes and even poverty in the general population. And that means poor patients. From the premise of the treatment process which undoubtedly involves 'material' intervention success requires materially able to cooperate partners. If a patient is not able to provide for him/her-self wholesome food and buy the necessary medications then the efforts of physicians to help are rendered senseless. Quite illustrative are the words of two interviewees (№10, №5): 'It is impossible for a pensioner [this is the population most often in need of healthcare] to live with one hundred leva [a monthly pension of 50 Euros] normally. He/she cannot buy ... elementary food to feed him/herself ... from this point on there is nothing to be talked about.'; ' ... and I am forced to make compromises with the fact that the patient does not have money and I have to treat him/her with a medication that I know is of no help.' The last words of interviewee №5 'is of no help' are clearly in conflict with the migrant physicians striving to be of help, to be physicians. Thus not being able to be of help they have become migrants in order to be physicians. Here it is necessary to

mention that this conflict contributed to the migration decision only after no way was seen to overcome it. An illustrative example is the one-year practice of interviewee №10 in a small town – that physician used a considerable part of his/her own insufficient income to buy the medications for the poor patients. A doomed to failure solution.

D. *Professional aspirations.* If the above aspect shows *what* is sought and achieved through the practice of the medical profession this aspect presents *how* it is preferred to be done. And the answer is by being a 'good doctor'. The ethos of the idea of the 'good doctor' manifests in the high importance attached by almost all respondents to fulfilment and content from the well-performed work, and to professional activity and diligence. The words of two interviewees (№9, №0) serve as examples: '... to be good ... in one's profession to the degree of perfection'; '... to be proud with one's work and to strive that it is of the best quality possible.' A deeper and more concrete focus reveals professionalism, humaneness, and abiding moral norms as embodying respondents' understanding of the 'good doctor'. This understanding represents on the one hand the attractive image of the medical profession with which the respondent's concept of the self is in resonance. While on the other hand it is the prime professional aspiration from which arise all other aspirations and towards which it acts as a constant corrective. From the three elements of the idea of the 'good doctor' professionalism is essentially important for professional identity. That is why many of the professional aspirations of respondents ensue from their understanding of professionalism. These include: acquiring and practicing quality knowledge from the progress of medical science and for some respondents participating in its generation; knowing and using up-to-date diagnostic and curative technologies. In this sense respondents aspire to active participation in the international exchange of medical knowledge and its application, i.e. to the practice of medicine at good international level.

Points of conflict or discontinuity for the self with its reality. Almost none of respondents' professional aspirations find their counterpart in reality. In order to be acquired knowledge should be first handed down. Two interviewees point to this self-evident condition as quite problematic. According to interviewee №4 this barrier to acquiring knowledge stems from 'a serious problem which is not talked about' – the strongly deteriorating inter-colleague relationships. As a root cause for this situation interviewee №4 sees a structural change in the healthcare system – the introduction of privately paid specialisations. It had a very important

consequence - bringing in the medical profession of the idea that '... medicine is a craft that has to be stolen and is not given ... and that everyone whom you teach something is a potential competitor for you' (interviewee №4). The resulting general atmosphere as described by interviewee №4 is: '... senior physicians are suspicious towards junior physicians, junior physicians hate senior physicians, junior physicians hate each other, which is the same for senior physicians'. And interviewee №9 gives concrete examples through which this atmosphere manifests: senior physicians perceive junior physicians as a threat to their professional position which starts a defensive reaction towards them. Thus junior physicians are not given opportunities for demonstrating and proving their capabilities, their high professional successes are left unnoticed, they are not assigned to positions adequate to their professional level and in some cases confront purposefully erected walls that hamper their professional progress. In this way respondents' aspiration for gaining and practicing quality knowledge collides with serious barriers in reality. For some respondents this conflict has taken part in the formation of the migration decision or in reinforcing it.

Another barrier to this striving presents a formal characteristic of the healthcare system – it has a poorly designed system for professional development and progress that offers 'low horizons' and scarce opportunities. In this way the majority of respondents face a barrier or rather a void in trying to realise a significant professional striving. The words of a number of interviewees illustrate the consequences: '... at that moment what I missed was an opportunity to achieve something more in my professional development ... before migrating ... I had the feeling that I had achieved what was there to be achieved ... I did not know what followed ... I was in a standstill.' (interviewee №6); 'I had the feeling that I mark time. ... Nothing happened in life professionally.' (interviewee №9); '... as if in a standstill and you ask yourself – you have come to here and from this point on?! And you see that there is almost no development. ... There was no normal development in healthcare ... and you cannot say "yes, I'll be here and learn something new". Everything went down and we stood in a standstill.' (interviewee №2). For most interviewees the described situation took part in migration decision-making in a quite explicit way. Some examples are: 'My aim was to continue my professional development which I did not see as possible here.' (interviewee №7); '... to see something new ... to learn things we'll not learn here.' (interviewee №2); 'Of course, this was exactly why I migrated.' (interviewee №8). Interviewee №6



presents an interesting viewpoint on this barrier – perceiving it as a sign that Bulgarian healthcare does not need the physicians whose potential goes beyond the professional horizons set by it. From this understanding interviewee №6 states: ‘... before I migrated I gave eight years to my country to find out whether it needed me or not.’

The poor system for professional development and progress has another not easily seen consequence. It canalises physicians’ striving for professional development and career in a wrong direction – towards the space for advancement opened up by the introduced financial incentives. In this way success starts to be measured through the number of patients served and the financial benefit brought by them. Interviewee №7 describes this phenomenon as a struggle for patients in which there are no winners: ‘... and you start to compete for patients ... You want patients and think about getting them but you do not think about professional development.’ As a factor contributing to this situation interviewee №6 sees the general change in values in society during the transition period – turning success and its material dimensions into major criteria for life satisfaction: ‘... this whole change in society towards measuring progress through material values and success or failure.’ In this way two parallel and contradictory value systems start to function in the medical profession – one in which the central value is satisfaction from well-performed work and respect as its outer measure and another for which work is mainly a means for making money while a well-done job is measured through material gains. And this situation drags respondents into a value conflict. A negative form of materialism is one of the most discussed points of conflict. It is described by interviewee №2 as excessive and violating core human values: ‘Materialism not within normal limits – to aim at material well-being, but materialism in its other form – ignoring significant things in human relations just for getting to something totally material.’ Its main manifestations are dishonest practices in the professional and inter-colleague relations planes. Interviewee №2 points out some of their frequently visible aspects - irresponsibility, egocentricity, struggle for power at the expense of others. Dishonest practices succeed in supplanting honesty and correctness in inter-colleague relations and in the achievement of professional goals and this presents one of the most painful for respondents point of conflict. Lack of openness, hypocritical and malevolent behaviour, ‘embitterment’, ‘bringing out the brute in oneself’ characterise inert-colleague relations.

The described contradiction between the two different systems can be seen as a multilayered value conflict. Each of its layers contributes to the formation of the migration decision. The first layer is that of conscious awareness that there is a value conflict. For a considerable part of respondents being aware of a value conflict and 'witnessing' its manifestations has contributed to migration decision-making. Respondents reveal two mechanisms with regards to influence on migration decision. One is the desire to distance oneself from the environment of the conflict. The other operates through professional satisfaction. The existence and the successes of the conflicting value system lower the satisfaction from the benefits one's own value system brings. Thus a desire is generated to prove the strengths of one's own value system and strengthen the satisfaction its results bring. This is seen as being possible through achievement of new professional aims and horizons in a value friendly context. The second layer is related to the fact that good professional results and progress in general require consonance and medicine is in general a team-based activity. Therefore the presence of value conflicts can have very deteriorating effects on professional development and progression. As the above description suggests the experienced value conflict provokes numerous interpersonal conflicts that not only generate negative working atmosphere but also hinder good professional interaction. The third layer is that of experiencing the conflict. In the words of two interviewees the value conflict brought to the self feelings of embitterment, burden, stress. Here again two mechanisms with regards to influence on migration decision emerge. Interviewee №2 describes one of them as impossibility to overcome the value conflict and free one's self from its negative consequences. The result is a self that incorporates negative aspects from the conflict and starts to spread them through one's own behaviour: 'We are in this social milieu, we worked in this social milieu and there is no way not to get entangled ... sometimes even in one's embitterment on the side of the bad ones – you attack someone without a reason.' In this way migration comes out as an opportunity to free the self and thus let it be more authentic: 'And this is a significant factor for our decision to *get away from here*. And not only for my decision – many colleagues from the clinic left for very similar reasons.' (interviewee №2). Interviewee №10 reveals the other mechanism. In trying to overcome the consequences of the conflict – high level of constant stress, danger of being turned into object of dishonest practices or into their accomplice – the self loses much of its inner resources that are necessary for good professional

functioning, i.e. for successful pursuing of one's major life striving. Or in interviewee №10 words: '... to protect oneself from the immoral [colleagues]. The people that can mislead you ... And this pushes out the most important for a professional – you start to think about things that push aside the main purpose of the physician.' Thus migration again comes out as an opportunity for the self to be in an authentic way.

All these points of conflict hamper achieving professionalism as understood by respondents and play significant role in the formation of the migration decision.

Knowing and using up-to-date diagnostic and curative technologies is the other aspect of professional aspirations that has no counterpart in reality. In this respect of central importance are the conditions of the working process, i.e. availability of material professional resources. According to interviewees they are 'inadequate, to put it mildly', 'extremely impeding the working process', 'more than bad', 'heavy', 'misery', 'primitive'. Behind these evaluations stand morally old equipment to the degree of backwardness, a limited range of medicines usually of low effectiveness, physically old equipment that more often than not is out of order, old transport vehicles for patients, low availability of consumables, etc. As becomes clear respondents lack opportunities to perform and develop professionally in the way they understand it. And this plays a significant role in the formation of the migration decision as the words of interviewee №10 well illustrate: 'And this is one of the reasons I have migrated – to develop as a physician in a much better way ... While here it is difficult to reach such a level.' The extremeness of the evaluations above suggests the second and more important effect with regards to migration decision. This state of the conditions of the working process, especially the poor availability of medicines, compromises the whole curative process and thus renders professional functioning meaningless. An illustrative example is given by interviewee №2. The availability of medicines at his/her workplace (a university hospital) has been constantly worsening for a number of years reaching a state when key drugs are missing: '... in the end [year 2004] we were forced to work with one or two drugs, and we lacked the most important medicines which were crucial for our patients. ... The hospital pharmacy was simply empty. So!?' This situation according to interviewee №2 confronts the physician with the following dilemma – either to stop taking patients, i.e. stop practicing, or try to help patients breaking a number of legal regulations, i.e. becoming a criminal: 'You have either to break the law ... to be a criminal, for which

you are going to be sanctioned any moment, or simply leave the patient in the street.' This is a dilemma that cannot be solved – either 'exit' is destructive to the self: 'The cruellest dilemma.' (interviewee №2). The words of interviewee №10 add some details to this important destructive conflict for the self: ' ... here you simply have to forget about morality in order to continue. You cannot keep your eyes shut when your patient is dying and it is not possible for you to prescribe him/her a medicine that exists ... And these are the moral obstacles, moral compromises that you have to make as a physician.' The nature of the conflict and the way it is experienced are quite explicit in the words of interviewee №10: 'We as physicians want to help the patient in any way possible and not being able to is the heaviest burden. And you know that these are material things that can be delivered, but you do not have them. And this is a very heavy burden.' For interviewee №2 this conflict creates a feeling of being trapped, caught in a standstill, facing an insurmountable hindrance, impotence. A way out is migration: ' ... and when a person confronts so many walls and he/she says to his/herself why should I stay here and wrack my brains!?' In the words of interviewee №10 it is clearly visible that the conflict is not only about being a good professional but it also reaches the central to the self striving to render help to people by being a physician: ' ... the social realisation as a physician, because every one of us studies this profession with the idea to give help to people. And you see that for a physician in Bulgaria this is quite difficult to do.' And here again migration comes out as an opportunity for the self to be in a more authentic way.

E. *Professional expectations.* While professional aspirations present that part of the interaction with society in which respondents are active professional expectations put forward the idea of their activity being reflected and coming back to them as sources of satisfaction. At the centre of professional satisfaction stands receiving positive feedback from patients with regards to achieved diagnostic or treatment results. Its contribution to professional satisfaction is first in significance and almost beyond comparison with that of others. It is followed by remuneration in its multiple dimensions – expression of the positive feedback from employer and society, i.e. their appreciation of physicians' work; means for meeting one's own and family vital needs and for maintaining good professional level. Another important expectation is professional development and progression to be based on knowledge, skills and capabilities.

Points of conflict or discontinuity for the self with its reality. It is the last two

professional expectations that come into serious conflicts with reality. With regards to remuneration the points of conflict are numerous. As a whole they stem from different kinds of mismatches. The received remuneration does not correspond adequately to the level of qualification and intensity of labour and to growing responsibilities. In this way it rather gives a negative feedback from employer and society. It is also disconnected from the requirements for professional development. This is clearly seen in the words of interviewee №5: 'It is not possible to have to buy a textbook in paediatrics for 150 euros and at the same time to receive a salary that is 150 euros. How can I buy this textbook?! How can I read this textbook?!' A requirement exists that physicians should deliver their labour in a predictable and consistent way with clearly set time limits while their remuneration is characterised with 'absolute uncertainty' (interviewee №2) with regards to formation and time. The expectation that remuneration should allow meeting one's own and family vital needs is also unmet. This is well illustrated by interviewee №2: 'At one moment I had to work in three places and my spouse [also a physician] on two positions in order to roughly succeed in securing an income for subsistence.' Due to taxing policies the result from this attempt to overcome remuneration shortcomings is only physical and mental exhaustion. All these points of conflict feed into the migration decision – migration is seen by respondents as an opportunity to receive an adequate material appraisal for their labour and to escape 'poverty', 'misery', 'dependence', 'financial insecurity'. The most serious for the self consequence from the conflict is revealed by interviewee №5. The difficulty in meeting the basic living needs disrupts adequate professional functioning and does not allow for practicing at a good professional level: 'And when I come back home I think how to get money to repair this or that ... or that the school demands money ... when my brain is busy in such a way I turn from a physician into a murderer ... I cannot deliver even forty percent of my capacity.' As a result of extreme material conditions the self starts to shrink in order to survive. Professional interaction with patients is one of the aspects from which the self begins to withdraw: 'When I am not paid for my labour, it is the patient who suffers. ... Because I have my close people ... that interest me most and all the others start to fade out, go to the periphery. ... but this is a protective reaction. I, too, need to survive.' Experiencing this situation is hardly bearable in intellectual and emotional terms and is defined as 'perversion' that traps the self and brings very deep dissatisfaction. In this way migration emerges as an opportunity for the self to regain integrity and fullness.

The expectation that professional development and progression should be based on knowledge, skills and capabilities also collides with reality. The conflict has multiple layers each of which contributes to the formation of the migration decision. In this respect what respondents find in reality is ‘bureaucracy’¹⁵, ‘corruption’, ‘cronyism’ which operate at all levels – entry exams to medical universities, university exams, competitions for specialisation and working positions. The first layer of the conflict is the barrier it creates for professional practice. In this respect very illustrative are the words of interviewee №4, one of the three excellent graduates of his/her university: ‘And I realised that if I stay in Bulgaria, I’ll simply be a loser. And not because I’m incapable, but because the conditions are going to be against me. And much more mediocre people than me are going to be much more successful just for being the children of professors in medicine.’ The second layer is a value dimension and relates to ‘the way things ought to be done’ (interviewee №0) - knowledge, skills and capabilities are the just criteria for access to professional resources. An example in this respect is given by interviewee №0 who wants and tries to advance on his/her professional path by applying this value: ‘... when a person wants to do something, he/she wants to be absolutely equal, to accomplish it without patronage, but simply ... according to his/her skills and capabilities. But it did not work for me in this way and this contributed very much to making the more cardinal decision [migration].’ The mechanism of influence on migration decision in this respect can take another form as the experience of interviewee №4 informs. The values that regulate access to professional resources which are also the values of respondents, are challenged by new and negative ones. Thus professional life is regulated by different and contradictory values which leads to confusion and unpredictability in achieving goals. In this way migration emerges as an opportunity to regain control over professional life – to practice in a context where definite rules bring definite aims and results. Or as interviewee №4 puts it: ‘Then I decided that I have to take things in my hands and that I could not let myself be tossed to and fro. And thus I decided to leave.’ The third layer is related to the level of professionalism. Put succinctly a corrupt system cannot deliver high levels of professionalism. Interviewee №10 gives details on this point. According to him/her the physicians that take advantage of corrupt practices are holders of corrupted moral and competence which are

¹⁵ Bureaucracy here means lack of effectively working transparent system for competitions that guarantees abiding of formal rules.



incompatible with a high level of professionalism: '... a person like this in no way can become a good specialist.' As can be expected corrupted physicians quickly succeed in taking leading positions of key importance for the functioning of the medical profession in the respective healthcare facility: 'They took the best positions and one day these people were going to determine what medicines should be used in a definite situation and what medical tests to be performed.' And here comes out an important mechanism for migration decision-making – the perspective that one's professional practice depends on incompetent and morally corrupt colleagues is unacceptable and generates the idea to distance oneself: 'And this thing, too, made me search for solutions for me because I did not want to work with such people ... they have no idea of basic things and one day you are going to depend on them. It sounded to me quite illogical. And this was one of the reasons for me to take this step [migration].' The forth layer relates to the experience of the conflict. It gives rise to strongly negative feelings like embitterment, sadness, feeling for being unneeded, insult. These feelings in some cases are aggravated by the openly cynical way of breaking formal rules and acting against accepted values on behalf of senior representatives of the profession. In conclusion it should be noted that it is the less visible layers of the conflict that play the more significant role in migration decision-making. These are the collision of values and the unpredictability it brings, the expected dependence on morally compromised and incompetent colleagues and the strongly negative emotional experience.

F. *Position towards social life.* The majority of respondents consider as important for them the opportunities they have to influence the development of social life through instruments of civic culture. This is clearly expressed in the words of two interviewees: '... to live in a society in which ... you are able to bring positive changes.' (interviewee №10), 'Our voice has to be heard in some way' (interviewee №9).

Points of conflict or discontinuity for the self with its reality. In reality respondents do not find effective mechanisms through which they as citizens can contribute to positive change. A number of respondents have reached such conclusions as a result of their own experience. They invested substantial efforts in solving social and professional problems but results did not follow and the experience as a whole was quite disappointing and brought evidence for pessimistic realism. In this way respondents form the attitude that the development of social life is out of their reach as citizens. Illustrative in this respect

are the words of interviewee №10: 'Because you see that you cannot manage in a country in which you can do nothing and you don't expect that anything positive can happen.' As a result a feeling of meaninglessness grows in respondents which points to the two mechanisms of influence of this collision with reality on migration decision-making. The first is that the self is deprived of a number of key opportunities to create the favourable conditions for his/her desirable relation to society and thus its achievement is questioned. The second relates to the fact that an important aspect of the desired relation to society – being an active citizen - cannot be realised and this confines the self leaving it emptier and smaller. In this way migration to a better developed civil society is seen as an opportunity to live as an active citizen and thus free oneself from the feeling of meaninglessness.

G. *Relatedness with close people.* Interviewee №2 reveals a surprising viewpoint in this respect which may sound paradoxical but remains logical – going far away brings you closer. The multiple conflicts experienced by interviewee №2 drained his/her vitality in an extreme way. As a result it becomes impossible for him/her to maintain close relationships and social life narrows and gets poorer: 'We were so tormented ... that the bonds grew weaker and thinner.' Relations with parents are also perceived as damaged because of the impossibility to fulfil adequately one's filial duty: 'We could help them [parents] only with presence. We could do almost nothing for them.'

The picture of the formation of the migration decision becomes complete with the discussion of the second element of respondents' understanding of Bulgarian society – functioning of social life. It comprises a number of problematic aspects for respondents which contribute to migration decision-making. These include the understandings respondents hold of the way in which the state is governed and the formal rules of social life are produced, the work of law protecting institutions, civic and political culture of society, the state of values in society, interaction between social agents, negative culture traits, opportunities for civil impact on social life, expectations for the successful ending of the transition period. As can be expected their discussion is not possible here due to limits in volume.

As the analysis suggests the attempts of respondents to relate to Bulgarian society in a meaningful to them way fail. The self fails to integrate truly into social reality and as a result the reciprocal continuity from which both self and reality grow is not established. Thus unable to be in an authentic way the self resides in a

multiple conflict state that depletes its inner vital resources and threatens its existence. It is in this sense that not migrating from Bulgaria would turn respondents into 'suicide' and 'victims' and could even challenge their human nature. In this light the migration decision should be looked at as formed by the serious hindrances or impossibility for the self to be in an authentic way. It is this point of view that reveals the meaning of the spontaneously given by some respondents 'names' to migration: 'salvation', 'deliverance', 'a way out in order to survive', taking back one's life.

Conclusion

The answer to the research question formulated concisely is: the migration decision of Bulgarian physicians arose from a conflict between their understanding of their selves and of the desired relation to society on one hand and their understanding of Bulgarian society on the other. Here 'conflict' stands in its wider meaning and embraces the following three nuances 'discrepancy', 'discontinuity', and the strongest one 'collision'.

Every respondent faced serious hindrances in realising the desired relation of his/her self to Bulgarian society. In this light the following picture of respondents' endeavour for self-realisation in Bulgarian society could be reproduced – IMPOSSIBILITY to:

- achieve life goals concerning professional realisation, family life and close people, self-perfection;
- realise professional aspirations for practicing medicine at a good international level and this practice to have humaneness and abiding of moral norms as unthreatened natural characteristics;
- be professionals according to their own conceptualisation of the medical profession – as an opportunity to render help and support to people or to realise in the highest possible extent their inborn intellectual potential and aptitude;
- meet their professional expectations – to be given adequate to their work material and non-material appreciation, professional development and progression based on knowledge, skills and capabilities;
- satisfy their striving to be citizens of their society with constructive and fruitful position and activity;

- fill in the greatest possible extent their life path with meaning in the way they understand it – realisation of the inner striving for and need to render help and support to people, purposeful aspiration for perfection of their selves.

As the findings and conclusions suggest, the study succeeds in answering the research question by applying a biographical approach together with concepts from social theory and social anthropology integrated in a comparatively coherent conceptual framework. The concept of self-identity proved effective and useful in explaining migration decision-making.

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Co-creating Transnational Social Spaces: Researching Poles' Migrations across Time and Space

Łukasz KRZYŻOWSKI

Abstract. The article examines auto-ethnography (as a form of methodological nationalism), a conceptual tendency that is helpful in the process of the construction of a multi-sited research field, (multi-sited ethnography), at two levels: spatial and temporal. I maintain that this type of data, (researcher's migration experience and history of migration of the family and local community), allows a better understanding of the nature of migration, which is understood as a process of long duration. More importantly, today's migrants perceive the migration of a hundred years ago, as well as the present, precisely as transmigration, and not as emigration or immigration.

Keywords: *migration, Poles, methodological nationalism,*

Introduction

The method of ethnographic field study is often used by sociologists. In Poland, field studies were conducted in this way since the beginning of the institutionalization of sociology, but since the 1970's, surveys have begun to dominate, thereby marginalizing the importance of the direct and personal contact the researcher has with the research group. The popularity of the positivist paradigm in social science research stemmed, inter alia, the possibility of carrying out the procedures of statistical inference based on quantitative data. This procedure allowed the presentation of research in an "objective" way, without the distorting impact of the researcher. It minimized, (through standardization of situations, interviews and research tools), the impact of interviewers. The distance between the "researcher" and "researched group" was and is an advantage in quantitative methods. In the last decade the methods of ethnographic field studies have begun to compete with the quantitative paradigm. At the same time it is worth noting that sociologists who have based their research on the basis of


ethnographic methods, typically see benefits arising from the procedure of the triangulation of methods and research techniques, and a far from complete negation of quantitative methods. The methodology of ethnographic research itself is under too numerous transformations, and within ethnographic research there are many tensions and contradictions - in particular ethical tensions, which the "researcher" must face. The issue of the personal and intimate relationship of "the researcher" with "the research area" is certainly a source of such tensions, however, as Minnie Bruce Pratt writes: "*We are not able to translate theory into practice as long as we cannot find it to be the strange and chaotic path of our daily lives*" (Pratt, 1995: 22).

In this article I would like to focus on the personal relationship within the field studies of transmigration, and provide some methodological conclusions drawn from these studies. They relate to the possible use of autoethnographic investigator data in the process of the construction of a multi-sited research field, (multi-sited ethnography), at two levels: spatial and temporal (Foner, 2005). I maintain that this type of data, (migration researcher's experience and history of migration of the family and local community), allows a better understanding of the nature of migration, which is understood as a process of long duration.

This article is divided into five parts. In the first part I will make a brief characterization of the community of Radgoszcz. Then I will describe my methodology of research and analysis of contemporary transmigration processes. In the third part I will describe the history of migration of my family and local community and present the impact of this experience on the conceptualisation of problems research of interest to me. Part four, details the ethnographic characteristics of contemporary migration and gives a description of my experience of being a migrant. In part five, I will present the impact of autoethnographic experience in historical and spatial dimensions, on the process of construction of a multi-sited research field.

1. A short description of the Municipality of Radgoszcz

Radgoszcz lies in the county of Małopolska in the south-western part of the district of Dąbrowa Tarnowska (picture 1). In the picture the district of Dąbrowa Tarnowska is marked with a red dot. Historically the Municipality belongs to the area of the lands of Tarnów:



The eastern part of the municipality is located on the border with the Podkarpackie Province. The Municipality of Radgoszcz is typically of a rural character, located away from major urban centres. The distance from Tarnów to Radgoszcz is thirty-five kilometres.

According to the local government in 2007 in the community consisted of 1,921 households and the total population and was 7153. Most of the households consisted of five or more people. The main source of income for these households was to work (for 52%, of which 20% derived income solely from agriculture), however, almost the same number of households received their income from a pension or life annuity - 48%. In September 2007, unemployment in the Municipality of Radgoszcz was at the level of 495 people, including 248 women (Radgoszcz Municipal Office, 2007).

The study presented in this article concerns Radgoszcz community, but due to unexpected difficulties encountered during the test, I had to take into account the processes and phenomena of migration, which took place in the whole of the region of Tarnów. The problem related mainly to the area of historical research. It transpired that it is not possible to determine the size of migration in the early twentieth century in the area under consideration because of damage to archives during World War I and II. Therefore, the process of analysis takes account data from the community, but also from the region. An interesting source of data was

the Bishop's Consistory Poll, which shows the size of mass migration from the Diocese of Tarnów. The territory of the Diocese covers the most significant historic region of Tarnów. In this way data were estimated for Radgoszcz municipalities under general trends of migration in Western Galicia during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

2. The methodology of the project

Over five years, (from 2002-2007), I conducted research in the Municipality of Radgoszcz and in Vienna, (including research on migrants from Radgoszczy). Initial "observations", (2002-2005), on who was leading in the community of migrants should not be viewed in terms of implementation of a "typical" research process, but as the counterpart of processes and phenomena, which at a later period, (2005-2007), became the object of my scientific interests. I would like to stress that my research interest in transmigration derived both from the historical and contemporary experiences of migration of my family, and my region of origin, where I lived until 2002.

Almost all families in the villages of Radgoszcz have a rich history of migration, dating back to the early twentieth century. Today, members of the communities studied are also taking part in migratory practices, creating a very strong series of transnational networks, including both mobile and relatively immobile members of the community. These networks reach to the United States of America, as well as to Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain and France. This details the most intense lines of transnational mobility of local residents. A contemporary community mobility test is therefore on the one hand, a continuation of the tradition of migration¹, on the other representative of global trends. For five years² I was an active part of the network being *there*, in Radgoszcz and *there*, in Vienna - to paraphrase the title of the article Hannerz'a Ulf (2003) - renovating an apartment with friends, family members and neighbours. At this time I began I began my, initially "informal" research, which in 2005 was reformulated into a

¹ A very important fact is that Dąbrowa Tarnowska County/District, which also includes Radgoszcz, was the centre of migration from Western Galicia in the early twentieth century. Mass migration has left many traces in the mentality, history and genealogy of the modern inhabitants of the area (Caro, 1914).

² I omit here my experience before leaving the municipality/community Radgoszcz for sociological study in Krakow.

systematic research project on transnational social space created by migrants from the community of Radgoszcz. Participant observation complements the analysis of informal discussions, group interviews, questionnaires and archival data.

3. Auto-ethnography and migration - dimensions through history

Migration is an aspect which has been present for more than a hundred years in the life of my family. In the next section of article I wish focus on my autoethnography as a research method which provides data confirming the function of transnational social spaces from the beginning of the twentieth century. I refer here to the concept of autoethnography developed by Leo Anderson (2006) – analytic autoethnography. Anderson suggests five key features of autoethnographical analysis. First, the researcher should be a member of the test community. Full participation in the life "researched" may result from membership of the primary group, with the inclusion of the researcher in the researched group during the research process (ibid.: 378-379). In the situation in which a researcher is a member of the group in which he was a child, as he proceeds to study phenomena and processes this may lead to many schizophrenic tensions. In my case these were due to continuous orientation attempts in "systematic" documentation and analysis on the one side, and genuine engagement in the life of immediate family on the other. Involvement in the social life of the tested community has provided me with understanding of what is transmitted by folklore, as well as access to important types of data, (memories, stories of migration of family members, photographs, souvenirs), but the use of this information has for a long time been thought to be unreliable. The second feature of autoethnography, according to Anderson, is an analytical reflectance of the researcher. During my study, that directive was associated with attempts to carry out the tasks of research, including my social location as a researcher, as a member of the family and the wider local community. The third feature of analytical autoethnography is a narrative visibility of the "I" of the researcher reflected mainly by a description of his own experiences as an investigator and member of the researched group. Dialogue with informants from outside the "I" is the fourth feature of research approach which interests me here. During field studies I have repeatedly consulted the current results and insights with members of my family. When, after the "end" of the test, I arranged for them a meeting summarizing the results of my previous

work, they gathered, only to claim: *“So what? We all know this.”* The final feature, within the directive relating to autoethnography is to use theory as a tool to assist in the analysis of empirical material (Anderson, 2006: 378). The latter aspect was very important in my research concerning personal and group experiences, and migration. I analyzed migration practice through the prism of the theory of transnational social space.

According to the theory of Thomas Faist (2000), social capital generates transnational social spaces. It plays a key role in creating, sustaining and developing links between the sending community and receiving community. According Faist we can distinguish four functions of social capital associated with migration processes. Firstly, you can point to the selective function of social capital, which determines who will migrate. Family, community and friendship connections are the gateway to the world of migration. Secondly, function – diffusion - function - affect the emergence, (or not), under the influence of positive experiences with migration, of a migration chain. Thirdly, the function of bridging social capital allows for the supportive communication of mobile units with their country of origin. The fourth feature of social capital: adaptability, determines the speed of assistance and the possibility of faster adaptation of new members of a migrant network to the institutional environment in the host society.

These features of social capital create transnational social space. Transnational social space is, according to Faist, the combination of ties, bonds and positions in networks and organizations, which operate across national borders. Cultural, political and economic processes associated with transnationality, include the accumulation of various types of capital: economic, human and social. The reality of transnational social space shows, first, that migration and re-emigration cannot be regarded as certain, irrevocable decisions. Moreover, transnational networks include in the analysis of migration relatively non-roaming individuals and communities. Secondly, even those migrants and refugees who had settled for a longer duration outside their country of origin, often remain involved with it through trans-national communication. Thirdly, those links are - according to theorists of transnational communities - more informal, or can be institutionalized as political parties (Faist, 2000a: 191-192). Analysing migration from the community of Radgoszcz in a transnational perspective we can assume that daily lives depend on variable transnational connections over transnational borders and that their identification is the result of being in simultaneous relation to two or

more "points" to create a kind of "space". They were not guests of the host country, because they settled there and were enrolled in economic and political institutions, the daily life of the community and the patterns of everyday functioning in the country, but also because of their loyalty to other places, remaining in contact with their home country. The migrants set up institutions and have an impact on local and national events in the country from which migrated (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc, 1995).

How did the migration of my family members in the light of the background previously presented appear in a theoretical context? The migratory history of my family was begun by my great-grandparents, who met in the United States in the early twentieth century. Although they were "permanently" settled in the village from which my great-grandmother originated, their migration abroad was for about ten years, (from 1905-1915). During their "absence", the upbringing of children was organized by family members. My great grandparents had been in communication with their family by writing letters, sending gifts and financial support. All of those aspects, as well as emotional support, were transmitted by sending community members who temporarily returned to Radgoszcz from the United States. Social networks in those days were very dense. The entire local community consisted of more or less unrelated persons, each of which thought of themselves as one community member. Socio-cultural practices associated with agriculture, (such as harvesting and haymaking), construction of houses, expeditions, fairs held in the nearby villages, (Radomyśl, Szczucin, recreation: Mielec Tarnow), were carried out jointly. Numerous socio-cultural practices had been organized around the institution of the Catholic Church. The church played a key role in creating and sustaining transnational connections - I will return to this issue later in the article. These dense social networks, social proximity - strong social capital - and the tremendous role of the Catholic Church were responsible for maintaining contacts, amongst mobile and relatively non-mobile members of the local community by extrapolation of local social control in the migrants' lives, (permanently or temporarily), abroad.

The first period of migration, (World War I), was remembered in my family through small souvenirs – however, most were destroyed during the Second World War when the entire village was evacuated and the material from the demolished houses was used to reinforce the trenches. There remained only a wooden chest, which my great-grandmother bought during her first stay in the United States. On

the chest walls were glued pictures depicting Japanese women dressed in kimonos. They constituted an object of interest throughout the community. The trunk accompanied my great-grandparents throughout all their travels in the United States and became a symbol of transnational communication and the migratory history of my family. World War I halted the practice of migration, closing the trunk of my family for almost fifty years³.

What is the migration pattern which emerges from the transnational activities of members of my family? Looking at the history of migration, I can point to examples that illustrate the migration through all four functions of social capital, (of which Faist wrote), in transnational processes. For example, analyzing the Ellis Island web archives, I found that a large number of migrants from Malec, (part of the municipality Radgoszcz), are my ancestors, members of two related families: Gmyr and Mroczek. As I wrote, the selective function of social capital that makes the experience of migration is possible within a specific network of kinship. A positive experience of migration, (a diffusion function of social capital), that is experienced by mobile units has increased migratory aspirations among family members. My grandparents' chest was in a sense a symbol of prosperity, which was achieved by migration. The relatively frequent, repeated, occasional travel back and forth of my family members is the best example of bridging the social capital aspect. Other factors such as the transmission of funds are very important in creating bridges between migrants and their sending community. The adaptive function of social capital was, (and is), seen by, for example, assistance in registering with the Immigration Office, being offered a place to sleep at the beginning of your stay, advice given to the newly arrived family members about work and help in the early days through illegal activity on the labour market.

The migration of my family was not a separate case of transnational activity. The results of my archival research clearly indicate that migration was a widespread practice in the Municipality of Radgoszcz during the early twentieth century. Empirical data on the historical period of my research comes from - apart from my family's history of migration - the Diocesan Archives in Tarnów. Radgoszcz was the centre of emigration from Galicia in the early twentieth century. A 15% decline in population due to migration occurred in 1890, (Caro 1914: 22); despite such important social phenomena the administration has absolutely no interest in

³ During World War I, my grandfather was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian army. During the fighting he was captured and was exiled to Siberia from where he returned around 1920.

them, but the Catholic Church records changes in major social indicators. In 1907 the Consistory Bishops sent a questionnaire to all the seminarians in the Diocese of Tarnow. The table below presents the results of a survey for each Deanery in the Diocese.

Table 1: The volume of migration from Diocese of Tarnów in 1907

Deanery	Number of migrants in 1907		
	USA	Austro-Hungary	Total
Bobowski	632	245	877
Bocheński	245	2639	2884
Brzeski	338	1783	2121
Czchowski	397	303	700
Dąbrowski	4863	1885	6748
Kolbuszowski	1131	1824	2955
Limanowski	1932	434	2366
Łacki	1959	1010	2969
Mielecki	5952	853	6805
Nowosądecki	1043	30	1073
Pilzneński	425	6	431
Radłowski	215	3017	3232
Radomyski	600	100	700
Ropczycki	1866	134	2000
Tarnowski	500	231	731
Tuchowski	523	174	697
Tymbarski	335	1002	1337
Starosądecki	439	7	446
Wielopolski	1330	3	1333
Wojnicki	599	3607	4206
Total	25324	19287	44611

Source: Diocesan Archives in Tarnów.

Migration from Dąbrowa, Tarnowska and surrounding area, (Mielec), were an important social process. Unfortunately, there is not data from Radgoszcz. Despite the absence of this information, we can estimate the size of migration from Radgoszcz using data from the parish located in the neighbouring villages, (Szczucin, Dąbrowa, Luszowice). According to a survey from 1907, approximately 15% of the population migrated from Szczucin and 10% in both Dabrowa and Luszowice.

Table 2: The size of migration from the particular parishes in the Diocese of Dabrowa in 1907

Parishes in Deanery Dąbrowa Tarnowska	Number of migrants		
	USA	Austro-Hungary	Total
Bolestaw	1500	15	1515
Dąbrowa	600	400	1000
Gręboszów	210	95	305
Luszowice	30	150	180
Odporyszów	200	105	305
Olesno	1000	380	1380
Otfinów	-	500	500
Radgoszcz	No data	No data	No data
Szczucin	1300	160	1460
Żabno	23	80	103
Total	4863	1885	6748

Source: Diocesan Archives in Tarnów.

The clergy played an important role in maintaining a close relationship between migrants and the sending community. Religion organised the transnational life of migrants, (Levitt 2004). According to archival data, migrants from Radgoszcz, especially those which travelled to the U.S.A., would order masses for the deceased, regardless of where they were buried, and people not migrating ordered masses for migrants in the intention of conferring good luck during the travels of others. There were also spontaneous collections of cash for church renovations. In the Diocesan Archives in Tarnów is evidence of the contribution of migrants to the renovation of the church in Luszowice, (Municipality of Radgoszcz):

"On the honourable request of the Reverend Bishops Consistory of the 15th March this year, I, signed below, have the honour to convey the joyful message of the Reverend Arch Bishop during a visit to the Canonical Parish in Luszowice, referring to America, where the resident parishioners of Luszowice collected a premium and sent an initial 1555 Crowns. With it citizens of Luszowice been encouraged to give 2214 Crowns." (Letter from the parish priest, Father John Suwady, the Consistory of Bishops of 28/03/1905).

These informal practices of creating and maintaining transnational social space were supported institutionally. In 1912, in Radgoszcz and Luszowice, migrants founded an organization called "Friends of the Parish of Luszowice." The main objective of this association was to give help to the sending community. Migrants financially supported

these religious groups, gathered resources to support their business, assured the hospitality of visiting pastors, sought among them support and guidance, and additionally participated in their religious services and cultural events of a religious nature.

In making a summary of this part of the article it should be noted that the tradition of migration is very strong in the researched community. The local social memory still functions regarding migrants from the past, their travel back and forth, their gifts from the U.S.A. and the stories associated with transatlantic travel. More importantly, today's migrants perceive the migration of a hundred years ago, as well as the present, precisely as transmigration, and not as emigration or immigration. One of my interlocutors said:

“Take me, for example ... my situation was that I wanted to emigrate, but failed, so now I live in Poland. I work abroad [Germany, Austria, Italy - ŁK], but I am not an emigrant. I'm just working and earning. I spend ten days in Poland and twenty abroad, where I work. Rather than leave for Gdansk, I am leaving to go to Vienna. In the worst situation ever I can go back permanently to Radgoszcz, but I am not an emigrant”. (Male, 35 years old, manual worker).

A similar position emerged during one of the group interviews:

“M.2: Emigration in Europe, that's not emigration;

M.8: Now it is not; before there were problems, before the Union, so it was difficult to return home to Poland;

K.9: No if you did not have papers, it was frightening;

M.1: In general I was worried that if they withdraw those ...

K.9: Now it's a laugh;

M.2: It's like in the United States, people transiting from one state to the second; it's the same in the Union;

K.9: A lot of people are planning to return to Poland, but the difference is that some will have to work in Krakow ...

M.2 In Gdansk ...

K.9: ...and not close to home, in Radgoszcz;

M.2: I will go to work for a week in Krakow or in Gdansk and at the weekend will return to home. It's better to go abroad. It seems to me that, as it is now, it is so normal, it is not emigration;

M.1: Well, it is so natural;

M.2: We were in Galicia and we are in Galicia” [emphasis - ŁK].

4. Autoethnography and migration - the contemporary spatial dimension

A return to my family's tradition of migration occurred in the mid-eighties. During this time my aunt went to France. A little later, (but still before 1989), a large part of my family went to the United States on the basis of the discovery of the birth certificate of my grandfather. This document confirmed that my great-grandfather was born in the United States, which greatly facilitated the procedure for applying for a visa. Apart from relatively frequent travel between Poland, France and the United States, the migration of members of my immediate family and the entire local community is now primarily associated with Austria and Germany.

In the mid-nineties my sister moved to Austria. She lives and works in Vienna to this day. A few years later, my brother tied his life to migration. I, while studying sociology have spent almost every summer in Vienna. I have worked with my brother and friends from Poland as a decorator, painter, lumberjack, bricklayer, helper in removals and repairman. Most of these activities I learned on the spot. I remember my first concern about the "work on the side" and lack of specific skills. All my friends consoled me as saying that as a migrant from that I am able to work "on the side", and as a Pole quickly learn that "profession". "Apprenticeship" concerned not only the "work" to which I was as a migrant, (albeit temporary), "predestined", but also appropriate behaviour. This was a kind of study of "being a migrant" in terms of what I must do and what not. First of all, my contact with the employer was limited to a minimum. In fact, I never talked with the family members for whom I worked, even though I saw them every day throughout the summer. The "bad tone" was the manifestation of fatigue caused by hard, physical work. "Work" has to be done in an "aesthetic" clean manner. I wondered then, whether such directives from migrant communities, actually derives from their previous experiences with employers. On the one hand, some of my interlocutors mentioned that at the beginning of their stay in Austria they had to learn a pedantic approach to the "dirty work". On the other hand, in informal discussions that took place during working hours there appeared a stereotypical, "organized German". How often it was emphasized: "There must be order!" Exceptions to this rule occurred during the absence of the employer. Such situations were the opportunity to rest, have loud conversations, naps, or to go shopping at the nearby supermarket. The least dusty worker was sent to the store, (which was not a

problem) and spoke German, (which was always a problem). All these strategies were applied so as not to arouse suspicion of Austrians, who could call the police.

The situation of living with migrants and being a migrant has provided me with interesting data. I watched with amazement the changing habits and attitudes of my friends and family in the context of transmigration between Vienna and Radgoszcz. Arrival to Poland was treated in terms of the instantaneous return to loved ones who currently do not wish to migrate. From Vienna we mainly brought toys for children, alcohol purchased in promotions, and electronic equipment purchased at a flea market, (*Fhlomarkt*). Migrants who built houses also imported building materials. In the area of Radgoszcz were many houses which were largely built from Austrian building materials. From Vienna we also imported architectural solutions, construction materials and decoration novelties. The flats of migrants in Vienna, where I lived did not differ significantly from typical flats in the sending communities. An interesting phenomenon I observed during the travel between Radgoszcz and Vienna was the change to maintain order and to work. In Vienna, everyone segregated garbage and maintained order in the area of employment and housing, (so that it is not too prominently viewed). They did not duplicate the stereotype of a typical Pole. This also applied to work. Each order was performed with high accuracy and commitment. In Poland, nobody sorts garbage. Migrants who built houses in Poland mainly did not participate in the work at home. With the money they earned in Vienna could not afford to hire workers "on the side."

Interesting, from a sociological point of view, were journeys to and from Vienna. Minibuses⁴ driving between Radgoszcz and Vienna enliven transnational social spaces, making them more "visible." They have fixed departure times and places. The trip takes about eight hours and is the best opportunity to exchange information about living, work, pubs, opportunities to benefit from social welfare and schools. During the trip from Vienna to Radgoszcz our theme was mainly on the experience of migration, relations with employers (it was a permanent feature of ridicule), purchasing and promotion. However, travels from Radgoszcz to Vienna were an opportunity for making an appointment, gossiping about relatively non-mobile friends, and planning time to the next return journey, which is usually every two weeks. In the summer months, minibuses filled with children. Minibuses are therefore a very important element of supportive ties, a sort of bridge between the sending and receiving communities.

⁴ Of course, in addition to minibuses, a great number of trans-migrants use their own cars.

As in the historical case, migration of members of my closer and extended family is not accidental, but rather the activity of transnational migration results from the migrant culture of the local community. It is very difficult to assess quantitatively the size of the migration from the community Radgoszcz. A decline in population due to migration was particularly evident after 1 May 2004, when Poland joined the European Union. Due to the lack of institutional arrangements for the migration processes, in a certain period of my field research I decided to carry out an auditorium questionnaire between third-grade students in two middle schools located in the Municipality Radgoszcz. The survey concerned the migration of their families. I collected one hundred questionnaires. The results of this survey are not surprising in the face of the tradition of migration. Young people do not only see migration from Radgoszcz positively, but also place it in their plans for life. The majority of respondents are planning to migrate in the future - just like their parents and grandparents. Almost all students surveyed have at least one close relative who has migrated. In the experience of the migrant families surveyed, students, informal conversations in different spaces, observation and group interviews that I conducted with known trans-migrants, in the final phase of field research, I have created the perfect - and it is very simple - categories of trans-migrants from Radgoszcz and their migratory patterns.

The first category is distinguished as "traditional" migrants. In this group there are people who have lived abroad for at least 10 years. Their placements are determined mostly by a migratory tradition in their families. The families of the surveyed students of this type were represented by their grandparents and their uncles and aunts. The history of migration of these people began during the communist times. In keeping with the tradition of migration from the Municipality of Radgoszcz, a major destination has always been the United States. Students, in whose families migrants were "traditional" confirmed that their forefathers also migrated. The second category of migrants from the community of Radgoszcz is "creative" migrants. By creativity I mean other than the traditional choice of target countries such as Spain, Italy, (particularly a destination of female migrants for employment in the care sector), rather than Britain, which is an interesting development, given the current trends of migration from other Polish regions. These countries were not the objectives of the migration of a hundred years ago. 'Creative' migrants use wide kinship networks in place of the traditional patterns of migration. The main distinguishing characteristic of this group are occasional visits home.

The final category of migrants is "proper" trans-migrants. With such members I worked, lived, drove, and had many discussions and interviews. There are several key patterns of migration in this group: a) the traditional lines of migration (Austria, Germany) with the exception of the United States (today) because of distance, b) frequent movement between two or more countries, c) enhanced network migration, d) having two homes – one in the host country, as well as in sending country e) increased consumption in the country of origin. Like the ancestors of a hundred years ago, today's migrants also live according to the calendar of religious obligations in the local community.

5. Autoethnography in the process of construction of multi-site research

Since the concept of globalization began to play a key role in sociology and anthropology, the ethnographic monograph unilateral model has been criticized. For example, weaknesses such as the limitations of the field, able to carry out field surveys in only one place (position) and the unhistorical nature of research in the field (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992; Gille, 2001) are constantly subjected to criticism. These demands seem to be fairly obvious in the study of transnational migration, so in order to conduct research I had to construct various academic perspectives in a flexible manner and examine ethnography in different spaces and places, as well as take into account the history of migration of the test community, my own family's experience of migration, and my own experiences in this field.

During preparations to conduct a study on migration from Radgoszcz, I began with participant observation carried out in two places: in the Radgoszcz and Xth district of Vienna (where it is possible to find the most likely number of households of the highest percentage of Polish migrants in the city) and in Polish churches and shops. As I mentioned, I worked and lived with other migrants every summer from 2002-2007. This experience of migration and growing up in the community has helped me in the process of conceptualization⁵. It was clear to me that so-called traditional concepts of migration are inadequate to describe functioning patterns of migration. Migration processes from Radgoszcz and socio-cultural practices of mobile community members, (past and today), led me to the concept of transnationalism and transnational social space developed primarily by

⁵ Such as the migration model described as Push-Pull.

Faist Thomas (1998; 2000), Alejandro Portes (1999) , Nina Glick Schiller (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc, 1995), Steven Vertovec (2007) and Ewa Morawska (2003; 2004). Using this framework/ it seems natural that multi-sited ethnography is the best methodology to study socio-cultural practices across borders.

Using multi-sited ethnography it is clear, in my view, that when examining contemporary global migration processes there are also other relevant fields of research, not related to an area of study in a geographical sense, but in a more academic context. As I showed at the beginning of this article, there is a strong and lengthy tradition of migration in the studied communities. During my research I discovered that most of today's immigrants have a family history associated with migration in the early twentieth century. Based on the proposals of George Marcus (1995), I have extended my research field into various perspectives, as this was the best way to study local processes, not in isolation but in conjunction with the wider global context. I defined my position (a) as two contemporary views of the community of Radgoszcz (and surrounding district) and Vienna (District X), and (b) two places from the past: the Municipality of Radgoszcz, (Diocese of Tarnow, Galicia), and the United States. In this way my multi-site ethnography covers space and time. All these positions are linked through social networks on the one hand, and social memories of the other. Field research is created by social relationships between mobile and relatively mobile community members who work in different areas, (Austria, Germany, France, but also Italy and Spain) and by the memory of the social mobility of ancestors, mainly migrating to the USA (so-called migration fever in the early twentieth century). By undertaking ethnography through rather flexibly defined positions, (connected in space and time), it is possible to examine what kind of socio-cultural practice takes place within multi-site research. These define the area of research as made possible through the use of my own experience as a member of a family and a migrant.

Summary

Migration from Radgoszcz and nearby areas played a significant role in the lives of their inhabitants for the last hundred years. Transnational mobility has become a habit, which structured contemporary patterns of migration, adjusted for global trends. Both a hundred years ago, and today, the area was and is dominated by transnational mobility. A sustainable design is created for migration through the

ages. This concept is understood here as a relatively stable pattern of various transnational socio-cultural practices and traditions of migration, which involve certain objective facts. The culture of migration can be described either in terms of nation-states with traditions of migration, (for example, Poland, Ireland, Italy), and from the perspective of local communities in which migration is affecting the process of long duration, for example: family history, kinship networks and friendship, intergeneration relationship, patterns/models of economic activity, public institutions, aspirations and future plans. Cultural migration in my local community is expressed not only through the practice of transmigration, but also by "their" institutions such as the two companies, which operate in the United States, (including the one was founded in 1912), and take an active part in the social life of the Radgoszcz community.

Based on research into migrants, regardless of their abode, we can form the image of Radgoszcz as a space in which individuals create various kinds of transnational links. They may take the form more institutionalized, such as the association of Polish-Americans, or less institutionalized, as socio-cultural transnational practices. Radgoszcz is a space which is not limited to a specific location on the Polish map. This is a set of values, symbols, patterns of interaction and socio-cultural practices, including those for migration models. My experience as a member of the test in a migrant community has allowed me to make a thorough analysis of the phenomenon of transmigration.

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RESEARCH ARTICLES

Attitudes toward Immigrants and Immigration Policy in United Kingdom

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Abstract. Although recent research found substantial variation in the strength of anti-immigrant opinions across new and old countries of immigration, most studies determined that the public increasingly supports restrictive immigration policies. This paper explores several sources of attitudes toward immigrants in United Kingdom and attempts to simultaneously test some of the most important theoretical explanations of public attitudes toward immigration issues when the family immigration history is taken into account. Results are based on a quantitative analysis of data from the European Social Survey (Round 4/2008). Even if when compared to persons from families with at least one foreign-born member natives express the strongest opposition to flexible migration policies and are more likely to have negative views regarding the immigrants' role in the British society, opinions vary significantly among groups differentiated by political preferences, socioeconomic attributes, and demographic characteristics. While for native Britons findings support the economic self-interest theory, education and social attachment (i.e., interpersonal and institutional trust) appear to be the strongest predictors of positive attitudes toward immigrants and opposition to restrictive immigration policies.

Keywords: *anti-immigration attitudes, immigrants, immigration policy, United Kingdom*

Introduction

As Mayda (2006, 528) noted, in many countries, immigration has recently become a central theme in political discussions focusing on international integration. In order to better understand country-level immigration-policy decisions and to anticipate future policy developments, public attitudes toward immigration-related issues should be known because they are a key input in policy outcomes and their viability.

During the past two decades, many studies on public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies in Europe and the United States consistently showed that immigrant populations are frequently facing suspicion, prejudice, and xenophobia in their host countries. Research also documented an increased public support for restrictive immigration policies (see Brader, Valentino, and Jardina 2009, DiGiusto and Jolly 2008, Fetzer 2011, Quillian 1995, Schildkraut 2011). As Crawley (2005) observed, United Kingdom is one of the 'receiving' countries in Europe, which apparently shares this general uneasiness of being a country of immigration.

Based on recent data, in June 2010, the foreign-born population represented 11.4% of the UK total population and non-British nationals made up 7.2% of the UK population (Mulley 2011, 2). The foreign-born population in United Kingdom increased significantly from 2,342,000 in 2000 to 3,824,000 in 2007. If in 2000, foreign-born persons represented approximately 4% of total population, in 2007, foreigners represented 6.5% of the total population and about 7.2% of the labor force in the country. However, the 1990-2007 average net migration per 1,000 people was only 0.7, a figure lower than that registered for the same time period in selected thirteen OECD countries (i.e., Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United States). The Western European countries that averaged the highest 1990-2007 net migration rate are Luxemborg (9.8), Spain (7.0), and Switzerland (4.3) (U. S. Census Bureau 2011, 839).

Although the foreign-born population is not particularly large in United Kingdom, and even if, as Crawley (2005) noted, attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy vary by region and groups in society, ad hoc polls and longitudinal surveys conducted in the last ten years have provided evidence of increasing public opposition to immigration. In fact, Lowles and Painter (2011), the authors of a recent research study focusing on issues of English identity, faith and race concluded that there is not a progressive majority in the British society and that there is a deep resentment to immigration, as well as skepticism towards multiculturalism. The research findings, based on a survey carried out on a large probability sample (N= 5,054), showed that approximately 63% of whites, 43% of Asians, and 17% of black Britons consider that immigration was a bad thing for the country. The study also found that 39% of Asians, 34% of whites and 21% of blacks believed immigration should be halted either permanently or at least until the UK's

economy was back on track. In addition, almost half (48%) of the respondents were open to supporting a new far-right party as long as it avoided fascist tendencies and did not condone violence. Furthermore, even if 52% of study participants agreed that "Muslims create problems in the UK," over two-thirds of people believe that 'English nationalist extremists' and 'Muslim extremists' are equally appalling. Approximately 60% of respondents considered that positive approaches (e.g., community organizing, education, and using community leaders) were the best way to defeat local extremist tendencies. In sum, although anti-immigration feelings are pervasive in the contemporary British society, political violence is opposed by the large majority of the residents (Lowles and Painter 2011).

The present secondary analysis intends to identify the individual-level indicators most likely to predict support for restrictive immigration policies and also tries to determine which factors significantly influence the public perception of the immigrants' role in the British society. The majority of studies that examined the effect of individual predictors on attitudes toward immigrants/immigration focused exclusively on the natives' perceptions or did not take into account the immigration history of the respondent's family.

This analysis contributes to the literature by examining predictors of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies expressed not only by natives but also by foreign-born individuals and persons who grew up in immigrant families. Alternative theoretical explanations of the public reactions to immigrant issues (e.g., economic theory, cultural marginality theory, contact theory, and human capital theory) as well as the effects on attitudes of political preferences, societal attachment (i.e., interpersonal and institutional trust), and religiosity are also explored in multivariate analyses conducted on a representative sample of UK residents.

Brief review of theoretical explanations of public attitudes toward immigration

Fetzer (2000) contended that there are three major theoretical explanations (i.e., cultural marginality, economic self-interest, and contact with immigrants) of public attitudes toward immigrants. In general, marginality theory states that marginalized groups tend to empathize with other oppressed people, persons who perceive themselves as being outside the 'mainstream', or other victims of prejudice (Fetzer 2000). In a version of the *cultural marginality theory*,

(see Espenshade and Calhoun 1993), “cultural affinity” is considered one of the most important determinants of immigration-related public attitudes. In this respect, “cultural and ethnic ties to immigrants promote pro-immigrant attitudes and support for a more open immigration policy (Fetzer 2000, 3).” In addition, Haubert and Fussell (2006) found that one’s exposure to other cultures (i.e., living abroad) was positively associated with favorable views of immigrants. The authors argued that living abroad contributes to a more cosmopolitan worldview, diminishing the importance of negative stereotypes about foreigners. In addition, (see Alvarado 2009), persons who lived in foreign countries tend to observe more often commonalities among individuals from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds than people familiar only with their native land. In a recent analysis of factors influencing pro-immigrant feelings in United States, Alvarado (2009) found that Americans who speak relatively well one foreign language are more likely to have positive perceptions of immigrants. It is possible that persons who learn a foreign language do that because they are interested to learn more about other cultures and do not share ethnocentric views, as those generally expressed by persons who take a ‘parochial’ stance on public issue (see Bean 1995), immigration policy included.

Empirical studies showed that when perceived as a cultural threat (see Espenshade and Hempste 1996) or as a potential threat to the natives’ language (see Chandler and Tsai 2001), immigrants are more likely to attract negative public sentiments. Using 2008 pre-election data, Brader, Valentino, and Jardina (2009) contended that, at least in the United States, ethnocentrism and not material interests continue to dominate explanations of public attitudes regarding immigration policies. In a study that explored the causes of public opposition to immigration and support for anti-immigrant political movements in three industrialized Western countries (United States, France and Germany) and evaluated the effects of cultural marginality, economic self-interest, and contact with immigrants, Fetzer (2000) contended that although the data analysis partly confirmed each of these three theoretical explanations, being a cultural outsider influenced immigration-related attitudes more than economics or contact did. The present analysis will explore the validity of the cultural marginality thesis comparing groups differentiated by the place of birth (i.e., UK or abroad) of the respondent and respondent’s parents. In addition, ethnic minority status will be used to test this theory.

Some proponents of an alternative theoretical perspective – *economic self-interest* - doubted cultural explanations of attitudes toward immigrants (see Harwood 1983, 1986) and argued that economic concerns appear to be the main reason for an increased opposition to both legal and illegal immigrants. Simon (1987) and Simon and Alexander (1993) noted that immigrants are perceived as a greater threat by lower-class people, who fear that immigrants, especially illegal ones, would lower the rates of pay, would negatively influence one's opportunities for mobility, and would create more competition for housing, schools, and social services. According to this view, opposition to immigration is mainly caused by economic deprivation and fear of further economic decline.

Economic interpretations of public attitudes toward immigrants are found in many scholarly works and several of these studies provide empirical support for the economic self-interest theoretical perspective. In a recent examination of structural correlates of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies in the United States, Sobczak (2010) asserted that economic disadvantage at the community level indirectly influences unfavorable views of immigrants because precarious economic conditions generate high levels of intergroup occupational competition, leading to negative reactions toward foreigners. In addition, Haubert and Fussell (2006) have noticed that the perceived threat from immigrants in the labor market is context specific, being more pronounced in areas where there are large immigrant communities.

Based on their analysis of 1983-1990 data from the British Social Attitudes Survey, Dustmann and Preston (2007) pointed out that even if economic determinants did matter when attitudes toward immigrants have been examined racial prejudice appeared to be an important factor in preference formation in Great Britain. Overall, findings showed that welfare concerns had a stronger impact on attitudes to further immigration than labor market concerns did. In addition, the authors found strong evidence that racial or cultural prejudice was associated with support for restrictive immigration policies regarding potential immigration from countries with ethnically different (non-Caucasian) populations. Using recent survey data from United Kingdom, Lowles and Painter (2011) identified a clear correlation between economic pessimism and negative attitudes towards immigration. The authors noted that the more skeptical people were about their own economic situation and their prospects for the future, the more hostile their attitudes were to new and old immigrants.

In a study of public attitudes toward immigrants in United States, France, and Germany, Joel Fetzer also acknowledged that beliefs that immigrants threaten natives' or one's own job strongly increase opposition to immigration. However, the author noted that this sense of economic threat appears to be much reduced among persons who have at least secondary school education (Fetzer 2000). O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006), the authors of a cross-country study that investigated the determinants of individual attitudes toward immigration concluded that anti-immigration opinions are not a function of economic interests alone; rather, they also reflect nationalist sentiment among respondents. Findings also showed that the high-skilled are less opposed to immigration than the low-skilled, the effect being greater in richer countries than in poorer countries. Several studies (e.g., Brenner and Fertig 2006; Daniels and von der Ruhr 2005; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Mayda 2006; Rustenbach 2010) that examined predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe and United States in the past decade consistently found support for the human capital theory that suggests that anti-immigrant attitudes significantly decrease with education and one's level of skills. The present analysis will also examine the economic self-interest and human capital theoretical perspectives using as predictors of attitudes toward immigration issues the respondent's perceived economic hardship and the educational level of the respondent and respondent's parents.

Contact theory is the third major theoretical explanation used by scholars to explain variations in public attitudes toward immigrants (see Fetzer 2000, 4). Although there are several variants of the contact theory, Gordon Allport's (1954) thesis remains in the literature an important departure point. Allport contended that positive effects of intergroup contact occur if four key conditions are satisfied: equal group status within the situation; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom (Pettygrew 1998, 66). In addition to these four conditions, Pettygrew (1998) noted that for optimal group interaction the contact situation must have 'friendship potential'. While according to Allport's contact theory, increased contact with immigrants would decrease anti-immigrant sentiments, other authors (see Girard, Charbit, and Lamy 1974) contended that personal contact with immigrants actually causes xenophobia. In order to explain the strong public support for the anti-immigrant Front National party in areas of France with large foreign-born populations, Perrineau (1985) concluded that 'casual' and not 'personal' (i.e., intimate relationships, friendships) contacts with

foreigners might generate hostile feelings toward immigrants (Fetzer 2000). A less optimistic alternative contact theory was also formulated by Forbes (1997). The author stated that even if immigrant-native interaction might partially contribute to a reduction in cultural differences, it could also generate ethnocentric attitudes and increased efforts to preserve intergroup differences, which in the end might favor anti-immigrant attitudes (DiGiusto and Jolly 2008, 1-3). Acknowledging that both individual differences and societal norms shape intergroup contact effects, Pettygrew (1998, 80) noted that “the deeply prejudiced both avoid intergroup contact and resist positive effects from it.”

According to Quillian (1995), the economic situation is a mediator between intergroup contact and the potential for conflict. The author observed that foreigners might be perceived as a threat if the number of immigrants would increase because natives might believe they have to compete for cultural hegemony and scarce resources. Therefore, anti-immigrant sentiments are more likely to become stronger in periods of economic hardship (Quillian 1995). However, a recent test of the contact theory that examined the effect of the immigrant population size on attitudes toward foreigners in Europe did not find support for the thesis that anticipated a positive relationship between the number of immigrants at national and regional levels and anti-immigration attitudes (Rustenbach 2010). And a recent analysis of attitudes toward immigrants in France found a significant negative relationship between the share of foreign population in a large geographic area (department) and anti-immigrant sentiments. Based on these research findings it appears that an increase in immigrant population was more likely to decrease xenophobia and racial antipathies, suggesting, as the study authors concluded, that “it might be some room for optimism in the intergroup dynamic literature (DiGiusto and Jolly 2008, 16).”

Despite the fact that after 2004, migrants from Central and Eastern Europe moved more widely across the country, most of the United Kingdom’s recent history migrants have been concentrated in urban areas (see Chapell, Latore, Rutter, and Shah 2009, 4). In 2009, for instance, over a third of all foreign-born migrants (2.6 million people) were living in London where they represent 34% of the total population (Rienzo 2011). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that residents of larger cities have been more frequently in contact (at least casual) with immigrants than persons living in smaller towns or rural areas in UK. Urban residency is considered in this analysis a proxy indicator for contact with immigrants and it will be used to test the contact theory.

In addition to tests meant to explore the validity and the explanatory power of cultural, economic, contact, and human capital theories, researchers also examined the effect on attitudes toward immigrants of societal attachment, political behavior, and religiosity. In general, findings suggest that persons who have a higher level of interpersonal trust are more likely to have positive opinions about immigrants, while individuals who sympathize with right-wing politics are more likely to support anti-immigration policies (see DiGiusto and Jolly 2008; Rustenbach 2010). Recent studies that investigated the impact of religious affiliation on immigration-policy preferences in United States, found that more religious respondents exhibited more positive attitudes towards immigrants, regardless of the religious denomination they belonged to (Daniels and Von der Ruhr 2005; Smith 2006). The present analysis will also explore the relationship between social attachment (interpersonal and institutional trust) and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. One's political orientation (i.e., support for Conservative party vs. support for other political party) will be used to observe the effect of political preferences on issues regarding immigration in United Kingdom. The Conservatives' approach¹ to immigration stresses the need to control immigration levels by introducing a cap on immigration and reducing the number of non-EU immigrants who plan to work and live in United Kingdom. According to the Conservatives' manifesto, by 2015 net migration will be reduced from the current level of 242,000 to "tens of thousands" immigrants per year. The Conservative Party, the largest political party in UK, is a centre-right political party that adheres to the philosophies of conservatism and British unionism. Currently, the Conservative Party governs in the first post-war coalition with the Liberal Democrats. David Cameron is the Conservative Party leader and the country's Prime Minister. In 2008, when the survey data used in this analysis were collected, the Labour Party was the governing body and the Conservatives were the opposition party.

Additionally, the analysis will examine the relationships religiosity – attitudes toward immigrants and will use gender and age as control variables. Regarding gender variations in attitudes, research found women to be more opposed to immigration than do men. Although not all studies found a consistent inter-country effect of age on people's reaction toward immigrants and

¹The immigration policies supported by the Conservative Party can be found at: http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_stand/Immigration.aspx

immigration policies (see Brenner and Fertig 2006), in general, age tends to be negatively associated with support for immigration (see Berzosa and Valentova 2010; Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong. 1997; DiGiusto and Jolly 2008; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Recent survey data also showed that young people in UK are more hopeful about the future and more open to living in an ethnically diverse society (Lowles and Painter 2011).

Data, Methods, and Hypotheses

The present analysis uses the European Social Survey data collected in 2008 on a probability sample (N= 2352) representative for the population age fifteen and older in United Kingdom (ESS Round 4 2008, 2011). The main objective of the analysis is to identify a set of personal-level indicators most likely to influence variations in attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies.

Data have been analyzed using ordinary least square regression. Attitudes toward immigrants/immigration policies have been measured using two separate composite indicators that serve as dependent variables in the estimated statistical models. The first dependent variable measures the respondent's support for restrictive immigration policies and has been computed through factor analysis conducted on three variables. Respondents have been asked to indicate how many foreign individuals of the same ethnic group as the majority (1), of different ethnicity as the majority (2), and how many people from poorer countries outside Europe (3) should be allowed to immigrate to United Kingdom. Individual responses varied from 1 (many immigrants should be allowed) to 4 (no immigrants should be allowed). The standardized reliability coefficient Cronbach's Alpha for this index is .892. When factor analysis (PCA) was conducted, only one factor was extracted (Eigenvalue = 2.472; variance explained = 82.41%). Factor loadings varied from .895 to .933. The continuous composite index has a normal distribution (e.g., Skewness = .147; Kurtosis = -.363). The second dependent variable measures the perceived role of immigrants in society. Respondents have been asked to assess on a scale that takes values from zero to ten the immigrants' contribution to the country's economy (1), to the country's cultural life (2), and to the country's general well-being (3). Higher scores indicate positive perceptions of immigrants' role. When reliability analysis for the three indicators was conducted a Cronbach's Alpha equal to .892 was obtained. Only one factor with Eigenvalues higher than

one was obtained when the index was computed through factor analysis (Eigenvalue = 2.470; variance explained = 82.34). This dependent variable has a normal distribution as well (e.g., Skewness = -.029; Kurtosis = -.529).

Following are briefly presented the selected individual-level predictors of variation in attitudes toward immigrants. *Interpersonal trust* is a composite variable based on three indicators that measure the respondent's opinion about people's levels of trustworthiness (1), fairness (2), and helpfulness (3). The reliability coefficient Alpha for this measure is .755. One component was extracted when factor analysis was used as a data reduction method (Eigenvalue = 2.017; variance explained = 67.23%). Higher values of the factor scores indicate a higher level of interpersonal trust. *Institutional trust* is a composite measure as well, formed based on three indicators that measure the respondent's level of trust in the country's parliament (1), the country's legal system (2), and the national police (3). The reliability coefficient Alpha for the index is .747. The index has been constructed through factor analysis and one component was extracted (Eigenvalue = 1.996; variance explained = 66.53%). Higher values for factor scores indicate a higher level of institutional trust. *Economic hardship* – the question used to measure economic hardship asked respondents to indicate the likelihood of not having “enough money for household necessities in the next 12 months.” This ordinal level indicator takes values from 1 (not at all likely) to 4 (very likely). *Religiosity* – one's self-assessed degree of religiosity takes values from zero (not at all religious) to 10 (very religious). *Political orientation (Conservative)* – this dummy variable was coded 1 for respondents who acknowledged closeness to the Conservative Party and zero otherwise. *Ethnic minority* – a dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who belong to an ethnic minority group and zero otherwise. *Gender* – a dummy variable coded 1 for males and zero for females. *Age* – a continuous variable that takes values from 15 to 96. *Education* – respondent's highest level of education takes values from zero (no qualifications) to 5 (advanced graduate degree). *Parents' education* – is an additive measure that combined the parents' highest level of education; it takes values from zero (both parents have no qualifications) to 10 (both parents have advanced graduate degrees). *Residency* – this dummy variable is coded 1 for residents of large urban areas and outskirts of large cities and zero otherwise. *Place of birth* – this variable is coded zero if neither the respondent or his/her parents were born in UK, 1 if the respondent was born in UK but has foreign-born parents, 2 if the respondent and one of his/her parents

were born in UK, and 3 if the respondent and his/her parents were all born in United Kingdom. A set of three dummy variables were created based on this classification, natives being the reference group (i.e., UK-born respondent and both parents).

It is hypothesized that education, religiosity, interpersonal and institutional trust, ethnic minority status, and residency in larger urban areas will be associated with positive perceptions of immigrants and a diminished support for anti-immigration policies. It is expected that support for anti-immigration policies and negative perceptions of immigrants' role in society will increase with age and perceived economic hardship. It is anticipated that native Britons will acknowledge a higher support for restrictive immigration policies and will be less appreciative of the immigrants' contribution to the well-being of the society and to the economic and cultural life in UK when compared to persons from immigrant families.

Results

Table 1 presents the distribution of responses for the indicators included in the composite index that measured attitudes toward immigration policies and the mean values for responses at questions included in the index that measured recognition of the value of immigrants to the economy, culture, and quality of life in UK. Results are presented separately for four groups that differ in terms of family immigration background. Preliminary analyses (see Table 1) show that the family background and immigration history influence at some degree the public perception of the immigrants' contribution to the British society and also have an impact on one's opinions about immigration policies.

For instance, it can be noticed that the largest proportion of people who consider that no immigrants should be allowed to enter the country are found within the group of UK-born respondents whose parents are natives as well. If 5% of those born abroad think that no immigrants of the same ethnicity/race as the majority should be allowed in the country, about 10% of the natives share this opinion. In addition, about 16% of the natives think that no foreigners belonging to minority ethnic groups should be accepted as immigrants in UK and almost one in five natives (19.2%) considered that no immigrants from poorer countries should be allowed to permanently settle in UK. Overall, the majority of native respondents want fewer immigrants, while the majority of respondents from immigrant families are more likely to favor an 'open-door' policy, arguing that 'some' or 'many' immigrants should be allowed into United Kingdom.

Table 1: Frequency distributions, means, and standard deviations for attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies (N = 2352)

	How many immigrants of the same race/ethnic group as the majority should be allowed?				Is immigration bad (0) or good (10) for the economy?	
	Many	Some	A few	None	Mean	SD
1. Foreign-born respondent & parents	19.4%	48.9%	26.7%	5.0%	6.10	2.42
2. UK-born respondent & foreign-born parents	15.1%	56.2%	26.0%	2.7%	5.35	2.47
3. UK-born respondent & one parent	19.8%	42.0%	29.0%	9.3%	5.08	2.58
4. UK-born respondent & both parents	7.9%	52.5%	29.8%	9.8%	4.36	2.36
	How many immigrants of different race/ethnic group as the majority should be allowed?				Is the country's cultural life undermined (0) or enriched (10) by immigrants?	
	Many	Some	A few	None	Mean	SD
1. Foreign-born respondent & parents	16.5%	44.5%	33.0%	6.0%	6.44	2.37
2. UK-born respondent & foreign-born parents	12.3%	54.8%	30.1%	2.7%	6.04	2.38
3. UK-born respondent & one parent	14.2%	43.8%	30.2%	11.7%	5.43	2.69
4. UK-born respondent & both parents	5.9%	43.2%	35.0%	16.0%	4.58	2.58
	How many immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe should be allowed?				Immigrants make country a worse (0) or a better place (10) to live?	
	Many	Some	A few	None	Mean	SD
1. Foreign-born respondent & parents	16.8%	47.3%	25.0%	10.9%	6.48	2.40
2. UK-born respondent & foreign-born parents	9.6%	56.2%	27.4%	6.8%	5.24	2.31
3. UK-born respondent & one parent	12.3%	46.9%	25.9%	14.8%	4.85	2.47
4. UK-born respondent & both parents	6.0%	37.6%	37.2%	19.2%	4.24	2.41

It can also be observed that, on average, the positive perception of the immigrants' role in the society gradually and constantly decreases with an increase in the number of UK-born family members (i.e., respondent and parents). When only the respondent's and his/her parents' place of birth are considered, data show

that on a scale from zero (negative perception) to ten (positive perception), ratings of the immigrants role in society vary from 4.36 to 6.10 (perception of immigrants' contribution to the country's economy), from 4.58 to 6.44 (perception of immigrants' contribution to the cultural life), and from 4.24 to 6.48 (perception of immigrants' contribution to the society's well-being). Lowest ratings are expressed by natives and highest ratings are given by foreign-born residents. UK-born respondents with one foreign-born parent and one UK-born parent had the second lowest ratings and UK-born respondents with both parents born abroad had the second highest ratings.

Table 2: Frequencies and descriptive statistics for study variables

	Total sample (N = 2352)		Natives (N = 1921)		Non-Natives (N = 431)	
	Mean or %	SD	Mean or %	SD	Mean or %	SD
Support for anti-immigration policies	.000	1.00	.067	.98	-.310	1.02
Positive views of immigrants' role in society	.000	1.00	-.107	.97	.483	.99
Interpersonal trust	.000	1.00	.019	.98	-.087	1.08
Institutional trust	.000	1.00	-.043	.97	.196	1.09
Economic hardship	2.13	.94	2.12	.94	2.16	.96
Religiosity	4.05	3.01	3.84	2.93	4.95	3.16
Political orientation (Conservative Party)	17.09%		18.53%		10.67%	
Respondent's education	2.08	1.63	2.05	1.61	2.25	1.71
Parents' education	4.18	2.79	4.09	2.72	4.59	3.05
Ethnic minority	6.9%		1.46%		31.09%	
Residency (large urban area)	31.34%		29.10%		41.30%	
Gender (Male)	45.58%		45.18%		47.33%	
Age	49.14	18.53	50.29	18.48	44.00	17.92
<u>Place of birth</u>						
Respondent & parents born outside UK	8.16%					
Respondent born UK, foreign-born parents	3.18%					
Respondent & only one parent born in UK	6.98%					
Respondent & both parents born in UK	81.68%					

Due to relatively small sample sizes for subsamples that represent families with at least one foreign-born person, in multivariate analyses the effect of

individual-level indicators on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies were examined separately only for two subgroups. One subsample includes natives ($N = 1921$) and the second subsample ($N = 431$) of first-generation immigrants, includes persons who are immigrants or are UK-born but have at least one immigrant parent. Table 2 shows the frequency distribution or descriptive statistics for the variables used in multivariate statistical analyses.

Based on the results² presented in table 3 it can be observed that respondent's education has the largest contribution ($\text{Beta} = -.194$; $p < .001$) to the explanatory power ($R \text{ square} = .184$) of the model that analyzes data for the entire sample. With an increase in one's level of education there is a significant decrease in support for anti-immigration policies. Restrictive immigration policies are also less likely to be supported by persons who have higher levels of interpersonal trust ($\text{Beta} = -.168$; $p < .001$) and institutional trust ($\text{Beta} = -.128$; $p < .001$), by persons who are more religious ($\text{Beta} = -.068$; $p < .01$), by individuals whose parents are better educated ($\text{Beta} = -.060$; $p < .01$), and by people who live in larger cities and suburban areas surrounding them ($\text{Beta} = -.048$; $p < .05$). Men appeared to be significantly less supportive of restrictive immigration policies ($\text{Beta} = -.053$; $p < .01$) than women, when controlling for the other variables in the model. Compared to natives, foreign-born residents ($\text{Beta} = -.061$; $p < .01$) were also significantly less likely to support anti-immigration policies. Individuals born in UK from foreign-born parents do not appear to have significantly different attitudes regarding immigration policies when compared to native Britons.

While in the overall sample financial distress does not appear to impact significantly opinions about future immigration levels, a person's age and one's political orientation are important predictors of negative attitudes toward immigrants. With an increase in one's age there is a significant support for anti-immigration policies ($\text{Beta} = .129$; $p < .001$). Persons who express closeness to the Conservative Party are more likely to support restrictive immigration policies ($\text{Beta} = .066$; $p < .01$) than those who have a different political orientation.

² In order to avoid multicollinearity, the variable 'ethnic minority' has not been used in analyses for the overall sample. This variable is highly correlated ($r = .49$, $p < .001$) with the dummy variable that compares the attitudes of first generation immigrants to the attitudes expressed by the reference group.

Table 3: OLS Estimates for Support for Anti-Immigration Policies

	Total sample (N = 2352)		Natives (N = 1921)		Non-Natives (N = 431)	
	B (Std. Error)	Beta	B (Std. Error)	Beta	B (Std. Error)	Beta
Interpersonal trust	-.174*** (.025)	-.168	-.181*** (.028)	-.173	-.175** (.056)	-.181
Institutional trust	-.129*** (.024)	-.128	-.124*** (.027)	-.121	-.135** (.052)	-.144
Economic hardship	.044 (.025)	.040	.071** (.028)	.065	-.087 (.062)	-.077
Religiosity	-.023** (.008)	-.068	-.025** (.009)	-.073	-.006 (.018)	-.020
Political orientation (Conservative Party)	.175** (.058)	.066	.179** (.061)	.071	.298 (.189)	.083
Respondent's education	-.118*** (.015)	-.194	-.121*** (.016)	-.200	-.102** (.035)	-.165
Parents' education	-.022** (.009)	-.060	-.016 (.010)	-.045	-.048* (.020)	-.140
Ethnic minority			-.028 (.214)	-.003	-.083 (.123)	-.037
Residency (large urban area)	-.105* (.047)	-.048	-.076 (.052)	-.035	-.202 (.111)	-.095
Gender (Male)	-.106** (.044)	-.053	-.116* (.048)	-.058	-.042 (.108)	-.020
Age	.007*** (.001)	.129	.007*** (.002)	.134	.009** (.003)	.148
Respondent & parents born outside UK	-.225** (.083)	-.061				
Respondent born UK, foreign-born parents	-.225 (.124)	-.039				
Respondent & one parent born in UK	-.165* (.080)	-.041				
Constant	.082 (.121)		.005 (.136)		.100 (.258)	
Adjusted R Square	.184		.171		.159	

***p ≤ .001; **p ≤ .01; *p ≤ .05.

Two additional models explored attitudes toward immigration policies for two separate subsamples; one subsample (N = 1921) includes only respondents born in UK whose parents were also born in UK and the other subsample (N = 431) includes respondents who were themselves and their parents born abroad or were UK-born but had at least one parent born abroad. Although inter-group differences in means for attitudes toward immigration policies do exist (see Table 2), in both subsamples, similar effects are recorded for several variables included in the estimated models. For

instance, in both subsamples respondent's education, one's level of interpersonal trust, and one's level of institutional trust are negatively related to support for anti-immigration policies, while age is positively and significantly related to support for restrictive immigration policies not only for the majoritarian group (Beta = .134; $p < .001$), but for non-natives as well (Beta = .148; $p < .01$).

While native Britons who acknowledge a higher degree of religiosity tend to oppose restrictive immigration policies (Beta = -.073; $p < .01$), UK-born persons who anticipate economic hardship are more likely to support anti-immigration policies (Beta = .065; $p < .01$). Similar attitudes are shared by natives (Beta = .071; $p < .01$) who feel closer to the Conservative Party.

Although the direction of the effect is the same in both subsamples, gender has a significant effect on attitudes regarding immigration levels only in the majoritarian sample. Native males are more opposed to restrictive immigration policies than native women (Beta = -.058; $p < .05$). Parents' education appears to significantly influence attitudes toward immigration policies only in the subsample that includes non-natives (Beta = -.140; $p < .05$).

Even if in both subsamples respondents belonging to ethnic minority groups and persons who live in large cities tend to oppose restrictive immigration policies, when controlling for the other variables in the model, these effects are not large enough to be significant. The selected variables included in the presented statistical models explain about the same amount of variance (i.e., approximately 17% for the majoritarian subsample and 16% for the subsample with at least one foreign-born person in the respondent's family) in attitudes regarding restrictive immigration policies.

Further analyses tried to identify the variables more likely to predict citizens' positive perceptions of the immigrants' role in the British society. Approximately 31% of the variation in public opinion is explained by the model for the total sample presented in table 4. Similar to previous findings, respondents who expressed higher levels of interpersonal (Beta = .216; $p < .001$) and institutional trust (Beta = .228; $p < .001$) were more appreciative of the immigrants' contribution to the economy, culture, and general well-being of the society.

Table 4: OLS Estimates for Positive Views of Immigrants' Role in Society

	Total sample (N = 2352)		Natives (N = 1921)		Non-Natives (N = 431)	
	B (Std. Error)	Beta	B (Std. Error)	Beta	B (Std. Error)	Beta
Interpersonal trust	.223*** (.023)	.216	.231*** (.026)	.224	.229*** (.052)	.243
Institutional trust	.229*** (.022)	.228	.244*** (.025)	.243	.191*** (.049)	.209
Economic hardship	-.055* (.023)	-.050	-.078** (.025)	-.065	.005 (.058)	.004
Religiosity	.018** (.007)	.054	.015* (.008)	.047	.021 (.017)	.065
Conservative Party supporter	-.211*** (.054)	-.079	-.222*** (.056)	-.089	-.159 (.177)	-.045
Respondent's education	.115*** (.014)	.189	.121*** (.015)	.203	.083* (.033)	.138
Parents' education	.029*** (.008)	.082	.034*** (.009)	.096	.016* (.019)	.048
Ethnic minority			-.005 (.195)	-.001	.425*** (.115)	.196
Residency (large urban area)	.156*** (.043)	.072	.126** (.047)	.059	.235* (.104)	.114
Gender (Male)	.145*** (.040)	.072	.138** (.044)	.071	.128 (.101)	.063
Age	-.003* (.001)	-.052	-.003* (.001)	-.061	.000 (.003)	.007
Respondent & parents born outside UK	.622*** (.076)	.171				
Respondent born UK, foreign-born parents	.386*** (.113)	.068				
Respondent & one parent born in UK	.166* (.079)	.042				
Constant	-.316** (.111)		-.256* (.124)		-.167 (.243)	
Adjusted R Square	.308		.290		.212	

***p ≤ .001; **p ≤ .01; *p ≤ .05.

The respondent's education and the respondent's parents' educational level are both significantly and positively related to the dependent variable. Men, persons who are more religious, and residents of larger urban areas have more positive views of immigrants' role in society than, respectively, women, less religious individuals, and people who live in rural or smaller urban areas. Foreign-born individuals and native persons with one or both parents born abroad have a

significantly more positive perception of immigrants and their role in society than native Britons. However, individuals who experience financial difficulties, persons who sympathize with the Conservative Party and older respondents tend to share a less positive view of the immigrants' contribution to the British society.

For natives and non-natives as well, interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and residency in large cities are significantly and positively related to positive perceptions of immigration. While UK-born ethnic minorities do not differ significantly in their opinions about immigrants' role in society when compared to non-minority natives, persons belonging to ethnic minority groups in the foreign-born subsample tend to have a much more positive opinion of the immigrants' contribution to the British society than non-minority respondents from immigrant families. However, it should be noted that the relatively small representation of UK-born ethnic minorities could have impacted the results pertaining to natives' opinions. If in the majoritarian subsample respondents belonging to an ethnic minority group represent only 1.5%, in the foreign-born subsample ethnic minorities represent 31% of subsample size.

Political orientation, gender, and age influence significantly the opinions expressed by native respondents only. While native men tend to perceive immigrants in more positive terms than native women do, older UK-born individuals, those who anticipate economic hardship and sympathizers of the Conservative Party are less likely to acknowledge the immigrants' positive contribution to the economic and cultural life of the British society than people who are younger, better-off economically, and those who feel closer to other political parties, respectively.

Discussion and conclusions

By simultaneously testing alternative theoretical explanations, this paper examined several individual-level factors most likely to influence attitudes toward immigration policies and immigrants in general, expressed by native Britons and also by persons who are first and second generation immigrants in United Kingdom. Results show that anti-immigrant attitudes and support for restrictive immigration policies are highly correlated in UK. Persons who indirectly express reservations toward multiculturalism (i.e., have a negative view of the immigrants' contribution to the economy, culture, and well-being of the British society) are

more likely to favor anti-immigration policies (e.g., for natives: $r = .64$, $p < .001$; for non-natives: $r = .55$, $p < .001$). Similar to findings from prior studies (see Dustmann and Preston 2007), a large segment of the UK population favors restrictive immigration policies, especially when potential immigrants are ethnic/racial minorities and the sending country is a poor non-European state. Approximately 51% of native Britons believe that no immigrants or only a few immigrants who belong to ethnic/racial minority groups from poor countries should be allowed in UK. Similar attitudes are expressed by the majority of natives (56.4%) regarding potential immigration from poor countries outside Europe. Support for anti-immigration policies is also expressed by more than one third of those who are first and second generation immigrants. While only noneconomic characteristics appear to significantly influence immigration-related attitudes expressed by non-natives, the natives' perception of immigrants and their reaction to immigration policies is shaped by personal economic circumstances, in addition to socio-demographic and cultural factors.

As anticipated, and in support of the cultural marginality thesis (see Fetzer 2000), when compared to natives, persons from immigrant families are significantly less likely to favor anti-immigration policies and are significantly more likely to perceive in positive terms the immigrants' contribution to society. It appears that being foreign-born and/or having foreign-born parents were the defining characteristics of a group, whose identity, despite individual differences in socioeconomic, cultural, and ethnic background, might be a result of shared similar life experiences in the new adoptive country. Results are similar to findings by Espenshade and Calhoun (1993), who determined that 'cultural affinity' (i.e., being a racial/ethnic minority and foreign-born) influenced attitudes toward illegal immigrants in US. However, it should be noted that in United Kingdom the impact of immigrant family status on attitudinal change is less important than one's societal attachment and education. Consistent with previous research (Rustenbach 2010), persons who display a high level of interpersonal trust are more likely to oppose restrictive immigration policies and tend to believe that immigration enriched the country's culture and strengthened the economy. Similar attitudes are expressed by persons who have high levels of confidence in the country's legal system, parliament, and national police. In the overall sample, when controlling for immigration status, respondent's education and institutional trust are the strongest predictors of variations in immigration-related attitudes.

Although this study finds partial support for the economic self-interest perspective, results suggest that non-economic factors have a stronger impact on attitudes toward immigration expressed by natives and persons from immigrant families as well. While economically vulnerable native citizens are significantly more likely to support anti-immigration policies and tend to have a negative view of immigrants, economic factors do not appear to significantly impact the immigration-related attitudes expressed by non-native persons. Consistent with prior research (Brenner and Fertig 2006; Daniels and von der Ruhr 2005; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Fetzer 2000; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Mayda 2006; Rustenbach 2010), it appears that the human capital theoretical perspective offers a better explanation of attitudinal change regarding immigration issues. As hypothesized, with an increase in one's level of education and in the educational level of the respondent's parents there is a significant decrease in support for restrictive immigration policies and an increase in positive perceptions of immigrants. Educational level is one of the strongest predictors of attitudes toward immigration for both subsamples (natives and non-natives). Even if the parents' education has a weaker effect on attitudes than respondent's education does, the variable significantly predicts positive perceptions of immigrants' contribution to the British society for both subsamples. As Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007, 437) observed, the effect of education/skills on immigration attitudes differs from the conventional arguments about labor-market competition. Education actually transforms the values held by individuals, encouraging them to have more tolerant and cosmopolitan views of the world and be more open to multiculturalism.

Although only a proxy measure was used to test the competing contact hypotheses, results appear to validate Allport's (1954) thesis, according to which increased contact with immigrants would decrease one's xenophobic and ethnocentric attitudes. Results are consistent with findings obtained by DiGiusto and Jolly (2008), who identified in France a significant negative relationship between the share of foreign population in a large geographic area and anti-immigrant sentiments. In particular, results suggest that native Britons living in large urban areas, where most immigrants reside in UK, are less supportive of restrictive immigration policies and are significantly more likely to acknowledge the immigrants' positive contribution to the economic and cultural life of the British society than natives who live in rural areas or smaller cities. Recent research (see Blinder 2011) based on Citizenship Survey 2008-2009 also found that when

compared to residents of other regions, white UK-born Londoners and other residents of London, where migrants are most heavily concentrated, are less likely to favor sharp reductions in migration to the UK.

As hypothesized and similar to results presented in prior research studies (DiGiusto and Jolly 2008; Rustenbach 2010) that examined the effect of political preferences (i.e., left-versus-right political inclination) on attitude formation, native Britons who are Conservative Party supporters are more likely to favor anti-immigration policies and are more likely to consider that immigrants had a negative impact on the country's culture, economy, and general well-being. Consistent with research conducted in United States (see Daniels and Von der Ruhr 2005; Smith 2006) and as hypothesized, the self-assessed level of religiosity appears to influence attitudes toward immigrants, independent of one's religious denomination. More religious natives are less likely to support restrictive immigration policies and tend to think that the immigrants' contribution to society is beneficial. Similar to studies conducted in other countries (Berzosa and Valentova 2010; Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong, 1997; DiGiusto and Jolly 2008; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007), gender and age impact immigration-related public attitudes in United Kingdom as well. With an increase in one's age there is an increase in support for anti-immigration policies. Interestingly, older persons in both subsamples (natives and non-natives) share similar views regarding immigration policies and immigrants in general. Gender differences in attitudes are observed only for native Britons. When compared to women, men are significantly more likely to support 'open-door' immigration policies and appear to be more appreciative of multiculturalism.

To summarize, this analysis found support for all the main theories that explain attitudinal variation in the public's opinion about immigration-related issues in United Kingdom. It should be noted, however, that this is a secondary analysis limited by the existent data, which did not include potentially important indicators. For instance, respondents were not asked to justify or explain their opinions regarding immigration-related issues and there is no way of knowing the rationale behind their attitudes toward immigrants or immigration policies. Although the 2008 European Social Survey does not include questions regarding one's direct experience/contact with immigrants, other recent surveys conducted in United Kingdom (see Blinder 2011) found that only a small number of British citizens claimed that their own neighborhood is having problems due to

immigrants. And approximately 85% of the respondents participating in the 2008-2009 Citizen Survey declared that people of diverse backgrounds get along well in their particular local area. Blinder (2011, 8) contended that the Britons' relatively strong support for restrictive immigration policies is in fact an expression of a general concern regarding United Kingdom as a whole, rather than a logic consequence of a direct negative personal experience with foreign-born individuals in one's own community.

This study showed that two subjective and highly correlated factors, interpersonal trust and confidence in important institutions (e.g., the country's Parliament, the legal system, and the police), are among the strongest predictors of variations in attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. Consequently, it could be assumed that the natives' diminished support for multiculturalism in UK is partially a reflection of a low level of institutional trust. Although public beliefs regarding important institutions are shaped by the media, political elites, and one's direct experiences with the police or the legal system, for instance, as Rothstein (2005) contended, the government's ability to be fair and impartial is a major trust-creating factor at both interpersonal and institutional level. Even if the present analysis could not establish causal relationships, results appear to support the contention (see Rothstein and Stolle's 2003) that one's level of interpersonal trust is significantly influenced by the individual's trust in policy-implementing societal institutions. In the overall sample there is a significant positive relationship ($r = .387$; $p < .001$) between interpersonal trust and institutional trust. The relationship is stronger for the subsample of native Britons ($r = .414$; $p < .001$) than it is for the subsample of persons who are first or second generation immigrants ($r = .312$; $p < .001$), suggesting that trust in institutions, particularly in those that provide public services (e.g., the justice system), translates at the personal level in the trust citizens express toward each other, influencing their perception of foreigners as well.

As this research and other studies suggest (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Mayda 2006) non-economic factors affect public attitudes toward immigration in United Kingdom more than economic variables do. Different from conventional arguments about labor-market competition, people with higher education levels are more likely to oppose restrictive immigration policies and tend to favor multiculturalism. Although the current British government plans to implement restrictive immigration policies in the near future, the country has already a

noteworthy foreign-born population, whose integration in society could be negatively affected if at the government level the benefits and consequences of multiculturalism are not properly explained to the public and beliefs that foster animosity toward foreigners are not discouraged. In addition, the natives' and non-natives' confidence in major institutions, an important indicator of the political health of the society as a whole, risks to be eroded if immigration and immigrants will continue to be presented by government officials as problematic. The 2011 riots in urban areas of England characterized by a higher proportion of households with no workers, higher levels of child poverty, higher youth unemployment rates, and lower levels of educational attainment than the corresponding national average figures (see Ben-Galim and Gottfried 2011) suggest that government policies focusing on reducing economic inequality by creating viable educational and employment opportunities for people living in deprived communities might have more long-term positive effects on the country's general well-being, the citizens' perception of immigrants, and the public's level of institutional trust than restrictive immigration policies alone could achieve.

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Ethnicity, Strategic Mobilization and Voting in the Romanian Parliamentary Elections of 2008

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Abstract. Social scientists have made contradictory claims about the impact of ethnicity on social cohesion, the levels of social trust, civic and political engagement. This paper conceptualizes ethnic diversity as a contextual variable and evaluates its effect on the electoral participation of the Hungarian minority from Romania, using a case study of the Romanian Parliamentary Elections of 2008. The article examines the differences in turnout between Hungarian electors living in different counties of Romania, and how this varies by the ethnic composition of the counties. We discern two patterns of electoral participation of the Hungarian minority: lower turnout in ethnically non-competitive counties (i.e. low ethnical diversity, with the size of Hungarian minority below 8% or above 50% of the county's total population); higher turnout in ethnically competitive counties (i.e. higher ethnical diversity, with the size of the Hungarian minority between 8% and 50% of the county's population). The findings support the "strategic mobilization hypothesis" according to which electoral mobilization was unevenly distributed due to various stakes attributed to voting in different electoral districts, followed by a pragmatic cost/benefit logic adopted by the leaders and partisans of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR).

Keywords: *ethnic voting, electoral mobilization, Hungarian minority, Romania*

Introduction

Ethnic voting is one of the persistent features of electoral behavior in post-communist Romania, especially in the areas inhabited by the Hungarian minority. Since 1990, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania's (DAHR from now on) electoral performance always reliably reflected the ethnic share of the Hungarian minority and assured it political representation in the Romanian Parliament. Both the Romanian public opinion and academia attributed DAHR's electoral success to the high solidarity and unity of a much disciplined Hungarian electorate. On the other hand, the leaders and partisans of the Romanian political

parties perceived that the above average electoral turnout of Hungarians was not only a consequence of a higher sense of voting as a civic duty among Hungarians, but also a result of the enviable electoral mobilization capacity of DAHR and its local branches.

However, the 2008 Romanian parliamentary elections seem to misfit Hungarian minority's behavioral pattern outlined above. The counties where the Hungarians represent the majority of the population (namely Harghita and Covasna) had among the lowest electoral turnouts. Overall, Hungarians had a lower propensity to vote in these elections, compared to the rest of the population of Romania. What is even more puzzling is that DAHR's partisans had a lower probability to vote than their counterparts from the main Romanian political parties. This paper explores the reasons behind the electoral patterns' dynamics of the Hungarian minority from Romania. More specifically, the paper aims to answer the following research question: *Why did Hungarians have a lower propensity to vote in the Romanian parliamentary elections of 2008, compared to non-Hungarians?*

I will assess two alternative hypothetical answers to this question, using both county aggregated data and individual-level survey data:

H1: *Non-vote as political disaffection*: Hungarians had a lower propensity to vote because they were less satisfied with government performance and political leaders, than non-Hungarians;

H2: *Non-vote as strategic de(mobilization)*: Hungarians' probability to vote is contingent upon a contextual variable, namely the ethnic diversity of the county of residence. Therefore, Hungarians had a higher propensity to vote in ethnically competitive counties (i.e. with high ethnic diversity) and a lower propensity to vote in ethnically non-competitive counties (i.e. with low ethnic diversity).

The paper is structured in 6 parts. In the first section of the article, I review two strands of academic literature in which this research is theoretically embedded, namely ethno-politics and mobilization theory. Then, I outline the ethnic dimension of electoral behavior in post-communist Romania with a special emphasis on the electoral turnout of the Hungarian minority. In section three, I focus on the electoral participation of the Hungarian voters and as well as DAHR's partisans, in the 2008 parliamentary elections. Section four presents the institutional context, namely the electoral reform of 2008, which changed the party-list proportional-representation system with a new electoral design, based on

single-member electoral districts. In section 5, I assess the impact of the institutional and ethnic contexts on the patterns of electoral behavior of the Hungarian minority's members, in different counties of Romania. In section 6, I draw the conclusions of the paper.

Ethno-politics and Electoral Mobilization: An Outline of the Theoretical Framework

The first strand of academic literature which theoretically frames this research examines the relationship between ethnicity and politics. Ethno-politics derived its popularity in many parts of the world from the enduring character of ethnicity as a political resource. Ethnicity is one of the factors though to influence the likelihood a person will be politically engaged. The impact of ethnicity on political engagement is very complex, however, and can only be suggested here. More specifically, as Woshinsky (2008) has pointed out, the influence of ethnicity on political behavior can be mediated or even obscured by other factors among which the most prominent is social status. In many cases, individuals belonging to ethnic minority groups, especially those despised by the majority, will be less politically active than average because usually minority groups are poorer and lower on social status than average, and groups toward the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum are usually less politically active (Woshinsky, 2008, p. 90).

However, if such socioeconomic differences between minority groups and the majority are insignificant, or if in our analyses we control for the effect of social status variables, it might turn out that in fact ethnic minority groups are more active than majority ones. The question then is why, *ceteris paribus*, the political involvement is usually higher in ethnic minority groups than average? According to Woshinsky (2008) the main reason has to do with social identification. Minority groups' members in all cultures tend to be more conscious of their group identity. In turn this group identification makes them more attuned on how society, through its political mechanisms, can affect their daily life (Woshinsky, 2008). Social consciousness derived from strong social identity is producing political participation of ethnic minority members especially when it is backed by an organization that can provide the mobilization framework necessary for political activism.

Ethnic parties represent the most evident organizational aspect of ethno-

politics (Salat, 2009). They have been successful in fostering ethnic identities, mobilizing voters and voter loyalty in elections in many democracies. Some authors even claim that in terms of electoral performance, ethno-nationalist parties have done better than class-based parties, especially in the Western democracies where class-based cleavages seem to fade away (Alonso, 2008). Despite a widespread decline of political parties' membership accompanied by a decline of turnout in elections, ethnic parties seem to have better preserved their electoral constituencies and most of the time display a remarkable stability in terms of electoral performance.

What are the potential explanations for the relative electoral advantage of ethno-nationalist parties compared to class-based parties? The answer to this question can be framed by the academic debate on the meanings of ethnicity underpinned from two different perspectives supported by primordialists, on the one hand, and constructivists, on the other hand (Hasmath, 2011). According to Alonso (2008, p. 82) primordialists (see Geertz, 1973; Gellner, 1983; Horowitz, 1985) would say that people think of ethnicity in primordial terms and therefore once created ethnic identities tend to be stable, and ethnic voters tend to be more rigid in their loyalties. Ethnic parties transform this rigidity into an electoral advantage. When voting is mainly based on ethnic membership electoral performance is expected to be stable as a straightforward reflection of ethnic demography (Horowitz, 1985, apud. Alonso, 2008, pp. 82-83).

In contrast, constructivists (Brubaker, 2004; Chandra, 2004, apud. Alonso, 2008, p. 83) would say that individual ethnic identities are easily changeable and highly malleable. Therefore one should not expect a priori more stable support for ethno-nationalist parties than for any other type of party. Ethnic parties are not mere reflections of ethnic demography, a constructionist would say (Alonso, 2008, p. 83). Yet, why then ethno-nationalist parties seem to be more stable in terms of electoral performance than class-based parties? Alonso (2008) believes that one possible answer could be that they are judged by voters using different criteria. Class-based parties are judged sensitively by voters on economic matters and they are highly vulnerable to electoral punishment on these grounds. On the contrary, ethnic parties are judged not so much on government performance but mainly in terms of the government's success "to represent the group that considers itself to have a national identity different from the rest of the population" (Aguilar & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2008, p. 127). For these reasons, Sonia

Alonso argues that the main political consequences of ethnic allegiances can be summarized as follows:

“... if it is true that ethnic allegiances provide nationalist parties with a competitive electoral advantage over class-based parties, *ceteris paribus* (i.e. under similar institutional settings), ethnic parties should show lower fluctuation of votes, less electoral punishment, lengthier durations in office, and less political erosion with the passage of time than class-based parties” (Alonso, 2008, p. 89).

The second strand of literature outlined here is mobilization theory, which emphasizes the role of mobilizing agents as a source of political participation of the citizens. The main argument of the mobilization theory is that people need a catalyst in order to participate. This could be a candidate, political party or other type of organizations or social networks that could drive people to politics. Even among individuals with similar socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics, there may be varying degrees of political participation due to the influences exerted by different mobilizing agents (Norris, 2002). These actors are well informed, know what are the ways and means of action which can bring benefits and therefore have every incentive to mobilize citizens to achieve certain political goals (Comșa, 2006).

Thus, the theories of *mobilization* highlight the importance of agents either taken individually (as the political leaders) or collectively as social organizations and networks generated by parties, unions, voluntary organizations and community associations which act as mobilizers of participation (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). According to Rosenstone and Hansen’s comprehensive study of political mobilization, this concept is defined as “the process by which candidates, parties, activists, and groups induce other people to participate” (1993, p. 25). Moreover, mobilization theorists highlight the link between the patterns of participation and the choices and incentives for participation structured by politically mobilizing agents. Furthermore, people will be mobilized through affiliation to political organizations, where they might be asked by others to take part and there is an increasing number of evidence that shows that links to parties and different social groups are important predictors of turnout (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007; Tătar, 2011). In brief, according to mobilization theory, people do participate primarily not because they can and want to participate, but because they were asked for by mobilizing agents.

The electoral relevance of ethnicity in post-communist Romania

Electoral behavior in Romania has a significant, and historically and geographically well documented, ethnic dimension¹, especially in Transylvania, including also the North-Western parts of the country (Bodocan, 2001; Ilieș, 1998; Șișeștean, 2002). But even within these regions, ethnic voting has an important territorial distribution, being more salient in some electoral districts than in others. After 1989, most of the ethnic minority groups from Romania have organized themselves in cultural associations aiming to preserve their identity and to represent them politically. Consequently, there is a plethora of organizations which participate in the Romanian parliamentary elections in different electoral districts that correspond more or less with the territorial distribution of specific ethnic minority groups (Bodocan, 2001).

However, in this paper I will focus on the political representation of the Hungarian minority from Romania and more specifically on the electoral performance of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR). DAHR has certain peculiarities when compared with other ethnic minority organizations from Romania. For instance, it is the only ethnic-based organization that has always passed the electoral threshold² in the Romanian parliamentary elections after 1989, and obtained proportional political representation for the Hungarian minority more or less in accordance with its share in the total population of Romania (Bodocan, 2001). DAHR is also different from the Romanian majority's political parties, being the political organization with the most stable electoral performance in the volatile post-communist political landscape of Romania: it has constantly gained seats in the Romanian Parliament under the same label and the same organizational structure (Salat, 2009).

¹ Ethnic voting is also relatively frequent in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Some authors argue that the map of ethnic voting in this region is simply mirroring the legacies of ethnic minority issues which appeared with the late formation of national states in this part of Europe (Vandermotten, Lockhart, & Freyer-Macola, 2003).

² The actual electoral threshold is of 5% of the total votes, or alternatively, a party would need to win the elections in 6 deputy districts and 3 senatorial districts. Some authors call this alternative threshold "lex DAHR" as they argue it was mainly conceived "as a safety belt" in case the DAHR would not pass the 5% threshold (Székely, 2009). Except the DAHR, none of the ethnic minorities' organizations has passed the 5% threshold in the last parliamentary elections. However, even if their representative organizations do not pass the electoral, each officially recognized national minority is granted a seat in the lower chamber of the Romanian Parliament (Chamber of Deputies). The representatives of national minorities in the Romanian Parliament constitute a distinct parliamentary group which regularly consists of 18 deputies. DAHR has its own, separate parliamentary groups, both in the Romanian Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.

Table 1: The electoral performance of DAHR in parliamentary elections, 1990-2008

Year	General Turnout Romania (%)	DAHR's electoral performance					
		Chamber of Deputies			Senate		
		Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats
1990	86.19	991601	7.23	29	1004353	7.20	12
1992	76.29	822290	7.46	27	831469	7.58	12
1996	76.01	812628	6.64	25	837760	6.82	11
2000	65.31	736863	6.80	27	751310	6.90	12
2004	58.51	628125	6.17	22	637109	6.23	10
2008	39.20	425008	6.17	22	440449	6.39	9

Data source: Salat (2009, p. 121)

In spite of its enduring electoral performance (see Table 1), DAHR is legally and formally not a political party (with a certain political ideology), but an umbrella organization which aims to promote and represent the interests of the Hungarian minority from Romania. However the political recast of the DAHR in the last 20 years is similar to the one of an ethnic party: “from an organization primarily concerned with the identity problems of the Hungarian minority in Romania to an organization interested mainly in increasing its electoral/political performance and coalition building potential” (Salat, 2009, p. 115). The lack of a strong and clear ideological position and its relative size (about 6-9 % of the seats in Parliament) are two important factors that make DAHR the ideal partner in coalition governments³ led by Romanian political parties that ideologically place themselves either at the left or right wings of the political spectrum. As Salat (2009, p. 118) points out, after 1996 the behavior of DAHR's leaders has been increasingly dominated by what can be labeled as “political rationality” accomplished by a pragmatic shift from a politics centered on the identity issues to a politics focusing mainly on granting access to resources through electoral success and the subsequent conversion of this success into political influence and governmental positions. The access to resources was then used as a mechanism to marginalize more radical leaders⁴, and the


³ From 1996, DAHR has almost continuously participated in government coalitions in a form or another: from 1996 until 2000 it was a member of the governing coalition led by the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR); from 2000 to 2004 it had a cooperation agreement with the governing Social Democratic Party (PSD); from 2004 until the end of 2008 it was again part of the governing coalition; since 2010 is participating in the governing coalition led by the Democrat Liberal Party (PDL).

⁴ In 2002, Gheorghe Șişeştean assessed the role of the DAHR's participation in coalition governments in Romania as having ambivalent consequences: on the one hand, is a test of the Hungarian political elite's willingness to participate in the decision making process in the

development of strong local clientele and a well organized network of political caucuses able to electorally mobilize the constituencies (Salat, 2009).

However, we cannot fully assess the electoral performance of the DAHR if we do not take into consideration the general patterns of electoral participation in Romania, after 1990. Data in table 1 point out that turnout in the Romanian parliamentary elections has dramatically declined in the last 20 years (Alexandru, Moraru, & Ercuş, 2009) by over 50%: from 86.19 % in 1990 to only 39.20 % in 2008. In a similar vein, DAHR lost more than half of the votes (numbers in absolute terms) in the last 20 years: from 991601 votes for the DAHR’s candidates for the Chamber of Deputies in 1990 to 425008 votes in 2008. On the other hand, this dramatic decline is obscured if we only look at the DAHR’s share of total votes casted in each election which seems remarkably stable (around 6-7%) both for the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. But this stability might prove to be only illusory if we take into account the general decline of electoral participation in Romanian parliamentary elections, regardless of ethnicity (Hungarians and non-Hungarians) or political and ideological affiliation.

Figure 1: DAHR’s lost votes vs. lost seats in subsequent parliamentary elections



Source: author’s own elaboration based on data presented in Table 1.

Note: data represent % of DAHR’s lost votes/seats compared to previous election for the lower chamber of the Romanian Parliament (i.e. Chamber of Deputies).

Romanian state, and at the same time, it helped to mitigate the segregationist fears existing in some segments of the Romanian population (Şişeştean, 2002, p. 152).

Figure 1 further explores the patterns of DAHR's electoral performance by comparing the percentage of lost votes with that of lost seats in two subsequent elections. In general, as one should expect there is a correlation between the shares of lost votes with the share of lost seats. However there are two notable exceptions from this rule. The first one, in 2000, when although DAHR lost more than 9% of votes compared with 1996, it gained around 8% more seats than in 1996. The second exception, and the one more relevant for the scope of this paper, is revealed by the parliamentary elections of 2008. Compared with 2004, although DAHR lost almost one third of the votes it did not lose any seat in the Chamber of Deputies. This is again in line with the fact there has been a general decline of turnout (both of Hungarians and Romanians) in the Romanian parliamentary elections of 2008 compared with previous elections: turnout has dropped from 58.51% in 2004 to only 39.20% in 2008. Consequently, in 2008 DAHR preserved its relative share of seats in the lower chamber of the Parliament mainly because the Romanian political parties have also lost significant amounts of votes, compared with the previous election of 2004.

Hungarian voters and partisans in the 2008 parliamentary elections in Romania

Despite declining turnout, Hungarians from Romania remain largely DAHR's "captive" electorate. All the data we have point out the electoral prevalence of the ethnic cleavage for the Hungarian minority's voters and DAHR partisans. For instance, over 70% of the Hungarian voters in the 2008 parliamentary elections in Romania actually voted for DAHR. On the other hand, over 90% of the DAHR's voters and over 92% of the DAHR's partisans (those who feel closer to DAHR than to any other political party) declared themselves as Hungarians⁵. They also have a generally low electoral fluctuation, that is Hungarian voters generally do not migrate from one party to another. Although some dissatisfied parts of the Hungarian minority also voted in the local elections of 2008 for another Hungarian party from Romania, namely the Hungarian Civic Party (HCP), the electoral performance of this party was rather modest⁶ (Salat, 2009; Székely, 2009). However, the relative immobility of Hungarian voters does not necessarily translate

⁵ Estimations based on the European Social Survey 4 applied in Romania in December 2008-January 2009, right after the parliamentary elections held on 30 November 2008)

⁶ The Hungarian Civic party did not participate in the electoral contest of 2008 as a party, but supported several independent candidates competing against the candidates of DAHR.

into a steady adherence of Hungarians to DAHR. Some authors even believe that while in opposition (during 2009), DAHR could try to reinforce the weakened ties with its electorate (Salat, 2009, p. 127). Moreover, Vladimir Pasti argues that the dynamics of the electoral behavior of the Hungarians from Romania is illustrating, in quasi-experimental conditions, the loss of trust of previously loyal voters in the political elites that represent them (Pasti, 2009, pp. 341-342).

Table 2: The propensity of the Hungarian minority's members to vote in the parliamentary elections of 2008 (Logistic regression analysis)

Dependent variable: 1=voter, 0=non-voter								
Predictors	B	SE	Wald	df	P	Exp (B)	95% CI for Exp. (B)	
							Inf.	Sup.
Constant	-3.945	.372	112.57	1	.000	.019		
Age (years)	.020	.004	32.321	1	.000	1.020	1.013	1.027
Male(1)	.282	.101	7.773	1	.005	1.326	1.087	1.617
Hungarian(1)	-.455	.197	5.368	1	.021	.634	.431	.932
Residence in rural area (1)	.718	.107	44.702	1	.000	2.050	1.661	2.531
Married (1)	.353	.109	10.438	1	.001	1.423	1.149	1.763
Children in household (1)	.269	.116	5.408	1	.020	1.309	1.043	1.643
Education (years of schooling)	.024	.016	2.306	1	.129	1.025	.993	1.058
Happiness scale (0-10)	.013	.025	.257	1	.612	1.013	.964	1.064
Media consumption index	.025	.011	5.283	1	.022	1.026	1.004	1.048
Subjective general health (1)	.272	.110	6.064	1	.014	1.312	1.057	1.629
Working abroad experience (1)	-.963	.269	12.775	1	.000	.382	.225	.647
Income	.064	.036	3.176	1	.075	1.066	.994	1.143
State owned company employee (1)	.298	.129	5.291	1	.021	1.347	1.045	1.736
Active in NGO (1)	.542	.327	2.759	1	.097	1.720	.907	3.263
Voluntary work (1)	.512	.205	6.271	1	.012	1.669	1.118	2.492
Trade unionist (1)	.075	.121	.387	1	.534	1.078	.851	1.366
Generalized trust scale (0-10)	.060	.019	10.096	1	.001	1.062	1.023	1.102
Church attendance frequency	.193	.036	28.154	1	.000	1.212	1.129	1.302
Model Omnibus Test $\chi^2(18) = 243.30$, $p < 0.001$, $N = 2053$ R^2 (Cox & Snell) = 0.112, R^2 (Nagelkerke) = 0.151 Hosmer & Lemeshow Test $\chi^2(8) = 4.784$, $p = 0.780$ Overall correct classification rate = 66.7%								

Source: own elaboration based on ESS4 post-electoral survey.

For the 2008 Romanian parliamentary elections, Hungarians not only voted in lower proportions compared with 2004, but also they had a lower propensity to vote than non-Hungarians from Romania (i.e. Romanians and also the other ethnic minority groups). Table 2 shows the results of the logistic regression analysis of the

predictors of voting in the 2008 parliamentary elections using post-electoral survey data. As highlighted in Table 2, Hungarians had a significantly lower propensity to vote (over 1.5 times lower probability) than non-Hungarians, even when we control for the effect of some basic socio-demographic variables as well as for the influence of different social capital indicators. Estimations from ESS 4 (2008) data, point out that around 34% of the Hungarians and 40% of the non-Hungarians voted in the 2008 Romanian parliamentary elections.

Table 3: Partisans’ mobilization to vote in the 2008 parliamentary elections⁷

		Non-voters	Voters	Total
Partisans of...	National Liberal party (PNL)	37%	63%	100%
	Democrat-Liberal Party (PD-L)	35%	65%	100%
	Social Democrat Party (PSD)	25%	75%	100%
	Democratic Alliance of Hungarians from Romania (DAHR)	39%	61%	100%
Total (Partisans in Romania)		34%	66%	100%

Source: own elaboration based on ESS4 post-electoral survey.

Note: data represent the % of voters and non-voters among the respondents who fell closer to a specific party than to other parties (i.e. are the partisans of a specific party).

What is even more puzzling is that not only Hungarian electors had a lower probability to vote, but also DAHR’s partisans⁸ (which represent around 35% of the voting age Hungarians from Romania) had a lower propensity to vote than their counterparts from other Romanian political parties⁹ (see Table 3). For instance, around 39% of DAHR’s partisans did not vote compared to an average of 34% of the total number of partisans in Romania which did not cast a ballot in the 2008 elections. How can one explain that although some people feel close to a specific party, a significant part of them tend not to vote (they are "partisan non-voters")?

⁷ For the sake of simplicity and clarity I present here only the results for the partisans of main political parties from Romania, although in some of the statistical analysis carried out for this research I included all the parties which were present in the ESS4 survey dataset.

⁸ Here, I use the term partisan to mean a person who declares that s/he feels closer to a specific political party than to all the other political parties.

⁹ Comparing the rates of absenteeism among partisans, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) seems to have mobilized the best its supporters in the parliamentary elections of 2008, only about 25% of those who declared themselves closer to this political party did not cast a ballot.

We believe that “partisan non-vote” can be interpreted both as a way to express political discontent and as a non-voting strategy based on rational calculation. Thus, on the one hand, partisan non-voters could be included in the category of those who were somewhat disappointed with the performance or decisions taken by certain politicians of the party they feel closer. On the other hand, partisan non-voters could also fall in the category of those who believe that the electoral stake is very low and therefore it does not deserve to take the effort to go voting, or alternatively, the elections are not competitive enough and their party will win or lose the election anyway, with or without their vote (i.e. their vote will not bring an additional number of parliamentary seats to the party or conversely will not reduce the number of seats won anyhow).

In the case of the political parties that have obtained parliamentary seats in the 2008 elections, the two situations (non-voting as dissatisfaction and strategic non-voting as a rational calculus) are best illustrated, on the one hand, by the National Liberal Party (PNL), and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians from Romania (DAHR), on the other. The two political parties are best suited for a comparison in this respect due to several reasons. First, PNL fits to a certain degree the pattern of what has been labeled in the theoretical framework of this paper as a class-based party with a strong commitment to the liberal ideology. On the other hand, as showed above, the DAHR politically behaves as an ethnic party. Second, in late 2008, PNL together with DAHR were both in power, forming the governing coalition¹⁰, so that they were both in an incumbent position in the 2008 parliamentary election. Third, the ESS4 post-electoral survey showed that in the winter of 2008/2009 both political parties had the highest shares of partisans (people close to the party) which did not vote in the parliamentary elections of 2008 (see Table 3: 39% of those close to DAHR and 37% of those close to PNL approach did not vote).

The reasons for which the supporters of the two parties did not vote seem to be different, however. If among PNL partisans occurs the lowest degree of trust in politicians (an average of 3.53 on a scale from 0="no trust at all" to 10="total confidence") of all parliamentary parties' supporters, sympathizers of UDMR show the highest degree of confidence (an average of 3.72 on the same scale from 0 to 10). However, Liberal supporters were most disgruntled with the government (an

¹⁰ Although in parliament the two parties did not have a majority, they have negotiated the support of PSD for certain legislative projects and initiatives.

average of 3.86 on a scale of 0 - "completely dissatisfied" to 10 - "completely satisfied") compared with the supporters of PD-L (average 3.99) and especially those of DAHR, which were the most satisfied with the work of the Executive¹¹ (an average of 4.56).

The comparative data presented above (PNL-DAHR) seem to support the hypothesis that ethnic allegiances provide ethnic-parties with and competitive electoral advantage over class-based parties, all other things being equal, ethnic parties suffered less electoral punishment and less electoral erosion than class based parties. In the case of PNL the high rate of absenteeism from voting of those who feel closer to this party could be explained, among other factors, by the low level of trust in politicians and the relatively high rate of dissatisfaction with the liberal governance. However, in the case of DAHR's supporters non-voting as an "electoral punishment" is a less plausible hypothesis for at least two reasons: a. Hungarians were relatively more satisfied with government performance than non-Hungarians in 2008 (although DAHR was part of the governmental coalition in 2008 as mentioned above); b. In 2008, Hungarians tended to be more trustful in political leaders and in political institutions than non-Hungarians. Yet why, then, Hungarians had a lower propensity to vote than non-Hungarians and, moreover, why DAHR's supporters tended to vote less in the 2008 elections than supporters of other political parties? The explanation of the increased absenteeism of DAHR's supporters seems to be connected with to the mobilization (or rather demobilization) strategies as a rational decision of both DAHR's leaders and the Hungarian electorate.

Institutional context: The Electoral Reform of 2008

To provide a potential explanation for this strategic mobilization (which actually meant in some areas lack of mobilization) of DAHR's voters, we need to make some clarifications about the institutional context in which parliamentary elections were held in 2008. For the first time since 1989, MPs were elected in single-member districts. In 2008, in each county were drawn a specific number of

¹¹ To test whether the differences between party supporters in terms of satisfaction with the work of the Government are statistically significant I used the analysis of variance (one way ANOVA). Satisfaction with Government's activity differ significantly between supporters of the 9 political parties (8 nominally mentioned political parties plus an "other party" choice) included in the questionnaire of ESS4 in 2008/2009: $F(8, 608) = 3.452$ $p = 0.001$.

electoral districts depending on the size of the population of that county. The drawing of these districts was done in an Electoral Code Commission based on proposals from political parties and negotiations between them. In each district was disputed only one parliamentary seat and each party could propose a single candidate. Each elector could vote for only one candidate in the electoral district of residence. How could a candidate win a parliamentary seat? In the first stage, a candidate would need to win the majority of the votes in the single-member electoral districts (i.e. 50% of votes + 1). In the second stage, if none of the candidates won a majority of votes in the single-member electoral district, there was a proportional redistribution of seats, at county level, among the parties which passed the electoral threshold.

I believe that, in terms of the competitiveness of the 2008 elections, there were two types of single-member electoral districts. Non-competitive electoral districts are overlapping more or less faithfully the electoral fief¹² of a political party and the winning of the parliamentary seat by the dominant political party's candidate in that college is almost certain. Competitive electoral districts are those that do not overlap any electoral fief and in which parliamentary seats are really disputed, none of the parties is dominant and therefore none of the candidates has the certainty that s/he will win the elections in the respective district. Taking into consideration the prevalence of ethnic cleavage for the electoral behavior in multiethnic areas in Romania, we can distinguish, in a similar vein, between ethnically competitive districts (the ones with ethnic diversity) and ethnically non-competitive districts (with low or inexistent ethnic diversity). Moreover, taking into consideration the fact that if no candidate has won a majority in the electoral district, there was a proportional redistribution of seats among parties at county level, we can also extend our classification to counties. Consequently, we distinguish between ethnically competitive counties (with high ethnic diversity) and ethnically non-competitive counties (low ethnic diversity).

Certainly in the Electoral Code Commission negotiations each party tried to maximize its chances of winning more parliamentary seats, by "drawing" the single-member electoral districts so that they overlap as closely as possible to the territorial distribution of its electorate. Therefore, each party sought to increase

¹² The party's electoral fiefdom is understood here as a place, area or region where a party/candidate regularly wins elections.

the number of 'safe' electoral districts (non-competitive) in which it will easily get a majority of votes and win the parliamentary seat. This risk-minimizing strategy has also implications for the resources allocated by political parties for electoral mobilization reasons. Thus, it is expected that political parties would focus their campaign resources in electoral districts that are really disputed and in which the mobilization of their own supporters, and also the undecided electors, can make a difference for one or the other of the parties/candidates. By contrast, in non-competitive electoral districts it is expected that neither the dominant party, nor the other competing parties should consume too many resources to mobilize voters. On the one hand, eventually, dominant parties have and almost insurmountable electoral advantage and they are very sure of winning the election in that district. On the other hand, any other competing parties are not so much interested to invest/waste resources in mobilizing voters in an electoral district where the chances of winning are extremely small. Following this logic, the strategic mobilization of voters will be differentiated according to the type of electoral district: greater mobilization (and consequently higher electoral turnout) in competitive electoral districts: smaller mobilization (and hence a lower participation rates) in non-competitive districts.

Patterns of electoral turnout in ethnically competitive vs. non-competitive counties

In order to test the statistical significance of turnout variation between ethnically competitive and non-competitive counties, I have selected 16 counties from Transylvania that concentrate almost 99% of the Hungarians living in Romania (Kiss, Barna, & Sólyom, 2008). These counties are (abbreviations in parentheses): Alba (AB), Arad (AR), Bihor (BH), Bistrita-Nasaud (BN), Brasov (BV), Caras-Severin (CS), Cluj (CJ), Covasna (CV), Harghita (HR), Hunedoara (HD), Maramures (MM), Mures (MR), Satu Mare (SM), Salaj (SJ), Sibiu (SB) and Timis (TM). In Table 2, I divided these counties into ethnically competitive (8 counties) and ethnically non-competitive (8 counties) based on the share of the Hungarians in the total population of the county. An ethnically competitive county is one in which the Hungarians' share is large enough to win at least one parliamentary seat (i.e. above 8% of the county's population in the case of our data), but not so large that they would win almost all the seats in that county (i.e. below 50% of the total population of the county). Conversely, ethnically non-competitive

counties are the ones in which the Hungarian minority is too small (i.e. has no realistic chance to win even a single seat in the parliament) or too large (above 50% and has all the chances to win almost all the seats in that county). In the absence of more valid data aggregated at county level, in Table 4, I use the share of Hungarians who voted for DAHR in each country as a proxy for the Hungarians' turnout in that county. I base this assumption on two facts, already mentioned in the previous sections of this paper: a. the Hungarians who voted in the 2008 parliamentary elections, actually voted in an overwhelming proportion for the DAHR's candidates; b. the number of non-Hungarians who voted for DAHR is insignificant.

Table 4: DAHR's electoral performance in 2008: county aggregated data

N o.	County Abbreviation	Hungarians who voted DAHR (%) (= turnout of Hungarians)	Hungarian population in the county (%)	Share of DAHR votes in the county (%)	No. of parliamentary seats won	Ethnically competitive county
1	BN	38.5	5.9	5.4	0	No
2	HR	37.6	84.6	74.3	4	No
3	AB	31.6	5.4	4.1	0	No
4	HD	31.2	5.2	3.5	0	No
5	CV	27.5	73.8	61.5	3	No
6	TM	24.9	7.5	5.3	0	No
7	SB	23.5	3.6	2.1	0	No
8	CS	22.8	1.7	1	0	No
9	SJ	54.7	23	27	1	Yes
10	MS	44.1	39.3	39.5	3	Yes
11	BH	43.6	26	25.1	3	Yes
12	SM	41.1	35.2	36.1	2	Yes
13	CJ	36.6	17.4	16.4	2	Yes
14	BV	34.1	8.7	7.6	1	Yes
15	MM	31.4	9.1	7.8	1	Yes
16	AR	30.6	10.7	8.3	1	Yes


Source: own elaboration based on data published by Salat (2009, p. 123) and the Central Electoral Office (www.becparlamentare2008.ro). Note: An ethnically competitive county is one in which the Hungarian minority is large enough to win at least one parliamentary seat and the Hungarians represent less than 50% of the county's population.

Table 4 points out that in ethnically non-competitive counties the “under-representation” of the Hungarian minority by DAHR tends to be higher than in ethnically competitive counties. That is the share of DAHR's votes in

noncompetitive counties tends to be lower than the proportion of Hungarian population in those counties, compared with ethnically competitive counties. Moreover, in three ethnically competitive counties (SJ, MS, SM) actually DAHR managed to slightly “over-represent” the Hungarian minority by having a greater share of votes, than the actual proportion of Hungarians in the total population of those counties. This might suggest that, in these counties, DAHR succeeded to mobilize Hungarians better to turn out and vote, than did the other competing parties with their supporters.

Besides the differences between ethnically competitive and non-competitive counties, in general, there is a very high association between the proportion of Hungarian population and the share of votes DAHR obtained in each country (see Figure 2). These findings confirm the fact that demography (or head-counting) is of special interest for ethnic parties (Salat, 2009) since their electoral success is a straightforward reflection of ethnic demography (Horowitz, 1985, apud. Alonso, 2008, p. 83).

Figure 2: Demography and ethnic voting – county aggregated data




Source: own elaboration based on data presented in Table 4

While the DAHR share of votes in a specific country almost linearly increases with the proportion of Hungarians living in that county, the relationship between the share of Hungarians in a county and the turnout of Hungarians in that county reveals a more complex pattern (see Figure 3). The relationship depicted in Figure 3 resembles more to a curvilinear pattern (reversed “U”) in which the turnout of Hungarians increases to a certain point after which decreases. More specifically, turnout tends to be lower in ethnically non-competitive counties, namely those with a low proportion of Hungarians and those in which Hungarians represent the majority of population (i.e. Harghita and Covasna).

On the other hand, turnout tends to be higher in ethnically competitive counties where Hungarians’ proportion ranges somewhere between 8% and 40% of the total population of the county. There is almost a 10-percentage points difference between the turnout of Hungarians residing in ethnically competitive and ethnically non-competitive counties. As such, the median turnout of Hungarians in ethnically competitive counties is 38.85% while the median turnout of Hungarians in ethnically non-competitive counties is of only 29.35%. Hence, turnout of Hungarians is significantly higher in ethnically competitive counties, compared to ethnically non-competitive counties (Mann-Whitney $U = 11$, $z = -2,205$, $p=0.028$, $N=16$).

Moreover, residence in one type of county or another (i.e. ethnically competitive vs. non-competitive) had a strong effect on Hungarians’ turnout in the 2008 parliamentary elections ($r = 0.55$). These findings support the strategic mobilization of Hungarians according to different stakes assigned to the electoral process both by DAHR leaders and the Hungarian electorate. Thus we can notice a higher mobilization of voters by DAHR’s local branches and leaders in counties where political competition with the other parties was fierce and “every vote counted” for winning (more) seats to the Parliament. On the other hand, in counties where DAHR had no chance to win votes or in those where it had no strong challengers (i.e. Covasna and Harghita) the mobilization of voters was lower. The institutional context (i.e. the new electoral setup) and the territorial distribution of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania contributed to this electoral outcome.

Figure 3: Patterns of electoral turnout – county aggregated data



Source: own elaboration based on data presented in Table 4

In the parliamentary elections of 2008, DAHR took the strategic advantage of a relatively high geographic concentration of its electorate in non-competitive electoral districts (i.e. located in areas inhabited dominantly by Hungarians). It is not by chance that, for example, in Covasna County has been recorded one of the lowest turnout rate in the parliamentary elections of 2008, only 33.1%. Thus, the county ranked 40 out of 42 counties in Romania, in terms of turnout (a lower electoral participation rate was recorded only in Bucharest and Timis county). However, with about 35 000 votes in Covasna county (representing approximately 61% of the total votes casted by the residents of this county), DAHR won 3 parliamentary seats for the Chamber of Deputies (the fourth being assigned to PSD) and 2 seats of senators. Ironically, with a double number of votes (over 71 000, representing nearly 70% of the valid votes casted in the county constituency), DAHR obtained, in the previous elections of November 2004, the same number of deputies and senators in Covasna county. In other words, the DAHR achieved in 2008 the same electoral outcomes in terms of number of MPs, "paying" only half

the cost of mobilizing their voters, compared to 2004. Or, put differently, the efficiency of resources used for electoral mobilization by the DAHR simply has doubled itself from 2004 to 2008. Not surprisingly, therefore the counties dominated numerically by Hungarians, namely Harghita and Covasna, are leading in a ranking of the counties with the strongest decrease in turnout rates from 1992 to 2008 (Alexandru, et al., 2009): in Covasna electoral participation decreased with over 52 percentage points, and in Harghita turnout was lower with 48 percentage points in 2008, compared to 1992. On average, turnout in Romania declined by 37 percentage points, over the same period.

The significant differences between counties in terms of electoral turnout of DAHR's partisans, suggests that the most plausible explanation for the higher rate of absenteeism of Hungarians from voting is the strategic (de)mobilization thesis. According to this thesis, there was a higher electoral mobilization of Hungarians in areas where the elections were ethnically competitive and where more votes really mattered for increasing the number of seats won by DAHR. On the other hand, in ethnically non-competitive districts DAHR's leaders knew that they have no real chance to win even a single parliamentary seat, or on the contrary, in the areas where Hungarians represent the absolute majority DAHR leaders knew that they can easily win most (if not all) the parliamentary seats.

Conclusions

The analysis of the 2008 parliamentary elections in Romania revealed not only a lower propensity of Hungarians to vote in general, but also, a lower turnout of DAHR's partisans compared with the supporters of other major political parties in Romania. However, DAHR supporters' absenteeism in the 2008 elections, higher than the national average, should not be interpreted primarily as a decrease in DAHR's electoral adherence in areas inhabited mostly by Hungarians, but rather as a rational decision for a more efficient distribution of resources used for the strategic mobilization of the Hungarian electorate in uninominal districts where DAHR knew it will win the election anyway, even in the context of a modest electoral participation of its supporters.

Although, in Romania, Hungarians as well as Romanians are increasingly dissatisfied with the performance of political elites, in general the lower turnout of the Hungarians in the 2008 parliamentary elections is not primarily due to the

dissatisfaction of voters with DAHR and its leaders. The paper showed that the relatively high abstention from vote of Hungarians is mainly a consequence of strategic de(mobilization) as a rational cost/benefit strategy adopted both by DAHR's leaders and partisans. In this paper I discerned different mobilization strategies in various countries depending on the perceived stakes of the electoral process. On the one hand, one can notice high electoral mobilization in ethnically competitive counties where 'every vote counts' for winning more seats. In these counties there was an important stake for DAHR's leaders and partisans in 'getting out the vote'. On the other hand, there was a low electoral mobilization in ethnically non-competitive counties, where DAHR's candidates had no realistic chance of winning even a single parliamentary seat or, on the contrary, had all the chances to win most of the seats. In these counties, there was no pragmatic reason to pay the cost of electoral mobilization.

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Why Do We Feel European? Social Mechanisms of European Identity

Geetha GARIB

Abstract: This article examines variables from social sciences influencing European identity in Western Europe. The study shows that several social variables can be used to predict the level of European identity, which can lead to a stronger European integration of citizens. Eurobarometer data from European Union countries show that specific social variables have a higher relevance for predicting European identity. In particular, the perceived importance of the EU, European pride and whether the EU is perceived as a good or a bad thing are used to predict one's European identity. Also, over time, there is a change in the social variables which are salient for determining one's European identity. European pride has become a stronger determinant of European identity compared to the perceived importance of the EU.

Keywords: *Europeanisation, European identity, pride, EU importance, European Union countries, Eurobarometer data*

Introducing European Identity

At an international party in Florence, Italy, my friend Daniel tells me he feels very European. His father is German, his mother is French, he was born in the UK and was raised partly in Spain and partly in Italy. He cannot identify with just one nationality and considers himself to be European. His European identity is very strong. However, what exactly does it mean to feel European? The mere statement that one "feels European" could convey a European identity, but what are the underlying mechanisms of a European identity? To feel European, is it really necessary to have a similar background to that of my friend, Daniel? This study seeks to investigate the underlying social variables that influence European identity and, therefore, to which extent one feels European. In particular, it considers political and psychological variables that are the underlying mechanisms of European identity.

For many people, their national identity becomes explicit when they go on



vacation abroad or live in a foreign country. This is when one becomes more aware of his or her cultural background. On the other hand, people may find that they also share a supra-national identity. For example, when an Italian and a Dutch person meet, they also share a European identity, which they would not have in common with a South African person. These social encounters leave us with particular questions concerning the analysis of social identities from a social science perspective. To what extent can social variables predict European identity? Which social variables are strongly related to European identity? Does the salience of these variables change over time? This article aims to provide insight into these questions.

European identity can be defined as the expression of being and feeling like a European citizen. The European Union promotes European citizenship as a means of European integration. Ever since the start of the European Union as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, several European countries collaborated with the aim of bringing Europeans closer together (Lazowski, 2008). In the beginning, the European Union developed important economic measures aimed at bringing European Union member states closer to a uniform or coordinated European economic policy (Bhabha, 1999; Dehejia & Samy, 2008; Alhorr, H.S., Moore, C. B. & Payne, G.T., 2008). Economic integration within the European Union was involved with the creation of a common currency, the elimination of specific tariffs, reducing gaps and developing a common market, whereby entrepreneurs were motivated to increase their businesses (Bosma, Jones, Autio, & Levie, 2008; Thacker-Kumar & Campbell, 1999). The aim of the European Union to create a free single economic market can also be considered as an aim of economic and social integration (Bhabha, 1999; Hamm, 1992). Thus, it seemed that the one of the main drivers behind the European Union was had an economic base. However, over time the European Union started to get more involved in creating more social cohesion among European member citizens (Graham & Hart, 1999). For example, in 1993 a cohesion project was launched to mainly economically develop regions and to develop social cohesion that would be higher than the European average (Graham & Hart, 1999). Thus, it seemed needed that after an economic integration of European Union citizens, a need started to exist to achieve social cohesion among European Union citizens. In fact, not economic drivers were the main mechanisms in influencing European identity but more and more social drivers were starting to be the main mechanisms for

influencing European identity. Furthermore, the European Union set up the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. In this Treaty the European Union citizenship is established. This Treaty stated that a citizen of any of the European Union member states, also has citizenship of the European Union: Art. 8 of the European Union Treaty mentions that 'Every person holding the nationality of a member State shall be a citizen of the Union.' However, European Union citizenship did not replace national citizenship: rather, it is complementary. The European Union citizenship also meant the creation of a European identity (Bhabha, 1999). By bringing Europeans together, the European Union has been promoting the development of a European integration and European identity over the years. They have been promoting European identity mainly because Europeans did not want to be in war with each other anymore. And European identity seemed to be not any more driven by economic mechanisms but by social mechanisms. Also, a way of promoting European integration is by developing European identity (Leonard, 1998). Looking at the history of the European Union, it seems they wanted to increase European identity, but is this really taking place? Are we indeed creating an international civil society based on similar values shared by various groups of peoples with different backgrounds, cultures and languages? The latter is a question that has been asked by several social science academics, some who tried to give an answer to it (Mayor, 1998; Keane, 1994; Aron, 1974; Hamm, 1992; Risse, 2001; Smith, 1992). The referenda held in the Netherlands and France about establishing a constitution for Europe in 2005 resulted in a clear "No". This might make some Europeans believe that Dutch and French citizens have a weak European identity. It might give an indication of a weak social cohesion among European Union citizens and a weak integration of European Union citizens within the European Union, which is actually an aim of the European Union. In order to fulfill this aim, it would be very interesting to find out how a strong European Union citizenship can be built. In this way, a stronger integration on a social level within the European Union can be achieved. In order to find out how to achieve this, one would need to distinguish the main social mechanisms that drive European identity. This question is at the heart of our main question, which we could formulate as follows: What are the underlying social mechanisms that drive European identity and which social variables can we use to predict the level of European identification? As many growing problems in Europe, this is also a question that should use a social-science approach (André, 1993).

Relevant variables from social sciences

Tajfel – a social psychologist, who has been very influential in the development of social psychology – and colleagues (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) developed the Social Identity Theory (SIT). This theory is essential to the discussion of social identities such as European identity. It is based on the following four tenets: individuals strive to achieve or to maintain a positive social identity; group membership contributes to an individual's social identity; the evaluation of an individual's own group is based on social comparison with other groups; a positive social identity is based on favourable comparisons. A social identity gives meaning to who we are in relation to other groups of people. It says something about us. As mentioned in the introduction, a person has several social identities, i.e. a person can be a teacher, a driver, or a customer at particular moments in time. All these identities are social identities, as they exist in relation to other people and the identities can be shared with others. The relationship between SIT and European identity as a social identity can be made when considering Europeans as human beings who identify with other Europeans, the European Union, and Europe as a superordinate-group (Florack & Piontkowski, 2000).

A considerable body of empirical research concerning European identity or attitudes to the European Union exists (Mayhew, 1980; Hewstone, 1986; Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart & Rabier, 1980; Deflem & Pampel, 1996; McCrone & Surridge, 1998; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Florack & Piontkowski, 2000). Mayhew (1980) carried out research on European political culture, i.e. Europeanism. He wanted to investigate attitudes and ideas of European people towards the European political culture. In his framework Mayhew included a variable for utilitarian support, operationalised through the statement whether it is good or bad to be an EU member.

Furthermore, Mayhew (1980) constructed a European integration support index including the latter statement. This European integration support index was constructed to predict support or opposition for European integration. Also, he used questions related to cognitive mobilization in the European integration support index. These questions included statements concerning how often the discussion of political matters takes place and to what extent you can persuade friends in political matters. Cognitive mobilization has been found to indicate European integration on an individual level in other studies (Inglehart, 1977; Janssen, 1991).

Duchesne & Frogner (1995) used data from Eurobarometers, a European

Union survey which is carried out twice every year, to study European identity. They also found that cognitive mobilization seems to be correlated with European identity. Inglehart & Rabier (1980) also used these questions in their studies on European integration.


According to Mayhew (1980), people first develop utilitarian support, and later on perceive the benefits resulting from successful performance, leading to the development of affective support: “The continuous satisfaction of utilitarian interests leads to the stimulation of affective links which become independent from the effects of daily performance” (p. 110). Mayhew (1980) reported that in France, Germany and Italy affective support levels tended to be higher than utilitarian support levels, while the contrary was true in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. He found that the majority opinion in the six founder states, where utilitarian and affective support were relatively high, was that it would have been better to be inside than outside the European Union, and that without the Common Market member states would be worse off.

Green (1999) studied European identity making specific use of a selection of Eurobarometers from 1976 – 1992. He tested with ordered probit analyses multiple surveys including the questions related to the benefit that people experience from EU membership, and societal wealth, which he links to life satisfaction. Life satisfaction can be influenced by work conditions, living conditions, job satisfaction and nonwork satisfaction (i.e., all domains of satisfaction other than work), where the influence of these indicators has been shown to vary between various European countries (Near & Rechner, 1992). Life satisfaction can also be influenced by dispositional variables, like personality characteristics (Diener & Lucas, 1999), social factors like marriage and social class (Argyle, 1999) and culture (Diener & Suh, 2000), satisfaction with esteem needs (i.e., self-esteem and freedom) (Oishi et al., 1999) and self-esteem (Benet-Martinez & Aygün, 2003).

McCrone & Surridge (1998) used the *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP) to examine national identity and national pride in the U.K., Western Germany, Sweden and Spain. They found that national pride is related to attachment to one’s country and one could assume that pride could be relevant for European identity. Müller-Peters (1998) finds that European patriotism is strongly related to having a positive attitude towards the Euro. She defines European patriotism as a third dimension next to nationalism and national patriotism, which are independent dimensions for national identity. However, she clearly outlines a link between

European patriotism and European identity, where an attachment to Europe and Europeans is likely to exist.

To conclude, the literature indicates that a number of social variables are relevant for influencing European identity. The variable measuring whether it is good or bad to be an EU member seems to be a relevant factor. Second, cognitive mobilization perceptions are relevant as factors influencing European identity. Third, the perception of the importance, the benefit and the movement of the EU are relevant variables for influencing European identity. Fourth, the amount of life satisfaction a European experiences could influence European identity. Lastly, national and European pride could be a relevant factor for European identity.



Therefore, we propose a model in which cognitive mobilization, EU value, EU importance, EU benefit, EU movement, life satisfaction and pride are the main influencing mechanisms of European Identity. The four variables of cognitive mobilization, EU value, EU importance and EU movement are referring to political elements of how European identity can be influenced. The three variables of life satisfaction, national pride and European pride are referring to psychological elements of European identity. As research has shown, both political elements and psychological elements are of relevance for predicting European identity. This model

also implies that even though the European identity of European citizens began as an economic alliance, European identity is nowadays more driven by political and even psychological motives. Thus, currently several social mechanisms can be found to influence European identity. The model that is proposed is based on two groups of mechanisms that predict European identity: namely psychological and political mechanisms. The literature clearly showed that these mechanisms seemed to be the most relevant ones to understand European identity. Consequently, these variables were included in this study on European identity. An existing data set that actually contains measurements for these variables is the Eurobarometer.

Eurobarometer variables

As European databases could help us with the understanding of European identity or European integration (Sinnott, 1994), a selection of Eurobarometer surveys was used to measure the relevant variables. The Eurobarometer surveys¹ are conducted approximately every six months in several European countries since 1973. The Eurobarometer surveys are commissioned by the European Union to monitor the social and political attitudes of European Union citizens. Representative national samples throughout the European Union, formerly European Community, member states are simultaneously interviewed each spring and autumn. Only the countries that were included in all datasets the Eurobarometers are included in the analyses. This means that late joiners or early leavers were deleted from the dataset so that these countries could not have any influence on the results.

European identity was measured by asking respondents to what extent they considered themselves as Europeans. It was decided to use all Eurobarometers from 1982-2002 in which this question appeared, as otherwise no measurement of European identity was available.

These Eurobarometers were chosen on the basis of practicality and expert judgment: since 1982, the European identification question has been included in the Eurobarometer, and at the time of investigation only Eurobarometers until 2002 were available. The items that were chosen for each separate Eurobarometer were based on the variables of the European identity model. The five political variables are the following: Cognitive Mobilization, EU Value, EU Importance, EU

¹ See for more information www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer

Movement, and EU Benefit. To measure cognitive mobilization two questions were included: one concerned the persuasion of friends when talking about politics and one question concerned the discussion of political matters. EU Value was measured with an item concerning whether the EU is a good thing or a bad thing. To measure EU importance two items were used concerning the perceived EU importance and the desired EU importance. EU movement has been measured by two items concerning the perceived movement of the EU and the desired movement of the EU. EU benefit was measured by which benefit they believed to have by being an EU member. The psychological variables are the following: Life Satisfaction, European Pride and National Pride. Life satisfaction was measured by asking respondents how satisfied they were with their lives. European pride and national pride was measured by asking respondents how proud they were of Europe and their nation, respectively.

These social variables were analysed to see whether these could be used as predicting European identity. Before doing the regression analyses, optimal scaling was performed with the variables.

Optimal Scaling

The original data in the Eurobarometer surveys was based on codes on a nominal scale or ordinal scale. However, an important assumption for doing regressions or other relatively advanced statistical tests is that variables were scaled on an interval or ratio scale. The optimal scaling technique can recode variables on a higher level of scaling, namely interval scaling. This method is very useful for this study as it includes various categorical variables. Optimal scaling was carried out with the variables to obtain an improved differentiation between the scores for the variables (Velden, 2004; Van Rosmalen, Koning & Groenen, 2009). Optimal scaling (Gifi, 2000; Linting, Meulman, Groenen, & Van der Kooij, 2007; Young, 1981) results in centroid coordinates that are assigned to categories of the variables. In this way, the method results in optimal quantifications for the variables so that these variables can be considered as interval variables. The optimal scaling technique generates centroid coordinates that are used to compute new optimally scaled variables. Centroid coordinates are used as new codes for the computed variables.

After optimally scaling the variables a regression was carried out with the

optimally scaled variables for all Eurobarometers (i.e., the 15 Eurobarometers from 1982 to 2002). Bivariate correlations were done with all variables to discover if a large amount of overlap existed between any of the variables. The results pointed out that there were two cases of high correlations (i.e. $r > .90$) were present between the variables of the dataset (see table 1): the second dataset of 1991 and the dataset of 1993. These variables have been deleted for analyses. The other variables did not show any high correlations between variables in any of the other datasets.

Regression Results

The variance of European identity on the basis of the analyses with the optimally scaled independent variables varies from 11% to 21% (see Table I). It seems that the amount of variance shows about a 100% increase over the period 1982-2002. The peak variance is in the 2002 Eurobarometer ($R^2 = 21\%$), while the lowest variance explained by the social variables is in Eurobarometer 19 (1983) ($R^2 = 11\%$). In table I one can find significant beta's that are sometimes as high as .21 and sometimes as low as .02. Of relevance, is however, that these variables do have a significance level of lower than .05 whereby these betas are still of relevance to report. The significant betas do contribute and influence to some part European identity.

In general the significant betas reported for the following variables are among the highest, maximal betas: "Perceived importance of EU" (from .03 to .22), "European Pride" (from .16 to .22), and "Good/Bad thing EU" (from .04 to .18). Consequently, on the basis of these findings "Perceived importance of EU", "European Pride", and "Good/Bad thing EU" are the variables that predict European identity best, while the variables "National pride", "Life satisfaction", and "Benefit from the EU" influence European identity expression to a lesser extent compared to all other social variables.

Table I: Regression results of regression on European Identity with optimally scaled Social Psychological variables (Betas and variances)

Social psychological variables	EB 17-1982	EB 19-1983	EB 33-1990	EB 35-1991	EB 36-1991	EB 37-1992	EB 40-1993	EB 43.1-1995	EB 44.1-1995	EB 50.0-1998	EB 52.0-1999	EB 53-2000	EB 54.1-2000	EB 56.2-2001	EB 57.1-2002
Perceived importance of EU	.21	.19	.17	.22	.19	.19	.18	.15	.08	.08	.04	.03	.06	NS	.12
Desired importance of EU	-	-	.11	-	-	-	-	.09	.12	.08	.08	.06	.10	.05	-
National Pride	.05	NS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.02	.06	-.11	-.12	-.02
European Pride	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	.16	.19	.22
Life satisfaction	.02	-.02	NS	.04	-.02	.04	.05	.06	-	-	.04	.04	.03	.04	.02
Benefit from the EU	-	NS	.04	NS	NI	NS	.02	-.02	.06	.07	.08	.10	.05	.07	.03
Good/ Bad thing EU	.06	.10	.04	.10	.14	.12	.12	.15	.18	.16	.18	.16	.14	.14	.11
Cognitive mobilization	.12	.16	.12	.08	.11	.07	.13	.11	NS	.09	.09	-.05	.08	.13	.10
Persuade friends	.10	.07	.07	.09	.09	.08	.12	.05	.09	.06	.09	.10	.03	.05	.07
Perceived movement of EU	.10	.06	.11	.07	.02	.07	NI	.03	-.06	.06	-.02	-.08	NS	-.05	-
Desired movement of EU	-	-	-	-	-	.13	.14	.06	.05	.11	.03	.08	.10	.03	.10
R square	.15	.13	.15	.12	.12	.19	.21	.15	.12	.18	.11	.12	.18	.14	.20

= absent in the relevant EB

NI= not included due to high multicollinearity with other social psychological variable

Changes over time in social variables

The “Perceived importance of EU” variable seems to show some fluctuation over the time-span of 20 years. While it has a significant beta of .21 in 1982 it steadily decreases to a significant beta of .03 in 2000 and even a negative beta in 2001 (beta = -.01). However, in Eurobarometer 2002, its beta suddenly rises to .12. Thereby, “Perceived importance of EU” seems to have less importance for European identity, but then (in 2002) seems to become more relevant. The latter change might have been caused by the introduction of the Euro in many European countries around the same time.

Similarly, the “Perceived movement of EU” variable starts off with a significant beta of .10 in the first Eurobarometer included in the analyses, but gradually the beta decreases. In 1991, the beta is only .02 and it is even negative in the Eurobarometers of the following years: 1993, 1995 (Eurobarometer 44.1), 1999, 2000 (Eurobarometer 53), and 2001. This change shows that the “Perceived movement of EU” variable initially loses some weight for influencing European identity and later also changes its meaning in influencing European identity. The latter shows that before 1993 a higher “perceived movement of EU” would lead to a higher expression of European identity, while after 1993 a higher “perceived movement of EU” leads to a weaker expression of European identity.

On the contrary, the variable “Good/Bad thing EU” becomes more important over the 20 year time-span. Its significant beta goes from .06 in 1982 to .18 in Eurobarometer 44.1 (1995) and remains above .10 in later years. Thus, the relevance of this variable seems to have increased over time.

The other independent social variables seem to be more or less stable over years, although incidental changes can be distinguished. The “Desired movement of EU” variable has a significant beta of .13 in the results of Eurobarometer 37 (1992) analyses, but a beta of .03 in the Eurobarometer 52.0 (1999) results. “National pride” has a beta of .06 in the Eurobarometer 53 (2000) results but a negative beta of -.12 in the Eurobarometer 56.2 (2001) results.

Another important change could be found for the social variable that has the highest importance (i.e. beta) relating to European identity compared to the other social variables in the same Eurobarometer. From Eurobarometer 17 (1982) until Eurobarometer 43.1 (1993) “Perceived importance of EU” has the highest relevance. From Eurobarometer 44.1 (1995) until Eurobarometer 54.1 (2000),

“Good/Bad thing EU” has the highest relevance. The latter Eurobarometer is the first Eurobarometer included in the analyses in which “European pride” is included, and from this Eurobarometer onwards “European pride” has the highest relevance. In other words, the most relevant social variable for influencing European identity changes from “Perceived importance of EU” to “Good/Bad thing EU” and then again to “European Pride”. Table 1 clearly shows that the importance of “Perceived importance of EU” over time after 1995 seems to become less, while “Good/Bad thing EU” is becoming more important. Before 1995, however, the most important social variable predicting European identity expression is clearly “Perceived importance of EU”. This finding might indicate that the relevance of people’s European identity expression has changed: from a focus on the importance that people attach to the EU, to the idea that they consider the EU as a bad or good thing. Eventually, the most relevant social underlying mechanism of European identity in the future seems to be the pride that people derive from being European.

From these findings we conclude that some social variables might be important for influencing European identity expression, depending on when the data is gathered. The findings show that variables change concerning the importance these have for European identity. This provides an indication to believe that European identity is a dynamic concept of which underlying drivers are changing over time. European identity per se is therefore not stable over time, and can relate to various variables over time.

Conclusions

Firstly, social variables used in this study are important for European identity, in particular political and psychological variables can predict European identity expression. This is a very interesting conclusion as the European Union was firstly set up as an economic driver for bringing European citizens together. However, social mechanisms are strong drivers for European identity at the moment. This shows that the relevance of social variables for influencing European identity. The results of the regressions give validation to the hypothesis, i.e., to some extent European identity can be influenced by the social variables of “Perceived importance of EU”, “European Pride”, and “Good/Bad thing EU” to a large extent, and the variables “National pride”, “Life satisfaction”, and “Benefit

from the EU” to a lesser extent. Thus, the results show that some social variables are more relevant or less relevant to predicting European identity than are other variables. Both political and psychological variables seem to be relevant for understanding the expression of European identity. However, political variables, like EU importance and EU value are more relevant than some psychological variables, like national pride and life satisfaction. Nevertheless, these variables are still of relevance for influencing European identity. It would be interesting to see if this is still the same in the future or whether political variables compared to psychological variables remain to be more important for driving European identity. The same analyses could be performed with Eurobarometer data of 2002 onwards to see if this still is the case. It would be interesting to perceive if any changes in the explanation of European identity are taking place. If so, this would mean that European identity is becoming a more psychological concept compared to a political concept, as it seems it is already the case to some extent. It is also interesting to see that currently, the European Union has made it possible to let Europeans perceive the European identity as a psychological concept, whereas it was created as a political and economic concept from the start.

Second, the study shows that the influence of the social variables on European identity changes over time. It seems that in particular “Benefit of the EU” would have the lowest relevance for predicting European identity. However, this does not mean that it has no relevance at all for influencing European identity. It still is significant for some Eurobarometers, and was even reported to have a beta of .10 in Eurobarometer 53 (2000). Consequently, it should not be excluded from research concerning European identity. Taking into consideration the findings, it might even seem that in the future this indicator could become more important compared to other indicators of the same principle. Therefore, one should be careful not to completely exclude indicators on the basis of their betas, because these can change over time. The finding that some variables are more important than others in influencing the strength of European identity could be related to that Europeans are experiencing stronger levels of exposure to the European Union over time. It is also interesting to see that the EU benefit as a political variable seems to decrease its relevance concerning predicting European identity. As has been mentioned, some indicators have become more relevant for the prediction of EU identity compared to the other indicators included in the regression. On the basis of the range of betas reported, “Perceived importance of EU”, “European



Pride”, and “Good/Bad thing EU” might be more relevant for research on European identity than the other social indicators. Two of these indicators are actually psychological variables, whereby evidence exists that psychological variables indeed are increasing its relevance over times. Moreover, the results show that these three variables have each been the most relevant variables at a different period in a single Eurobarometer. Thus, it appears that the indicators “Perceived importance of EU”, “European Pride”, and “Good/Bad thing EU” should be of higher relevance compared to the other indicators for any study concerning European identity. This might indicate that the status of the European Union used to be important for determining the strength of European identity, while now the status or utility of the European Union seems to be more important for influencing one’s European identity. This indicates the lower relevance of political variables for driving European identity and a stronger relevance for other variables, like psychological variables. As a consequence, European identity is becoming a more psychological concept than a political concept that was created by the European Union from the start. The empirical evidence shows out that European Citizenship that was created as a political or economic entity seems to be driven more and more by psychological phenomenon that European citizens are perceiving: namely the fact that they psychologically feel as being part of a European entity that is not mainly driven by political or economical mechanisms but also by psychological mechanisms. European citizens in fact do “feel” that they European and express their European identity based on the psychological motivations they feel inside. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the expression of European identity is merely and only driven by these psychological motives. In fact, it does seem that political variables are still of relevance, but the relevance might be less in the future. Therefore, it might be interesting to see if in recent years of Eurobarometer surveys this finding can still validated, and if indeed psychological variables are more and more driving the European Union citizenship compared to political variables.

One should bear in mind, however, as the results point out, that some social (i.e. political and psychological) indicators might be more relevant than others. The order of relevance of these indicators might, furthermore, even change over time. Thus, even if the social variables might be useful for predicting European identity in future studies on European identity, the interrelations of indicators or variables could change. Consequently, in the future the most suitable indicators for

European identity should be found, but with this study a starting point has been made. Specifically the indicators in this study could be used for predicting European identity in the past, present and future, taking into consideration the relevance of the indicators. This will help us to understand how we can also increase the European identity among EU member citizens, so that we can fulfill one of the main goals of the European Union. As the creation of a European identity was one of the goals that the European Union strive to succeed, it seems that the European did fulfill that goal partly, but in order to encourage that goal one could make use of the mechanisms that are driving European Identity. If the European Union, for example, focus more on these mechanisms, it could strengthen the European identity of many more Europeans over time even more, and thereby, reach a higher level of achievement concerning this goal.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Keith Jacobs, *Experience and Representation: Contemporary Perspectives on Migration in Australia*, Surrey: Ashgate, 164 pages, ISBN 978-0-7546-7610-2 (hardcover)

Review by Marius I. TĂȚAR

Combining multiple and complementary perspectives is particularly useful in the scholarly publications aiming to explore new directions in understanding the complex phenomena of migration and its challenge in redefining identity. *Experience and Representation: Contemporary Perspectives on Migration in Australia*, by Keith Jacobs, can be included in this trend, as the book brings in an approach to the study of migration that departs from mainstream research in several ways. First, as the author notes in his *Introduction*, it “is not a book that attempts a synthesis of economic, legal, social policy, demographic or political perspectives, nor is it one that sets out to prove a thesis about the study of migration by gathering new empirical data from interviews with individuals with individuals who have migrated” (p. 3). Second, the perspective proposed by the author steams from his own dual status of insider/outsider, noted in her *Preface* by Anne J. Kershen, the *Studies in Migration and Diaspora* series editor at Ashgate. As an insider who migrated from United Kingdom to Australia, the author has firsthand knowledge of the social and psychological issues set in motion by migration. At the same time, from the outsider’s perspective, the author is an academic who “deconstructs and applies a range of theories of migration theories and combines these with reference to leading anthropological, political and cultural

scholarly studies” in order to point out how migration has been represented in contemporary Australia.

Consequently, the focus of the book is on the subjectivity of migration and its impact on identity and self-image, and not on demography and social policy related to migration (although these are also briefly reviewed in the introductory chapter of the book, but just in order to provide a historical context for recent developments of migration processes in Australia). Migration as subjectivity is explored in reference to an academic literature grouped by the author into three strands: socio-anthropological (migration understood as part of the trajectory of mobility and a social feature of globalization), psychoanalytical (the feelings and thoughts associated and affected by migration experiences) and artistic representations of migrations (the way migrants are portrayed in the media, literature, films). The book also discusses “some of the interpretations within the sociological literature on migration and ethnic relations” in the political context of the Australian society. In addition, the author discusses the ways in which understandings of migration informs Australian cultural attitudes.

The main contribution of the book is to set out the appropriate perspective on “how our understanding of migration requires us to consider movement in concert with place and how these two formations are embedded and nested within one another” (p. 136). The author argues that migration (re)shapes identity and self-image as “migration forces upon us changes in terms of who we are and how we see the world”, and he frames this migration-identity interplay in the contemporary debates about globalization, trans-nationalism and multiculturalism.

The book is structured in three parts. Part I on *Understanding Migration* consists of two chapters that explore the key theoretical perspectives on migration with reference to sociological, psychoanalytical and cultural geographical insights. The chapters in this part highlight the importance of “situating” both the *cultures* and experiences of migration in “a place, a time and an interlocking set of policy environments”.

Part II on *Migration and Urban Encounters* consists of three chapters, the first of which focuses on the political impact of globalization for Australians and migrants as well, which live in ethnic neighborhoods and are both affected by their physical environment and the encounters and interactions they have with others. The chapter on the *Politics of Australian Multiculturalism* focuses on the sites of contestation and debate about multiculturalism, both in the realm of political



philosophies, namely on the role of the state in promoting social equality, and in the realm of empirical sociology, where multiculturalism is used to evaluate everyday life experiences. The chapter on *Media Portrayals of Migrants* points out that the media coverage is symptomatic of the existing power relations as media often reinforces ideological understandings of migrant lives in opposition with Australians' way of living. However, the author notes that "we have to be careful not to construe it [the media] as a monolithic agency performing in accordance to a particular trajectory". Instead he suggests that a more agency-based interpretation is required to account for the fact that, at least in some instances, individuals and social groups are able to shape and change the dominant ideological categorizations.

Part III on *Contemporary Australian Identity* examines different understandings of Australian identity (especially those that spring out of the debate around the opposition between migrant and Australian identities); cultural expressions of belonging manifested in the Australian literature and cinema; and "the ways in which migrants maintain material and symbolic connections with their home".

As a provocative and thoughtful monograph that contributes to the ongoing academic and political debates on globalization, digitization and post-colonialism, this book will be of interest to scholars of migration and identity, ethnicity, culture and politics, as well as policy-makers and political activists involved in these fields.

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