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THEMATIC ARTICLES – CHALLENGES OF MIGRATION:
WHO MIGRATES, WHY AND WITH WHAT EFFECTS?

Socio-Economic Determinants of International Migration\(^1\)

Yaroslav PRYTULA, Nataliia POHORILA\(^2\)

Abstract. Since economic factors cannot fully explain the determinants of bilateral migration, this study explores the social and cultural determinants that influence an individual’s decision to migrate. Values, norms and interests in a given culture, may determine whether an individual’s intention to move translates into actual migration. Work values inherent in different cultures could explain why people move or do not move under the condition of perceived economic advantages of migration. A gravity type migration model is used to incorporate variables related both to economic indicators and work values. It is perhaps the first migration study to use the World Value Survey (WVS) and the European Value Survey (EVS). We use 2000 stock bilateral migration dataset collected by the World Bank. Our findings indicate that if more aspects of work are valued in a country, this country sends more migrants. Also we show that countries with higher extrinsic work value orientation tend to send more migrants, while countries with higher intrinsic work value orientation tend to send fewer migrants. Our finding shows that the value of work and the level of job security in a country may significantly change migration decision.

Keywords: migration, gravity model, work related values

1. Introduction

The traditional approach to explaining aggregate migration flows between two countries is based on Hicks hypothesis formulated in 1932, which stated that

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\(^2\) The authors would like to thank Tom Coupe, Yurii Taran, Michael Alexeev, Shlomo Weber, James Leitzel, Roy Gardner, Loek Halman and the participants at the EERC seminars for their constructive comments, discussions and recommendations that helped to substantially improve this paper.
“differences in net economic advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main causes of migration” (Hicks, 1932). Later works of Sjaastad (1962), Harris and Todaro (1970) and Borjas (1987, 1989) consider the migration decision as an investment in human capital. If the ‘resource re-allocation’ produces positive return, then an individual decides to migrate. A simple model presents net migration as a function of the difference between the discounted present value of expected real incomes in the source and destination country over migrants’ planning horizon minus some measure of individual characteristics of migrants and the costs of migration.

As mentioned in Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) such a neoclassical model based only on difference in expected incomes often fails to explain observed migration flows. Indeed, Ratha and Shaw (2007) found that about 38 percent of identified South-South migrants came from countries with higher incomes than their host country; moreover, they estimate that “more than two-thirds of South-South migrants from low-income countries are in other low-income countries.”

A number of studies use different measures of the cost of migration in order to increase the explanatory power of the migration model. The first of these was the model developed by Hatton (1995) to explain U.K. emigration. Based on the social network concept, he represented the average costs of migration as a function of the current stock of migrants from sending country in destination country and found positive albeit not statistically significant dependence of both gross and net migration on migrant stock. Fertig (2001) repeated the estimation in the cross-sectional study of determinants of immigration flows to Germany and found a significant negative relation between net migration flow and migrant stock. Mansoor and Quillin (2007) use a similar approach to explain migration flows from CIS and ECA countries to six destination countries adding the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) transition index as another socio-economic variable to better represent average costs of migration. While receiving mixed results on estimating their model for six destination countries, they conclude that economic variables - wage and employment differentials - were statistically significant only about half the time and they produced the opposite of the expected results in a number of cases. At the same time, the EBRD transition index, as an indicator of quality of life in home countries, showed more consistent results, i.e. significantly negatively correlating with migration rate in most of

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3 South is defined to comprise developing countries.
cases/specifications. These authors concluded that it is important to include various social, cultural and political indicators as explanatory variables (Mansoor and Quillin, 2007, p. 78).

A “post-materialist shift in value systems” theory (Inglehart, 1990) describes how values shifted from the accent on material gain to the values places primarily on leisure, self-expression and life satisfaction in the post-industrial period. If the primary motif for the former period was family subsistence, the current trends may be determined by living and working standards, decent working conditions, self-actualization, rights protection, and life satisfaction.

In their recent work Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009) used life satisfaction scores from Eurobarometer and found that “the propensity to migrate is even more highly correlated with life satisfaction than it is with GDP per capita.” On the other hand, Lewer et al. (2009) constructed two non-economic quality of life indices and did not find significant relation between these indices and immigration to 16 OECD destination countries from 1991 to 2000.

In our opinion, the role of value orientations for migration decision is understated in contemporary research and the international value studies have not been yet explored as a resource for migration studies. We focused our attention on work values, which are attitudes and beliefs that could be conducive for migration decisions. We elaborate and empirically test several hypotheses on how particular work values may propel or hinder outmigration.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our theoretical model and hypotheses. Section 3 presents data and univariate analysis. Section 4 describes our empirical model and estimation strategy. Section 5 presents our regression based empirical findings and section 6 discusses main findings and limitations of the analysis.

2. Hypotheses

Bencivenga and Smith’s (1997) extension of Harris and Todaro’s classical migration model can explain the mechanism in which the increase in the range of decision variables (economic and value related) may affect the optimizing behavior of economic agents. They produce a two-period, overlapping generations model that contains an urban and a rural production sector with a
heterogeneous labor force: some types of workers are more skilled (i.e. productive) than others and this information is private that induces a separating equilibrium, so that only skilled workers will seek urban employment. Suppose workers differ not only because of skills composition but also because of different work values. It has been shown (Kalleberg, 1977) that the failure of workers to achieve their intrinsic values in respect to the content of the task is a cause of dissatisfaction with their job. Also, it might be argued then that a worker with satisfied work values will become more productive in comparison to a worker with unsatisfied values (Kazanas, 1978; Buckingham and Coffman, 1999). Hence, the satisfaction of a worker with stronger work values increases his/her productivity in comparison to a worker with weaker work values. Adding this proposition to Bencivenga and Smith’s (1997) model we conclude that only skilled and/or job value demanding workers would seek urban employment provided their job values would be satisfied there. In other words, higher worker productivity caused either by higher skills or stronger work ethics can only be realized through migration to a highly productive economy, which is capable of satisfying growing work demands. Hence, if work is valued and it is scarce in a society, then society will send more migrants to other countries.

Here we consider two approaches to measure work values in a society. One approach considers work importance as such, and is measured by a respondent answer to the question “How is work important in your life?” using the scale “very important”, “rather important”, “not very important”, “not at all important”. Using this notion of work values we will test the following hypothesis

Hypothesis 1. If work is highly valued in a society, and demand for work is not satisfied, then this society sends more labour migrants.

The second approach of measuring value of work is calculating the number of choices made by a respondent from the list of different aspects of work values that are important to him/her. The surveyed population is asked to select the most valuable work characteristics like job pay, content of job tasks, career opportunities, and job security and so on from a list of eleven options. The sum of the selected values is interpreted as the level of work aspirations: a larger number of aspects chosen indicates higher work aspirations. This could

4 Here and further we use interchangeable the notions of ‘job values’ and ‘work values’ since both are widely used in the literature.
be especially relevant for migration decision if aspirations have grown recently. For example, in post-communist countries where until recently people did not have the opportunity to choose their working conditions, work values did not exhibit much variation. As the market opened and as variation in working conditions grew, values of work become more and more diversified. The new open market system introduced workers to part-time employment, self-employment, contractual work, work at small businesses, and work at transnational corporations. We can make an assumption that in such countries the expectations toward various aspects of job grew, and if the domestic labour market fails to satisfy these demands, people will be willing to migrate. This proposition is expressed in the next hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2. The number of emigrants that a given society sends is positively and directly related to the number of work aspects that workers in that society value.

Sociological literature that considers two different groups of work values: intrinsic and extrinsic. Herzberg (1957) distinguished between the “motivators,” or intrinsic factors, and the “hygienic factors,” or extrinsic factors of work. The former have been interpreted as esteem and self-actualization, the latter as social factor and security. Later this concept has found its repercussion with A. Maslow’s (1970) “higher” and “lower ranked basic needs.”

The question is, how work values, intrinsic or extrinsic, help to predict migration rates. It is well known that work values, or meaning that people assign to their work, are interpreted as an intermediate variable that mediates the effect of income rewards on job satisfaction (Morse and Weiss 1953, Goldthorpe and Lockwood 1968). Values inculcated in early childhood and those acquired in mature age were recognized to be chief determinants of job satisfaction (Kalleberg 1977). We can infer, therefore, that independent of satisfaction with income rewards, if some other aspects of job as its content or job security are valued, then values could be determinants which drive or circumscribe migration.

Following Herzberg we define intrinsic values as those related to the content of the job task, the role of work and personal self-fulfillment at work. Extrinsic work values are those related to “external” or “hygienic” work.

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5 For example in Poland the average number of valued work aspects surveyed by EVS rose from 2.67 in 1989/1990 to 7.02 in 1999/2000.
conditions: job pay, physical conditions in the work place, working hours, job security, and so on. Intrinsic values are associated with post-materialist values and higher level of needs in Maslow’s terminology. Inglehart’s studies showed that populations of the countries with post-materialist values are happier. Also, it has also been shown that people whose goals are intrinsic tend to be happier than those with extrinsic goals (Kasser and Ryan 2001, Gruenberg 1980). It is explained that children who are socialized in a better educated strata tend to strive for intrinsic values, while children socialized in less educated strata, tend to strive for extrinsic values (Kohn and Schooler 1983). We may suggest that those with intrinsic values are more satisfied with their jobs, and will be more reluctant to leave their country. Alternatively, those with high extrinsic values could be dissatisfied and we may expect them to want to migrate. Moreover, extrinsic values could be conducive to migration because they were found to be prevalent in periods of social instability. According to the studies in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia (Ardichvili, 2009) extrinsic demands toward job were highest in the period of social calamities in the 1990-s in Russia: high job insecurity, wage areas, undefined prospects. In other words, extrinsic values always play the role of migration motivator, however, the development of intrinsic values withhold migration. Hence, we have:

Hypothesis 3. In nations where strong intrinsic work values are prevalent, the rate of out-migration is lower.

Hypothesis 4. In nations where strong extrinsic work values are prevalent, out-migration is higher.

We use the gravity model framework to test the above stated hypotheses. Hypotheses 1 and 2 directly or indirectly assume that people will migrate given no opportunity for job satisfaction, while hypotheses 3 and 4 are formulated independent of job satisfaction. In order to test this conditional dependence, we augment the standard gravity model with the interaction of work value and job satisfaction variables. In the simplest version such model can be written as:

\[ M_{ij} = \alpha + \beta X + \gamma_1 \text{Work\_value}_{ij} + \gamma_2 \text{Job\_satisfaction}_{ij} + \theta_1 (\text{Work\_value}_{ij} \times \text{Job\_satisfaction}_{ij}) + e_{ij} \]

where \( M_{ij} \) is a migration from country \( i \) to country \( j \), \( X \) is a vector that

---

6 Based on the sample of 32 countries for which WVS has questions about job satisfaction, we found the correlation between job satisfaction and intrinsic and extrinsic to be equal to 0.1 and –0.07, correspondingly.
includes standard variables, to be discussed below, frequently included in gravity models of international migration. The effect of \( Work_{-value} \) on migration conditional on \( Job_{-satisfaction} \) is given by the sum of the coefficient on value of work variable and the coefficient on the interaction term multiplied by job satisfaction variable: \((\hat{\gamma}_1 + \hat{\theta}_1 \times Job_{-satisfactionij})\). Equating the last expression to zero one can derive a condition on job satisfaction variable to have a positive or negative effect of work value variable on migration depending on the hypothesis. Putting mean value of the job satisfaction variable in the expression gives the average effect of the work value variable on migration.

3. Data

Data on our dependent variable - bilateral stock migration - comes from the World Bank Migration and Remittances project. This is the first attempt we are aware of to use the World Bank dataset on bilateral migration stock to investigate the economic and non-economic determinants of international migration. This dataset contains bilateral stock migration data collected from national censuses that took place around 2000. As mentioned in Ratha and Shaw (2007) the World Bank dataset on bilateral migration stock is the most comprehensive one presently available. At the same time due to its wide coverage and absence of standardized definitions and common reporting standards of migrants, the dataset may lack accuracy.

The sample in this study is limited to 62x62 country pairs for which comparable work value related data are available. This sample accounts for more then half of world migration stock in the year 2000 and represents countries with different socio-economic background. The chi-square test of representativeness of our sample in relation to GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars for the selected countries in comparison with the world distribution indicates that our sample is representative.

To construct our main independent variables we use the statistical data collected in the World Values Survey (WVS) which focuses primarily non-European countries and the European Value Study (EVS), which focuses primarily on European countries. These surveys have been conducted every five years
The fourth wave of the WVS and the EVS—which was conducted in 1999-2000—contains data for the largest sample of countries available among these surveys—62 countries. In this study we use 11 work value related questions for the analysis. Each question reflects the average opinion of a country’s population about the importance of a specific aspect of work. Such aspects include (1) good pay, (2) not too much pressure, (3) job security, (4) respectability of a job, (5) good hours, (6) opportunity to use initiative, (7) generous holidays, (8) responsible job, (9) a job in which you feel you can achieve something, (10) a job that is interesting, and (11) a job that meets one’s abilities. Additionally we studied responses to the question if work is important aspect of respondent’s life.

The indices of intrinsic and extrinsic work values are calculated based on the first 11 questions, originally formulated in the EVS study and qualified as “extrinsic” [questions (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5)] or “intrinsic” [questions (6), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11)] by the authors who worked with the EVS data (Halman and Vloet 1994, Savicka 1999). We use two alternative measures to calculate these indices: additive indices (average number of valued aspects of work) and factor scores extracted with the help of principal component analysis. In application to work values, principal component analysis has been used by Savicka (1999) and in combination with latent class analysis it had been used earlier by Halman and Vloet (1994). Their analyses revealed high correlation among the corresponding work value variables, consistent in time and within different European countries.

We measure job security by the Economic Security Index (ESI), which is calculated by the International Labour Office (ILO) on the basis of different forms of security associated with work such as employment protection, skills protection, income protection, and etc. The ESI index is a weighted average of 25 indicators of three types that reflect institutional arrangements, organizational process and the actual effective provision of job security. For each country, the ESI index was calculated in 1999 and normalized ranging between 0 and 1 where the higher value indicates better job security. Coverage of the ESI index is limited to 52 countries, as such our estimations where we use ESI are based on limited sample.

We used the World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset to obtain the necessary macroeconomic variables. Some gaps in the year 2000 unemployment since 1981. The fourth wave of the WVS and the EVS—which was conducted in 1999-2000—contains data for the largest sample of countries available among these surveys – 62 countries. In this study we use 11 work value related questions for the analysis. Each question reflects the average opinion of a country’s population about the importance of a specific aspect of work. Such aspects include (1) good pay, (2) not too much pressure, (3) job security, (4) respectability of a job, (5) good hours, (6) opportunity to use initiative, (7) generous holidays, (8) responsible job, (9) a job in which you feel you can achieve something, (10) a job that is interesting, and (11) a job that meets one’s abilities. Additionally we studied responses to the question if work is important aspect of respondent’s life.

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We used the World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset to obtain the necessary macroeconomic variables. Some gaps in the year 2000 unemployment

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7 available at: www.worldvaluessurvey.org
8 Accessed through the socio-economic security database at: www.ilo.org/sesame
data were filled from United Nations data. Data on wages are combined from the UNECE dataset and EBRD transition report. Geographical and cultural information (distance between capitals, land border, common language and colonial ties comes from Centre D’Etudes Prospectives et D’Informations Internationales (CEPII).

We also use two indices of cultural differences between countries that account for the societal value of traditional authority versus secular-rational authority and survival values as opposed to self-expression values. Inglehart’s (1990) concept of traditional authority societies as opposed to secular-rational authority culture (TSR) reflects the contrast between societies in which deference to the authority of a God or the nation (traditional authority) is viewed as important and those societies in which the subordination to state power, or rationalized bureaucracy (rational authority) is stressed. On the other hand, Survival values as opposed to Self-Expression values (SSE) dimension of culture reflects differences between societies that emphasize hard work and self-denial (Survival values) and those that stress quality of life issues, such as self-expression, leisure, friendship, women’s emancipation and equal status for racial and sexual minorities (Self-Expression values).

The TSR and SSE scores are calculated using the factor analysis on the WVS and EVS questions relating to economics, politics, religion, sexual behavior, gender roles, family values, communal identities, civic engagement, scientific and technological progress, environmental protection, and ethical concerns. Here we use TSR and SSE scores estimated by Tadesse and White (2008) and define TSR and SSE cultural distance between countries as an absolute value of the difference in the corresponding scores.

Table 1 contains results of the univariate analysis of economic and work value related variables for two groups of countries of our sample - those with positive and negative stock migration in the year 2000. Our sample contains 36 countries with negative and 26 countries with positive or zero 2000 stock migration. Column eight shows the ratio of means and indicates the significance

---

9 Tadesse and White (2008) also proposed to define cultural distance between countries as a composite index of differences in mean values of the TSR and SSE scores as 

\[ CD_{ij} = \sqrt{(TSR_i - TSR_j)^2 + (SSE_i - SSE_j)^2} \]

In this study we do not find CD to be significant in explaining stock migration, while, individually, TSR and SSE are found to be significant.
level of t-test of equality of means for these two groups. As one may expect the
direction of migration on average goes from poor countries to rich countries. In
the same vane, unemployment rate on average is higher in sending countries
although not significantly.

Table 1. Difference in economic and social variables between countries with negative and
positive stock migration in 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negative migration</th>
<th>Positive or zero stock migration</th>
<th>Negative/Positive stock migration ratio for</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obs</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10.83</td>
<td>8.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (const 2000 $)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5592.02</td>
<td>7740.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita PPP (current international $)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9037.54</td>
<td>8278.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and work-value related variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSR index</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-0.235</td>
<td>0.648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSE index</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-0.284</td>
<td>0.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of importance of work in life, Job_imp</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3.619</td>
<td>0.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of intrinsic work value, additive</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.595</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of extrinsic work value, additive</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of intrinsic work value, factor score</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of extrinsic work value, factor score</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average number of valued work values</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.453</td>
<td>1.350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO Economic security index (ESI)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>0.187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank migration database, WDI, WVS, EVS, ILO, authors’ calculation † (a)/(b)/(c) indicate 1% / 5% / 10% significance of t-test of equality of means.
Many of the value-related variables do not show significant difference between two country groups. At the same time, those with significant differences in means behave supportively to our hypotheses. Importance of work and index of extrinsic work value are higher in source countries. The ILO economic security index shows that job protection is significantly lower in source countries.

Insignificant differences in work value variables between the positive and negative stock migration countries can be explained by inner differentiation among values in the countries under study. As Gruenberg (1980) showed, intrinsic values are to be found among “high occupations rather than low qualified jobs,” we may expect that in the countries with high inequality for opportunities for advancement, the differentiation of values is high, and this differentiation would yield nearly equal averages of both types of values.

4. Empirical Model and Estimation Strategy

We utilize the gravity framework to study migration. The gravity model has become a standard workhorse in cross-sectional studies of bilateral migration flows. The most general specification of the gravity model of migration is given by:

\[ M_{ij} = \alpha + \beta X_{i(j)} + \gamma Z_{i(j)} + u_{ij} \]

where \( M_{ij} \) represents some measure of migration from country \( i \) to country \( j \), \( X_{i(j)} \) is a set of (log) economic variables of country \( i \) and \( j \), and \( Z_{i(j)} \) is a set of other explanatory variables for countries \( i \) and \( j \), that are specific to a particular study and may include geographical, cultural, social and institutional factors.

The standard economic determinants of international migration used in empirical migration literature include the average wage or GDP per capita as a measure of (potential) income in home and host country and the rate of unemployment (employment) as a measure of probability of obtaining that income.

We will follow this approach using GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars as a measure of potential income. We will use distance between countries

---

10 See, for example, the work of Karemera et al. (2000) to study determinants of international migration to USA and Canada, the work of Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) to study the determinants of remittance flows, and the works of Mayda (2005) and Ortega and Peri (2009) to study determinants of international migration to fourteen OECD countries.

11 See, for example, Hatton (1995)
and a dummy for common border as a control variable for the cost of migration. Cultural distance variables, common language and colony dummies will be used to control for possible barriers for migration.\(^{12}\)

This study is unique in that it uses variables representing relative work values and job-security to explain the directions of international migration. Table 2 reports the estimation results of several different variations of the following basic specification:

\[
\log\left(\frac{M_{ij}}{Pop_i}\right) = \alpha + \beta_1 \log\left(\frac{GDP_{per\ Capita_{ij}}}{GDP_{per\ Capita_j}}\right) + \beta_2 \log\left(\frac{unempl_{ij}}{unempl_j}\right) + \beta_3 \log(\text{Dist}_{ij}) + \beta_4 \text{Border}_{ij} \\
+ \beta_5 \log(\text{TSR}_{ij}) + \beta_6 \log(\text{SSE}_{ij}) + \beta_7 \text{Lang}_{ij} + \beta_8 \text{Colony}_{ij} + \gamma_1 \log\left(\frac{\text{Job\ imp}_{ij}}{\text{Job\ imp}_j}\right) \\
+ \gamma_2 \log\left(\frac{\text{Intrinsic}_{i}}{\text{Intrinsic}_j}\right) + \gamma_3 \log\left(\frac{\text{Extrinsic}_{i}}{\text{Extrinsic}_j}\right) + \gamma_4 \log\left(\frac{\text{ESI}_{i}}{\text{ESI}_j}\right) \\
+ \theta_1 \log\left(\frac{\text{Job\ imp}_{ij}}{\text{Job\ imp}_j}\right) \cdot X_{ij} + \theta_2 \log\left(\frac{\text{Intrinsic}_{i}}{\text{Intrinsic}_j}\right) \cdot X_{ij} + \theta_3 \log\left(\frac{\text{Extrinsic}_{i}}{\text{Extrinsic}_j}\right) \cdot X_{ij} + u_{ij}
\]

where \(i\) is the origin country and \(j\) is the destination country, \(M_{ij}\) is the stock of migrants from \(i\) to \(j\) in the year 2000. If not mentioned otherwise, \(GDP_{per\ Capita}\) variable is GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars and \(Unempl\) is unemployment in 2000\(^{13}\). \(Dist\) is the distance between capitals of two countries. \(TSR\) and \(SSE\) are cultural distances between countries defined in the Data section. The dummy variable \(Border\) has a value of one if the two countries share a land border. \(Lang\) and \(Colony\) dummies are equal to one, respectively, if a common language is spoken in both locations, and if two countries, at some point in the past, had a colonial relationship. \(Job\_imp\) - the respondents were asked to

\(^{12}\) Studies of Mayda (2005) and Ortega and Peri (2009) used immigration policies dummy to control for migration barriers.

\(^{13}\) Hatton (1995) and Fertig (2001) suggest to separate unemployment variables for origin and destination country to account for the assumption of bigger uncertainty about employment prospects in destination country that leads to a greater weight being placed on the employment rate in destination country. In this study we do not separate these variables since our preliminary estimation for the separate unemployment variables showed that the coefficient for unemployment in the source country does not show expected sign while usage of relative unemployment gives theory consistent estimation results.
evaluate the importance in their life using the 4-point scale: 1 – no important at all, 4- very important. ESI is a measure of job security in a country. Extrinsic and Intrinsic are indices of extrinsic and intrinsic work values.

Our hypotheses imply that the decision to migrate might involve some complex interaction between economic and social work related variables. To capture this complexity we include several types of interaction in our empirical model. Namely, we interact the ‘importance of work’ variable, intrinsic indices, and extrinsic indices with income, unemployment and job security variables to find certain conditions under which people are discouraged or encouraged to migrate. This procedure reflects our hypotheses that people with different work values might differ in their migration decision under similar economic conditions. $X_{ij}$ is an interaction variable that reflects our hypotheses, depending on specification it will be represented by relative income, relative unemployment or relative job security.

Since the addition of interacting terms may add to the multicollinearity problem we centered all variables by subtracting the mean value from each variable. The centering of variables often helps to minimize the multicollinearity problem and does not change the interpretation of estimation results (Aiken and West, 1991).

According to a standard international migration theory, we expect $\beta_1 < 0$, $\beta_2 > 0$, $\beta_3 < 0$, $\beta_4 > 0$, $\beta_5 < 0$, $\beta_6 < 0$, $\beta_7 > 0$, $\beta_8 > 0$. According to our hypotheses we expect the coefficient for relative work importance to be positive, the coefficient for relative intrinsic work value index to be negative and the coefficient for relative extrinsic work value index to be positive. Our hypothesis 2 also states that the coefficient for the average number of valued work values should be positive. To test this, one specification will include the average number of valued work values (variable all_values) instead of the additive intrinsic and extrinsic indices.

As pointed out by Brücker and Silverstovs (2004) the choice between using net or stock migration rate (migration as a percentage of the population in the home country) to represent dependent variable relies on a number of arbitrary assumptions. Consider a long-run relation with net migration rate as a dependent variable and persistent differences in (expected) income levels. In such a case the
model implicitly assumes that either the total population of the home country will eventually migrate or migration will not happen at all. As an alternative they propose to use migration stock instead of flow as a dependent variable. Other problems that arise with net migration data are a mis-measurement of migrants due to a lack of standardized definition of migration (mostly OECD countries maintain a consistent definition of immigrants across countries), mis-reporting and problems with accounting for return migration. Although, the mentioned problems to some extent exist also in stock migration data, however we believe that stock migration data are more accurate, especially for developing countries that account for about a half of total world migration.\textsuperscript{14}

Also, some discussion is needed to justify our approach to regress 2000 stock migration rate, which is close to a sum of net migration rates over years, on other variables that relate purely to the year 2000.\textsuperscript{15} As shown by Mayda (2005) emigration (flow) rates show considerable inertia and therefore highly correlate to stock migration rates. The same inertia is found in work value related variables. Ogburn (1932) defined the delayed reaction of people to changes as cultural lag and Inglehart (Inglehart and Baker 2000) admitted that the changes in values are rather slow that justifies their usage in this study. We will use lags of income and unemployment variables to test the robustness. We also use the lagged income variable to address a possible endogeneity problem that might arise from the reverse causality of migration on income. Indeed, one may argue that newcomers have a negative impact on a destination country’s wages and hence income. The usage of the lagged income variable may mitigate the endogeneity problem since it is hard to believe that future emigration can influence contemporary income in a destination country. The same logic can hardly be applied to values since they change very slowly. Also, cultural changes are not that easily calculated as income or remittances. The scales that sociologists use do not have such large variability as, for example, income has. Also, the scope of migration is not large enough to allow observing immediate changes in work values or job satisfaction in the destination country.

Our sample is affected by the well-known problem of most gravity models of international trade - our dependent variable contains a large portion of zeros\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{14} See Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) for other arguments in favor of stock migration as a dependent variable

\textsuperscript{15} This approach is not new and is used in other studies (see for example Ortega and Peri (2009)).
(out of 3746 observations 45% or 1706 observations are zeros). Since we use the log-log formulation of the model, the estimation of the basic specification will drop zero observations that may lead to selection bias. To overcome this problem an arbitrary small number may be used instead of zeros. In their recent study Ortega and Peri (2009) add one to the stock migration in order to account for zero migration rates and used the OLS estimator. The approach used in this study is based on Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p. 531) who recommend using Tobit maximum likelihood estimator adding the observed minimum value to logged dependent variable. While the minimum value of trade is somewhat questionable in the case of international trade, the value of one is a straightforward choice in the case of stock migration.

5. Estimation Results

Table 2 shows the estimates for both Tobit and OLS that is used to verify the robustness of our results. Both OLS and Tobit MLE estimates are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Tobit estimates show well-known regularity of being larger than OLS estimates and the average ratio of these estimates equal about 57% that is very close to the proportion of nonlimit observations in the sample (Greene, 2000).

Stock migration rate is negatively related to the income difference indicating that a 10% increase in the destination county’s income per capita increases stock migration rate by about 9.8% \(^{16}\) (the increase of \( \frac{GDP_{perCapita_j}}{GDP_{perCapita_i}} \) by 10% decreases \( \frac{GDP_{perCapita_i}}{GDP_{perCapita_j}} \) by 9%, hence \(-9\%\cdot 1.464\cdot 0.74=9.8\%)\(^{17}\)). The OLS estimate is a bit smaller indicating a 6.1% increase in the stock migration rate. The Tobit estimation (not reported in this study) with average wages in 2000 as a proxy for income gave a similar result indicating a 11% increase in the stock migration rate in response to a 10% increase in the

\(^{16}\) Mayda (2005) reported 19% increase in net migration rate in response to 10% increase in the destination county’s income per capita.

\(^{17}\) Wooldridge (2002) indicates that in order to interpret Tobit estimates (marginal effects) one needs to multiply these estimates by an adjustment factor that numerically is close the proportion of nonlimit observations in a sample. Here we estimate marginal effects using corresponding simulation in the model object of Eviews. The implied adjustment factor for model (1) is estimated to be equal about 0.74.
destination county’s average wage. The Tobit estimation of model (1) with lagged income and unemployment variables change the estimated coefficient for relative income from $-1.464$ for the year 2000 to $-1.558$ for the year 1997 to $-1.605$ for the year 1995 and to $-1.251$ for the year 1990. Lower absolute value of the coefficient for the year 2000 suggests the potential presence of the endogeneity problem, since reverse causality likely biases the income coefficient toward zero. At the same time, higher (negative) coefficient for lagged income may indicate “accumulation” effect of stock migration.

Table 2 also indicates the importance of geographical and cultural variables in explaining migration flows. All these variables are significant and have expected signs. Distance between countries remains an important constraint factor for international migration. According to our estimates, a 10% increase in the distance between countries decreases the stock migration rate by about 8% (Tobit) to 10% (OLS) on average. Common border, common language, and colony relations increase stock migration. High estimated coefficient for colony dummy indicates that institutional constraints like visas and immigration policies play an important role in decreasing migration flows.

It is worth mentioning effect of the difference in cultural orientation on stock migration. Most of the specifications indicate a negative or insignificant effect of the difference in TSR values and, somewhat surprising, a positive and significant effect of the difference in SSE values. The estimation with the composite Cultural Distance (CD) index revealed its insignificant effect on stock migration rate. The positive effect of the difference in SSE shows that people do migrate to the places with different attitudes toward work and quality of life. Specifically they migrate from the places where hard work is valued to the countries where self-expression in labour dominates. This result gives additional support to our hypotheses pointing out that the dimension of culture that reflects attitudes toward work significantly influences stock migration rates. At the same time, difference in attitudes toward authority reduces bilateral migration between countries. In the

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18 Indeed, the assumption that immigrants are likely to decrease income in the destination country and to increase income in the origin country imply increasing of relative income variable, hence the coefficient will decrease in absolute value.

19 As it was empirically established by Inglehart (2000) these post-materialist values, as he defines it, are to be found at the richest welfare states of the world which are Scandinavian countries. Countries that are low on the SSE scale could be less or more poor depending on criterion, however, their distinctive feature is materialistic culture that implies hard work as a necessary precondition for obtaining highly valued material welfare.
other words, people do not migrate to the countries where the norms of authority subordination and the idea of individual role are different from their own.

Now let us take a look at the work value variables and their interactions with economic and job security variables. Model (1) presents estimation results with interaction of work value variables and income. The resulted coefficient for Job_imp variable is the following expression:

\[-4.93 - 2.86 \times \left( \log \left( \frac{GDP_{i}}{GDP_{j}} \right) - \log \left( \frac{GDP_{i}}{GDP_{j}} \right) \right)\]

Equating it to zero and solving for the income variable reveals that Job_imp variable has positive effect on stock migration rate provided GDP per capita in the source country is less then 0.13*GDP per capita (0.18 for OLS) in the destination country. This shows that greater importance of work in the source country increases migration only if income in the source country is considerably lower then in the destination that supports our Hypothesis 1. Solving similar inequalities for the coefficients of Intrinsic and Extrinsic indices, one can see that these coefficients do not change signs under reasonable values of income variables in the source country and destination countries and have signs suggested by our hypotheses 3 and 4.

Consider model (2) that is similar to model (1), we only excluded two interaction terms for Intrinsic and Extrinsic variables in order to estimate the coefficient for the income variable conditional on Job_imp variable. Solving the inequality

\[-1.44 - 4.32 \times \left( \log \left( \frac{Job_{i}}{Job_{j}} \right) - \log \left( \frac{Job_{i}}{Job_{j}} \right) \right) > 0\]

implies that the destination country's increase in income negatively influences stock migration flow if \( \frac{Job_{i}}{Job_{j}} < 0.72 \). As shown in Table 1 the latter inequality rarely holds, but it indicates that if Job_imp for the destination country becomes considerably higher compared to Job_imp in the source country, then the increase in the income gap might not translate into a higher migration rate. In other words, relative scarcity of jobs in the destination country measured by relatively high importance of work may discourage migration even under increasing relative income opportunity.
Table 2. Results of a gravity-type migration model with work value indices and interaction terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model (1)</th>
<th>Model (2)</th>
<th>Model (3)</th>
<th>Model (4)</th>
<th>Model (5)</th>
<th>Model (6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Tobit</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Tobit</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Tobit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPperCapita</td>
<td>-0.67a (0.03)</td>
<td>-1.46a (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.67a (0.03)</td>
<td>-1.43a (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.67a (0.03)</td>
<td>-1.44a (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.27a (0.06)</td>
<td>0.32a (0.10)</td>
<td>0.27a (0.06)</td>
<td>0.31a (0.10)</td>
<td>0.27a (0.06)</td>
<td>0.31a (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log(Distance)</td>
<td>2.82a (0.38)</td>
<td>3.71a (0.49)</td>
<td>2.80a (0.38)</td>
<td>3.79a (0.49)</td>
<td>2.75a (0.38)</td>
<td>3.70a (0.49)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>0.32a (0.06)</td>
<td>0.37a (0.10)</td>
<td>0.32a (0.06)</td>
<td>0.29a (0.10)</td>
<td>0.37a (0.06)</td>
<td>0.40a (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>1.19a (0.28)</td>
<td>1.52a (0.44)</td>
<td>1.21a (0.28)</td>
<td>1.58a (0.44)</td>
<td>1.31a (0.28)</td>
<td>1.77a (0.44)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colony</td>
<td>3.23a (0.40)</td>
<td>4.43a (0.50)</td>
<td>3.13a (0.41)</td>
<td>4.28a (0.51)</td>
<td>3.32a (0.40)</td>
<td>4.65a (0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All_values</td>
<td>-4.93a (0.88)</td>
<td>-11.3a (1.72)</td>
<td>-4.93a (0.89)</td>
<td>-10.9a (1.72)</td>
<td>-4.93a (0.92)</td>
<td>-8.10a (1.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job_imp</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intrinsic</td>
<td>Extrinsic</td>
<td>Job_imp*GDPperCapita</td>
<td>Intrinsic*GDPperCapita</td>
<td>Extrinsic*GDPperCapita</td>
<td>Job_imp*Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intrinsic</strong></td>
<td>-0.75a (0.26)</td>
<td>-0.49 (0.47)</td>
<td>-2.48a (0.33)</td>
<td>0.33a (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.61a (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.21 (0.48)</td>
<td>-0.18 (0.47)</td>
<td>-4.32a (0.63)</td>
<td>0.85a (0.13)</td>
<td>1.84 (0.42)</td>
<td>-1.64 (1.40)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.75a (0.26)</td>
<td>-0.49 (0.47)</td>
<td>-2.48a (0.33)</td>
<td>0.33a (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.61a (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.74)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>-0.49 (0.47)</td>
<td>-2.48a (0.33)</td>
<td>0.33a (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.61a (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.74)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.75b (0.27)</td>
<td>-0.54 (0.48)</td>
<td>-2.48a (0.33)</td>
<td>0.33a (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.61a (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.33a (0.32)</td>
<td>-0.62 (0.52)</td>
<td>-2.48a (0.33)</td>
<td>0.33a (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.61a (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2.97a (0.33)</td>
<td>-5.56a (0.64)</td>
<td>-2.48a (0.33)</td>
<td>0.33a (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.61a (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Job_imp</strong></td>
<td>-0.13 (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.6 (1.22)</td>
<td>-2.48a (0.33)</td>
<td>0.33a (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.61a (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.55a (0.11)</td>
<td>0.35c (0.21)</td>
<td>-2.48a (0.33)</td>
<td>0.33a (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.61a (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.74)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.49b (0.20)</td>
<td>0.90 (0.39)</td>
<td>-2.48a (0.33)</td>
<td>0.33a (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.61a (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.74)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.13 (0.12)</td>
<td>-0.61a (0.22)</td>
<td>-2.48a (0.33)</td>
<td>0.33a (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.61a (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.74)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-5.50a (0.64)</td>
<td>0.90 (0.39)</td>
<td>-2.48a (0.33)</td>
<td>0.33a (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.61a (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.19 (0.74)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Obs.</strong></td>
<td>3746</td>
<td>3746</td>
<td>3746</td>
<td>3746</td>
<td>3746</td>
<td>3746</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>R^2</strong></td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dependent variable = \[ \log \left( \frac{\text{Stock Migration}_{ij} + 1}{\text{Population}_{i}} \right) \]. Subscripts \( i \) and \( j \) indicate source and recipient country, respectively. All interaction variables appear in the equation as a zero centered measure of relative distance of corresponding variable between countries \( i \) and \( j \) in the following form:

\[ \log \left( \frac{\text{Variable}_{i}}{\text{Variable}_{j}} \right) - \log \left( \frac{\text{Variable}_{i}}{\text{Variable}_{j}} \right). \]

White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (OLS), Huber/White standard errors (Tobit) are in parenthesis. (a)/(b)/(c) indicate 1%/5%/10% significance. Pseudo \( R^2 \) is reported for Tobit estimator.

In model (3) we repeat the estimation of the basic model leaving only interaction between the Intrinsic index and GDP per capita. Repeating the analysis did not find realistic conditions in the relative Intrinsic indices in order to change the sign of the income variable, hence relative income negatively influences migration flow independently from the level of intrinsic work value.

In model (4) we use Unemployment as an interaction variable. The estimation results show the insignificance of of Job_imp(12) interaction term in explaining stock migration that reveals the unconditionally negative dependence of stock migration on relative job importance that does not fully support our Hypothesis 1. A number of works (Hatton (1995) as well as Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) notice that the (un)employment variable in many cases does not produce theory consistent estimation results. Here we think we are in the same trap. On our opinion, this might due to inaccuracy of unemployment data, especially for less developed countries.

Solving corresponding inequalities for the coefficients of Intrinsic and Extrinsic indices and comparing the results with ratio of average unemployment for source and destination countries from Table 1 one can conclude that these coefficients do not change signs under reasonable values of unemployment in the source and destination countries and have signs suggested by our hypotheses 3 and 4.

Model (5) uses ILO Economic Security Index (ESI) as a measure of overall job security. The higher the value of ESI the better job security is. Looking for the cases when coefficients of work value variables change their signs gives the following results:
Here in the first row we receive a result consistent with our hypothesis 1: an increase in the importance of work in the source country increases migration only if job security in the source country is significantly lower than in the destination country. Our finding shows that the level of job security in a country may significantly change the migration decision. Here we also find support for hypotheses 3 and 4 since positive dependence of stock migration on the relative index of extrinsic (intrinsic) work values always (rarely) holds.

We also estimated the models (1), (4) and (5) with factor score measures of intrinsic and extrinsic work values described in the Data section. The estimation results (not shown in the tables) of all three models are very similar to those obtained for models (1), (4), and (5).

Finally, model (6) reports estimation results of the basic model where we use the average number of valued work values (All_values) as an explanatory variable instead of intrinsic and extrinsic indices. The positive coefficient for this variable supports our hypothesis 2 that countries where the labour force becomes more demanding for various aspects of work send more migrants ceteris paribus. Solving the inequality for the coefficient to be positive conditioning on relative income we conclude that a positive relation between the stock migration rate and the difference in the average number of valued work values holds until income in the destination country is less than five times higher than in the source country (Table 1 indicates that on average income in the destination country is almost three times higher than in the source country). This finding shows that for the countries with similar income levels per capita, work value aspects play a bigger role in determining migration flows.
6. Conclusion and Discussion

In this study we show the importance of accounting for labor market conditions and work values of population in sending and receiving countries when studying migration. We confirm the findings of other researchers on the importance of the income variable, of the distance between countries, of common borders, of common languages, and of colonial relations in explaining migration. We found that cultural distance in the dimension of attitudes toward work positively influences stock migration, while distance in the dimension of attitudes toward authority has the opposite effect. Also, we show that if more aspects of work are valued in a country, this country sends more migrants. Our study reveals the ultimate importance of both, extrinsic and intrinsic values of work. People tend to migrate from the countries where extrinsic values are high, and people tend to stay in the countries where intrinsic values are high. Concerning the perception of the ‘importance of work’, our findings show that out-migration will be low for countries where the importance of work is high, but people will migrate if their anxiety about job instability is considerably high.

The main limitation of our study is the lack of data that may confirm the correlation between values and the decision to migrate at the individual level. If labor migrants are not studied in a comparable international level, we unavoidably deal with opinions of people who have not migrated, whereas migrants brought their motivation to the countries of their destination. In addition, lacking the information on education and the age of migrants, we cannot control for their correlation with intrinsic values that could enable us to differentiate factors for different social groups. Knowledge on so called “shuttle migrants,” who are frequently illegal, is even scarcer. Most official statistics refer to legal migrants, who leave their countries for different reasons, whereas correlations of job values and migration outflow rather concerns labour migrants, who are often shuttle migrants such as in the cases of cross border trade and seasonal work. Labour migrants are typically either absent from present national representative studies, or their number is too small. The study of remittances is a promising approach to the extension of our analysis.
References


Beyond Nationality: Dispatches from Immigrant Workers in the Global City

Manuel ABRANTES

Abstract. Research on migration policy, social structures and labour market dynamics underlines the persistent vulnerability of immigrants in the labour market of contemporary western societies. However, little attention has been paid to the diverse manners in which these factors overlap in the life of migrants moving within the same origin and destination settings. This article examines the case of Brazilian-born migrants working in Amsterdam, drawing on the analysis of statistical data, policy documents and fifteen life stories. It starts by explaining the aim of the research and the choice of origin and destination units. Findings are organized according to four key elements: legal status, gender, year of arrival, and occupation. It is argued that these elements comprise increasing differentiation mechanisms and provide an improved notion of what is at stake for migrant workers dwelling in the global city. The main conclusion is that international borders are undergoing a significant reorganization in their daily operation, in particular due to concomitant changes in migration law and flexibility strategies in the labour market. Reinforcement of distinct categories of migrants, expansion of rights for relatives or civil partners of European Union citizens and increasing pressure over undocumented workers require future research to consider whether migration policy is being replaced by a global order of human selection owing more to social and economic profile than nationality.

Keywords: labour, law, gender, city

Introduction

The situation of immigrants in the labour market of contemporary western societies has raised considerable soul-searching since the works of Castles and Kosack (1972, 1985) or Piore (1979). Recent reports by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2006, 2007, 2008a) suggest that the increase in transnational flows did not alleviate the vulnerability of labour
migrants. According to these reports, 12.4% of the workforce in OECD countries by 2005 had been born abroad. After a decade of continuous job growth in most western European countries, by the mid-2000s the unemployment rate remained significantly higher for immigrants, the largest differentials being found in Scandinavian countries, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Another common development is that foreign-born workers show a higher incidence of temporary work. This happens in most of the OECD countries without an apparent correlation with the share of temporary work in the total labour force. Non-European migrant women are found to be in particular disadvantage concerning unemployment, temporary work, or socioeconomic downward mobility.

While there is a substantial amount of research on migration policy, social structures and labour market dynamics attempting to account for the vulnerability of ethnic minorities, little attention has been paid to the diverse manners in which these factors overlap in the life of migrants moving within the same origin and destination settings. Tensions between a heterogeneous society and a regulated labour market should not be understood as clear-cut or stagnant, and heterogeneity in this case comprises more than just nationality or ethnicity. Year of arrival, gender, family composition, legal status and variation across occupations are some of the core issues warranting further attention in the examination of how migrant workers negotiate their position in the labour market. Pursuing these question marks means “digging in the penumbra of master categories”, to use the famous expression of Sassen (2005). Empirical qualitative research is especially required if one is to “consider that part of having a vigorous public sociology is that we can work at theorizing with our publics, accepting that they also can theorize – can see, and may indeed see what we cannot see, because we are blinded by the enormous clarity of our theories” (Sassen, 2005: 403).

In this article, the case of Brazilian-born migrants working in Amsterdam is examined. Analysis results from a research project conducted in 2008 covering statistical data sources, policy documents and life stories collected from fifteen migrants (for a whole view of the project, see Author, 2011). The selection of both origin and destination countries was careful. Various studies undertaken in the Netherlands indicate that risks raised by atypical work practices such as temporary contracting, spurious self-employment or the informal economy fall especially hard on immigrants coming from outside the European Union (Van Ours and Veenman,
1999; Tijdens et al., 2006; Berkhout et al., 2007; OECD, 2008b). In particular, migrants show a lower degree of capacity to cope with discontinued professional trajectories (Bijwaard and Veenman, 2008). Additional interest stems from the fact that the Netherlands has been often regarded in international policy-making as providing a model of employment to be emulated (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; European Expert Group on Flexicurity, 2007, European Commission, 2007a, 2007b).

On the other hand, much has been said about the choice of national units in the study of migration and the underlying subscription to a sort of uncritical statist sociology (Sassen, 2001; De Genova, 2002). One of the complexities in the study of migration is that countries, usually perceived as the units in which migrants move, no longer exist in the conventional sense of economic entities (Miles and Satzewich, 1990; Reich, 1991). The selection of a particular origin country nonetheless presents two critical advantages. First, much of the legal framework can be held fixed, illuminating sources of variation around it. Second, if it is true that the concepts of national economy and national society deserve great suspicion, the process of migration is often shaped by collective strategies and networks, many of which revolve around imagined communities. By circumscribing observation to one single country, it is possible to explore the distribution of opportunities and risks within this group and question in empirical context whether a group actually exists.

The following sections are organized according to the key elements emerging from the empirical research: legal status, gender, year of arrival, and occupation. In the concluding remarks, it is argued that these four elements comprise increasing differentiation mechanisms and provide an improved notion of what is at stake for migrant workers dwelling in the global city.

**Legal status**

While ranking 8th in the top nationalities of migrants applying for a temporary permit in the Netherlands, Brazil ranks far lower in the top nationalities of applicants for a permit of unlimited time (data supplied by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics and Department of Immigration and Naturalisation, 2008). Still, Brazil is the source of a fast-growing national minority in the Netherlands. Based on official numbers, the extensive report by Bijl et al. (2005) and consultation with institutional representatives, the number of Brazilian nationals living in Dutch
territory can be cautiously estimated at 17 thousand. According to law, all procedures for regular migration must be initiated at the Dutch Embassy or Consulate in the migrant’s place of residence. This requirement exists since the guest worker regime of the 1960s, but it was only in the period of 1998-2002 that became mandatory in practice. Asylum applicants constitute a distinct category as they can be granted a residence permit without the right to participate in paid employment. The general rule implemented in 1974, the period of the ban on migration in various European countries (Sassen, 1999), is that a non-European Union citizen can only be recruited in the Netherlands after the employer proves there is not any applicant holding European Union citizenship who shows the same ability to perform that particular job. In order to do so, the job vacancy must be advertised in the public employment services. The status then granted to the migrant worker is temporary. During the first few years, it must be renewed periodically under the requirement that the migrant has a continuous source of income to cover living and health costs. Afterwards it can be replaced by a permit of stay for unlimited time.

The obvious difficulty of going through the bureaucratic procedure, officially designed to protect the regional workforce, has never been a pacific political issue. Not to mention the discontent of migrant representatives about the existence of the whole law, some political parties and business representatives grew increasingly critical of its application to all non-European Union citizens. If highly qualified migrants cannot make their way in when employers need them, it is claimed, this may bear heavy consequences for the “new strategic goal” of the European Union to become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” (European Council, 2000). In 1998, an exemplary legislative update in the Netherlands introduced a distinction between arbeidsmigrant (Dutch for “labour migrant”) and kennismigrant (“knowledge migrant”). This distinction is based on the income of the migrant. If the income declared by the employer is higher than a given amount (at the time of writing, 45,495 Euros gross per year for a migrant over 30 years of age or 33,363 Euros gross per year for a migrant younger than 30), the migrant is entitled to the status of knowledge migrant. In this case, the employer is not required to prove the better abilities of the migrant over applicants holding European Union citizenship. Additionally, the migrant does not need to pass a “civic integration examination” assessing personal knowledge of Dutch society and language as required to labour migrants before being allowed to
move to the Netherlands. This distinction between two types of immigrants has been echoed by the European Commission’s proposal for a Blue Card meant to extend and standardize the privileged conditions for “third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment”. In May 2009, agreement by all Member-States came in the form of a Directive, from which Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom are though excluded.

The knowledge migrant status is especially available to workers in the top professional layers of technological and scientific occupations. The case of Paulo, one of the respondents in my empirical research, is especially interesting. The international software company he works for offered him the option of moving to the Netherlands either under a posted worker contract or through the knowledge migrant procedure. It was very difficult for him to calculate the impact each of the options would have on his income. First of all, he was moving into a new position in the company; then, the company has a different pay grid for every location; dollars had to be converted into Euros; taxes were charged in a different manner. In the end, he decided to go for the knowledge migrant status because it was something “more real, it sounded more like I was really moving here, not like a temporary thing”.

On the other hand, migrants who intend to work on a self-employed basis must submit a business plan in advance to Dutch authorities, which can either accept or reject it under certain parameters of economic solidness. In fact, it may be more difficult to find one’s way through migration law by working for somebody else than creating your own small enterprise. Street shops, language schools or handicraft import services have bloomed among migrant communities in Amsterdam. In the case of Alexandra, for instance, her first earnings in the Netherlands came from informal work in a flower greenhouse. Before that, she had had a very hard time making a living as a hairdresser in her hometown Teresina. The opportunity at a Dutch greenhouse was definitely an improvement, even if she felt it was quite a tiring job when she would be unexpectedly required to work for 16 hours in a row. She is better off now spending 12 hours a day at her own flower shop.

The system is very complicated. Getting credit is very complicated. And there’s a lot of bureaucracy, all of it in Dutch, and you go to services where they make sure they don’t speak English. Getting the opening license is difficult, because they want to know what experience you have, what training you have... I had experience of working with flowers, that was something. Then you go to the... verkoophandel...
the chamber of commerce, and they will tell you whether it’s possible or not. I recently started a course on agriculture and flowers... although I now stopped it because I don’t have the time for it. But it’s important because they are very demanding and will not be giving you the permit if they think you’re going to go bankrupt. It’s the survival of the fittest. (Alexandra)

For Alexandra, survival became a bit easier after she married a Dutch man. The result of this was not only the simplification of her legal residence status, but also a crucial helping hand with all the papers and bureaucracy required to keep the shop operating.

Engaging in a partnership or marrying a person who is legally residing in the Netherlands is a frequent channel for migrants to obtain the legal permission to reside and work. In 2007, it constituted 49.1 per cent of all applications for a temporary stay in the Netherlands (Department of Immigration and Naturalisation data). The partner or spouse assumes legal responsibility for any living and healthcare costs that the foreigner may not be able to take up. In order to do this, the sponsor must prove sufficient continued income for at least one year before the application is submitted. In the current law, unlike earlier, migrants in this situation must also pass the “civic integration examination” on Dutch language and social norms.

Once granted, the permit enables migrants to reside and work in the Netherlands for three years, after which they can apply for a renovation of the temporary permit on their own or apply for Dutch naturalisation. During the first period, the partner is free to withdraw from the role of sponsor by own initiative. The foreigner must then leave the country. This is a significant source of vulnerability for migrants under partnership status, as shown in the lifestory of Sara. She had recently completed her university graduation in Business Management in São Paulo when she decided to visit some friends in Europe, relying on money saved while living with her wealthy parents. She fell in love with a Dutch man she had just met. When she said she would like to extend her stay, it was her boyfriend’s father who became the legal sponsor for Sara’s permanence in the Netherlands.

But after a while our relationship started to wear off, and I wanted to break up. And my boyfriend threatened me, he said: “If you break up, I’m going to the police and you’ll be deported.” It was really a very traumatic situation for me. And I saw how easily that can happen, as it does so often. Yes, I was here because I was with him, but I didn’t want to go away because I was being expelled. I didn’t want to go home.
And I had met another Dutch man by then, and he suggested me: “I will guarantee your stay...” And I said: “Look, I don’t want any more of this, I mean, I was guaranteed, now you guys can unguarantee me if you want, I’m leaving!” But all this left a strong mark on me... the vulnerability, and how easily a Dutch person can determine your future, do you see? (Sara)

The procedure for family reunification with children is the same in the sense that the person who is legally residing in the Netherlands is responsible for ensuring means of support. When reaching the minimum age for employment, descendants are then allowed to work in equal conditions with Dutch-born citizens. In the current law, they must opt between Dutch or Brazilian nationality at the age of 21. This consideration is likely to be influenced by developments in legislation in and out of the Netherlands. Lili came to the Netherlands as a minor when her mother married a Dutch man and the main reason why she recently decided to obtain Dutch nationality is that it will simplify mobility especially across the wealthiest nations. This can be said to be a significant achievement as she would like to pursue an international career after finishing her university studies in Business Management.

If I take my Dutch passport, I can even be a beggar on the street but if I want to live in England today I can, you see? Just because I’m an European citizen. And being Brazilian I must prove a million things and ask for a thousand documents and pay a thousand Euros and go through so much trouble before I can just move to another country! For me, that’s not very cool. That’s the only advantage for me, otherwise... That and being able to enter the United States without a visa. Entering the United States is a pain. It’s terrible now. (Lili)

Some European Union member states further allow descendants of national citizens to apply for a passport based on the *jus sanguinis* principle, although the maximum degree of familiarity with that ancestor may differ. The nationalities most frequently obtained by migrants born in Brazil seem to be Portuguese and Italian. These countries not only apply the *jus sanguinis* principle in a more extensive way than other states like the Netherlands, but they also have long migration links with Brazil.

**Gender**

According to data from the Brazilian Consulate in the Netherlands, 69 per cent of the Brazilian-born people living in Dutch territory by 2008 were women. The predominance of women has been on the increase at least among documented
migrants, as observed for other contemporary migratory flows (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2002; Castles and Miller, 2003). In 1999, 66 per cent of all the newcomers from Brazil registered by the national public survey were women; in 2005, this proportion was 71 per cent. An interesting remark when comparing the statistics over this time span is that, both in 1999 and 2004, half of the male newcomers were not registered by the end of the first year of stay. Among women, a proportion of 75 to 80 per cent was still living in the Netherlands after the first few years. This is probably related to the higher propensity of migrant women to engage in a legally registered partnership or marriage with a legally resident citizen. Does it mean that men constitute the great bulk of undocumented migrants then? There are no signs pointing towards this hypothesis. Research has shown that Brazilian women also have a significant presence in the undocumented flow, often earning their living as domestic workers or in the sex industry (Piscitelli, 2008).

Regarding the participation of women in the formal labour market, it is important to consider that the Netherlands shows the highest rates of part-time employment in the European Union. The fact that part-timers are predominantly women and mothers gave rise to the concept of one-and-a-half-earner family model (Yerkes and Visser, 2005). A recent report by Hagoort and Goedhuys (2008) and my own fieldwork suggest that many households with at least one Brazilian person go along the same pattern. The debate about lifestyle options versus employment deregulation is certainly still on the table. Notwithstanding the general impression that the low female participation in the labour market may be intertwined with the low quality of jobs more easily accessible to women, it is reasonable to think that causal effects may work the other way around as well. When confronted with poor working conditions, women will more easily withdraw from work — household finance allowing — than going into troubles to improve their situation, either by negotiating terms with the current employer or looking for a more gratifying job. At the same time, it does not seem that difficult for employers to find a female worker to replace the one who left.

Naidá completed two university graduations in Philosophy and Fashion Design in São Paulo. Her first job in the Netherlands was as a personal assistant of a company executive. She was paid by the day, and later worked full-time in several retail shops under temporary contracts. There have been long periods of unemployment in between, especially since she had a child from her marriage with a Dutch man.
I’ve always put a strong demand over myself to do something. My husband never charged me with anything, he supports me all the time, he never said I had to work, also because we’ve never experienced any situation when we were actually short of money, he earns more than enough for us to have a good life... I think the pressure up to a moment was so huge, my own pressure, that I would accept any work and subject to anything that would come, you know, anything that would allow me to say: I’m working, I can take care of myself. (Naída)

**Year of arrival**

The prospects of a secure income-earning stay in the Netherlands are substantially different than in the past. Especially striking is the account of Diana, who started working in Amsterdam as a schoolteacher in 1973.

I went to work and naturally you always have to fill in a number of forms, and they always ask your nationality. I put my Brazilian nationality. And nobody ever noticed! I started working, and three or four months later I told the school I was going to quit the job... and they picked up my file, we were looking through it, and they discovered I was Brazilian and that I was working illegally because I didn’t have a work permit! Nobody had ever told me I needed a work permit, and I never thought about it either. At that moment they filled in all the paperwork so that I could have a work permit. (Diana)

When marrying a Dutch citizen shortly before this event, Diana had not applied for Dutch naturalisation because “it was not necessary to make the decision right then, I could make it later on”. It was precisely in 1974 that she decided to obtain the Dutch nationality, “and naturally since that day this was never a problem again”.

Conditions over time did not change simply for migrants. They changed for some migrants more than for others. Beatriz came to the Netherlands in 2003 within an exchange program established between a Dutch university and the university in Rio de Janeiro where she was working as a researcher. By the end of her period as a visiting scholar, she had fallen in love with a Dutch man. Their engaging in a civil partnership solved the issues about to erupt from the immigration office, although she had to spend five months back in Rio de Janeiro sorting out all the required papers and waiting for the final permit. She is now the mother of a 2-year-old boy with dual citizenship. Her current activity combines academic research, a part-time position as the coordinator of a community project and voluntary work in a local institution.
As shown by Jeffery (2001), the set of rights attached to European Union citizenship and indeed the concept of European Union citizenship itself is an extension of the rights established earlier for the movement of workers in a purely economic sense. Nowadays carrying European Union citizenship means full waiving of the regularisation procedure, but this was not the case until a few years ago. João was able to secure his stay in the Netherlands in 2003 by applying for a Portuguese passport thanks to one of his grandfathers, who was born in Portugal and migrated to Brazil in the 1940s. However, he was only allowed to legally settle down in the Netherlands if he had at least a part-time employment bond. He found a job in a cleaning company. It is noteworthy that, despite holding a university diploma in Political Science from the University of Brasília, João has worked as a cleaner to the present day.

On the other hand, Rafael has not been able to get a residence permit in the Netherlands so far. Like many other migrants, one of his priorities it to keep living costs as low as possible so that a substantial part of his earnings can be sent over to his parents and child back in Rio de Janeiro. He is also saving money to visit them in the near future, but he is concerned about border controls and the possibility that he may not be able to re-enter the Netherlands. Chances of getting a legal permit to reside and work are not too bright at the moment. “Marriage is the only way”, he tells me. “There is no other way; through work it is just not possible.”

Another undocumented respondent, Tomás, also told me about his concern for the recent proposal to introduce a visa requirement for Brazilians visiting the Netherlands as tourists, as well as the application of the European Union Directive on Return of Illegal Immigrants.

And there is a new law. In order to leave Brazil, you need a health insurance that didn’t use to be mandatory. I mean, these are small changes that make it a bit harder. Still, I know how it works, so...! Even in the immigration services – I came through Paris this last time, I already came through Paris I don’t know how many times, five times or something, Paris always used to be smooth. This was the first time they really stopped me, searched me, talked to me... They did a lot of things, to know if you are contradicting yourself or something. (Tomás)

Having a health insurance in the Netherlands, a retirement fund or a written housing rental was always out of reach for undocumented migrants. Nevertheless, opening a bank account or making a mobile phone yearly contract
used to be simple, Tomás says. Now companies will often require social security and fiscal identification, only given to those with a residence permit.

**Occupation**

It has been commented that the same culture giving paid work a core position in social relations accepts a sharp value hierarchy of activities and production systems, linked to the perceived continuum of high-low skilled occupations (Beck, 2000; Sassen, 2007). At the same time, migrants come from regions where duties and rights regarding work may not have the same social and institutional centrality, and personal prospects or expected time of stay may be yet other crucial elements in their sense of entitlement (Portes, 1995).

The experience of the respondents exposes the disadvantage of migrants working in particular sectors, namely cleaning, domestic work and construction. Although the occupational distribution of the Brazilian population in the Netherlands is unknown, statistics (OECD, 2008a, 2008b) and local experts suggest these are professions occupied by a considerable number of them. The same can be said about the lower segment of jobs in retail, tourism and agro-industry. Occupational disadvantage is intertwined with the definition and distribution of tasks, the balance of control and autonomy, the internal structure of the firm and the role of trade unionism, among other things.

In the words of respondents, technical skills are constantly identified as being easier to “bring” from Brazil than any other type of skill because they are more independent of the social or cultural context in which they are exercised. This trend can be observed both in the formal and informal economies. Rafael told me certainly his experience doing painting work in Rio de Janeiro helped him find work in the construction sector upon arrival in the Netherlands, because “the methods, the techniques of painting are equal in the whole world, it doesn’t make any difference if it’s here or in Brazil”. “A tooth is a tooth in any part of the world”, Fábio told me. Yet, this did not mean he would be able to get his diploma in Dentistry validated by Dutch occupational authorities. He is currently working as a hygienist. Christiane also had her diplomas rejected by Dutch authorities after studying for 9 years and working for 20 as a doctor and homeopath in Brazil, a time during which she frequently came to Europe for scientific events. Since homeopathy is not recognized as a medical specialization in the Netherlands, she is
able to work as self-employed under certification of the Dutch Association of Homeopaths. The fact that her degree in classical medicine was not recognized though makes her feel as if she works, in her words, “out of the system”, since she can not prescribe things like medical exams to her patients. She is now considering trying to validate her diploma in another EU member state where “the process may be easier”, such as Portugal.

Those who worked or graduated in the fields of humanities, social science or arts feel this experience has been of very limited value in their trajectory. Naída, who worked for ten years in the fashion industry in São Paulo and holds two university diplomas, is not able to specify the huge number of rejected job applications in the Netherlands. She ended up taking her work of magazine covers, which she initially thought to be her greatest asset, out of her curriculum vitae submissions.

Although oversimplified comparisons should be avoided, it is interesting to look into the case of migrants dealing with flexible contractual arrangements next to the case of undocumented migrants. The most extreme case may be the one of Lili. To support her living costs through university, she has been working for two years now in a call centre under an “Agreement for Temporary Employment” through a recruitment agency, which determines that the employment relation may be terminated unilaterally by any of the parts with an advancement notice of 8 hours.

It’s not exactly a contract, what you have with the agency. It’s weird. It’s a paper where you sign that they basically own you! It says you’re going to work for a company they arranged for you, that everything is done through them, that they pay the salary, that they earn a certain amount over what you do, bla-bla-bla... But it’s not a fixed contract, you know? It doesn’t mention any end, it doesn’t mention any period... It has the name of the client company and it says I work there. I signed it a long time ago and I didn’t even look. Moreover, I’m sure I lost it somewhere. (Lili)

The employment relation for undocumented workers seems to vary just as much, and it is difficult to assess security. Sometimes, like Rafael in the construction sector, you are dependent on a phone call from your regular employer asking if you are available the next day. But Rafael has developed a personal bond with his employer, who is not expected to contact a different worker for the same
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service. Tomás has been working as a cleaner for the same employers for several years. There has never been a single piece of paper with their signatures on it, but their employment relationship has resisted the two times Tomás was detained by the police and deported to Brazil.

While the improvement of conditions in occupations in which migrants are over-represented remains far from social and political awareness in part because these occupations are considered unskilled or even unworthy, a parallel assumption permeates the self-perception of workers. They often avoid any struggle for the improvement of conditions on the grounds that what is wrong is not the current working conditions they are granted, but rather the existence of the job itself, or at least the fact that they are the ones doing it. The relevance of mentality and ideology in the workers’ sense of entitlement is discussed elsewhere (Author, forthcoming; see also Lautier, 2003; Anderson, 2009).

Concluding remarks

Important things changed since the guest worker regimes of the 1960s in countries like Germany, France or the Netherlands (Penninx and Roosblad, 2000). The role of the European Union has raised particular difficulties of assessment by social scientists. On the other hand, law is expected to play a strong role in the ability of migrants to negotiate their way through the labour market. The findings of the research covered in this article corroborate Anderson’s (2009: 407) insightful view: “immigration controls are perceived as being sorting mechanisms, or more generally, a tap that is switched on and off depending on national interests. But they are moulds rather than taps, producing workers with certain types of relation to the labour market, and residents with certain types of relations to citizens and social institutions.”

Examining the overlap of legal categories, social structures and labour market dynamics in the life story of migrants contributes to the characterization of important elements of differentiation such as gender, year of arrival, legal status, or occupation. If ever the institutional structure for the inclusion of minorities was homogeneous, a growing concern for policy-makers and immigrants alike has been about which of the migrants are welcome. Whereas Rafael wishes there was an extraordinary regularization period like it happened a few years ago in Spain so that a trip to see his six-year old son would not jeopardise his job in Amsterdam, for
software consultant Paulo it is demanding professional schedules with frequent 80-hour weeks and trips that make it difficult to visit his family. Qualitative evidence on the life of migrants is key in our understanding of what is at stake, as “the empirical details of these [new] social forms are also a window into the features of the current globalization phase” (Sassen, 2007: 99).

Two final considerations must be drawn. First, the position of migrants in the existing legal and social structures is related to various types of capital – not only educational or professional – they may hold or lack. The majority of Brazilians holding the legal right to reside and work in the Netherlands today obtained it on the grounds of family formation or European ancestry. Although these two channels are not inherently linked to the socioeconomic background of migrants and may therefore seem arbitrary as far as employment is concerned, there are some socioeconomic elements to it. Those who obtain a residence permit though partnership often meet this person while visiting a friend in Europe, backpacking, or living in another European Union member state; it is also not uncommon that the acquaintance occurs when the European Union citizen goes to Brazil for holidays or work. In other words, certain socioeconomic backgrounds make it easier for Brazilians to find an European citizen in their past or future family tree. Particular privileges in regards to the negotiation of working conditions are an apparent consequence.

Second, attention should not be paid only to borders between origin and destination countries, but also – perhaps chiefly – to borders between migrants regarding their legal rights and sense of entitlement. These borders are certainly not straightjackets or unchangeable over time, but they can be understood as producing compartments in which migrants resort to their variable capacities to negotiate living and working conditions. The suggestion is that international borders are going through a significant reorganization in their daily operation, in particular due to numerical and functional flexibility strategies in the labour market and changes in migration law. Reinforcement of distinct categories of migrants, expansion of rights for relatives or civil partners of EU citizens and increasing pressures over undocumented workers are some of the underlying evidence. Blue cards, red cards and pink cards may have existed for a long time under different names. Yet the trend is for these colours to get starker. Future research should therefore question whether migration policy is being replaced by a global order of human selection owing more to social and economic profile than nationality.
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Personal Networks and Migration Decision: The Case of Jamaican Brain Drain

Rosalyn NEGRÓN

Abstract. Brain drain is the phenomena where the most educated citizens of a country migrate to countries with better opportunities. This typically affects developing countries more negatively than developed countries. Given the close proximity to the US and the high standard of education of its citizens, Jamaica tends to be particularly hard hit by this brain drain. In this paper I examine intentions to migrate among skilled and educated Jamaicans. Specifically, I explore to what extent the composition of their personal network affects their decision to migrate. The data set consists of 62 university students, roughly half of who intended to migrate. Data were collected on 40 people that they knew, including information about social support provided by their social networks. The socioeconomic data about respondents did not predict intentions to migrate. However, students at Campion College, a prestigious high school linked to upper middle class status, were significantly more likely to express an interest in migration than students from other schools. Frequency of travel abroad was negatively related to intention to migrate for those that had traveled at least once. The proportion of network members that provided informational and career advice was significantly higher for those that intended to migrate. Implications of these findings for immigration policy in Jamaica and receiving countries are discussed.

Keywords: Brain drain, Jamaica, US

Introduction

Brain drain is noted when a high proportion of people having or seeking tertiary-level education leave their countries to work or train abroad. Typically, these migrations affect developing countries more negatively than developed countries. However, it is now widely acknowledged that labour-exporting countries benefit from migrants’ remittances, improved skills and new technologies brought back by returnees, and increase in the overall average of education (De Hass 2005; Stark, et al 1997; Miyagiwa 1991). Nevertheless, these benefits hold when a small fraction of educated people go abroad. Jamaica is among those countries where
the number of highly educated people going abroad is exceedingly more than those with similar backgrounds who choose to stay (The World Bank 2011; Docquier and Marfouk 2006; Adams 2003; Carrington and Detragiache 1999). Despite the heavy implications of this trend for the island’s economic development, little scholarly attention has been focused on Jamaica’s brain drain.

A 2003 World Bank report, and subsequent work (see for example The World Bank 2011; Özden and Schiff (Eds) 2006), showed that brain drain is especially high for Jamaica, with approximately 80 percent of those with tertiary-level education emigrating. Among the 24 labour-exporting countries analysed in the 2003 report (which best coincides with the research period for the current study), Jamaica had the highest migration rate of tertiary-educated people to both the United States (US) and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (Adams 2003). The percentage of the most educated Jamaicans who migrated to the US is 360 percent and 95.8 percent to the OECD (Adams 2003). Responding to these trends, the Jamaican government has required that University of West Indies graduates work on the island as repayment of financial aid. Similarly, Mico Teachers College, a leading teacher preparation school in Kingston, has its alumni work on the island for a designated period of time subsequent to graduation. Still, government-sanctioned recruitment drives have encouraged trained professionals like teachers and nurses, to relieve worker shortages in the U.S. and the United Kingdom (UK).

Brain drain has been traced to many causes but brain drain studies have privileged macro-level push and pull factors (Kline 2004; Mahroum 2002; Cheng and Yang 1998; Portes 1976) and effects on growth of sending and receiving countries (Schiff 2006; Kapur and McHale 2005; Commander, et al 2004; Beine, et al 2001; Mountford 1997). Less emphasis has been placed on how global and economic forces, as well as local conditions, guide and frame individual choice and intention. In this paper, I focus on migrant intention, particularly examining the ways that a person’s social environment prior to emigration influences the decision to migrate. I look beyond economic, push-pull factors to identify specific micro-social conditions, or what Portes (1976) calls tertiary forces, and explore the effects of these conditions on views toward migration.

While brain drain migration is a subcategory of international migration in general, its unique qualities warrant separate treatment. The global competition for cheap but competent labour creates specific demands for migrants who are
educated and highly skilled. As noted above, many of these migrants are actively recruited and special immigration policy provisions and incentives are put in place to attract them. Because of their skills and level of education, the most educated and skilled migrants often have more employment options both at home and abroad. Thus the decision to migrate among these migrants is distinct from that of a migrant with limited skills and resources. Historically, migration has been posed as a household decision aimed at maximizing the earning potential of the household. However, the most educated and highly skilled of a developing nation like Jamaica are often members of some of the more prosperous families and have at their disposal a range of resources and options. Thus, there is reason to believe that for highly skilled and educated potential migrants, the decision to migrate may be a personal choice or preference, meeting the individual needs rather than those of the household as a whole.

The role of social networks in the migration process may also be distinct for unskilled versus skilled migrants. Some high skill migrants may rely less on network members for help in seeking work or school opportunities abroad. Through the Internet and online job databases these migrants can deal directly with employers or schools abroad. Others can establish roots abroad through the higher education system as students or recent graduates. Additionally, because of their special training or skills, professional migrants have a higher capacity for achieving social acceptance, as well as finding stable employment (Kuo and Tsai 1986). Rather than rely heavily on migrant networks, highly skilled and educated migrants may play a crucial role within the social networks of others at home seeking to migrate.

The international migration literature has focused on the role of social networks in a receiving country that facilitates a migrant’s passage. Here I focus on what constitutes a potential migrant’s immediate social environment (defined trans-locally), specifically their personal network, prior to a move. While this makes sense for studying skilled and educated migrants, who rely less on migrant networks abroad, it also represents an understudied aspect of the role of social networks in international migration, skilled or unskilled.

**Social Networks and Migration**

Network theory is significant for linking individual action with overarching economic and social processes (Meyer 2001). Goss and Lindquist (1995) suggest
that the incorporation of networks into theoretical and empirical analyses provides
a means of articulating agency and structure and reconciling the functional (i.e.
neo-classical economic theory) and the structural perspective (i.e. world systems
theory). Massey (1988) considers network formation to be the most important
structural mechanism supporting cumulative causation in international migration.

The networks that emerge through the migratory process consist of sets of
interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in
origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared
community origin. Immigration policies, such as those in the US, where immigrant
visas are allocated on the basis of a family tie to someone already in the country,
reinforces and formalizes the operation of migrant networks and adds to the
migrant multiplier effect (Massey, et al, 1994; Richardson 1992). The existence of
these ties is hypothesized to increase the likelihood of emigration by lowering the
costs, raising the benefits, and mitigating the risks of international movement.
Network connections also constitute a valuable form of social capital facilitating
access to foreign employment and high wages (Ho 1993; Boyd 1989; Massey 1988;
MacDonald and MacDonald 1974; Choldin 1973).

While there is an abundance of work on the importance of networks in the
destination area, less is known about what influence a person’s local (sending
country) network has on the decision to migrate. A study of foreign business
management students studying in the UK and the U.S. found that those with strong
ties to family in their countries of origin were less likely to express an intention to
stay abroad after graduation (Baruch, et al 2007). This finding suggests that just as
close family ties pull foreign students to return home, such ties may also be
instrumental in people’s decisions to stay. I maintain that close friendships,
extended family relationships, and mentors can also discourage intentions to
migrate. Existing research lacks the systematic measurement of those social
networks hypothesized to play a crucial role in the migration process. While it is
recognized that personal networks provide information and support that factor
into the migration decision-making process (De Jong, et al, 1986), examining the
characteristics of individual ties within a person’s network may prove insightful. In
this paper I apply a method to systematically elicit the names of personal network
members (alters in the social network analysis jargon) from 62 respondents in
Kingston, Jamaica. In addition to asking questions about the respondents
themselves, I asked several questions about each network alter, particularly
concerning the type of social support each provided. In this paper I focus the analysis on three main areas relating personal networks to the migration decision-making process:

_Hypothesis One. Proportion of alters providing social support._

Whereas much of the literature on social networks and international migration focuses on the role of migrant networks in the recipient country, here I also considered the social support provided by personal networks in the sending country. I hypothesized that people with a higher proportion of network alters who provided various kinds of social support (practical, informational, career, educational) were more likely to migrate. The supportive environment created by a personal network rich in various kinds resources that are available on a regular basis may bolster confidence, lessen any fear of failure, or provide a range of options to someone considering migration.

_Hypothesis Two. Proportion of a person’s alters living abroad_

I hypothesized that people with a high proportion of alters that live abroad are more likely to say they would like to migrate than those who do not. This hypothesis draws upon the assumptions proposed by chain migration theory. Having social contacts abroad lessens the risks involved in migration by providing potential migrants with access to or information about housing, employment, childcare, etc. Individuals with little or no ties to people abroad will find it more difficult to migrate. Bolstered by telephone and computer-mediated communication such contacts abroad indeed constitute a person’s social environment.

_Hypothesis Three. Travel abroad_

I hypothesized that those people who have travelled abroad are more likely to say they would like to migrate. Individuals who have already travelled abroad have a number of characteristics that facilitate future migrations. One characteristic is that they may have established some of the needed documentation that would be crucial in future movements abroad. In general, visas and green cards for travel abroad from Jamaica are difficult to acquire. Having
network contacts abroad is one of the most important criteria for achieving permanent resident status. Individuals with this documentation will find it easier to migrate. Further, travel abroad may be closely linked to having contacts abroad able to receive or help a new migrant. Potential migrants who have already travelled abroad may have had family and friends who they visited in their travels. This is especially true for individuals who have made repeated trips abroad.

**Data Collection**

I collected data over a 75-day period in the summer of 2002. I chose Kingston as the research location for several reasons. Most importantly, as the capital of Jamaica and the island’s largest city, Kingston draws students and professionals from many parts of the island. This made it possible to access students and professionals from both urban and rural areas. Additionally, all of the nation’s top tertiary level educational institutions are located in Kingston. These include the University of West Indies, University of Technology (U-Tech), Mico Teacher’s College, and the Kingston School of Nursing.

Sixty-two respondents were recruited using schools as the sampling frame. The primary method for recruiting respondents was to visit classrooms in the various schools that granted permission to enter. A brief pre-selection survey was distributed to students that included general demographic questions, as well as questions on intentions to migrate. Two hundred and seven surveys were filled out. The final sample consisted of 31 men and 31 women who a) answered all survey questions, b) provided their contact information, and c) kept their interview appointment. I also selected the sample to have an equal number of respondents who indicated that they were considering migration and who indicated no interest in migration. The final data set included 29 respondents who expressed interest in migration and 33 who did not. Of the final 62 respondents, 24 were students in the social sciences, 11 in business, ten in education, ten in medicine, five in the natural sciences, and two in the humanities.

In order to generate the personal network data, each respondent was asked to complete a personal network questionnaire. The questionnaire asked each respondent to list the names of 40 people they knew (alters). I fixed the number of alters at 40 to be sure to get both strong and weak ties. Forty alters has been demonstrated to be a sample size large enough to draw from the periphery of most respondents’ personal networks (McCarty 2002). A respondent knew someone if the alter recognized the
respondent by sight or by name, and if they could contact the person, by mail, telephone, e-mail or face-to-face. Respondents were first asked to freely list 30 people they knew. For the remaining ten, I asked two questions: 1) “Do you know anyone who currently lives abroad”; and 2) “Who here in Jamaica do you rely on for support”.

Next to alters’ names, respondents were asked to write how they were related to that person (family, friend, school acquaintance, work acquaintance, neighbour, etc.). For each alter listed, respondents indicated how close they felt to that person using a Likert-scale with one (1) meaning “Not at all close” and five (5) meaning “Extremely Close”. The next section of the instrument asked respondents to list what kinds of support they could rely on each person for. They had six types of support to choose from, and they could include as many as applied to them (see Table 1).

### Table 1: Types of Support

For each of the following please indicate whether you have relied or are certain that you can rely on each person for each type of support:

1. **Financial Support:** For amounts of at least US$50 or JA$1000.
2. **Emotional Support:** For issues related to your personal life.
3. **Advice About School:** For advice and information related to school. For example what classes to take, what schools to apply to and whether to continue schooling.
4. **Advice About Career:** For advice and information related to your career. For example, where jobs may be available, or what career path to take.
5. **Practical Support:** For things that may come up in day to day living. For example, provide you with transportation, provide childcare for your children, take care of you if you were ill, or pick up an item for you at the store.
6. **Information Support:** For general useful information. For example, legal information, financial information, or information about a job opportunity.

### Results

Descriptive statistics based on results of the demographic questionnaires are outlined in Table Two. While the results from the convenience sample are not meant to be representative of the study population, attempts were made to find participants that fit several characteristics that were relevant for the study. For example, I recruited
students from Campion College, a prestigious and highly selective high school, because early interviews indicated that people perceived high school students who are admitted into schools abroad upon graduation as being an important part of the brain drain phenomenon in Jamaica. Campion College in many ways geared its students for study abroad and offered the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT’s) and American College Testing (ACT’s) to its students. In fact, analysis of 172 pre-selection surveys (207 pre-selection surveys were returned but 35 had missing information about migration plans) showed that Campion College students (n=72) were two times more likely to express an interest in migration than students from other institutions combined (Pearson Chi-square test of significance = 17.78, p = < .0001, and a relative risk of 2.05).

Table 2: Respondent-Level Data from Demographic Questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>24.08</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td>16 – 52 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.P.A.</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.25 – 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic Status</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower – 6.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Middle – 23.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Middle – 47.83%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Middle – 21.74%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Times Travelled Abroad</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1-2 times - 47%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(For those who travelled abroad)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-4 times – 3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4-5 times – 31%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5+ times – 19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Status</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td>Part-time – 77%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Full-time – 23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Status</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td>Full-time – 78%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Part-time – 17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not a student – 5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Attended</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td>U. of West Indies – 49%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Campion College – 14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mico Teacher’s College – 12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U. of Technology – 12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kingston School of Nursing – 9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other – 5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational and Study Areas</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td>Social Sciences – 38%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Business – 18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education – 16%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medical – 16%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Natural Sciences – 8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Humanities – 4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The US was most often mentioned in the interviews as the location where many of the network members who lived abroad were located. It was also the most common desired destination among the respondents (46%), with the UK second (21%) and Canada third (18%). The most important reasons attracting respondents to the US were job and educational opportunities. Those who were attracted to the UK often cited their dislike of the US as an important reason why they were interested in the UK. Other countries in the Caribbean were important for those who were reluctant to leave the climate and culture of the Caribbean but sought better economic conditions abroad (10%).

To get a sense of the effort that those who expressed interest in migration were actually putting into the migration process, each respondent was asked to list all the steps that they had already taken. The most common step was contacting relatives, reported by 19 of the 29 respondents who intended to migrate. This illustrates the important role that contacts abroad play in the migration decision process for the respondents in this study. As indicated in the interviews, respondents recognized the difficulties inherent in migration, particularly the financial and visa-getting aspects. Financial obstacles – having the financial resources to purchase planes tickets or enough money saved to pay for living expenses upon arrival – were cited most often as formidable obstacles to migration. Even so, whether they were considering migration or not, respondents expressed confidence that family abroad would help them in the process. Applying for a green card or visa was the least common step taken by those who expressed interest in migration. The three respondents who entered this option had already acquired green cards through their families abroad. One respondent was a US citizen, a status she had acquired through her mother. The fact that such a crucial part of the migration process was visited less often is a reflection both of the difficulty of acquiring entrance into the preferred destination countries, and perhaps the lack of urgency of migration for many of the respondents. And given that most of the respondents in the sample were students, it may be that completing studies was a more immediate goal.

The interviews suggest that migration is a possibility in many people’s minds, but not necessarily inevitable – nor ultimately desirable. Along these lines, even those who expressed strong interest in migration did not necessarily think of a move abroad as permanent. Consistent with findings from studies of return migrants (Conway, et. al. 2005; Thomas-Hope 1986; Gmelch 1980; Cerase 1974) -
particularly Caribbean migrants – in their interviews, respondents shared that migration would help meet specific objectives after which return would be ideal. Such objectives included gaining experience, self-improvement, graduating with a degree, or “making some money”. Besides the desire to apply skills learned abroad to work in Jamaica, respondents notably talked about the need to be with family and friends as a major motivation for return, with no discernable difference between men and women. As one 22-year-old female hospitality management student put it:

I couldn’t stay for good. I love JA. I love home. I love all my friends, my family. I can’t go away for too long and not want to come home. It would have to be just for a while, just to get settled and make enough money. I get homesick very easily and I miss my friends, cause they’re constantly around me, and my family. Right now it’s just my mom and me and I want to be by her.

**Respondent level data and desire to migrate**

Table Three outlines the results of Pearson’s correlations conducted for selected respondent level variables. In terms of predicting desire to migrate the two items that were significantly correlated were Effort and Times Travelled Abroad. Effort was measured by summing the different steps taken by respondents who expressed interested in migration. The lowest value possible was zero and the highest six. Respondents with higher values had taken more steps towards migration. As would be expected, individuals who had strong intentions to migrate had taken more steps toward migration ($r = .61$, $p = <.0001$). Importantly, there was a strong negative correlation between number of times respondents travelled abroad and desire to migrate ($r = -.38$, $p = .024$). The coefficient reflects the relationship between travel abroad and desire to migrate for those respondents who had travelled abroad at least once. However, when respondents who have never travelled abroad are added to the analysis the relation is no longer significant. A thirty-year-old woman training to be a registered nurse illuminates why travel abroad may be discouraging for migration:

I’ve been to Canada, I’ve been to a couple of Caribbean islands, I’ve been to various places in the States, so I think it’s people who have never really been there, that are just fascinated by the whole idea...I don’t see it that way. I would travel two or three times a year...sometimes I run up and do some shopping,
‘cause I hardly shop in Jamaica...there are certain things that I will go specifically to get. I just see [the US] as a vacation spot. Some people see it as a land of opportunity and all that but I think we have opportunity here...Some of them really don’t know, because they think that it’s a bed of roses when they are going to be going to this place...I don’t think they know what they are getting into.

Her response shows two themes prominent in the responses of interviewees who did not wish to migrate. The first has to do with loyalty to Jamaica and the belief that because struggles can be found abroad or at home, it would be best to give back to their country and make it work in Jamaica. After commitments and attachments to family and friends, loyalty to Jamaica was the second most common reason given by respondents for wanting to stay in Jamaica. A related theme, captured by the nursing student above, had to do with the perception that those who wished to migrate didn’t actually have first hand experience with life outside of Jamaica and therefore had idealized views of what life abroad would be like. This theme will be discussed further below.

Table 3: Migration and Respondent Level Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Pearson’s r</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effort</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>&lt; .0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Times Travelled Abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travelled at least once</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including “Never travelled”</td>
<td>-.137</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>.287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPA</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Status</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.744</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The measure used in this study for socio-economic status had no predictive power. This may be due to several reasons. The instrument used to gather socio-economic status (SES) data was not ideal. To avoid offending potential respondents, SES information, (low, lower middle, middle, upper middle) was gathered during the interviews instead of an open-ended income amount question. Because of this there is no way to tell whether one respondent’s perception of “middle” is comparable to that of another respondent’s. Additionally, there may not be enough variability in this particular sample to provide statistical power. Most people classified themselves in the
lower middle and middle, with few people in the extreme categories, especially in the low category. To some extent this is expected since the vast majority of respondents were students who were at least able to afford a college education.

**Personal network composition and desire to migrate**

Network composition refers to the attributes of members of a personal network and their relationship to the respondent (*ego*). Such measures include average strength of ties to alters, average age of alters or percent of kin in the network. The tests of Hypotheses One (H1) and Two (H2) called for analysis of compositional variables. For example, H1 proposed that people with a higher proportion of network alters who provided various kinds of social support (practical, informational, career, educational) were more likely to migrate. The compositional measure of average closeness to alters was also included to gauge if a desire to migrate was associated with either high or low levels of closeness to network members, a possible indicator of the strength of social support available in a network. T-tests were conducted to determine if there were any significant network compositional differences between those who expressed interest in migration and those who did not.

While no significant differences in average closeness were found between those who expressed a desire to migrate (average closeness = 3.3) and those who did not (3.1), statistically significant differences were found in four social support areas (see Table Four). Respondents who expressed interest in migration had a higher percentage of their network provide practical, informational, school and career support. While both alters in Jamaica and abroad provided such support, the interviews provide further nuance. Respondents indicated that while their contacts abroad could give practical help — such as provide a place to eat and/or stay and transportation — they would be less likely to give financial support. These alters abroad were usually members of their extended families and were generally less close to the respondents. The average percent of ego’s contacts abroad who were close (a rating of four or five out of five in the closeness scale) was 36 percent, indicating that respondents’ most close contacts were those who lived in Jamaica. These immediate Jamaica-based contacts were most instrumental in providing school and career support. They included classmates and professors, who had the most firsthand sense of the demands and prospects of fields that each respondent had embarked on. Professors were especially valued for their knowledge and experience. In talking with respondents I also found that parents were encouraging of migration as a
way to meet specific career and educational goals. Even some who were not interested in migration shared that their parents believed the best opportunities for personal and career advancement were to be found abroad. For example, one female nursing student who planned to migrate after graduation said of her mother: “When I was in high school she wanted me to go because she thought that college over there would have been better. I wasn’t enthused about it and I still think that the Jamaican education system is better”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compositional Characteristic</th>
<th>Interested in Migration N=33 (Percent)</th>
<th>Not Interested in Migration N=29 (Percent)</th>
<th>Prob&gt;t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Support</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>.8884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Support</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>.2905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical Support</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>.0308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informational Support</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>.0025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Advice and Support</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>.0087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career Advice and Support</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>.0014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Members Abroad (N=43)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>.2694</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis Two posited that people with a high proportion of alters that live abroad are more likely to say they would like to migrate than those who do not. This hypothesis was not validated by the data. The average number of alters who lived abroad was 9.7, with a maximum of 32, a minimum of zero, and a mode of ten. Of those who had zero to five alters abroad – hypothesized to be less likely to express an interest in migration – six intended to migrate and seven did not. As shown in Table Four, the average percent of respondents’ network members who lived abroad was 27 percent versus 22 percent for those with no intention to migrate. This difference was not statistically significant. Statistical validation was limited by the reduced sample size that was used in this particular analysis. Nineteen respondents out of the sample of 62 did not provide specific information on who among their network members lived abroad, therefore they were excluded from the analysis.

Having a large pool of people who live abroad might not be as important to the migration decision as having a key member of the network who lives abroad. The interviews revealed that such key members range from parents who have gone ahead to establish roots in another country, to siblings, a partner, and close friends. Interview
narratives further suggest that several respondents in this study were open to migration because one important person in their network – who hadn’t yet moved – was considering migration. For example, when asked what factors motivate him to migrate, a twenty-one-year old Accounting student said:

...My girlfriend wants to go, well she wants to go to America and get her masters, and I’m not really into the America thing, so if she decides to go to America then more than likely I will choose Canada, if I were to get into a school in Canada and UK, then I would choose Canada on that part...the only reason I would go to the US is for my girlfriend.

For those who planned to stay in Jamaica, key relationships also served to temper any thoughts about migration. A twenty-four-year old Education student responded in the following way when asked if migration is an immediate option for him: “I wouldn’t say that...my grandmother is really old, she is 93, she’s been looking out for me, so I don’t want to leave her alone”. Such notions of duty and responsibility to loved ones were mentioned both as reasons to migrate and reasons to stay by those who were interested in migration and those who were not. For example, in talking about her responsibility to her young daughter, one woman affirmed that while she did not want to migrate, if security in Jamaica did not improve she would have to leave for her daughter’s sake.

**Discussion and Implications**

This study was limited by a small sample size. Furthermore, with a focus on migration *intentions*, this study can say little about whether or not respondents will actually migrate. Still, steps taken towards migration (effort) and intent to migrate were highly correlated. This suggests that for many of the respondents in this study, a positive intention to migrate was accompanied by practical steps towards a move. While this study is limited by a lack of valid measures of socio-economic status, socio-economic status and education seem to play an important role in the migration decision. This is suggested by the differences found between Campion College students and other students in the pre-selection questionnaires administered to potential participants. Campion College students were significantly more likely to express an interest in migration than their post-high school counterparts. Campion College is known to serve mostly upper middle class families and attendance there is popularly thought to be a
reliable indicator of students’ privileged socio-economic standing (Brown 2007). As with other students planning to migrate, Campion College students were particularly interested in pursuing educational opportunities abroad. However, upon return upper middle class emigrants are able to draw on their families’ high status to mobilize social connections advantageous for finding the best jobs in Jamaica. Given the Jamaican economy’s limited capacity to support returned professionals, such connections make return migration a viable career strategy. The question remains whether the Jamaican economy is best served by returned migrants or by the remittances sent by those who settle abroad permanently. Exacerbated by the global financial crisis, the country’s growing unemployment rate – approximately 12 percent in 2010 (PIOJ 2010) – complicates the use of recruitment programmes to entice Jamaicans to return home. Still, targeted recruitment aimed at building an entrepreneurial workforce on the island may be a feasible development option.

Significantly, the data negate the hypothesis that more frequent travel abroad encourages an interest in migration, but with a caveat. The number of times respondents travelled abroad for those who had travelled at least once proved to have a negative effect on the respondent’s desire to migrate. However the statistical significance is lost when those who had never travelled are added to the analysis. Perhaps those who have never been abroad do not know enough about conditions abroad to be persuaded for or against migration. Another interpretation is that those who travel frequently are drawing benefits from their travels that create less of an incentive to migrate. Having access to products and services abroad, or the opportunity to maintain ties to relatives and friends abroad, without having to make the heavy investment of moving, may dampen the desire to migrate. Kossoudji (1992) points out that migrants with access to networks abroad tend to make shorter and more frequent trips feeling confident of their ability to come and go with ease. For those for whom migration is not an option, such as because of strong commitments to Jamaica-based relationships, frequent travel abroad makes it possible for individuals to still reap some benefits of having transnational connections. Furthermore, the interview data support the notion that travel abroad led to more realistic views about the pro’s and con’s of life outside Jamaica. Several respondents who had no interest in migration cited their reason for this to be that they had experienced what other countries had to offer and they did not feel that it was better than what could be found at home. In a sense, the mystique and idealism with which many potential migrants viewed countries like the US did not exist for those respondents. A further explanation is that those with sufficient financial resources to travel abroad for leisure
have a favorable economic standing in Jamaica, which diminishes the allure of migration as a means of securing economic stability. Nevertheless, I take seriously respondents’ assertion that exposure to the world beyond Jamaica dampens a “grass is greener on the other side” attitude. A possible policy response to the finding that more travel abroad relates to diminished desire to migrate would be to reduce visa restrictions for travel to the US, UK, and Canada – the three chief destinations of Jamaican migrants. On the part of the Jamaican government, conditional travel grant programmes for short trips to visit family, enroll in short career-enhancing courses, or to intern, volunteer or work in targeted programmes may serve to stem brain drain.

The results of the compositional network data were also revealing. The significant differences between those who were interested in migration and those who were not in terms of practical, informational, school and career support raises some interesting questions not only about the functions of personal networks but also about their formation. The interviews do not suggest that the respondents purposefully constructed their networks with future migration in mind. In fact, a majority of respondents who were interested in migration did not actually state that their migration plans were definite. The question dealing with the steps taken towards migration indicate most respondents who were interested in migration took few to no steps towards the migration goal.

How do attributes of an individual’s social network translate to that individual’s intentions? The literature on social support, particularly the health and psychology literature, provides insight into the role that perception of social support plays on physical and mental health outcomes, for example, in dealing with major life changes or depression. Research on the perceived availability of social support have found an association between perceived social support and such network factors as network size, frequency of social contact, closeness to network members, and a greater number of multiplex relationships (Russell et al, 1997). When it comes to migration, however, the literature is sparse, particularly in addressing the role of social support prior to a move.

The results of this research suggest that perceiving one’s network to be rich in certain types of support may influence an individual to look at migration more favorably. This contrasts with the notion that highly skilled migrants leave for abroad because they do not have enough supportive networks at home
(Meyer 2001). It is important to note that I focus on quantity rather than the quality of the support provided or potentially available. I found no differences between types of support in terms of the types of relationships that provided them. Consistently, family and friends provided the majority of the support for all types of support, but the number of people available to provide that support was the crucial factor.

How networks function to provide resources and support to individuals has also been an area for debate in the social capital literature. It has been suggested that social capital has its roots in social networks and social relations (Lin 1999). The resources embedded in a network and the relations within the network have been two areas of focus. According to Lin’s (1982) social resources theory, embedded resources include the wealth, power, and status of those who an individual has direct or indirect ties to. In the case of the present research, information could also be classified as an embedded resource. The amount or variety of such resources provides a way to identify and measure social capital. The results of the network composition analyses provide one way to operationalize social capital within the context of migration.

For this population, mostly students in their early to mid-twenties, the decision to migrate is associated with career and educational advancement. This would be expected, and is indeed a necessary characteristic for this study since it is focused on examining some of the factors that may lead to higher rates of brain drain migration from Jamaica. It is reasonable that for individuals with career and educational goals, having a large percentage of their network able to provide career and school advice and information would be important both to their professional advancement as well as to their decision to migrate. Especially since the migration option is inextricably linked to the desire to improve or maintain their professional qualifications and economic situation. In interviews, respondents most often cited educational advancement as a motivation for migration. Respondents who pointed to educational advancement as a main driver of their migration plans tended to specifically name degree programmes they hoped to pursue. For those less specific about their plans, a broader theme of “seeking opportunities” emerged. The search for opportunities encompassed educational and career goals tied to the overarching concern for achieving economic security. It is interesting to note that several respondents who cited educational advancement as their reason for wanting to migrate also saw
migration as a temporary condition. This resonates with Brown’s (2007) findings in her study of educated and highly qualified Jamaican return migrants. She notes that, “For those Jamaicans with a pre-migration middle class status, [the intent to return] is informed by an objective to achieve professional training sufficient to sustain or better this status when they return to Jamaica” (Brown 2007: 98).

Informational support and practical support were also important for those interested in migration. One possible explanation for the significance of informational support for migration is that individuals who have access to considerable informational support are in an enhanced position to know about and better understand the process of migration (i.e. how to apply for entrance into another country, or about the financial costs of migration). This kind of knowledge can serve to simplify the process and as a result contribute to a perception of migration as an attainable goal.

Finally, practical support is an active resource. Individuals who have a large proportion of their network provide practical support can rely on their network members for assistance in both routine and emergency day-to-day situations. They are afforded a certain level of security that someone with less support of this kind may not have. I suggest that the security, or at least the perception of security, that is created by having many network members provide practical support, is crucial to the migration decision-making process because it allows the individual to feel less intimidated by any possible obstacles to migration that may discourage a person from wanting to migrate.

Conclusion

International migration studies that have focused on the role that migration networks play in the migration process most often detail the importance of contacts abroad. Migration networks, then, are those sets of relationships that facilitate migration because of their unique experience abroad, because they are actually situated abroad, or because they have had already migrated and returned home. In this study, I focused on another, often overlooked, aspect of the migrant network, what constitutes the potential migrant’s social environment prior to a move. These personal networks include both those who are abroad and those who live in the potential migrant’s immediate social context. Focusing on educated and skilled individuals, this study
placed special emphasis on potential migrants’ immediate social environment in Jamaica.

While network factors are related to migrants’ decisions to go abroad, it is clear that Jamaica’s economic woes and high rates of violence provide a critical backdrop for understanding this study’s findings. Indeed, all of the respondents in this study, regardless of their intention to migrate, mentioned Jamaica’s high crime rates and difficult job market as important factors for the brain drain phenomenon. Some who indicated in their questionnaires that they were not considering migration revealed in their interviews that if Jamaica’s gun control problems and related violence were not curbed they would seriously think of migrating. Indeed, concern for the safety of close network members in Jamaica – particularly family – motivated some to consider migration. This is just one way in which respondents’ key Jamaica-based relationships influenced the decision to migrate.

With this in mind, the primary goal of the research was to determine what personal network factors distinguished skilled and educated Jamaicans who do want to migrate from those who do not. The results of this research suggest that there are some personal network attributes that encourage migration. Particularly, having a large percentage of one’s network provide informational, practical, and career and school support proved to be significant for the intention to migrate. This study further revealed that frequent travel abroad was associated with less interest in migration. Further research is needed to understand the relationship between travel abroad and individuals’ networks. Interviews revealed that contacts abroad facilitated temporary travel, but this study did not determine whether aspects of individuals’ Jamaica-based social networks played a role in temporary travel abroad. It appears, however, that the decision to migrate among the study’s participants, the weighing of advantages, disadvantages, opportunities and risks are often understood vis-à-vis valued relationships.

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From Object to Actor? Building Partnerships with Migrant Organisations: The Case of Germany

Katerina-Marina KYRIERI, Constanze BRASSER

Abstract. The existing problem of integration of migrants coming to Germany is far from being resolved due to a long-lasting lack of a specific integration policy. However, at present, a growing number of German political institutions encourage cooperation with migrant self-organizations (MSOs) believing that this is a successful policy tool to involve migrants to the integration process in Germany. The paper scrutinizes the interaction between political bodies and MSOs at a conceptual and an operative level. It will highlight to what extent MSOs have been consulted and included on matters of policy formulation. Furthermore, their role as project executing organization will be addressed. It will demonstrate the importance assigned to them and what achievements were made to include representatives of migrants into the integration process. In an attempt to tackle problems of cooperation between organization and the state, policy recommendations will be provided.

Keywords: Migrant-Self Organizations, Germany, Migrants, Cooperation

In September 2009, Kenan Kolat, chairman of the Turkish community in Germany (Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland), called for the establishment of a new ministry, the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) in Germany. This call underlines what has been self-evident for a long time: integration of migrants is far from being a closed matter in Germany. High unemployment rates among migrants, as well as poor access to housing and many other indicators reveal that former policies have not yielded the desired effect. Besides the poor levels attained within these integration parameters, it remains an enduring problem that migrants have no or insufficient means to bring attention to their concerns. This is

1 Ministry for migration and refugees
2 Umbrella organisation of Turkish migrant self-organisations founded in 1995.
3 Turkish German Community. Erklärung zum nationalen Integrationsplan – Zwischenbilanz, 2008.
4 In 2007, the risk of the foreign born being unemployed was twice as high as that of people born in Germany. OECD, OECD warnt Mitgliedsländer vor Abschottung gegen Migration, 30. June 2009.
particularly disquieting as it also violates principle six of the European Union’s (EU) Common Basic Principles (CBP) on integration, which states that “access for immigrants to institutions, (...) on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration”. 4

Furthermore, the lack of participation is not only a question of migrants’ rights. Instead, it might provide the explanation for ineffective integration policies, since non-involvement means that regular input and feedback loops do not flow. To address this problem, an increasing number of political institutions in Germany, for example, ministerial offices, express their willingness to cooperate with migrant self-organizations (MSOs). Hence, this paper discusses whether the cooperation with MSOs might be an effective means to solve the problem. Data will be drawn from existing literature as well as own surveys. Germany is the selected case study for two reasons: first, because it is one of the major, if not the largest, European migration countries, and second due to the recent paradigm shift towards perceiving itself as a migration country.

In order to tackle the question of whether cooperation with MSOs is a good policy tool, it is essential to analyze the landscape of MSOs, as well as the actual interaction between them and the relevant political bodies. Within the analysis, particular focus will be on the position of third country nationals’ (TCN) organizations. In the last part, insights attained throughout this paper will be used for the formulation of policy recommendations, as well as a foundation for examining the implications of state-MSO cooperation for good practice within the EU.

Policy-making not only relates to the situation it intends to address, but also to the existing policies. Thus, it is necessary to look at the migrant population in Germany, its outlook as well as the current integration framework. In 2007, Germany had about 15.4 million inhabitants with a migration background. 5 Despite this high number, migration has been comparatively low in recent years. The majority of migrants have been guest workers who came to Germany after the Second World War. Migration to Germany was an unconstrained issue until the oil crisis in 1973. Since then, however, Germany issued a recruitment ban (Anwerbestopp), which is still valid today. The current flow of migrants is mainly

composed of asylum seekers, family members and economic migrants. Yet, the latter group is subject to certain conditions such as a minimum income. Special agreements exist for students and seasonal workers whilst resettlers also have a special status.\(^6\)

It is remarkable that 8.3 million of Germany’s population with a migration background is foreigners, that is, people without a German passport. Such a high number is due – among others - to low naturalization rates, which arguably result from the country’s quite strict citizenship requirements. However, about 3.7 million are EU-27 inhabitants who, due to their reasonably privileged status, might be less interested and dependent on acquiring German citizenship.\(^7\)

Traditionally, German citizenship has been more dependent on a person’s descent (\textit{ius sanguinis}) rather than someone’s place of birth (\textit{ius soli}). Nevertheless, the new migration law\(^8\), which entered into force in January 2005, tried to make a step in adopting aspects of the \textit{ius soli} model for migrants of the second or third generations. In most cases, obtaining German citizenship requires giving up possibly existing second citizenship and the same applies for first generation migrants. Mostly, first generation migrants can obtain citizenship after having lived in Germany for at least eight years, subject to the following conditions\(^9\):

- Sufficient knowledge of the German language,
- Possession of residence permit or warrant/entitlement,
- Giving up of other citizenships,
- Declaration of loyalty stating both the absence and non intention of violating the Constitution,
- Commitment to free, democratic based order,
- Sufficient resources to secure living,
- No criminal record,
- Test (courses for preparation are offered)

This exemplifies that access to citizenship is low, thus, integration policies

\(^7\)Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, \textit{Working Paper 27}
should pay more attention to ensuring migrants’ rights. Yet, for many years, Germany did not pursue a specific integration policy. Politicians were convinced that migrants would go back to their countries and consequently, integration efforts did not go beyond the necessary. In fact, until 1998, politicians stressed that Germany was not an immigration country.\footnote{In the coalition contract of CDU/CSU and FDP in 1982, it is stated ‘Germany is not an immigration country’, there are disputes about the end of that era. CDU, CSU and FDP, \textit{Koalitionsvertrag}, 2009.}

Recently, the situation has changed considerably. Integration is mainstreamed into more policy fields and new immigrants are obliged to take part in integration courses. Tests (\textit{Einbürgerungstest}) intend to ensure that migrants do not only learn the language, but also have a basic knowledge about the country and its values.\footnote{\textit{Informationen zum Einbürgerungstest}, last modified 2010, available at http://www.integration-indeutschland.de/nn_1344932/SubSites/Integration/DE/02__Zuwanderer/Einbuergungstest/einbuergungstest-inhalt.html (accessed 10 Nov. 2011)} Nevertheless, as already assumed in the introduction, integration policy is far from being a groundbreaking success. One problem raised by the increasing migrant population is their (non-)ability to make their voices heard.

In comparison to EEA citizens who since the Maastricht Treaty have an active and passive right to vote in communal elections,\footnote{Hilmar Von Versebe, \textit{Das neue Wahlrecht für EU-Bürger}. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000} third country nationals in Germany are not entitled. In fact, as illustrated by the table below, it is often the case that migrants have no communal voting right.\footnote{Table in German is to be found in Norbert Cyrus and Dita Vogel, \textit{Förderung politischer Integration von Migratinnen und Migranten. Begründungszusammenhänge und Handlungsmöglichkeiten}, (Oldenburg: Universität Oldenburg: 2008), p. 25.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting rights of third country nationals</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No communal voting right</td>
<td>Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only active but no passive right to vote</td>
<td>Belgium, Estonia, Portugal*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal right to vote (sometimes only after fulfilment of certain conditions)</td>
<td>Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Malta, Luxembourg, Portugal*, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain, Belgium, Estonia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\footnote{(* depends on country of origin)
To balance the lack of voting rights, advisory councils for foreigners (Ausländerbeiräte) were set up in many communities; they assemble at the local, federal and state level. In 2009, we attest more than 320 in the country. However, their role is merely consultative and elections are subject to enormously low turnouts, often below 20 per cent. In North Rhine Westphalia, the average turnout was 12.28 per cent and in Rhineland Palatinate it was 9 per cent, in 2004.

In light of the above problems, cooperation with MSOs appears to be necessary. However, before discussing the role of MSOs, it is essential to establish its concept. Moreover, in order to prevent any confusion regarding the term, some scholars and officials use instead the expression “immigrant associations”. Nevertheless, there is no common definition, which goes beyond what the word itself implies. The following definition given by Huth, serves well to exemplify the breadth of the term and the extent of the phenomenon. She defines MSOs as all forms and occurrences of migrants’ self-help, whether in a formal or an informal union. As factual as this broad definition is, there are important differences between the various forms. Nonetheless, the paper will not elaborate on this issue before presenting in brief the development of MSOs. It is important to look at the historical emergence of these organizations to understand the driving force behind MSOs’ force and some of the complexities of the current landscape.

The development of MSOs closely relates to Germany’s immigration history. As already mentioned, the first major migration flow to Germany was guest workers (Gastarbeiter) following the World War II. However, as the migrants believed that their stay would only be temporary, they made little or no effort to assemble in particular organizations. Furthermore, it was argued that self-help

16 Uwe Hunger, Politische Partizipation der Migranten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und über die Grenzen hinweg. BAMF, 2009, p.11.
17 Norbert Cyrus, 2005, Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Germany, Politis: Oldenburg, p. 33.
18 Vincente, Ausländerbeirat, p.4
activities were seen to be an unwelcome sign and even dangerous and attempts of self-organization were alleged communist acts. Thus, the German State, itself even more convinced of the temporary nature of migration, called for charity organizations to care of the migrants’ most pressing needs. Apparently, the charity organizations informally divided up responsibilities according to migrant groups’ religions. The Caritas, for example, was responsible for catholic migrants from Italy, Spain and Portugal.

In spite of the initial idea of social support, charity organizations also became involved in giving migrants a voice in public. Nevertheless, as they adopted this mandate reluctantly, new civil society organizations established themselves to improve foreigners’ living conditions. Arguably, these new organizations laid the foundation for the emergence of self-organizations. In fact, by the 1970s, MSOs had started to emerge. By the 1980s, all major groups of guest workers had established their own organizations. Many scholars explain this as being a consequence of deficits in the service provision of the charity organizations and the non-involvement in their internal management. Others, however, see this increased desire for self-organization down to migrants’ awareness that migration would not necessarily be temporary and guest workers had started to bring over their families (Familienzusammenführung). Arguably, the families’ contact with the host society led to the desire to preserve their own culture through self-organizations. Some countries of origin even encouraged the foundation of self-organizations as to maintain migrants’ bond with their home countries.

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23 Ibid.
relevance of this historical background will become evident throughout the next section on the current landscape of MSOs in Germany.

The introduction to this chapter already outlined the diversity of MSOs in Germany. However, one can further distinguish MSOs according to their organization as well as their orientation. In fact, MSOs in Germany are active in many different fields. The first organizations, as the section on the historical background indicated, were mainly concerned with cultural issues. Over time, however, MSOs became more concerned with issues related to the host country. Their activities diversified and single entities often specialized in one particular area such as educational support for their children. Nowadays, different authors place existing MSOs in different categories. Below, Hunger’s categorization is illustrated as it comes closest to a quantitative account, which is not limited to groups of one single nationality.28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Clubs</td>
<td>22,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Centres</td>
<td>16,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Humanitarian Organisations</td>
<td>14,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport and Leisure Clubs</td>
<td>14,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Organisations</td>
<td>11,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Organisations</td>
<td>5,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family and Parents Organisations</td>
<td>5,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Organisations</td>
<td>4,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations for single groups</td>
<td>4,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No categorisation possible</td>
<td>0,1</td>
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</tbody>
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Within these categories, organizations still differ largely. Moreover, the orientation of groups varies amongst the different groups of migrants. Spanish and Greek organizations, for example, are renowned to be interested in education

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issues.\textsuperscript{29} Yet, the category of political organizations is not the only one who is politically active; all groups have specific interests whose realization may improve through contact with political institutions.

As regards their organization, the main distinction is, on the one hand, between formal and informal organizations and, on the other hand, between homogenous and heterogeneous.\textsuperscript{30} Even though there are no common criteria to define the formal or informal nature of the organizations, one indicator might be whether an organization has an internal organization in terms of, for example, a board. The distinction between heterogeneous and homogeneous groups refers to the composition of its members. Homogeneous groups are the ones whose members share the same origin or ethnicity, while heterogeneous consist of people from different ethnic backgrounds.

Formal organizations in particular are likely to maintain contacts among each other. There are horizontal contacts, which tend to be fairly informal and vertical ones, which are more likely to be formal. More precisely, single entity MSOs tend to be organized in umbrella organizations.\textsuperscript{31} How many umbrella organizations exist is unknown, but there are both, homogeneous and heterogeneous ones. One can recently observe that umbrella organizations form transnational alliances at, for example, the European level;\textsuperscript{32} yet, this issue goes beyond the scope of the paper.

In 2001, about 16,000 MSOs had registered in the Central Register of Foreign Associations (\textit{Ausländervereinsregister}) of which around 11,000 were Turkish.\textsuperscript{33} Due to the informal nature of many organizations and the lack of registration, there is no concrete account of MSOs in Germany. However, extensive investigations in North-Rhine-Westphalia, a Bundesland amongst those with the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
    \item[29] Ibid, pp.14-15
    \item[31] Uwe Hunger and Stephan Metzger, ‘\textit{Kooperation mit Migratenorganisationen – Studie im Auftrag des Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge’}, Münster, 2011, p.18.
    \item[32] Ibid.
    \item[33] Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration, \textit{Bericht über die Lage der Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in Deutschland}. 2007, p.170.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
highest shares of foreigners, disclosed about 2,400 MSOs in this single state.\textsuperscript{34} Consequently, it seems likely to assume that there are about 20,000 to 30,000 organizations in the whole country.\textsuperscript{35} As regards the distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups, Hunger found that 80 per cent are homogeneous.\textsuperscript{36}

Because of the homogeneous nature of most MSOs, the discussion about their role focuses mainly on whether this homogeneous nature either supports migrants’ integration or rather creates obstacles. Elwert and Esser initially led this argument. In particular, Elwert argued that MSOs play an important, integrative role by providing migrants with guidance and information. He assumed that the exchange of information, for example, would help newcomers to integrate into the host society\textsuperscript{37}. Esser, on the other hand, claimed that MSOs had a segregative effect. From his point of view, MSOs led migrants to remain with each other and thus to develop parallel societies instead of integrating into the host society\textsuperscript{38}. In essence, a key issue is that migrants tend to communicate in their mother tongue.

Thus far, there are supporters of both sides. However, as Thrändhardt has regularly stressed out migrants do not have the chance to decide between participating either in organizations of the host society or their own.\textsuperscript{39} Various obstacles and discrimination often hamper migrants’ access to host society organizations. For example, migrants’ membership in political parties is low.\textsuperscript{40} Some German parties, e.g. CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union) allow only German or EEA citizens and foreigners who have stayed at least three years in Germany, to apply for a membership.\textsuperscript{41} Among others, this might be caused by political skepticism, language problems and possibly fewer opportunities.

\textsuperscript{35} Cyprus, \textit{Active Civic Participation}, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{36} Hunger, \textit{Von der Betreuung zur Eigenverantwortung}, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{39} Thrändhardt, \textit{Integration und Zivilgesellschaft}, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{40} There are no numbers for the whole of Germany. However, in a study in North Rhine Westphalia, only 0.4% of those interviewed were members of a party Marplan 2001 in Cyrus, \textit{Active Civic Participation}, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{41} CDU webpage http://www.mitglied-werden.cdu.de/page/18.htm
within the party. Therefore, regardless of the integration effect of the MSOs, one should better reflect whether political parties contribute to maintaining a distinctively segregative stance.

Moreover, it appears that migrants who are members of homogeneous organizations have better contacts with Germans than those who are not affiliated with any group or organization. According to Huth, participation in any organization is beneficial in giving members a sense of belonging. Riesgo also points out that homogeneous organizations are well suited to teach migrants some active engagement. Interestingly, some scholars actually argue that involvement in MSOs allows migrants to gain new skills which are of great help in fostering access to the labor market. Last but not least, MSOs also play a role in collecting remittances. Turkish organizations, for example, raised money for earthquake victims in Ismet. But the link between MSOs and remittances has not yet been studied in any detail. Nevertheless, it serves to exemplify the benefits to be gained by MSOs.

The first section of the paper showed that Germany missed various chances to achieve successful integration in the past. Nevertheless, the need for multiple inputs was eventually recognized. Because of this understanding, cooperation with migrant self-organizations emerged on the agenda. Cooperation is not only motivated by the desire to give migrants a voice and, thus, increase the legitimacy of policies, but also by the attempt to benefit from their specific position. Cooperating with MSOs carries many benefits. First of all, MSOs have a lot of knowledge about migrants’ problems due to their direct contact with them. The European handbook for integration confirms that MSOs “can draw attention to problems such as health care, housing or education, and make suggestions for

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42 Cyrus, *Active Civic Participation*, p. 23.
improvements to the relevant ministries”.

In addition, MSOs are not only aware of migrants’ problems but are also able to address and reach them. Moreover, contacts and cooperation with migrants may affect them positively since organizations have the power to formulate their opinion. Giugni and Passy also indicate that providing MSOs with moderate participation channels will ensure they will not use aggressive forms of action such as protests.

To make the cooperation more feasible, the next section will attempt to distinguish between the conceptional and operational dimension. This distinction already reveals that cooperation manifests itself in different forms. Whereas the conceptional dimension refers to MSOs’ involvement in the design of policies, the operational one is mostly concerned with MSOs’ participation in the policy implementation. Generally, the picture is complicated as, on the one hand, the federal, state and local levels share their responsibilities likewise the political and administrative authorities, and on the other hand, there is little or no coordination among the actors involved. Even though not all of the initiatives for cooperation emanate from the institutions, the focus of the paper is on the federal level.

As said earlier, the conceptional level refers to policy formulation. As diverse political and administrative actors are involved in policy design, so the cooperation problems are various. For instance, it is very difficult to attest how much cooperation is enough and, since there is no impact assessment, to what extent it has been successful.

The most common form of cooperation is the German integration summit,

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51 Bartels, *Verstärkte Partizipation*

which took place for the first time in 2006. The main purpose of the summit is to bring together different actors from politics and administration but also civil society. MSOs participated as part of the last group. The participating MSOs were selected on the grounds of existing contacts. In particular, there was preference for nationwide-operating organizations and there were efforts to have representatives from different migrant groups. So far, three summits have been organized and the second one in 2007 resulted in the adoption of the German National Integration Plan (NIP), which is composed of various self-obligations of the different actors.

Among others, it includes promises made by the German State regarding the method of cooperation with MSOs, such as:

- MSOs will be consulted in the development of state and local integration plans;
- The Federal Government assured that it would fund technical assistance to MSOs by supporting MSOs in implementing projects and supporting the development of MSO networks;
- The BAMF is committed to involve MSOs in the development of nationwide integration programs.

Despite MSOs’ general consent to the summit, the run-up to the second and third summits came under the banner of protest. Before the second summit, many – especially Turkish – MSOs announced that they would not participate due to the immigration law, which had entered into force. This law addressed certain restricting provisions about family reunification e.g. excluding elderly and sick people from reunification. The 2008 summit intended to analyze the progress

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54 Email from state Ministry for Integration and Refugees (BAMF).
made in implementing the national integration plan. At this event, MSOs expressed their discontent, mainly with the failure of migrants’ educational success. Within Germany’s three-tier school system, a majority of children with migration backgrounds visit the lowest level school (Hauptschule).

Besides the annual integration summits, it is worth mentioning that the national Minister of state for migration, refugees and integration participates in further dialogue with MSOs. The frequency, scope and topics of these meetings vary considerably. On the ministerial level, the information is less transparent. Parliamentary groups are also in contact with MSOs. For example, the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) convened a congress with MSOs in July 2009.

In theory, the Ministries of Interior, Labor and Social Affairs are mostly concerned with integration issues. There was also a large meeting of MSOs at the Culture Ministers’ conference in June 2008. However, their willingness to communicate ongoing cooperation and projects with MSOs has only increased in the last few years. Some information appears on the website of the BAMF and it was recently (2010) that the federal office, in association with the Ministry of Interior, established a working group which drafts proposals and recommendations for new migration legislation.

On request, the two relevant parliamentary committees (interior, labor and social affairs), declared that they do not consult any MSOs on their own but rather rely on the information provided by the Ministries. The committee of the interior, however, stated that MSOs request meetings; yet, no further information on realization and frequency is ever given.

Furthermore, in relation to some initiatives taken by MSOs, it emerges that some well-organized MSOs, especially umbrella organizations, strive to issue their

60 Free Democratic Party (Liberals)
opinion(s) on specific issues publicly or to address certain politicians and other stakeholders directly. Recently, for example, an umbrella organization of MSOs wrote, together with the charity organization to which it is still affiliated, an open letter to Thilo Sarrazin, politician and board member of the German Central Bank, asking him to resign. Sarrazin came under severe criticism for alleged hostile statements against immigrants. Besides this, some MSOs have attempted to raise their issues by inviting politicians to discussions.

Actually, MSOs have relatively precise interests. In their position concerning the 2009 elections, MSOs organized in der Paritätische Gesamtverband, called for, amongst others, local suffrage, easier naturalization, no discrimination regarding family reunification, improved educational opportunities, more funds for integration policy and also a consolidation of MSOs.

As indicated above, operational cooperation is concerned with getting MSOs involved in policy implementation. In fact, this is mainly related to MSOs taking part in projects. However, it does not necessarily entail that migrants take over projects, which the state develops, but it mostly suggests that MSOs run projects, which are relatively close to their regular activities, on behalf of the state. The beneficiality of subsidies, however, is disputed. In general, the benefits for the state rely on using MSOs’ knowledge and experience whilst the greatest advantage for MSOs is the additional income. Opponents argue that subsidies lead to a crowding out effect, meaning that subsidies will simply replace previous funding, instead of leading to the set-up of new projects. Even though funding can direct organizations’ activities in certain directions, studies have confirmed that state subsidies do not lead to such a crowding out effect.

As MSOs do not receive any funding from the state, their income is often limited to membership fees, donations and income from events (Pallares et al, 2006, p.15). Thus, project funding is very valuable. In 2010, new funding guidelines were published which for the first time denominated MSOs as project executing organizations. Furthermore, the guidelines called for more cooperation with MSOs in integration projects. Within the last three years, the numbers of participating

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65 Bartels, Verstärkte Partizipation
MSOs have tripled. Currently, they exceed a hundred MSOs. In 2008, only eleven percent of the projects, funded by the BAMF, were run by MSOs.67 This poor level of participation is significantly explained by the difficulties encountered by the organizations.

In many cases, MSOs are unable to handle the formal requirements for state funding. In order to be able to respond to MSOs’ needs and to strengthen them as long-term partners, the BAMF conducted a study on this issue. One of the main conclusions of these studies was that, due to MSOs’ limited financial means, special difficulties exist with regard to the own share of project costs. To respond to this specific problem, the state actually took the rather innovative step to recognize time contributions as cost share.68 However, there are still many more problems faced by MSOs. In particular, small MSOs have no experience of writing tender applications or project management.69 As a sign of success, the share of MSO projects has increased by 17% and now amounts to 27%.70 (A sample of projects is in the annex).

In order to address this situation, two main responses can be identified. On the one hand, they train “multipliers”.71 In this context, there is an effort to educate some central members of MSOs so as to share and exchange information. In many cases, these trainings are provided by foundations. Additionally, many umbrella organizations started to provide useful information brochures on their websites. On the other hand, attempts have been made to help MSOs through so called tandem projects. In September 2009, the BAMF issued another call for tandem projects for which it has awarded grants. Tandem projects focus on the cooperation of established bodies, which are experienced in running projects and MSOs wanting to improve their project skills.72

Even though both sides value the cooperation, they nevertheless face certain problems. A distinction must be made between problems which occur in

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67 Bartels, Verstärkte Partizipation
68 Hunger and Metzger, ‘Kooperation mit Migrantenorganisationen’
69 Bartels, Verstärkte Partizipation
70 Email from state Ministry for integration and refugees (BAMF).
71 Bartels, Verstärkte Partizipation
the actual cooperation and problems which hamper closer cooperation. Most points made by the MSOs are more concerned with obstacles to closer cooperation. Nevertheless, a few problems which were faced in the previous framework will first be touched upon. Firstly, MSOs criticize the fact that, in many cases, they themselves have to bear the costs of travel and time. As most MSOs operate on a voluntary basis, meetings during official office hours create an associated obstacle.\textsuperscript{73} Secondly, as might also be indicated by the first point, they believe that their work is not sufficiently recognized.\textsuperscript{74} Often, MSOs feel used to attract participants to projects of other organization, because of their proximity to migrants. In return, they sometimes are prohibited from participating in the design and management of projects.\textsuperscript{75} Thirdly, MSOs feel as though they have no or little agenda-setting powers, but, are more or less consulted on a closed list of items. MSOs want institutionalized rights, which legally require their involvement in the agenda-setting process and grant them agenda-setting powers.\textsuperscript{76} Additionally, they demand more and better support for programs, allowing them to become professional.

State and administration, on the other hand, appear to face fewer problems in the existing cooperation. Nevertheless, it seems likely to assume that they are rather unhappy with some MSOs’ tendency to use their (non-)participation in set consultations to express their discontent regarding migration laws or integration successes, as was the case in the integration summit. Moreover, in some cases cooperation is difficult because some MSOs refuse to sit at the same table with other organizations.\textsuperscript{77} Furthermore, the BAMF, which might be regarded as the main administrative actor at the state level, lacks exact data of the existing number of MSOs. Only a fraction of the MSOs existing in Germany is registered at the central register. Thus, it is difficult to address and inform MSOs about existing consultations and support activities. As concerns further cooperation, they are mostly concerned with the complex landscape; they find it difficult to identify contact persons. According to the BAMF, there is a lack of connectedness between

\textsuperscript{73} Möhle, \textit{Bundesweites Integrationsprogramme}
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Hunger and Metzger, ‘\textit{Kooperation mit Migratenorganisationen}’, p.7
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} These other organisation are mainly composed of individuals without migratory background. These may be for example, charity organisations, youth clubs, cultural centres, sports clubs, etc.
Determining the position of TCNs is a challenging task. As the whole institutional construct lacks a clear structure and clear rules of in- or exclusion, one cannot really say that TCNs are disadvantaged from a theoretical standpoint. Also, it is important to note that due to the early and huge influx of Turkish guest workers, Turks are not well categorized as Third Country Nationals within that context.

The history of MSOs in Germany has shown that the migrant groups who came to Germany as guest workers established themselves very early and are, thus, often more organized and, consequently, likely to be more influential. For example, better organized groups can be expected to have more resources to finance travel costs to political institutions and the like. Furthermore, new organizations have less knowledge about access points. However, there is not only the temporal disadvantage but also one of size. Very small population groups, as is the case for many TCNs, do rarely have their own groups. Consequently, they can only organize themselves in less specific groups which make the articulation of more particular interests more difficult. Additionally, size can be a criterion for funding.

In addition, Danish found that, in the case of Spain and Italy, migrants’ political activism was dependent on their cultural background and the way they participated in politics in their country of origin. As it seems reasonable to assume that the same holds true for migrant organizations in Germany, this is another factor leading to the betterment of specific migrant groups.

As mentioned beforehand, MSOs request more institutionalized rights and propose the establishment of an advisory board. Even though the Ministry of State had always been reluctant towards the establishment of such an advisory board, the new government revived the idea in its coalition agreement in autumn 2009. It was finally established in early 2011 as part of the Office of the Chancellor (Bundeskanzleramt). It is within the competence of the operating staff responsible for integration. It comprises thirty-two members, of which ten are MSOs. The representative of this advisory board is the Minister of State for migration.

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78 Hunger and Metzger, ‘Kooperation mit Migratenorganisationen’
79 Schrover and Vermeulen, ‘Immigrant Organisations’, p.831
80 Gaia Danese, Participation beyond Citizenship: migrants’ associations in Italy and Spain, Patterns of Prejudice, 35(1), 2001, pp. 69 - 89
81 Coalition agreement is an agreement, which is completed between the parties that form the government. It is signed after the elections and within this agreement parties formulate policy priorities for the upcoming legislative period, CDU, CSU and FDP, 2009
refugees and integration. Originally, it had been criticized that such an advisory board would be too selective. The common migration advisory board of German foundations was also skeptical. It remains to be seen as to how far this will be beneficial for the empowerment of the migrant population. However, the establishment of the advisory board can be interpreted as a success and reflects the willingness to include migrants’ opinions into the process of policymaking.

Conclusions and recommendations

This paper has shown that cooperation between migrant organizations and state actors takes place in various forms and allows policy-makers to get feedback and input as a means to improve policies. Nevertheless, the emergence of this cooperation requires Germany to recognize itself as an integration country and to adopt a two-way integration approach. Facing up to the facts seems to be a precondition for effective integration policy and should be taken into consideration, especially by the newly emerging migration countries on the outskirts of the European Union.

The emergence of the abovementioned cooperation policy has most certainly brought about a further step, nevertheless leaving potential for improvements. In the following recommendations for state actors, MSOs as well as the civil society will be introduced.

State:

- The state should evaluate its hitherto cooperation with MSOs. This will allow it to detect and address previous shortcomings. Without such an impact assessment, it is not possible to know how successful cooperation has been and what it holds for the future. As concerns MSOs’ involvement in project implementation, previous experience should lead to the formulation of best practices.
- There should be better cooperation and exchange between the different levels of government. Policies tend to vary considerably among the different federal states. Dialogue will allow them to learn from each other. In the long run, minimum standards could be agreed

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upon as a means to ensure equal participative opportunities for migrants throughout Europe.

- Increased efforts should be undertaken to get in contact with MSOs and establish networks among them - especially MSOs who are interested in lobbying. In the selection of MSOs for consultation purposes, special attention should be paid to the equivalent involvement of TCNs. Consultative meetings should be accompanied by a call for written observations.

- Even though there are many challenges in improving the current cooperation, it should not be forgotten to foster the more innovative involvement of MSOs in, for example, the raising and sending of remittances.

MSOs:

- MSOs should not perceive boycotting consultations as a means to achieve their interests or to get attention, but should notice the consultations as the right place to raise their concerns.

- MSOs should keep trying to integrate new members and ensure that they act in the interest of the majority.

Society:

- Media should draw attention to the role played by MSOs in Germany. They should eliminate the misconception that MSOs are only oriented towards their home countries.

- Society organizations like parties and trade unions should undertake increased efforts to attract migrants as members.

- Charity organizations should bear in mind that they support MSOs but do not prevent them from acting independently or even compete with them for project funding.

Regarding the question whether cooperation is seen as an effective tool to make integration policy more effective, it can be suggested that this newly emerged cooperation is likely to improve integration policies as it provides a participative channel for the migrant population. However, it has shortcomings in its scope as well as its operation. For example, migrants do not have any real power to put issues on the agenda. Consequently, it can be said that MSOs have become actors, but in no way equal partners.
Furthermore, certain groups of migrants appear to be advantaged and MSOs are not democratically operating bodies. Studies have shown that participation in MSOs is positively related to members’ education. As a result, mere cooperation with MSOs might lead to ignoring the voice of the highly vulnerable. It is safe to say that cooperation with MSOs cannot be seen as an effective alternative for giving third country nationals the right to vote. As this requires a constitutional reform, it is essential to boost efforts to change public opinion and start seeing integration policy not only as a reaction but also as a tool to be proactive – making Germany an attractive destination for migrants.

As concerns lessons for the international scene, the case of Germany has shown that cooperation with MSOs bear many benefits. Concrete forms of cooperation certainly depend on a country’s very specific circumstances. Most importantly, cooperation presupposes the existence of MSOs which might not necessarily be the case in newly emerging migration countries. However, through subsidies and other forms of assistance, states might be able to take an active role in contributing to their formation.

**Annex I: Sample of subsidized projects**

This table is in no way comprehensive. It merely serves to provide some example of projects subsidized by the state.83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant Organisations</th>
<th>Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khan &amp; Milusic GbR Institut für Veranstaltungs- und Projectmanagement</td>
<td>Database of youth MSOs as well as MSOs which are active in youth work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGARP – consortium of foreigners’ councils in Rhineland-Palatinate</td>
<td>Among others: workshops for the professionalisation of members of the foreigners’ councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haus Afrika</td>
<td>Among others: workshops, seminars, consultancy etc. to make the German school system more transparent – especially for African parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landsmannschaft der Deutschen aus Russland E.V.</td>
<td>Traveling exhibition about Germans of Russian origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griechisch-Orthodoxe Metropolie von Deutschland – Bikariat in Bayern</td>
<td>Integration measures for Greek population in Munich and the surrounding areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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RESEARCH ARTICLES

The Impact of the Crisis on Illegal Employment of Foreigners and the Related Policy - Case study: Czech Republic

Vera–Karin BRAZOVA

Abstract. The aim of the article is to provide a critical perspective of the public policy measures to tackle the illegal employment of foreigners in the Czech Republic taken by the Czech government in the wake of the global financial crisis. In the introductory part of the article, the problem of illegal employment of migrants in the Czech Republic is delimitated and put into a theoretical context. Based on the study of official documents as well as on expert interviews, the analysis of the changes in the public policy dealing with the problem of illegal employment is conducted. While the crisis triggered a more open public debate and brought the problem on the agenda of some core public policy actors and while new measures were taken to address the issue, some of the main underlying problems remain unaddressed. In the final part, a possible future development in the area of illegal employment of migrants is outlined, drawing on the global labor migration trends as well as on the current public policy practice in the Czech Republic.

Keywords: Illegal employment, labor migration, non-EU nationals, public policy, impact of economic crisis

Introduction

Recently, with the economic crisis, the concern about illegal employment\(^1\) of migrants (re)surfaced on the political as well as academic\(^2\) agenda worldwide. There is a relatively large body of literature providing a general overview of global migration trends after the crisis, (usually only briefly) mentioning the illegal labor

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\(^1\) The term *illegal* (as opposed to e.g. *irregular*) is used in the Czech legislature. To avoid confusion, the term *illegal* will be used throughout the article.

\(^2\) Unfortunately, however, the literature on the topic is still relatively scarce compared to other migration-related topics.
migration/employment⁵. While the authors speak of a global trend of restrictions on labor migration all over the world – from Russia to Australia, from the UK to Malaysia⁴ - they also note an actual decrease in irregular labor migration⁵. Based on a historical analysis, Green and Winters⁶ acknowledge in this regard the impact of government immigration policies: Their structure and operation can affect how much and how quickly inflows respond to changing circumstances, and how likely migrants are to leave⁷.

For the Czech Republic, there are reports on how the policymaking responded to the crisis⁸, however these do not devote much attention to the problem of illegal employment as such. The problematic was covered for the first time by Drbohlav⁹, yet this work was published immediately before the crisis and thus does not reflect the impact thereof.

The aim of this paper is to provide a more detailed contextual overview of the problem of illegal employment with respect to the public policy at place. Especially in the field of policy analysis, such practice is expected to contribute to the structuring of the problem¹⁰ and to a better understanding thereof – enabling us to predict, at least partially, the outcomes of the policy measures taken in the wake of the economic crisis.

The following text, then, will seek to answer the research question: Did the crisis lead to an actual increase in illegal employment? And if so, how did this happen? Rather than looking only at the quantitative data (which are used here as indicators¹¹) the paper will examine various forms of illegal employment, their changes and their consequences. To achieve this objective, the explorative analysis will be used, aiming specifically at problem structuring as described by Dunn¹². The main methods applied include the secondary data analysis, analysis of the legislature and semi-structured expert interviews.

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³ See e.g. Dadush, Falcao 2009; Koser 2010; Castels, Miller 2010 ⁴ Koser 2010; 17; Castels, Miller 2010; 9 ⁵ Koser 2010; 19 ⁶ Green, Winters (2010) ⁷ ibid; 1068 ⁸ Most notably Rozumek, Tollarová, Valentová 2010 ⁹ Drbohlav 2008 ¹⁰ see e.g. Dunn 2004 ¹¹ Given the nature of the phenomenon of illegal employment, no „hard“ data are at disposal. The indicators used in this article derive from the data on (legal) economic activities of migrants as published annually by the Czech Statistical Office. ¹² Dunn 2004
Although there have recently appeared analyses of the problem on the global level\textsuperscript{13} as well as on the regional level\textsuperscript{14}, the author believes that a better understanding of the problem requires a lower level of analysis in the first place, especially when the policy implications are to be considered. Therefore, the level of nation state was selected. The particular case of the Czech Republic is interesting insofar that it – on the one hand – represents a new EU member state with only a recent experience with labor immigration, as opposed to the old EU countries where the illegal employment has been on the political agenda for many years.

On the other hand, however, the Czech case is specific in that of all new EU countries, it has relatively soon become a destination country for foreign labor migration and has been predominantly a country of immigration\textsuperscript{15} over the last seven years\textsuperscript{16}. The country has the highest immigration numbers of non-EU citizens, compared to all other new EU countries\textsuperscript{17}.\textsuperscript{18} Other states in the region show much lower immigration figures\textsuperscript{19} and somewhat different patterns: While in Poland and Hungary the illegal employment of migrants is strongly connected with seasonal work and with the agricultural sector\textsuperscript{20}, in the Czech case this is more strongly linked with the industry and tends to be of a rather structural nature\textsuperscript{21}.\textsuperscript{22} As such, the Czech Republic occupies a specific place between the old and the new EU countries regarding the problem of illegal employment of migrants.

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\textsuperscript{13} see e.g. Castels, Miller (2010)
\textsuperscript{14} see e.g. Maroukis, Iglicka, Gmaj (2011)
\textsuperscript{15} Note: As opposed to being a transition country for labor migration.
\textsuperscript{16} Mol 2011
\textsuperscript{17} Flander 2011; 2
\textsuperscript{18} In 2008 nearly 60 thousand non-EU citizens migrated into the Czech Republic (which was 77% of all immigration). The second highest number among the new EU countries can be found in Slovenia with 26 thousand non-EU immigrants making up for 93% of total immigration. Source: Flander/Eurostat 2011.
\textsuperscript{19} In 2008 the immigration of non-EU citizens to Hungary was approximately 18 thousand (50% of all immigration); to Poland 9 thousand (74% of total) and to Slovakia 8 thousand (48% of total). Source: Flander/Eurostat 2011.
\textsuperscript{20} Maroukis, Iglicka, Gmaj 2011; 136.
\textsuperscript{21} See further.
\textsuperscript{22} Note: Both Polish and Hungarian visa have recently started to be misused by the Ukrainian migrants as „channels“ of how to get into the Czech Republic after the restrictions on the Czech labour visa. Source: Schroth, interview 23.10.2011.
\end{flushleft}
Problem delimitation

This paper focuses exclusively on the so-called third country nationals. Although the EU citizens can be employed illegally, the legality of their stay remains untouched\(^{23}\). This contrasts significantly with the situation of the formerly mentioned group, where the legality of stay depends on the legality of employment. Asylum seekers, too, find themselves in a more advantageous position in this regard, as the issue of their work permit does not have to reflect the situation on the labour market as it is the case with non-EU labour migrants.\(^{24}\) The practice of illegal employment, moreover, concerns the third country nationals predominantly\(^{25}\), however is the scope of the problem hard to estimate.\(^{26}\)

When employed illegally, the exploitation of migrants is quite common\(^{27}\). Not only the employment rights are neglected (e.g. extremely long working hours, low wages, poor working conditions, etc.) but in some cases even the human rights are breached upon.\(^{28}\) Due to their irregular status, these people do not have virtually any means of how to solve their situation. The life in an irregular position, moreover, does not confront the migrants only with existence problems, but also with further pressing questions after their identity, status or group belonging\(^{29}\).

\(^{23}\)Burdová and Hradečná, undated
\(^{24}\)ibid.
\(^{25}\)To be more specific: As for the legally employed migrants from non-EU countries, the Ukrainians and Vietnamese together have steadily represented more than one third of all migrants (both from EU and non-EU countries) employed in the Czech Republic, the average for the years 2004-2008 lying at 38% of all employed foreigners. After the migrants coming from Slovakia, the Ukrainians and Vietnamese are by far the largest groups of labour migrants. Quite similarly, among the migrants caught at illegal stay (and hence supposedly engaged in illegal work), the majority is from Ukraine (33% in 2008 and 35% in 2009) and Vietnam (7% in 2008 and 9% in 2009). Since 2004, the Ukrainians and Vietnamese (in the given order) have always been the two nationalities leading the figures on illegal stay. (data from the Czech Statistical Office 2011 and Police Headquarters Czech Rep., latest data available for 2009)
\(^{26}\)Given the illegality of the conduct, the only possibility is to rely on (however imperfect) expert estimates. These vary largely, however, from 40.000 to more than 200.000 illegally employed migrants before the economic crisis started. (Drbohlav 2008; 111)
\(^{27}\)It is fair to note, however, that e.g. a study conducted among Pakistani migrants in the UK showed that legal status did not always mean better wages. (Ahmad 2008)
\(^{28}\)Drbohlav 2008; 10
\(^{29}\)Eichenhofer 1999; 13
From a security point of view, on the other hand, the (altogether not uncommon) link with organized crime and corruption can be seen as a challenge. Also from the economic perspective – although there are some authors who argue that illegal employment is actually beneficial for the local economy\(^{30}\) – the positive effect is often outnumbered by the costs spent on prevention and repression\(^{31}\).

With the human rights, security and economic aspects being covered elsewhere in the literature, the aim of this paper is to shed some light on what could be called a public policy aspect. From this perspective, especially the interplay between illegal employment and labour migration policy will be studied.

**Why Is There Illegal Employment – Theoretical Explanations**

With the integration of the country in global production chains and with most of the immigration being for labour purposes, the theory of Transnational production circuits\(^{32}\) can be regarded the most appropriate theory at the general level of explanation. In the pursuit of attracting foreign investment, the activity of offshore companies has been facilitated with the help of tax holidays and lower regulation under the neo-liberal agenda. The result has been the shift of some parts of the production\(^{33}\) to other states. Together with this, the decoupling of the direct relationship between the companies and the labour occurred in many cases. The workers are frequently hired by subcontractors, which practice often enables the firms to misuse illegal labour without being “guilty” of illegal employment themselves. According to McNevin, in this way, the differences between the formal and informal economy are actually blurring. The transnational production circuits encourage the hiring of irregular migrants who represent a source of cheap and flexible labour.\(^{34}\)

In the Czech Republic, the supra-national companies specialized in the final assembly of products are the most criticised in this regard. Being lured into the country by investment incentives, these companies rely largely on foreign manual labour. As the former minister of Labour and Social Affairs put it, due to the character of the positions offered by these companies, large numbers of unskilled manual labour are needed in an

\(^{30}\) see e.g. Boyes, Melvin 2008

\(^{31}\) see e.g. Hanson 2007

\(^{32}\) see e.g. McNevin 2007

\(^{33}\) Most notably manufacturing of materials and assembly

\(^{34}\) McNevin 2007; 659-660
extent the Czech labour market is unable to provide.\textsuperscript{35}

Quite complementary with the above mentioned theory – yet on a lower level of explanation – is the dual labour market theory. Labour migration (be it legal or illegal) is understood here as a consequence of a permanent demand inherent to economic structures of advanced societies. Ignoring the push factors, the dual labour market theory seeks an explanation on the side of pull factors and eventually sticks with the chronic and inevitable need for foreign labour force\textsuperscript{36}.

The main assumption of this theory is that some positions (or occupations) are not attractive for the domestic workforce. They are typically the so-called 3D\textsuperscript{37} jobs which are coupled with low social status and low wages. For the employers, it is a better strategy to employ foreigners who are willing to accept low wages. Labour market is thus virtually divided into two different markets: the primary and the secondary one. The latter is characterized by a high intensity of work, unskilled and unstable jobs. It is particularly this workforce that can be easily dismissed. Especially in the times of an economic downturn, these workers are expected to be among the first to be laid off.\textsuperscript{38}

In line with the above theory, in the Czech Republic, the employment of third country nationals is associated predominantly with unskilled manual work characterized by extreme flexibility and replaceability of the workforce. Also the words of the director of one of the regional Labour Offices point in the direction of an existence of a dual labour market: \textit{There is a large number of activities which a Czech worker would not do, even when discarded from the register of job seekers and suffering economically from not taking that job.}\textsuperscript{39} This concerns predominantly the electrical industry, assembly and excavation work where the employment of foreigners appears necessary.\textsuperscript{40}

In the field of public policy, another two theoretical approaches can be identified in the literature on the topic. Although not being as frequently quoted as the above theories, the so-called complementarity and substitution theses deserve some attention.

According to the first mentioned one, the legal and illegal forms of employment of migrants are relatively independent. Any broadening of the extant legal schemes for labour migration thus does not necessarily lead to a corresponding lowering of the demand for the clandestine work. As the illegal employment remains attractive for the

\textsuperscript{35} Nečas, in an interview for \textit{MF Dnes} 3.9.2008
\textsuperscript{36} Massey et al. 1993; 440-441
\textsuperscript{37} 3D stands for Dirty, Degrading and Dangerous
\textsuperscript{38} Massey et al. 1993; 440-444
\textsuperscript{39} Fránek, 14.10.2010
\textsuperscript{40} ibid.
employers by its low costs, the demand therefor will continue to remain in place. On the supply side, the broadening of legal schemes is expected to lead to an increase in labour migration in general – both regular and irregular one - regardless of the demand.41

The reasoning of the latter thesis of substitution – on the other hand – points in a totally different direction. According to this thesis, the broadening of legal schemes is seen as a means of reduction of both the demand for clandestine labour and the supply thereof. Hence, the main assumption here is that the demand for legal workers will increase if the supply is sufficiently high. The main difference from the previous thesis of complementarity is the expectation that supply (including the potential one) is more or less finite.42

**Various Facets of Illegal Employment in the Czech Republic**

At the first glance, the notion of illegal employment seems to be obvious and, hence, the definition thereof simple. Yet, when dealing with the problem in more detail, we encounter a large variety of forms that this practice actually takes on. These different “facets”, as they might be called, are crucial not only for the comprehension and assessment of the relevant policy measures, but also for the understanding of the impacts of the economic crisis in this field. Before being able to assess any impacts that the crisis had on illegal employment of foreigners, it is thus crucial to define and delimit what actually illegal employment is.

Illegal employment is often directly associated with irregular migration. However, as it will be shown further, this relation is not the only possible one. In fact, the irregular migration which (in the Czech legal context) inevitably leads to illegal employment makes up only a very small share.

According to the Czech law, illegal work is defined as any dependent gainful activity exercised without any labour or other contract. While this applying to the Czech citizens as well, in the case of foreigners also the accord with the work permit and the validity thereof must be met.43 Defining the term in a slightly different way, the Czech Research Institute for Labour and Social Affairs understands illegal employment to be breaches against legal prescriptions on employment and entrepreneurship of foreigners44. Although both of these two

41 Boswell, Straubhaar 2004
42 ibid.
43 Employment Act No. 435/2004 Coll. §5
44 Horáková 2005; 26
categories – employment and entrepreneurship – abide by totally different legal regulations, in the particular case of illegal employment of foreigners, they often melt into one category in practice.

To shed more light on the different interactions between the (il)legality of stay and the (il)legality of employment, the work of Junkert and Kreienbrink seems to be fairly helpful. Dealing with the legal aspects of illegal employment of foreigners in Germany, the authors come to distinguish four categories of illegal employment – depending on the stay- and work status of migrants. After some modifications which are to be explained further, the resulting chart can be quite successfully adapted to the Czech context (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stay</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Illegal</th>
<th>Legal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illegal</td>
<td>„Classical case“ so-called overstayers</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Semi-legal so-called (special)partners</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author, based on Junkert, Kreienbrink 2008; 22 – adapted and changed to fit the Czech reality and the topic of this paper (based on own analysis).

The category A, as identified in the table, represents a „classical case“ of illegal employment of foreigners who are staying in the country illegally. Apart from those migrants who already entered the country by illegal means (e.g. with the help of smugglers or using forged documents), this group is characterized by the so-called overstayers, i.e. foreigners who entered the country using tourist or other visa and who have stayed in the country after their visa expired, becoming irregular in this way.

Due to the existence of the external borders control of the Schengen area and also due to the geographical location of the Czech Republic, surrounded exclusively by Schengen members, most foreigners enter the country in a regular way and only thereafter become irregular. Usually, this happens after the

45 Junkert, Kreienbrink 2008
46 Junkert, Kreienbrink 2008; 22
expiration of the tourist visa which is frequently misused for irregular labour migration. In 2007, this was the most frequent way of how migrants got to the black labour market in the Czech Republic.\footnote{Čermák, Dzúrová 2008; 148} Quite a similar situation occurs when work visa expire or are not prolonged.\footnote{Drbohlav, presentation 31.8.2009}

One of the reasons for such practice is believed to be the ignorance or unawareness of some of the migrants who – quite often – are unable to distinguish between the different types of visa.\footnote{Byamba, presentation 3.9.2009} Another reason could also be a better accessibility of the tourist visa (and its lower price in the case of corruption). Last but not least, the dismissal from job also leads automatically to the loss of working visa (as this is bound to one specific position). Especially this category A has become the main target of policies directed to tackling illegal employment – both at the EU and the national level.

The category B represents – in the Czech legal context – only a purely theoretical category. Obtaining a legal stay permit is bound to the existence of a regular employment. Hence, it is virtually impossible for the migrants to reside in the country illegally and yet have a legal employment. A similar practice seems to be common for all countries in the Middle Europe\footnote{see e.g. Junkert, Kreienbrink 2008; 24 or Čižinský 2005}.

The category C includes, according to Junkert and Kreienbrink, those foreigners who have a valid residence permit but who do not possess a permission to work in the country. The authors give here an example of the citizens of the new EU Member States in Germany\footnote{Junkert, Kreienbrink 2008; 22-23} (under the transitional period for the free movement of workers in place till May 2011).

In the Czech Republic, on the other hand, no such provisions are extant, which would combine valid residence permit with a restriction on employment\footnote{The only exception from this can be the case of asylum seekers who are not allowed to work during the first year after their arrival (see Asylum Act No. 325/1999 Coll). Being a very specific category and migrating from different reasons than the labour migrants, asylum seekers are not dealt with in this paper.}. Under the above stated category C, however, the semi-legal practices can be
subsumed, where migrants are employed officially as special partners or members of a cooperative. This way of employing migrants in a semi-legal way is most common in the construction industry: Dozens of foreigners become members of a cooperative but in reality they do manual work in a position of employees.\textsuperscript{54} The main reason for employing migrants in this way is above all the relative ease of this practice combined with a large difficulty to prove the misconduct in case of a control.\textsuperscript{55}

Under the practice described here, foreigners do stay in the country legally using entrepreneur visa. It must be also noted that this given kind of visa is significantly easier to obtain, compared to regular work visa.\textsuperscript{56} A valid entrepreneur visa thus ensures the legality of stay. The employment in this way, on the other hand, cannot be regarded as legal, such practice (in the case of foreigners) being explicitly forbidden by the law.\textsuperscript{57}

The misuse of corporate entities (limited liability companies and cooperatives) for the illegal employment of migrants has started to gain significance since 2004.\textsuperscript{58} In the place of (special) partners, however, migrants find themselves frequently in an unfavorable position as their employers dispose of a large array of compulsory means. One (quite popular) of them is to indicate a fictive address of migrant’s residence in the official documents or the cancellation of the consent to accommodation. In such case, migrants only have a limited time to indicate the change of the address to the Alien Police to maintain their regular status. When such practice has been applied by the employers, many migrants found themselves in an irregular position without even knowing about it.\textsuperscript{59}

The category D could be perceived as the „most legal“ kind of illegal employment. It would be misleading, though, to associate it with purely legal practice. Junkert and Kreienbrink, for example, distinguish four different modalities of infringements to be found within this category\textsuperscript{60}: a) the legal employment of migrants where the Labor Code is severely neglected\textsuperscript{61}; b) cases with all

\textsuperscript{54} Sieveking, Reim, Sandbrink 1997
\textsuperscript{55} Kalinová, e-mail correspondence 15.5.2009
\textsuperscript{56} ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Employment Act No. 435/2004 Coll.
\textsuperscript{58} Vintr, presentation in January 2008
\textsuperscript{59} ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Junkert, Kreienbrink 2008; 23-24
\textsuperscript{61} In the Czech context, the practice of (some) staffing agencies can be mentioned in this regard, as they are commonly accused of the non-existence of insurance, precarious working
infringements caused solely by the employer; c) cases where otherwise legally employed migrants who are staying legally in the country undertake a further, additional, job they are not entitled to; and finally d) the so-called *bogus self-employment* when officially self-employed migrants work in reality exclusively for one employer and are fully dependent on the instructions as well as on the conditions laid down by this employer. This disguised employment is not, however, only a domain of migrants. On the contrary. Both in the Czech Republic, as well as in other EU Member States, not a negligible proportion of citizens participate in the labor market in this way.

In the case of migrants, however, the situation is further complicated by the fact that even when belonging to this category, migrants can quite easily move to the category A described above, i.e. to a full irregularity. After two years, when the visa expires, the duty to prolong the visa arises. This, again, is often coupled with organized corruption and with the unawareness of some of the migrants of the necessity to activate their visa.

Quite common is also the switch from labor visa to entrepreneur visa by the migrants employed by the staffing agencies. As the staff manager of an agency specialized in employing foreigners put it: *Our Vietnamese (...) are preparing themselves for the situation after their work permits expire by switching to entrepreneur visa. Internally, I do not agree with this, but I do not hinder them, however.*

Although it is the category A which is mainly perceived as a challenge by policymakers – which is also strongly reflected in the policy of fighting the illegal employment – the categories C and D should not be taken for less problematic. As the main difference is only the temporary or seeming legality of stay of the conditions, extremely long working hours, immediate replaceability with no social security, etc. (see e.g. coverage of the topic by M. Vidlák published in *Lidové Noviny* newspaper in 2008 and 2009).

Given the fact, though, that in the Czech Republic the work permit is strictly linked to a particular position, this situation cannot occur under the Czech legislation.

A common example in the Czech case would be workers from Eastern Europe working on (re)constructions of private houses on the weekends. Yet, it can be argued that particularly this practice should not be perceived as vastly problematic as this form of conduct does not largely endanger the legality of migrants’ stay.

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64 Junkert, Kreienbrink 2008; 23-24

65 Communication from the Commission COM(2007) 640; Williams 2009

66 Schroth, interview 8.4.2009

67 Novotný, e-mail correspondence 13.3.2009
migrants, the problems of poor working conditions, low wages and a potential adverse impact on the official labour migration policy remain the same. Moreover, the categories C and D resulted to be more convenient for the employers, also when compared with the legal employment. While legal employment of migrants is strictly regulated and perceived as very rigid by the employers, employing the migrant workers through the category C or D is significantly easier. The conditions to be met in the latter cases are – in contrast – very liberal. As it will be shown further, especially the category D seems to have gained on importance with the economic crisis.

Policy preceding the crisis

The policy efforts to tackle illegal employment in the Czech Republic prior to the crisis can be divided into three periods. The first one, in mid 90s, when illegal employment was not defined as a social problem, was characterized by liberal policies. This corresponds with the scope of migration at that time – the country being mostly a transit one with respect to labour migration. The liberal orientation of the given period could be also explained by the ruling center-right coalition which governed practically throughout the whole 1990s.

The second half of the 1990s, on the other hand, is to be seen as a restrictive one, influenced by the then restrictive policies of the EU. Although still being predominantly a transit country for labour migration at that time, in the 1990s irregular migration started to increase, with migrants coming especially from the former USSR. It can be assumed that it was particularly this fact of increasing migration (both regular and irregular) which lead to the imposition of the Act on the Residence of Foreign Nationals in 1999. Out of the same reason – because being mostly a transit country – no provisions in other areas (such as regulations of employment or sanctions for illegal employment) were necessary. With the course of time, this was to change, however.

Already with the beginning of the new millennium, tens of thousands of

68 Kalinová, e-mail correspondence 15.5.2009
69 Baršová 2008; 83
70 It was only in 1998 when the center-right government fell and was replaced by a caretaker government.
71 Baršová 2008; 83
72 Kopeček 2004
73 Act on the Residence of Foreign Nationals No. 326/1999 Coll.
Ukrainians were working in the country illegally\textsuperscript{74}. The problem of illegal employment started slowly to surface: The notion even appeared for the first time in the policy statement of the (leftist) government elected in 2002. Nevertheless, only the mere existence of the problem was briefly stated here, with reference to illegal migration\textsuperscript{75}.

Also the year 2004 can be perceived as an important milestone: With the entry to the EU the Czech Republic turned to be more attractive for labour migration, both legal and illegal one\textsuperscript{76}. The third, conciliatory period from 2000 to 2006 was thus characterized on the one hand by the focus on repression; on the other hand, however, the efforts to facilitate legal labour migration appeared\textsuperscript{77}. It was in this period, when the Employment Act\textsuperscript{78} was enacted, also newly regulating conditions for the employment of migrants.

In the heyday of the economy, foreign companies in automotive and electrical industry were lured by governmental economic incentives to place their plants in the country, which was often done regardless of the characteristics of the domestic labour. Consequently, a large need for low- and unskilled manual workers arose, which the Czech labour market was unable to satisfy. In this respect, the practice of CzechInvest\textsuperscript{79} was often criticized: \textit{(CzechInvest) by its activities pushes for the weakening of control functions of the public service, e.g. regarding the mandatory assessment of the impacts of investments}.

Although the policy of employment of foreigners (including the illegal employment) is primarily associated with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, this institution cannot be regarded as the most powerful actor in the field. The call for facilitating cheap labour migration came from the Ministry of Industry and Trade and, as a result, the so called Green Cards were introduced by the amendment to the Employment Act\textsuperscript{81} with effect from 1.1.2009, making labour migration easier.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Kopeček 2004
\item Policy Statement 2002; 26
\item Fridrichová, presentation 11.12.2007
\item Baršová 2008; 83
\item Employment Act No. 435/2004 Coll.
\item The investment and business development agency established by the Ministry of Industry and Trade.
\item Kaiserová 2008; 1
\item The amendment also drew a clear distinction between EU Countries citizens and third-country nationals, only the latter being understood to be “foreigners” for the purpose of employment. Employment Act No. 435/2004 Coll.§ 85.
\end{thebibliography}
From the perspective of this paper, the most important aspect of this new legislation was the inclusion of unskilled workers into the labour migration schemes, which was not an original intent of the official labour migration policy and can be understood as a result of the strong business lobby. The introduction of Green Cards was not preceded by any analysis nor was it grounded in any long term strategy, the whole policy being rather a mere expression of momentary needs of the employers.  

Yet there was one even more problematic aspect to the Green Cards with respect to the low-skilled professions. Many countries were ruled out from the scheme by the Ministry of Interior due to security reasons, including the countries from which most of the labour migrants were usually recruited. The reality of labour migration flows was thus in this case largely ignored, with the only exception of Ukraine, which was in the scheme included. Vietnamese and Mongolian migrants (the two largest groups of migrant workers from the third countries after Ukraine) had to rely further on the old and rigid procedures.

Hence, the pre-crisis labour migration policy of the period from 2007 to 2009 can be characterized in many ways as schizophrenic. On the one hand, there was a mismatch between the original intention of facilitating labour migration of high-skilled foreigners and the need for low-skilled workforce of the industry. After the introduction of the (largely criticized) Green Cards, the disparity appeared between the countries which were included in this scheme and the ones from which many labour migrants were recruited. On the other hand, as it was suggested earlier in this paper, there was a vastly large difference between the procedure of getting employment- and entrepreneurial visa (be it for self-employment or special partnership), the latter being significantly easier to obtain and hence misused.

In the pre-crisis period, the illegal employment did not stand high on the agenda, especially when compared with the need to ensure low-skilled workforce for the construction, automotive and electric industry the domestic labour market was not able to provide. Although some experts and NGOs were pointing at the irregular practices, the illegal employment was still rather a latent problem at that time.

82 Sládková, interview 26. 3. 2009; Kalinová, e-mail correspondence 15. 5. 2009
83 Notice of the Ministry of Interior from 17.12.2008
84 The project Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers was developped by the MLSA in 2003.
85 see Drbohlav 2008
What follows after the crisis?

A) The impact of the crisis on the reality of illegal employment

Due to its integration in global production chains, the Czech economy was seriously hit by the global economic downturn. In 2008, after a relatively long period of growth, the economy slowed markedly and entered a sharp recession in late 2008. A sharp rise in unemployment followed – starting from the first quarter of 2009 – as most major sectors contracted, manufacturing and construction being the most seriously affected. The downward trend of the real economy stopped in the second quarter of 2009 with the economy starting to recover slowly and getting eventually into positive figures in the first quarter of 2010.\(^{86}\)\(^{87}\)

Hence, (not only) with respect to the illegal employment, the year 2009 should be perceived as a critical one. On the one hand, some employers, especially in the construction sector, reportedly reacted to the crisis by laying off Czech long-term employees and hiring foreigners, mostly from Eastern Europe and the former USSR countries (who were) hired for temporary contracts, often without any documentation (i.e. illegally).\(^{88}\)

On the other hand, also many migrants were laid off. As the following graphic (Chart 1) shows, among the five largest groups (by nationality) of legally employed migrants in 2008, the so-called third country nationals were the ones who were the most hit by the crisis and consequent dismissals. Here, the comparison with the Slovaks and Poles (i.e. EU nationals) is quite interesting. The Slovaks and Poles show quite similar distribution among the different occupations\(^{89}\) as the three other non-EU nationalities – all of them being employed predominantly in manual (both skilled and unskilled) professions.\(^{90}\) Yet, the employment of the Slovak and Polish nationals seems to follow strikingly different patterns, not reacting markedly to the economic crisis.

In the reaction to the crisis, the Czech government launched two consequent programmes aimed at helping the migrants who had lost their

\(^{86}\) Data for the year 2010 from the Czech Statistical Office at www.czso.cz
\(^{87}\) OECD April 2010; 3
\(^{88}\) Fránek 10.2.2011
\(^{89}\) According to the official Classification of Occupations (CZ-ISCO)
\(^{90}\) Czech Statistical Office 2011
jobs due to the economic downturn to return back to the country of origin. These Voluntary Returns, with both the first and second phase organized in 2009, were declared a success by the government.91 Yet, in the first phase – designed for the legally staying migrants only – the total number of 1871 third country nationals applied and were facilitated by the program. In the second phase, which was open both for regular and irregular migrants, 199 and 125 applied, respectively.92

Source: Own graphics based on the data by the Czech Statistical Office (2011), state of 31.12. for every year.

Looking back to the Chart 1, the total drop in legal employment for Ukrainians, Vietnamese and Mongolians together between 2008 and 2009 was

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91 see e.g. the statement of the director of the Dept. of Migration and Asylum Policy of the Ministry of Interior
92 Parlamentní Listy, 15.12.2009
36 381\textsuperscript{93}. This number seems to be quite contrasting with the figures given by the Voluntary Returns program (i.e. some two thousand people returning back home with the help of local authorities).

According to the statistics, the overall number of migrants leaving the country in 2009 was 9350\textsuperscript{94} (this includes all migrants, however, the nationality-specific data not being at disposal). A similar number for emigration is reported by Mr. Daniel Chytil from the Czech Statistical Office also for the year 2010\textsuperscript{95}. Hence, there is an apparent mismatch between the number of migrants losing their job (and thus automatically the legality of their stay) and the number of migrants leaving the country.

When the employers had to dismiss their workers due to the crisis, the labour migrants from Ukraine and Vietnam resulted to be by far the most seriously affected groups\textsuperscript{96}. As it was already shown above, the emigration figures did not, however, correspond with this situation. As the research of the Czech Economic Chamber suggests, although the demand for labor migrants has fallen significantly among the Czech employers, migrants did not leave the country.\textsuperscript{97} In two years, from September 2008 to September 2010, 34 688 Ukrainians reportedly disappeared from the official statistics.\textsuperscript{98}

Moreover, the number of immigrants continued to outnumber the emigration even in 2009, with total emigration making up only twenty per cent of the gross migration of foreigners\textsuperscript{99}. This general picture is also quite well reflected in the reality of Ukrainian and Vietnamese migration. Unlike Polish (and to a lesser extent Slovak) nationals, who were rather leaving the country, by the third country nationals immigration continued to prevail\textsuperscript{100}.

Another important feature – when assessing the impact of the crisis on illegal employment – is the growth in the numbers of self-employed foreigners in the Czech Republic: Quite interestingly, while the numbers in the employment of foreigners dropped in the wake of the economic crisis, the

\textsuperscript{93} Own calculation based on the Czech Statistical Office data for the Employment of foreigners by most frequented citizenship for the years 2000-2010
\textsuperscript{94} Czech Statistical Office 2011
\textsuperscript{95} Suchá, 9.12.2010
\textsuperscript{96} Interview with Petr Klimpl, the director of regional Labour Office in Fránek, 14.10.2010
\textsuperscript{97} Ekonom 3.6.2010
\textsuperscript{98} Interview with Petr Klimpl, the director of regional Labour Office in Fránek, 14.10.2010
\textsuperscript{99} Czech Statistical Office 2010
\textsuperscript{100} Czech Statistical Office 2011
numbers of migrants having a trading license increased significantly, especially between 2008 and 2009.

This (rather unexpected) growth did not, however, concern all migrants in the same way. As it can be seen from the following graphic (Chart 2), across the four groups of labour migrants (both EU and non-EU) which were discussed above with respect to the employment, the growth in self-employment was not even. Particularly with the Ukrainians, the mirror-image to the employment line from the Chart 1 seems to be striking.

Similarly, in the case of Mongolian migrants (who are not included in the chart due to the overall low number of their self-employment), after a relatively steady period lasting for several years, from 2008 to 2009 the number grew markedly, by 72%. Over the next year, the growth continued, yet more slowly (by some 10%)\(^\text{101}\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Viet Nam</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8,757</td>
<td>1,251</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>1,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8,719</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>1,289</td>
<td>1,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9,282</td>
<td>1,289</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>1,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8,684</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>1,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9,255</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>1,851</td>
<td>1,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9,865</td>
<td>1,851</td>
<td>2,323</td>
<td>1,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10,681</td>
<td>2,323</td>
<td>2,969</td>
<td>1,608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own graphics based on the Czech Statistical Office (2011) data.

The resort to self-employment, subsequent to the crisis, can thus be viewed as an alternative strategy to remain in the country (at least partially)

\(^{101}\)ibid.
Yet, as it was shown above, this legality is questionable and, which is worse for the migrants, not necessarily stable. Many migrants are unaware of the obligations connected with the trading license and are thus expected to “fall” into illegality.

It can be hence concluded that the findings in this section do support the hypothesis inspired by the theories of transnational production circuits and dual-labour market. The third-country nationals were affected severely by the economic crisis, especially those working in unskilled manual positions. The labour migration turned out, however, not to be fully flexible, with migrants staying in the country even after their dismissal from legally held jobs. From comparing the numbers of dismissed foreign workers with those who left the country – be it in an assisted or not assisted way – the actual increase in illegal stay and hence also employment can be inferred.

**B) Policy after the crisis**

As it was already noted above, the immediate reaction of the government to the crisis was the launch of the Voluntary Returns program to help migrants who lost their job due to the crisis getting back home. Nevertheless, relatively large numbers opted rather for staying in the country, despite their legal jobs disappeared. As one study conducted among the migrants in the aftermath of the crisis suggests, the main factors impeding return were *the existence of major debt, the lack of a supportive community*, as well as more subjective factors *such as shame of one’s failure to succeed abroad*.

Another swift reaction of the government vis-à-vis the crisis was the suspension of all labour visa procedures (for employment, self-employment and special partnership) in selected countries (i.e. Moldova, Mongolia, Thailand, Ukraine and Vietnam) in the period from April to late September 2009. Later on – after this transitional period – the labour visa were set to

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102 For the employers, this is, of course, a more convenient state as the labor gets cheaper, saving money on social and health insurance.
103 Such as the payment of insurance or taxes.
104 Sládková, interview 18.10.2011
105 Rulíková 2010; 16
106 MoI 2010
be limited in number, in the case of Moldova, Mongolia, Ukraine and Vietnam.  

Being approved in 2009, the new Penal Code\(^\text{108}\) in which also the unauthorized employment of foreigners was regulated came into force with the beginning of 2010. This meant an important breakthrough as until then this regulation absented completely, the old Penal Code not even mentioning the notion of illegal employment nor any alike\(^\text{109}\). Not only was this a significant change regarding restrictions, but the new legislation also represented an important turning point in viewing responsibility – this was broadened to include the employers and not solely the migrants themselves. It is necessary to note, however, that the content and imposition of the Penal Code (with respect to illegal employment) was not driven by the reflection of the current situation in the field. Rather, as the main drive can be seen the necessity to implement the EU directive\(^\text{110}\) on sanctions for employers\(^\text{111}\).

As the crisis highlighted the semi-legal practices and brought the attention of policymakers to the problem of illegal employment, more regulations started to be underway. One of the most important is the Amendment\(^\text{112}\) to the Foreigners Residence Act and to the Employment Act, in place since January 2011. As with the Penal Code, also this Act largely reflected the legislation at the EU level. Yet, in many ways it turned to be stricter than the original EU directives on the issue\(^\text{113}\). In sum, more obligations were introduced both for the migrants as well as for the employers.

By the new regulation (aimed predominantly at third-country nationals), many aspects of labour migration were touched – including the introduction of biometrics and the obligation to update with any change of address, the aim of which is to eliminate *illicit practices of some work agencies*\(^\text{114}\). Further changes included a partial coverage of expulsions to be borne by the employer, increased control competences of the Customs Office

\(^{110}\) 2009/52/EC  
\(^{111}\) Sládková, interview 26.3.2009  
\(^{112}\) Act No. 427/2010 Coll.  
\(^{113}\) Kučera, 26.11.2010  
\(^{114}\) ibid.
and – most importantly – a greater regulation of entrepreneurship. As a consequence, residence permits are no longer issued upon the special partnership. Moreover, when applying for entrepreneurial visa, an interview at the respective embassy is required.\textsuperscript{115}

Based on the experience from the crisis, in January 2011, a completely new system of economic/labour migration was approved by the government, including the option for setting the limits (quotas) on the numbers of economic immigrants.\textsuperscript{116} With this legislation (which is expected to come into force in 2014), the administrative burden for foreigners should be lessened and the responsibility of the employers increased.\textsuperscript{117} In the case of low- and unskilled migrants, temporary migration is considered the leading principle.\textsuperscript{118} However – as it was the case with the Voluntary Returns – the question arises whether a flexible system of labour migration reacting accordingly to the current needs of particular industries\textsuperscript{119} is feasible.

In many respects, the crisis served as an impetus for the policy regarding both labour migration and illegal employment. On the one hand, there was a clear shift from holding migrants responsible towards the responsibility of employers (which was mainly due to the EU legislation) and staffing agencies (as a reflection of the common practice). On the other hand, vast restrictions were implemented with respect to the labour migration of third-country nationals.

At the same time, the crisis made apparent the (long time neglected) problem of semi-legal or seemingly legal employment. The differences between the practice of employment and “entrepreneurship” were narrowed down by imposing new regulations on the latter one. The post-crisis period can be, thus, best characterized as restrictive with growing regulation on the whole. The overall changes in policy and the official attitudes of the government – as expressed in the Policy Statements – are summarized in Table 2.

\textsuperscript{115} MoI 2011
\textsuperscript{116} ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Novotná, presentation 28.2.2011
\textsuperscript{118} Čižinský, presentation 28.2.2011
\textsuperscript{119} Novák, presentation 28.2.2011
Table 2: Illegal employment in the Policy Statements of Czech Governments and related policy

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content of the Policy Statement of the Government with respect to illegal employment</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Illegal migration mentioned (call for restrictions) – no mention of illegal employment</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Illegal empl. mentioned with connection to illegal migration (problem only mentioned)</td>
<td>Illegalempl. mentioned with connection to asylum policy (call for restrictions, the need to eliminate the problem expressed)</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>No illegal empl. mentioned. Decision to monitor the impacts of the crisis in the field of migration</td>
<td>Illegal employment connected with staffing agencies (call for stricter regulation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Migration Policy</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
<td>Consolidation: restrictions + first attempts to manage legal labour migration</td>
<td>Attempts to facilitate legal labour migration - the needs of the industry prioritized</td>
<td>Restrictive turn - consolidation through stricter regulation of entrepreneurship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Source: author (based on official documents of Policy Statements „Policy“ and „Milestones“ based on Barlová 2008 and own analysis of the legislature and official documents)
Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to provide a more detailed contextual overview of the problem of illegal employment of migrants with respect to the public policy at place. Albeit fully acknowledging the relevance of structuralist theories, the article focused on the policymaking on the level of a nation-state which it understood as an important factor co-influencing the actual practice of illegal employment. After various facets of the problem were outlined, the public policy preceding the crisis was reviewed so as to provide a ground for an assessment of the impacts of the economic crisis.

It can be maintained that the third-country nationals (by then) legally working in the country in low- or unskilled positions were affected more seriously than their EU counterparts. Yet, despite the loss of their legal jobs, many migrants opted for staying in the country, even at less favorable conditions when working in an illegal or seemingly legal way. For the reasons discussed above, especially the bogus self-employment started to proliferate. Although this provides the migrants with a legality of stay, they might easily “fall” into irregularity in the relatively close future, when the obligations from the entrepreneur visa will to be met.

The policy in the field of tackling illegal employment (both pre- and post-crisis) has to be seen rather through the lens of the complementarity thesis, as the liberalization of legal labour migration schemes for unskilled migrants was never thought to be an appropriate means to reduce the practice of illegal employment. Moreover, even when the attempt to facilitate labour migration was made (i.e. Green Cards), this did not respect fully the migration reality, letting out e.g. the Vietnamese and Mongolians who represent a relatively high percentage of the migrant workforce.

From this perspective, it can be argued that it was also the rigidity and complicity of the official schemes which resulted in the misuse of the highly liberal regulations for entrepreneurship. The crisis, then, only highlighted these practices and, as such, served as a catalyst for a more complex policymaking in this area. With more restrictions underway, the question remains, however, whether these will not lead in their effect to an actual increase in illegal employment, especially when not being coupled with sound migration schemes respecting the migration flows. Moreover, the current expectation that the labour migrants will be in the future fully flexible in their reaction to the changing needs of the employers is
highly dubious. In this respect, should the currently proposed concept of temporary migration be implemented, the illegal employment could be expected further to increase.

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EU Directive 2009/52/EC
Neighborhood Amenities, Satisfaction, and Perceived Livability of Foreign-Born and Native-Born U.S. Residents

Yanmei Li

Abstract. Neighborhood amenities and satisfaction have been widely discussed in previous research, but little attention has focused on how they relate to residents’ nativity status. This research will contribute to the scanty literature in this specific matter and help us further understand the place identity of immigrants. Using the 2007 American Housing Survey, bivariate and multivariate regression analysis, this research finds that the difference in neighborhood amenities between native-born and foreign-born residents reflects the differences in demand for favorable amenities and convenience, respectively. Compared to native-born residents, foreign-born residents tend to live in neighborhoods with less desirable amenities, but residents are more satisfied with the livability of their neighborhoods. However, when controlling for residential characteristics the difference in perceived neighborhood livability becomes insignificant. This indicates that consistent with some of the previous studies socioeconomic characteristics, instead of nativity status, determine the disparities in neighborhood amenities, neighborhood satisfaction, and perceived neighborhood livability among foreign-born and native-born residents.

Keywords: Native-born, foreign-born, neighborhood amenities, neighborhood satisfaction, neighborhood livability

Introduction

As one of the major population growth sources in the United States, immigrants continue to have profound impacts on the socioeconomic characteristics of the American society. During the process of becoming accustomed to the relatively new living and working environments, immigrants face various challenges in finding their ideal housing and neighborhoods, partly due to unfamiliarity with a new system, and financial and/or language barriers (Lichter and Johnson 2006; Mahalingham 2006; Organista et al. 1998). Immigrants’ choices and decision-making processes about where to live might be different from non-
immigrants because of their unique socioeconomic characteristics and needs. Socioeconomic status, in addition to the desire for a community similar to that in the home country, a sense of place, and being close to work, friends and relatives, complicates the residential preference theories of immigrants (Mazumdar et al. 2002; Murdie and Teixeira 2003).

Neighborhood amenities and subjective neighborhood perceptions relate to senses of place and neighborhood satisfaction levels of residents (Freeman 2001; Furr et al. 2005; Lansing et al. 1964, 1970; Lund 2002; Shaw 1994; Yang 2008). Although different people have distinctive views about pleasant (and unpleasant) environmental amenities, people share common experiences about many of those amenities. Based on theories in environmental psychology (Abt Associates 2006; Staples et al. 1999), desirable amenities usually include green space, newer buildings, availability of community recreational facilities, proximity to water bodies, and others. Undesirable neighborhood amenities include, but are not limited to, the following: litter, noise, crime, junk and trash accumulation, and undesirable land uses (such as proximity to factories, highways, or airports). Undesirable amenities tend to contribute to lower levels of neighborhood satisfaction from residents (Galster and Hesser 1981; Miller et al. 1980). Neighborhood satisfaction is a significant predictor of mental health, life satisfaction, perceived safety, and the likelihood to move (Baba and Austin 1989; Campbell et al. 1976). Frequent migration can increase mental anxieties, especially among immigrants with significant language and cultural barriers, less social support and those who experience discrimination (Ritsner and Ponizovsky 1999). Measurements of neighborhood satisfaction might be biased if people are unsatisfied, but are unable to move. Thus, in this situation, immigrants may passively perceive that they are satisfied.

Generalized neighborhood satisfaction theory is well developed and research in locational attainment and assimilation of immigrants is abundant. However, few scholars have explored neighborhood amenities, environmental attitudes, and satisfaction of foreign-born residents and immigrants (Adeola 2007; Abt Associates 2006; Furr et al. 2005; Hunter 2000), and none compared how native-born and foreign-born residents differ in terms of neighborhood amenities and satisfaction. Locational attainment, status attainment, countries of origin, and assimilation determine housing and neighborhood preferences of immigrants (Woldoff 2003; Waters 1999). It is not clear whether foreign-born residents and
immigrants live in neighborhoods with fewer desirable amenities and thus are less satisfied with their neighborhoods. Given that foreign-born individuals and immigrants play significant roles in the American society, knowing more about their residential environments and neighborhood satisfaction will help policy makers improve their quality of life. Improvements can be associated with neighborhood attributes, which in turn might help decrease their tendency to move, increase their place attachment and identity, and ease some of the anxieties associated with frequent migration (Hernández et al. 2007).

This paper links the classical theories in residential preferences of immigrants to the outcomes (measured by satisfaction and perceived livability) of these preferences and will expand our understanding of the different psychological reactions to the built environment between native-born and foreign-born residents. The American Housing Survey (AHS) is the only national dataset that includes information about nativity and neighborhood characteristics and perceptions. Although AHS data might not accurately represent the structure of residents in the U.S., housing preferences usually reflect the differences in demographic differences. Future research will explore more detailed idiographic behavior among native-born and foreign-born residents in terms of residential satisfaction and how the behavior relates to migration and housing market equilibrium. The paper starts with a brief overview of locational attainment models and neighborhood satisfaction theories related to nativity status, followed by simple statistical summaries of the dataset. Then, descriptive and Chi-Square analyses of neighborhood amenities and itemized neighborhood satisfaction are presented based on nativity status. An OLS (Ordinary Least Square) regression model is used to measure how neighborhood amenities, satisfaction, and residential characteristics (such as race, education, marital status, and countries of origin) contribute to the level of overall perceived neighborhood livability.

Theoretical framework and hypotheses

Residential preferences of immigrants

There is abundant literature and research regarding residential mobility decisions and how individuals or residents achieve maximum satisfaction under the constraints of budgetary and social preferences (Bartik et al. 1992; Dynarski 1986; Weinberg et al. 1981). Research has found that housing outcomes of immigrants are largely determined by their socioeconomic status, especially income and
education levels, rather than nativity or immigration status (Friedman and Rosenbaum 2004).

Spatial assimilation theory establishes a solid foundation for locational preferences or attainment of immigrants or foreign-born populations (Massey 1985). Early immigrants tended to settle in neighborhoods and enclaves conveniently located close to various amenities and employment centers. Later on immigrants began to move out of these enclaves to seek more desirable neighborhoods. The spatial pattern switching from inner city, low-income enclaves to suburban, relatively more affluent places has generated an enormous impact on individual residents and urban forms (Massey 1985). Locational attainment models (Alba and Logan 1991, 1992, 1993), status attainment models (Blau and Duncan 1967), and place stratification models (Alba and Logan 1992) all explain how residential characteristics and preferences lead to different housing and locational preferences. These models agree that the household “sorting” process departing from the inner-city, ethnic enclaves to the wealthier, suburban neighborhoods can be explained by the socio-economic and assimilation statuses of immigrants and their desires to obtain more residential amenities.

Neighborhoods have become multi-ethnic and more diverse than ever before and the spatial patterns of immigrants have become more complicated (Clark and Patel 2004; Fasenfest et al. 2004). Suburban and inner city dichotomy still exists, however, both places are accepting immigrants with various income levels and the dichotomous division has become increasingly blurred. Inner city areas are no longer the first choices for immigrants. Certain immigrant groups, such as Asians, have predominantly chosen suburbs as their primary place of residence (Woldoff 2003; Waters 1999). Although integration between native-born and foreign-born population has gradually increased and the geographic distribution of new immigrants is more dispersed, immigrants tend to live in more concentrated areas or enclaves compared to the native-born population, partly due to cultural and language barriers (Lichter and Johnson 2006).

When considering the effects of race and ethnicity on locational attainment, in general Black groups and native Blacks have a spatial disadvantage compared to non-Black groups and non-Black immigrants (Adelman et al. 2001). White and Sassler (2000) argue that ethnicity, instead of immigration status, is the dominant factor to explain the differences in locational attainment choices and preferences. In certain areas residential segregation is still of significant social and policy concern (Jackson 2004).
Nativity, neighborhood amenities, satisfaction, and perceived livability

Neighborhood satisfaction is defined as a perceived status of comfort or discomfort of the residents within a neighborhood. Residents’ satisfaction with the built environment is measured by resident characteristics, housing attributes, and neighborhood and community characteristics (Campbell et al. 1976). Models of residential satisfaction often incorporate an individual’s subjective perception of satisfaction and objective housing and neighborhood attributes which might be related to satisfaction. The theoretical framework of neighborhood satisfaction has changed little since its initial conceptualization in the 1960s.

Based on Foote et al. (1960) residential satisfaction, which can be classified into housing, neighborhood, and other satisfaction, had several research themes since the 1960s. These themes indicate that homeowners tend to be more satisfied with their neighborhoods (Austin and Baba 1990; Baba and Austin 1989; Galster and Hesser 1981; Michelson 1977; Rohe and Stewart 1996; Shaw 1994) and neighborhood social characteristics are significant factors in determining residential satisfaction in certain neighborhoods (Foote et al. 1960; Keller 1968; Moriarty 1974). In addition to homeownership, characteristics including education, age or life cycle stage, the adequacy of space, the physical conditions of the unit, neighborhood satisfaction, and the age of the housing units, are significantly related to housing satisfaction (Galster and Hesser 1981; Galster 1987b; Ha and Weber 1991; Varady 1983). Housing satisfaction is then found to be positively related to neighborhood satisfaction (Galster and Hesser 1981; Ha and Weber 1991).

Neighborhood and community attributes, such as residential density measured in different ways, size of the community, the location of the residence in a metropolitan area, and neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics are also incorporated into the modeling of residential satisfaction (Campbell et al. 1976; Dillman et al. 1979; Doling 1976; Galster 1987a; Michelson 1977; Uyeki 1985). Improvements in neighborhood conditions can promote residential satisfaction and

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1 The proportion of homeowners in a neighborhood is also found to be positively related to neighborhood satisfaction (Galster, 1987; Varady, 1986; Rohe and Basolo, 1997; Rohe and Stegman, 1994).
2 There are mixed or insignificant results on the effects of education, income, race, and length of tenure on neighborhood satisfaction (Austin and Baba, 1990; Baba and Austin, 1989; Galster, 1987a).
neighborhood stability, which is defined by longer length of tenure, increasing property values, and improved physical and socioeconomic conditions (Rohe and Stewart 1996). Perceived problems in the neighborhood are negatively related to neighborhood satisfaction, while perceived livability positively relates to neighborhood satisfaction (Galster and Hesser 1981; Miller et al. 1980).

As stated in earlier sections, much of the empirical work related to the locational attainment and neighborhood satisfaction models and theories did not explain the differences in neighborhood amenities, perception, and satisfaction of foreign-born populations, particularly the differences between native-born and foreign-born residents. Locational attainment models explained that certain factors, such as ethnicity, racial background, and income and economic status (rather than nativity status) determine where immigrants choose to live (Adelman et al. 2001; Rosenbaum et al. 1999; White and Sassler 2000; Alba et al. 2000). It is not clear which kinds of neighborhoods foreign-born populations tend to live in and whether they are less satisfied with their neighborhoods compared to native-born residents. There is a missing linkage between locational attainment models and neighborhood satisfaction of immigrants and how they differ from native-born residents. In particular the aspects of perception and satisfaction of immigrants are under-investigated by scholars. Little research has focused on these issues except Abt Associates (2006) and Furr et al. (2005).

Abt Associates (2006), which uses the American Housing Survey metropolitan data, found that most residents react similarly to desirable or undesirable neighborhood amenities. Crime and inadequate police protection are perceived more by whites and African-Americans than other racial or ethnic groups (Abt Associates 2006). Abt Associates (2006) also found that open space is less likely to be close to minority homes; African-American residents tend to live nearby abandoned or vacant buildings; minority renters are more likely to live in a neighborhood where roads need major repairs, and neighborhood satisfaction is largely determined by homeownership. Furr et al. (2005) investigated neighborhood crime perception of former Soviet Union refugees and found that these refugees are less satisfied with their neighborhoods, yet have a higher level of perceived safety compared to the general public. However, none of these studies have systematically explored the differences of neighborhood amenities and satisfaction between native- and foreign-born residents.
Hypotheses

After comparing neighborhood amenities between foreign-born and native-born residents this research intends to argue that resident characteristics, neighborhood characteristics (actual and perceived), and neighborhood satisfaction contribute to perceived livability levels. Higher satisfaction and livability levels will reduce residents’ tendencies to move, thus stabilizing their quality of life. This is particularly important for immigrants who are familiarizing themselves with a new environment. This paper hypothesizes that:

1. Foreign-born residents tend to live in neighborhoods in close proximity to employment, schools, and shopping, while native-born residents tend to live in close proximity to water, open space, and recreational facilities.

2. Compared to native-born residents, and after controlling for residential characteristics, foreign-born immigrants tend to live in neighborhoods with less desirable amenities, hence they are less satisfied and are less likely to rate their neighborhoods as more livable.

Data and methodology

The American Housing Survey (AHS) is the largest longitudinal national housing dataset administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD 2004). AHS is the only national dataset that includes neighborhood quality and satisfaction which can be identified based on nativity status. This paper collapsed the amenities and satisfaction into categories such as infrastructure and physical attributes, safety, business accessibility, public services, and neighborhood housing. Since the number of observations based on countries of origin is small for most countries this research aggregates the countries based on regions (Asia, Middle East, North America, Africa, Australia, Latin America, and Europe) to measure how countries of origin are related to neighborhood amenities and satisfaction. This research focuses on the
following sets of variables: perceived neighborhood livability measured by a Likert scale from 1-10; itemized satisfaction with public transportation, police protection and shopping; neighborhood attributes such as infrastructure, safety amenities, business accessibility, public services and neighborhood housing; residential socioeconomic characteristics such as age, race, income, educational status, and countries of origin. Most of the variables are discrete data measured with a Likert scale.

In the 2007 American Housing Survey among all the residents which identified their citizenship status, about 91% (89,259) are U.S. citizens. Among all the residents 81% (79,856) are native-born, born in the U.S., Puerto Rico or U.S. outlying area, or born abroad of U.S. parents. About 19% (18,473) are foreign-born regardless their citizenship status. Among the 18,473 foreign-born residents, 9,403 are U.S. citizens and 9,070 are non-citizens. The average length foreign-born residents have been in the United States is 21 years. Compared to native-born residents (with a mean age of 44 years old), foreign-born residents tend to be older with a mean age of 48 years old. Foreign-born residents have a lower median household income ($67,233) than that of the native-born residents ($77,027). Roughly 74% of native-born populations are homeowners, compared to 57% of foreign-born residents. Foreign-born residents who are not citizens have a lower homeownership rate than those who are citizens. Compared to native-born residents, education levels of the foreign-born residents are highly uneven and skewed to the lowest and the highest levels. This means that a larger portion of the foreign-born population is either least educated (with high school diplomas or lower,) or highly educated (such as with a graduate school degree). For the entire population of the American Housing Survey national data the racial breakdowns are as follows: 82% White, 12% Black, 4% Asian, and 2% of other racial background. Among foreign-born residents 52% are of Hispanic origin, compared to 7% of native-born Hispanics. Among foreign-born residents 2,215 are from Europe, 3,428 from Asia, 717 from the Middle East, 320 from North America/Canada, 9,284 from Latin America, 496 from Africa, and 42 from Australia (see Table 1).
Table 1. Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th># of Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>Freq (value=1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable:</strong> Perceived Neighborhood Livability (1-10)</td>
<td>94,557</td>
<td>8.05</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neighborhood Satisfaction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Public Transportation Satisfactory (1: satisfied; 0: unsatisfied)</td>
<td>95,532</td>
<td>51,940 (54.37%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Police Protection Satisfactory (1: satisfied; 0: unsatisfied)</td>
<td>95,693</td>
<td>88,365 (92.34%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Public Elementary School Satisfactory (1: satisfied; 0: unsatisfied)</td>
<td>32,322</td>
<td>29,712 (91.93%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Shopping Satisfactory (1: satisfied; 0: unsatisfied)</td>
<td>92,433</td>
<td>90,203 (97.59%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure and Physical Attributes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Recreational Facilities Available (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>38,517 (39.17%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Green Spaces within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>96,066</td>
<td>38,947 (40.54%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodies of Water within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>97,994</td>
<td>15,965 (16.29%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads within 1/2 Block Need Repairs (1: major repair work; 2: minor repair work; 3: other)</td>
<td>94,319</td>
<td>5,430 (5.76%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad/Airport/4-Lane Highway within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>96,106</td>
<td>15,085 (15.70%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parking Lots within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>96,117</td>
<td>25,391 (26.42%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Safety Amenities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walls/Fences surrounding Community (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>97,605</td>
<td>8,698 (8.91%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business Accessibility</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Institutions within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>96,147</td>
<td>29,002 (30.16%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories/other Industry within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>96,071</td>
<td>4,360 (4.54%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Services Provided (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>18,850 (19.17%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trash/Junk in Streets/Properties in ½ Block (1: major accumulation; 2: minor accumulation; 3: other)</td>
<td>95,997</td>
<td>2,288 (2.38%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neighborhood Housing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandoned/Vandalized Buildings within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>92,785</td>
<td>4,945 (5.33%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit about Same Age as nearby Units (1: older; 2: same; 3: newer; 4: other)</td>
<td>92,195</td>
<td>11,110 (12.05%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apartment Buildings within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>96,075</td>
<td>26,627 (27.71%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-Family Town/Row Houses in 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>95,684</td>
<td>17,529 (18.32%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Family Homes within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>96,155</td>
<td>25,391 (26.42%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Shares Plumbing Facilities (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>98,262</td>
<td>826 (0.84%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of the Householder</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>47.25</td>
<td>15.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativity Status (1: native-born; 0: foreign-born)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>79,856 (81.21%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalization Status (1: citizen; 0: non-citizen)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>88,926 (90.44%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment: High-School (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>15,470 (15.73%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment: Graduate School (1:yes;0: no)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>10,203 (10.38%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment: College Degree (1:yes;0: no)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>46,029 (46.81%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status of Householder (1: married; 0: not married)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>65,925 (65.01%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender of Householder (1: male; 0: female)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>56,473 (57.43%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race of Householder (1: White; 0: non-White)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>80,498 (81.87%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race of Householder (1: Black; 0: non-Black)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>11,441 (11.64%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race of Householder (1: Asian; 0: non-Asian)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>3,999 (4.07%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race of Householder (1: American Indian; 0: non-American Indian)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>886 (0.90%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race of Householder (1: Pacific Islander; 0: non-Pacific Islander)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>295 (0.30%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race of Householder (1: Mixed; 0: other)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>1,050 (1.07%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Householder with Spanish Origin (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>14,835 (15.09%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership Status (1: owner; 0: renter)</td>
<td>96,674</td>
<td>69,654 (72.05%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of Origin: Asia (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>3,428 (3.49%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of Origin: Middle East (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>717 (0.73%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of Origin: Canada (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>320 (0.33%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of Origin: Africa (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>496 (0.50%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of Origin: Australia &amp; New Zealand (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>42 (0.04%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of Origin: Latin America (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>9,284 (9.44%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of Origin: Europe (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>98,329</td>
<td>2,125 (2.25%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 indicates that most residents are satisfied with their neighborhoods, but only about 54% are satisfied with public transportation. About 39% of residents are located in neighborhoods without community recreational facilities and a small portion live in neighborhoods with problems. Most survey respondents answer that they live close to single-family houses.

There are several data limitations that future research can correct. The first is that although the AHS provides abundant information about housing and related characteristics, it is not the best dataset to represent residential structure and characteristics. In addition to this, neighborhood amenities and satisfaction questions in the AHS do not measure all the important attributes and characteristics of satisfaction with neighborhoods. Furthermore, neighborhood satisfaction is also determined by housing satisfaction, but the AHS housing satisfaction questions do not have an overall measure of how satisfied residents are with their housing units. This hinders the specification of the regression models as they suffer from omitted variable issues. Revealing the relationships between residents, neighborhood amenities, satisfaction and livability perceptions, rather than predicting livability perceptions is the focus of the paper. Therefore these issues might not be highly relevant. Lastly, a significant amount of survey respondents did not identify their nativity status and countries of origin in the AHS. This might jeopardize the randomness of valid observations when using countries of origin in the regression models. Better data will help to improve the analysis in the future. In addition to making changes in the AHS more specific datasets focusing on housing and neighborhoods should be constructed about foreign-born residents and immigrants.

The analysis is divided into three sections: descriptive analysis, bivariate analysis, and multivariate analysis. The descriptive analysis section explores the data and summarizes the basic characteristics of the variables; particular attention is given to residential characteristics. In the bivariate analysis section neighborhood amenities and itemized satisfaction variables are summarized and compared based on nativity status. Finally, residential characteristics, neighborhood amenities, and itemized neighborhood satisfaction are incorporated into an OLS regression model. The dependent variable is perceived neighborhood livability. The independent variables are sets of variables in neighborhood satisfaction, infrastructure and physical attributes, safety amenities, business accessibility, public services, neighborhood housing, and household characteristics. If the regression model
indicates there is a significant difference of perceived neighborhood livability among native and foreign-born residents, separate regression models will be used to explore how the difference is determined among these two groups by nativity status. If the regression model does not show significant differences no further action will be taken.

Results

**Difference in neighborhood amenities**

Table 2 indicates that there are some differences in neighborhood amenities among different groups of residents based on nativity. In general, native-born residents live in neighborhoods with more favorable amenities than foreign-born residents. Neighborhoods of foreign-born residents tend to be close to businesses, factories, industries, neighborhood public elementary schools, and apartment buildings. A Chi-square test indicates that most of the variables are significant at 0.01 or 0.001 levels between native-born and foreign-born residents\(^5\).

Infrastructure and physical attributes of a neighborhood can significantly predict neighborhood quality (Shaw, 1994; Lansing et al., 1964, 1970; Yang, 2008), and these attributes are some of the most important factors in determining homebuyers’ location decisions. Native-born residents tend to live in neighborhoods with more favorable amenities such as community recreational facilities, open green spaces, and bodies of water. About 40% of native-born residents are in neighborhoods with community recreational facilities, compared to 33% of foreign-born non-citizen residents. More foreign-born residents are closer to railroads/airport/4-lane highway within \(\frac{1}{2}\) block. Foreign-born non-citizens tend to live in neighborhoods with the least amiable infrastructure and physical amenities. They also tend to complain more about roads needing major repairs\(^6\).

Gates and entry systems to neighborhoods are often perceived to add safety to the neighborhoods\(^7\). Compared to native-born residents, foreign-born residents, especially non-citizen, have a higher percentage of living in gated

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\(^5\) The Chi-square test result might be biased due to large sample size.

\(^6\) However, the five measures in the survey did not include all the physical attributes of various neighborhoods and neglected some important features such as sidewalks, landscape coverage, setbacks, building heights, and the overall maintenance of neighborhood facilities and buildings.

\(^7\) Other safety measures, such as the frequency of police patrols in the area, are not captured in the survey.
communities or those with required entry systems. This finding is consistent with the findings from Sanchez et al. (2005). This might be because many foreign-born residents are renters and they seek more perceived neighborhood safety, especially given the psychological stress of living in an unfamiliar environment compared to their home countries.

Table 2. Comparison of neighborhood amenities between native-born and foreign-born residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amenities</th>
<th>Native-Born (%)</th>
<th>Foreign-Born (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure and Physical Attributes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community recreational facilities available (yes)***</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open spaces within ½ block of unit (yes)***</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodies of water within ½ block of unit (yes)***</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads within ½ block need repairs (major repair work)*</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad/airport/4-lane highway within ½ block (yes)***</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Safety</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry system required to access community (yes)***</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walls/fences surrounding community (yes)***</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority of neighbors 55+ (yes)***</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Businesses Accessibility</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood stores within 1 mile (yes)***</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/institutions within ½ block (yes)***</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories/other industry within ½ block (yes)***</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood public elementary school within 1 mile*** (yes)***</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trash/junk in streets/properties in ½ block (major accumulation)**</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community services provided (yes)***</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neighborhood Housing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandoned/vandalized buildings within ½ block (yes)***</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit about same age as nearby units (same)***</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apartment buildings within ½ block of unit (yes)***</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-family town/row houses in ½ block (yes)***</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile homes within ½ block of unit (yes)***</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit shares plumbing facilities (yes)***</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.001;  ** p < 0.01;  * p < 0.1

In general, over 90% of both native-born and foreign-born residents have access
to neighborhood stores within a mile of their homes, but more foreign-born non-citizen residents tend to live close to various businesses and factories. The reasons that foreign-born residents tend to be closer to neighborhood stores, businesses, factories, or other institutions and factories might be due to the convenience or cultural traditions of living close to commercial quarters. Meanwhile rental communities are often close to commercial and industrial activities and potentially have a less favorable location in terms of land use.

Public services can be measured by public schools, roads, transportation, provision of utilities, waste pick-up and disposal, and others. About 19% native-born residents responded to having neighborhood public elementary schools within 1 mile, but about 40% foreign-born, non-citizen residents live close to public elementary schools. This might indicate that foreign-born residents, in general, value convenience and accessibility more than native-born residents.

The difference in housing attributes manifests the significant difference in the quality of neighborhoods and the property values associated with these housing units. Higher percentages of vacant housing, rental housing units, and mobile homes usually signal less desirable neighborhoods, although it is often a case-by-case phenomenon. Generally speaking, among the six elements measured by the American Housing Survey regarding neighborhood housing, a larger percentage of foreign-born residents reported living close to apartment buildings and/or single-family town/row houses, particularly for those foreign-born, non-citizen residents. On the other hand, a larger portion of native-born residents live close to mobile homes, especially native-born whites who tend to live closer to mobile homes and bodies of water than any other groups.

Therefore, in general, there are some differences in residential preferences and neighborhood amenities between native-born and foreign-born residents. Native-born residents tend to live closer to bodies of water and green open space, in neighborhoods where there are recreational facilities, residents are older, community services are provided, and there are more single-family detached houses. Foreign-born residents, particularly foreign-born, non-citizen residents, tend to be closer to highways, airports, railroads, and in gated (or entry-system enabled) neighborhoods where there is easy accessibility to businesses, factories, or institutions, public elementary schools, and more rental or multiple family housing units. Judging from these facts we cannot conclude that foreign-born residents tend to be in neighborhoods with low levels of livability because the trade-off between convenience and neighborhood amenities dominates the locational decision-making process of residents. However, proximity to bodies of water,
open space, and living in neighborhoods with community services and recreational facilities are added benefits to quality of life.

**Neighborhood satisfaction and perceived livability**

In general, most residents are very satisfied with the neighborhoods they live in, although there are slight differences between native-born and foreign-born residents. A higher percentage of native-born residents tend to complain about people and things in neighborhoods as bothersome (Table 3). The most notable difference is that about 43.1% native-born think public elementary school so bad they want to move, compared to 35% foreign-born residents. This could indicate that foreign-born residents are more satisfied with schools, or because they might not have an option to move easily they are less likely to respond yes to this question. All the residents, regardless of nativity status, are highly satisfied with police protection, public elementary schools, and shopping. Native-born residents are less satisfied with public transportation than foreign-born residents. Only about 48.6% native-born residents are satisfied, while 71% foreign-born residents are satisfied. This might indicate foreign-born residents use public transportation more than native-born, thus more would answer yes; or neighborhoods where most native-born residents live, such as suburban neighborhoods, do not have satisfactory access to public transit.

### Table 3. Comparison of neighborhood satisfaction between native-born and foreign-born residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Perception or Satisfaction</th>
<th>Native-Born (%)</th>
<th>Foreign-Born (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People in neighborhood are bothersome (yes)***</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undesirable neighborhood/property bothersome (yes)***</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor city/county services are bothersome (yes)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litter in neighborhood bothersome (yes)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noise in neighborhood bothersome (yes)***</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public elementary school so bad you want to move (yes)***</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other problems bothersome (yes)***</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood public transportation satisfactory (yes)***</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood police protection satisfactory (yes)**</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>89.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood public elementary school satisfactory (yes)***</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>94.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood shopping satisfactory (yes)***</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.1
The item “ratings of neighborhood as place to live” has a Likert scale of 1 to 10, where 10 is the highest rating. The average rating for all the residents is 8.05, which means most survey respondents think their neighborhoods are highly livable. The majority of the residents rated their neighborhoods as moderately or highly livable (scales 5-10); while a larger portion of foreign-born residents rated the livability of their neighborhoods between 5-8 (see Figure 1). A smaller portion of foreign-born residents rated the livability of their neighborhoods between 1-2 or between 9-10. This indicates that most foreign-born residents are moderately satisfied with their neighborhoods, compared to the dichotomy of the livability perception of native-born residents which have a larger portion rating the neighborhoods either as the least livable or the most livable. A Chi-square test indicates that native-born and foreign-born residents are significantly different in terms of the rating of neighborhoods as livable.

Figure 1. Rating of neighborhood as place to live based on nativity status

8 Again, due to large sample size the Chi-square test result might be biased.
Residential characteristics, neighborhood amenities, satisfaction, and perceived livability

The previous sections analyzed the overall difference between native-born and foreign-born residents in residential characteristics, neighborhood amenities, satisfaction, and perceived livability without controlling for the effects of multiple variables. An OLS regression model is used to explore how residential characteristics, neighborhood amenities and satisfaction are related to the overall perception of neighborhood livability (see Table 4). Thus the dependent variable is Rating of Neighborhood as Place to Live (with a Likert scale of 1-10). There are 80,229 valid observations for the regression model and the R-squared is 0.19. The low R-squared value indicates that neighborhood amenities, satisfaction, and residential characteristics only account for a small portion of the variance explaining the overall ratings of neighborhoods as livable. Omitted variables could be from housing characteristics and satisfaction, geographical characteristics, other neighborhood amenities, and other itemized neighborhood satisfaction.

In the combined model we find that there is no significant difference in perceived neighborhood livability between foreign-born and native-born residents (see Table 4). With the exception that the satisfaction with public transportation is negatively related to perceived neighborhood livability, all of the other three neighborhood satisfaction items positively contribute to perceived neighborhood livability. This might imply that in most of the U.S. metropolitan areas public transportation mainly serves low-moderate income riders and neighborhoods. Although the provision of public transportation might not be directly related to perceived neighborhood livability, neighborhoods with mature public transit systems might not have satisfactory housing and neighborhood amenities.

Favorable amenities, such as proximity to open space and bodies of water, prove to be positively related to perceived neighborhood livability. Less favorable neighborhood conditions, such as having parking lots within a ½ block, and business, institutions and/or factories within a ½ block negatively relate to perceived neighborhood livability. Although we are not sure which businesses, institutions or factories are within the vicinity of the survey respondents the results indicate the importance of having zoning and land use regulations. Giving that neighborhood shopping satisfaction positively relates to neighborhood livability we can speculate residents favor having certain businesses but not others. Safety concerns, reflected by satisfaction with police protection and having walls/fences surrounding communities, positively contribute to perceived livability.
Table 4. Regression models of factors related to perceived neighborhood livability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Parameter Estimate</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Pr &gt;</th>
<th>t</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable: Perceived Neighborhood Livability (1-10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.0167</td>
<td>18.15</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neighborhood Satisfaction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Public Transportation Satisfactory (1: satisfied; 0: unsatisfied)</td>
<td>-0.1756</td>
<td>-14.25</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Police Protection Satisfactory (1: satisfied; 0: unsatisfied)</td>
<td>1.0803</td>
<td>47.15</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Shopping Satisfactory (1: satisfied; 0: unsatisfied)</td>
<td>0.3217</td>
<td>8.48</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure and Physical Attributes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Recreational Facilities Available (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>0.1223</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Green Spaces within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>0.2229</td>
<td>18.80</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bodies of Water within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>0.1064</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads within 1/2 Block Need Repairs (1: major repair work; 2: minor repair work; 3: other)</td>
<td>0.2419</td>
<td>24.89</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parking Lots within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>-0.1318</td>
<td>-8.52</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Safety Amenities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walls/fences surrounding Community (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>0.0959</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business Accessibility</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business/Institutions within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>-0.0672</td>
<td>-4.59</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories/other Industry within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>-0.1023</td>
<td>-3.69</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public Services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Services Provided (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>0.0212</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.1798</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trash/Junk in Streets/Properties in ½ Block (1: major accumulation; 2: minor accumulation; 3: other)</td>
<td>0.8548</td>
<td>53.51</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neighborhood Housing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandoned/Vandalized Buildings within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>-0.8026</td>
<td>-29.56</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit about Same Age as nearby Units (1: older; 2: same; 3: newer; 4: other)</td>
<td>0.0725</td>
<td>8.19</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apartment Buildings within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>-0.1847</td>
<td>-11.26</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-Family Town/Row Houses in 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>-0.0159</td>
<td>-1.03</td>
<td>0.3020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Family Homes within 1/2 Block (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>0.1027</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Characteristics</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of the Householder</td>
<td>0.0114</td>
<td>29.12</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativity Status (1: native-born; 0: foreign-born)</td>
<td>0.0283</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.4877</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalization Status (1: citizen; 0: non-citizen)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>-0.0264</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>0.5882</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>-0.0429</td>
<td>-1.68</td>
<td>0.0930</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>-0.1624</td>
<td>-2.44</td>
<td>0.0149</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Race (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>-0.0887</td>
<td>-1.22</td>
<td>0.2219</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment: College Degree (1: yes; 0: no)</td>
<td>-0.0489</td>
<td>-4.20</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Household Income (log)</td>
<td>0.0750</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Status of Householder (1: married; 0: not married)</td>
<td>0.0539</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Single-family neighborhoods, neighborhoods with fewer abandoned/vandalized properties, and neighborhoods with newer housing stock tend to be viewed as more livable compared to multi-family neighborhoods and/or older neighborhoods with more abandoned/vandalized properties. This indicates the importance of physical features (open space, water, and abandoned/vandalized properties), public service (roads and trash/junk), cleanliness (trash/junk), and compatibility and density of land uses (parking lots, business/institutions, and single-family vs. multi-family neighborhoods) in explaining residents’ perception of livability.

In probing how residential characteristics relate to the levels of perceived neighborhood livability older, married, higher income individuals and/or homeowners tend to rate their neighborhoods as more livable. Racial minorities tend to rate their neighborhoods less livable, while foreign-born residents from certain countries (such as Europe, Latin America, and Middle East Countries) tend to rate their neighborhoods more livable.

Conclusions and discussions

In conclusion, the research finds that native-born and foreign-born residents have some differences in terms of residential characteristics, housing tenure status, neighborhood amenities, neighborhood satisfaction, and perceived livability. Native-born residents have higher homeownership rates than foreign-born residents. The distribution of resident income is heterogeneous among different groups. Citizen residents, regardless of whether they are native-born or foreign-born, have higher income levels and homeownership rates than non-citizen groups. When looking at the age of resident occupants, citizen residents, whether native-born or foreign-born, tend to be older than non-citizen residents.

In terms of neighborhood amenities, native-born residents in general tend to live in neighborhoods with desirable amenities such as community recreational facilities available, proximity to bodies of water, and proximity to open spaces. Foreign-born residents tend to live in neighborhoods with less favorable amenities, such as proximity to highways, roads needing major repairs, proximity to businesses, factories, other industries, and multiple-family housing units. However, foreign-born residents tend to live closer to neighborhood stores and elementary schools, and public transportation is very satisfactory. Native-born residents tend to rate their neighborhoods either as highly livable (8-10) or not highly livable (1-4). Native-born resident occupants are less satisfied
with their neighborhoods and they tend to complain more about things and people as bothersome in the neighborhood. Native-born residents complain that people, litter, noise, public elementary schools, and other problems are bothersome, and they are less satisfied with public transportation, public elementary schools, and neighborhood shopping. On the other hand, foreign-born residents, especially non-citizen residents, tend to complain less and are more satisfied with most of the itemized neighborhood elements. Both groups reported similar satisfaction levels with police protection. However, the regression analysis indicates there is no significant difference in perceived neighborhood livability among foreign-born and native-born residents, controlling for residential characteristics. This is consistent with what Friedman and Rosenbaum (2004) have found that socioeconomic status of the residents, instead of nativity status, determines the housing outcomes of immigrants.

Hopefully these findings will help us understand more about the locational attainment, neighborhood perceptions, and satisfaction of residents based on nativity status. These results might have some public policy implications when providing public services and desirable amenities to neighborhoods. Differences in quality of life expectations and focuses might explain some of the differences between native-born residents and foreign-born residents, especially if the foreign-born residents are originally from countries with lower standards of living. Better housing, neighborhoods, and the overall built environments in the U.S. make them more satisfied, even though the quality of their housing and neighborhoods might still be significantly lower compared to native-born residents. Although we are not sure how residents balance convenience and amenities, satisfaction levels are greatly determined by personal heterogeneous experiences and socioeconomic characteristics. The central issue should focus on improving quality of life for both native-born and foreign-born residents, providing both convenience and favorable amenities without sacrifice of housing affordability.

It is challenging to create neighborhoods with more favorable amenities and convenient services, especially in those with concentrated renters and immigrants, or suburban neighborhoods where land uses are highly homogeneous and segregated. Since more foreign-born residents might concentrate in urban areas where favorable amenities such as open space and bodies of water are not available, other favorable amenities such as community services and recreational facilities should be provided. Another major issue is about socioeconomic status, the quality of housing, the amenities, and services which ultimately determine residential satisfaction and neighborhood livability. The ultimate goal of improving quality of life of residents, no matter foreign-
born or native-born, is to improve their socioeconomic statuses such as income and education, which in turn determines their residential preferences and neighborhood satisfaction. The research results can be also combined with various programs to advance quality of life indicators for all residents, particularly private programs targeting to help immigrant residents who oftentimes are not eligible to receive public assistance.

Neighborhoods are important determinants of residents’ locational preferences; accordingly, how different residents react to different neighborhood amenities needs to be studied in more depth. As mentioned previously this paper provides the first attempt to understand residential satisfaction of immigrants and the differences in neighborhood amenities, satisfaction and perceived livability between native-born and foreign-born residents. However, it suffers from a few data limitations. In the future the neighborhood elements in the American Housing Survey need to be more comprehensive and reflect on the most current socio-economic conditions. Satisfaction with housing should be added to the survey as an individual variable. Moreover, first-hand data using restructured survey instruments might be helpful in providing more detailed synopsis about if and why foreign-born and native-born residents differ in neighborhood amenities, satisfaction, and perception. The targeted survey and research should focus more on immigrants based on countries of origin and how previous personal experiences influence their current perceptions of satisfaction and livability. Future research should also try to obtain larger sample sizes of both foreign-born and native-born residents controlling for geographical differences. Objective neighborhood amenities where foreign-born residents live should be incorporated in the research. Thus future research should attempt to correct for the data limitations and focus on more detailed idiographic analysis of immigrants and their residential satisfaction and perceptions of neighborhoods.

References


FOCUS: TRAFFICKING OF HUMAN BEINGS

Trafficking of Human Beings – An Academic Attempt to Support the EU Actions in the Fight Against It

Lia POP

Abstract. The following lines are describing the core of a European project, in which the Research Centre on Identity and Migration Issues (RCIMI) is one of the five beneficiaries. The Project is entitled: The Fight against Trafficking of Human Beings in the EU: promoting legal cooperation and victims protections (THB: COOPtoFIGHT). The project is initiated and coordinated by professor de Suosa from Centro de Estudos Sociais da Universidade de Coimbra – Portugal and it is financed by the Prevention of and the Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union – Directorate Generale Home Affairs of the European Commission. The duration of the Programme is of 24 months.

1. Human Beings Trafficking in EU – as a nowadays gross problem

“Trafficking of Human Beings” (THB) is a technical term which designates the contemporary form of the most hideous crime in the human history: the crime to enslave natural persons and to use them as objects.

This crime is a large and expanded attack: against the human societies pillars of protecting Human Rights. It is a crime against the fundamental value of civilized societies: a) against the due respect for any human person dignity; b)

1 The research paper is done in the framework of the documentation for running an EU Programme: PROGRAMME 2010/ISEC/ AG/054 30-CE- 0447227/0035: The Fight against Trafficking of Human Beings in the EU: promoting legal cooperation and victims protections. (THB: COOPtoFIGHT). The research paper is done "With the financial support of the Prevention of and the Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union – Directorate Generale Home Affairs. This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein."
against the law and the judicial system which is meant to secure the human persons respect; c) against the regulations in the economic field developed in the democratic societies; d) against the culture – accumulated by civilizations in an evolutionary process of 2000 years – the culture of paying respect to any human persons and to not use them as an object; e) against the humanity practices of solidarity in front of such a catastrophic process.

Concomitantly, the Trafficking of Human Beings practice is an explosive and creative form of exploiting the natural persons, as slaves; of revival and re-inventing, some time, more brutal forms of slavery - as trafficking children for organs removal; forced begging, or as forced prostitution of sold victims – sometimes, of inventing sophisticated forms of en-slaving – as developing a trade with human organs, human product as cells, as ovules, sperm, ... or with services as a surrogate mothers for pregnancy time ..., as sperm or ovules paid donors ... The triple engine of such an explosion is: a) the transforming of the slavery and exploitation in one of the most profitable business in the world; b) active stimulus which slavery is for the economic process: to gain as much money as possible and to invest them in the developing of the business; c) the establishing of a large offer\(^2\) of people volunteering to be used, because, for them, to be involved is the best alternative.

In conclusion, the Trafficking of Human Beings is a formula which indicates the nowadays slavery\(^3\) as a process in which slaves masters are running the rape of children, women, and men, their exploitation in contemporary production and trade. It is a process of transforming natural persons into slaves, by traffickers and their accomplices.

\(^2\)The offer is the continuous and increasing wave of strangers – mainly immigrants – in the society having enough money to buy them. The offer is created through a culture of migration – backed substantially by media - to over-developed sites in the World, capitalist or not. (The Atlantic region, the Eastern coastal regions in China, the Arabian centres of investments, the tourist destinations magnetizing the industrious poor people from their special proximity. We mean by special proximity, the proximity of the collapsed societies, societies unable to issue political projects and political leadership to provide to their fellow citizens a future at home. We find such kind of states especially in Africa, Asia but also everywhere from Central and Latin America, to the East Europe Part of them were exploited, according to media reports.

\(^3\) The slavery is not a metaphore, but a reality defined as such, by the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, on the official website of the European Commission – Home Affairs section: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/crime/crime_human_trafficking_en.htm
Is it THB statistically significant for EU countries in 2012?

Unfortunately, Yes! It is! The EU Coordinator for the Fight against Trafficking of Human Beings has — recently — declared: “There are millions of people being trafficked each year within the EU and globally and, unfortunately, the figures do not seem to be decreasing ... Worldwide, the profits from trafficking in human beings reach an estimated €24bn a year”. Unfortunately, there are not available data on the real dimensions of such criminal activity. But, there are EU and others parts interested in it, which develop projects and establish institutions able to provide reliable information on THB.

Which are the main forms of human persons trafficking?

As the OSCE Coordinator for Anti-trafficking, Giammarinaro identified them, the main forms - considered by the criteria of exploitation field - are:

1. Trafficking for Labor Exploitation
2. Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation
3. Trafficking for Forced Begging and Illicit Activities
4. Trafficking for the Purpose of Organ Removal and Trafficking in Organs, Tissues and Cells
5. Child Trafficking

In conclusion, the THB is the major crime of nowadays, its trends are to expand, its cover fundamental dimensions of human lives.

2. Who are the next victims?

The question of who is involved in THB seems to be far away from our milieu, but its innovative core should alert all of us directly and impose on us as priority to fight for a society freed for such a barbarian crime.

The official reports, as well the press ones, prove that the victimization is a frequent process, because its success is largely profitable.

Sociologically viewed, the question of the victims, starts with the hypothesis as: The victims of THB are the vulnerable persons. Indeed, the hypotheses of the researchers — many times confirmed - are: the victims are

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socially or naturally vulnerable persons, insiders, and outsiders. The insider victims are the most vulnerable EU citizens to poverty, ignorance, naivety: a) children from families with weak capacity to protect them; b) women with limited education and incredible family burdens; c) handicapped persons ....; d) the cynical members of some families; d) people from some Rroma groups etc. The victims from outside are: the people which engage themselves and their families in adventures, naïve, and non-familiar with Europe; the cynical, victims of a culture of lack of self - respect as person, in exchange of a large access to consumerism; the illegal migrants as a group.

Looking back to the GRETA Reports it is to be underlined that — for the most of its forms - the trafficking recruiting, in EU and in the ESS, is geographically mapped.

What we would like to propose for sociological investigation is the hypothesis that the THB recruiting map is also similar with the map of absolute poverty. In EU, it is strong at the South and East margins, and diminished at the center. The map for consumerism is, by contrast, comparable with the money agglomeration ... It is reversed: focused in the rich zone ...

The trafficking of human beings – in majority of its forms - is exploding in the times when large aggregations of new consumers occurs: wars – as ex-Yugoslavian wars ; the sports events- football championship; holidays .. The demand is shaping the offer.

Taking into account the press reports, the problem of the next victim it is not so far from us. In an unsafe community, anybody could be in a risk to be raped, trafficked, sold and exploited by the traffickers.

That is why, the problem of THB is a problem of any European citizen, and a problem of protecting HR.

3. The project to fight THB and to protect victims in Europe

There are four institutional circles that are trying to protect EU citizens by THB industry attacks: OSCE; Council of Europe; UE Institutions – EU Commission with its Directorate Generale Home Affairs ; and the national States institutions. Beside them, the local and family close connections are functioning in the same

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direction: protection.

The four circles develop programs to designate, circumscribe and control the criminal phenomenon; of issuing and implementing effective common rules and legislations to fight it; and of alert and mobilize citizens to defend themselves and solidarism at community level to make impossible the recruiting process.

They should be endorsed by a culture of any micro-society to not tolerate such types of activity, and by an education of self respect and of capacity to be aware, and to keep the kindred aware.

There are three major types of actions carried out by EU, through its agents, and in close cooperation with other political actors focused on the problems at the global or regional level.

The main EU types of actions are:
1. preventions of the phenomenon of THB,
2. protection of the victims of THB,
3. and prosecuting the traffickers and their accomplices.

EU’s success in combating Trafficking of Human Beings consists in: having a common rule in Europe in prosecuting the criminals and in protecting the victims: Directive 36/2011⁶; having harmonized concepts in conducting the judicial process; having specific institutions charged to carry out the implementation in it, National Rapporteur or other similar; a For the second and third direction the UN, – has succeeded to harmonize The efforts of Prevention are the comprehensive and collective works. They involve any European citizen as an individual interested to live in security and dignity at home as well as involving the Civil Society, Universities included.

The EU individual citizens could be mobilized to stay in alert – as a soldier – against the trafficking and traffickers actions in its community: not to let traffickers to spread their tentacles with marvelous promising far away to the naïve people at their village, areas of living, working, praying …; not to accept any service to people that seems to have such kind of interests …; to teach to others the lessons of stay in touch with yours; and not to accept to let one’s ID to other persons.

⁶DIRECTIVE 2011/36/EU available at:
4. The EU Universities in fighting THB

The University – as a corporate body – could contribute to edify the professional approach to the issue, to provide expertise, as well as it could contribute directly to raise the public awareness by structural and conjectural projects or actions.

In terms of structural projects, the Universities could create or to support the interdepartmental groups devoted to the charged to explore possibility to develop, conferences, seminars, and workshop in THB - issues; to organize specific interdepartmental and cooperative\(^7\) groups of research in the field; to encourage the mentioned groups to apply to HOME projects as - Daphne, Priamos ...; to establish European network of researches; to publish academically systematic their findings ...; to present, in an appropriate manner, as frequent as possible, the problem of THB, its dimensions, and the efforts to tackle it in the general media – quality and tabloids -; to structure teams ready to be involved in advising policies proposals, implementation, or evaluations – at local, regional, national level ....

The University could also encourage trainings for journalists, for public institutions communicators in the field – PRs - , for NGOs members involved in the field ... as an another structural project.

The University could edit professional journals in the field; as well as, they could organize the printing of books dedicated to explore THB in special collections in its Printing House ...

As conjectural actions, the University forces could support or organize actions to give academic visibility to European actions, progress, and problems in combating THB – by publishing on-line News Letters on THB; to involve public in knowledge the concrete phenomenon at home, to suggest ways of controlling and stopping it – by organized forums of public debates or blogs; to cooperate with media to raise the public awareness confronted with the trafficker attacks, or with police and judicial success in convicting the criminals ... or with institutional success in protecting and reinset victims into a community.

\(^7\) We consider the cooperative groups the groups which bring together academic, political, police, judicial, administrative, media and other forces committed to tackle the phenomenon of THB.
5. The University of Oradea – Research Centre for Identity and Migration in an EU Program

Concerned with the dimensions of THB, aware of the academic resources ready to work in the Research Centre for Identity and Migration Issues – Oradea University has participated in an EU project devoted to fighting THB. As it is mentioned the PROGRAMME 2010/ISEC/ AG/054 30-CE- 0447227/0035: The Fight against Trafficking of Human Beings in the EU: promoting legal cooperation and victims protections. (THB: COOPtoFIGHT)

The duration of the program is for 24 months.

The Program was initiated and it is coordinated by professor de Suosa from Centro de Estudos Sociasis da Universitate de Coimbra – Portugal.

The co-beneficiaries are the Institute of Public Affairs established in Poland; the Research Centre for Identity and Migration Issues – Oradea University, established in Romania; Universita Catolica del Sacro Cuore – Trasnscrime, established in Italy; Universite Libre de Bruxelles, established in Belgium. The associated partners are Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, (UC3M) and DGAI – Observatory for Trafficking in Human Beings – Lisbon. Centro de Estudos Sociasis da Universitate de Coimbra with its team is designing the project and it is assuming its EU management. At the national level there are, also, national coordinators.

In a simplified manner presented, the objectives of the in progress Program are: to understand the trafficking - sex and labor –; to analyze the impact of the legislation on THB; to compare the efforts of states in implementing EU directions in their legislations, in developing cooperation at EU level, in improving their practices and issuing best practices in fighting the crimes and in protecting the victims; to promote workshops with the experts; to test European guidelines; as to promote the training of the legal and other actors in the field ...

The target group is the group of the specialists and of the future specialists in THB fighting and victims protection. The activities to be carried out are: establishing the list of the updated literature in the field; studying the problems; research – as desk and field researchers; monitoring the practices and the press reports on it;

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collecting data; and organize transnational comparing actions; organize meeting with the experts. Expected results in terms of knowledge are, among the others: a better understanding of proceedings in fighting the THB in different EU countries, to identify the factors that hinder efficiency in criminal investigations and victims protection.

In terms of judicial and social practices, correlated with THB, the expected results are to support largely among the professionals, authorities, NGOs activists, journalists ... the motivation to improve and self improve their activity and to reach the EU standards. It is also to encourage the transnational cooperative model in sharing experiences, best practices, frequent obstacles and inherent risks. In terms of “material” products, the Program is expecting to achieve: a book; 4 scientific articles; 1 website; 4 workshops; 1 handbook ; and 1 international conference.

Our Center is determined to include – experimentally – an academic course in THB in the MA Programme, EU PUBLIC POLICIES. It could be a course valorizing the experience gained in the EU programme as well as, of the future research in the profile carried out by our Centre. For our group of researchers, as well as, for our centre, The Research Centre for Identity and Migration Issues – Oradea University (www.e-migration.ro), The Programme: The Fight against Trafficking of Human Beings in the EU: promoting legal cooperation and victims protections is a challenge. It is challenging our determination to enlarge and in-depth our academic competence; our capacity to cooperate and to learn from and with experts from bodies – with different backgrounds and projects – to valorize the leading figures from such a diverse field; and mainly to propose results significant in a European Context.

For Academic bodies, generally speaking, such kind of work it is a test. We consider it as a test of openness to community gross problems, to the problems that threat the communities “bien etre”, as THB does. Letting it out, and continuing academic routine is not on the way of academic morality... The devotion to contribute to understand and to improve the solutions for such types of social issues, seem to be a contemporary imperative .They prove to be respectful and open to the society which were investing intellectually, morally and financially there. On the other hand, involving in topic as THB, the Academic World demonstrates that the Academia is able to transfer its theoretical expertise into society resource in the very moment, when a gross threat and new risks confront it. In such a context, the University has the opportunity to prove its social function and its specific value.
The institutional perspective in the fight against human trafficking in Romania - The national anti-trafficking body

Ioan LAZA, Ioana ALBU

The institutional construction is a proof of political will, a proof of authority and maturity of a society, of its responsibility and functionality. It offers the favorable framework of institutional capacity evidence, of working out and putting into practice some policies, strategies, programs and action plans in various sectors and fields in accordance with the aim, the objectives and standards aimed at, set by one’s own bodies or derived from those defined by the transnational assumed regulations. An institutional construction becomes as much more articulate and efficient the more it is more stable and more dynamic, and at the same time flexible and adaptable to the challenges of an environment often marked by most acute crises and tensions. Motivated by the history lessons, it is but natural to yearn for stable institutions which should guarantee the democracy, the rule of law and human rights.

Handling the problem of human trafficking, phenomenon with profound social and economic implications, circumscribed to the globalization of organized crime requires an adequate institutional construction for the issues it deals with, compatible with the European structures in this area of interest. The national strategy against human trafficking for 2006-2010 issued by the Government of Romania, structures the specific institutional framework, particularizing it on relevant action pathways: prevention, fight, assistance, monitoring and counseling. The concern with configuring an integrated system, which should harmonize the efforts and to increase the efficiency of the reaction capacity to the manifestations of this scourge is visible.

In approaching the 2006-2010 Strategy\(^2\), the institutions responsible for the **prevention** of human trafficking are: the Ministry of Administration and Home Affairs (The National Agency against Human Trafficking, the General Romanian Police Inspectorate by the Institute of Research and Fight against Criminal Matters), the Ministry of Health (The Public Health Departments), The Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sport (District School Inspectorates, *Casa Corpului Didactic*, Centers of Information and Documentation), the Ministry of Labor, Family and Social Protection (The General Department of Social Assistance, the General Department for Child Protection, the National Agency for Work Force Occupancy, the National Agency for the Equality of Chances between Men and Women), non-governmental organizations, international organizations (ILO, IOM, UNICEF, a.o.)

At another level, the system of institutions dealing with the fight against human trafficking reunites: the Ministry of Administration and Home Affairs the General Romanian Police Inspectorate, the General Inspectorate of Border Police), the Public Ministry (The Department of Investigation of Organized Crime and Terrorism Offences), the Ministry of Justice (The National Network of Specialized Judges in sorting out human trafficking cases)\(^3\).

With reference to assisting the victims of human trafficking, the institutional framework includes: The Ministry of Health (Departments of Public Health), Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sport (District School Inspectorates, *Casa Corpului Didactic*) the Ministry of Labor, Family and Social Protection (The General Department of Social Assistance, the General Department for Child Protection, the National Agency for Work Force Occupancy- the district councils/ sectorial ones in Bucharest), the Ministry of Justice (probation services), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NGOs and IOs (IOM, etc).

Monitoring the assistance of victims as a result of human trafficking incurs on the National Agency against Human Trafficking and to the General Department of Child Protection.

The general institutional framework can be easily completed with the

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\(^2\) The strategy for 2011-2015 was not made public yet at the end of 2011, being at the stage of obtaining the approval of the Public Policies Unit within the Ministry of Administration and Home Affairs; the final form of the document being further on submitted for being promoted for approval to institutional partners.

\(^3\) The network is formed by 56 judges from each Court of Appeal with a tribunal in Romania, being notified the international body Eurojust, European Commission, the Council of Europe, UN, etc.
Romanian Immigration Office, The Witnesses’ Protection Office, the interministerial work group, the parliamentary group for the fight against human trafficking, a.o.

Priority given to integrated approaches

Romania has adopted as late as 2001 the first national action plan on the fight against human trafficking. Until 2008 there was no unitary system of identifying and supporting the victims of human trafficking. By the Order no. 335 of October 29, 2007 here was to be approved the National mechanism for identifying and referral of the human trafficking victims which entered into force on December 17-th 2008, thus being made concrete one of the objectives of the National action plan 2006-2007 in view of implementing the national strategy against the human trafficking for 2006-2010. This document represents, according to the stipulations in the preamble, an ensemble of measures and actions destined to the identification of the victims of human trafficking and of handing them over to the providers of protection and assistance services. It is thus aimed at “adopting a unitary and coordinated response, which is meant to lead to improving the capacity of identifying the victims of human trafficking and ensuring their protection and assistance, irrespective of the institution or organization with which these come in touch with for the first time.\(^5\)

The main way of identifying the victims of human trafficking is represented by the actions of the specialized structures within the Police. The mechanism above-mentioned stipulates, at the same time, that the identification process, from the perspective of judiciary bodies – takes place within the activities of criminal pursuit which vises collecting the necessary evidence with regard to the existence of human trafficking offences, as well as in the context of specific actions of applying the law: informative actions\(^6\). In the case in which the Romanian citizens are expelled or returned home from the territory of other states – among these there can be identified – by the declarations taken by the border police officers at Romania’s state border - the potential victims of human trafficking. The assistance granted by the diplomatic missions and the consular offices of Romania abroad in

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\(^4\) Published in Romania’s Official Gazette No. 849 of December 17-th 2008

\(^5\) The National Mechanism of Identifying and Referral of the Human Trafficking Victims, Preamble, p.3

\(^6\) Ibidem, section E, page 12
view of obtaining a travel document which would allow repatriation is another
filter in identifying the human trafficking victims, being known that most of the
times these are taken or destroyed the identity or travel the documents. The
requests for assistance from some victims by means of the Tel Verde service (green
line) (0800 800 678) available from 2007 allow for their identification. The same
finality could be envisaged for the alerts at the emergency telephone line with
regard to the possible committing of an offence of human trafficking.

The national mechanism of for identifying and referral of the human
trafficking victims describes in detail not only the indicators that must be taken
into account for identifying a possible/potential victim, but also the procedures
of handing them over to the institutions or organizations responsible for
protection and assistance. According to the exigencies mentioned in this
document7, the specialized structures of the Police – the Department of Fights
Against Organized Crime, with all its services and the General Inspectorate of the
Border Police shall contact the regional representative of the National Agency
against Human Trafficking for evaluating the needs for assistance of the victims
and maintaining the contact with it. Other structures from the national defense
system and public order systems – the Criminal Investigation Police, the Public
Order Police, the Gendarmerie- have the obligation to notify the other specialized
structures of the Romanian Police as well as, according to the case, the
departments/offices/services of the Department for Investigating the Offences of
Organized Crime and Terrorism. The specialized structures of the Police have the
duty of making the risk evaluation of the case in the perspective of its audience by
the judicial bodies. In its turn, the representative of the regional center of the
National Agency against Human Trafficking shall ensure the immediate referral of
the victim for assistance in an urgency regime, after which it shall appoint a person
responsible for the case, the task of whom it is to monitor the assistance granted.
The respective person in responsible for maintaining the link with the victim,
ensuring it the necessary support for all stages of the development of the criminal
process. The mechanism particularizes at the same time the procedures in the
situation in which the victim was referred and repatriated by the International
Organization for Migration, by its missions, and by an NGO from Romania,
respectively, as well as in the circumstances of identifying the victims by means of
diplomatic missions or of the consular office of Romania. If the victims of human

7 Ibidem, pp.14-15
trafficking are foreign citizens, they benefit on the territory of Romania, without discrimination, from the same measures of assistance and protection as the victims of the traffic of persons, Romanian citizens. The Romanian Office for Immigration is the institution regulating the situation of the human trafficking victims, foreign citizens, in accordance with the provisions of the legislation referring to the regime of foreigners in Romania.

The Law no. 678/2001 on the prevention and fight against human trafficking stipulates multiple attributions for the actors of the anti-traffic body. For example, there are to be retained some of them: thus the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the mission to draw up a list of states presenting a high potential from the point of view of human trafficking, which shall be communicated upon request to the institutions interested. The same ministry together with the Ministry of Administration and Home Affairs has the obligation to adopt the necessary measures to hinder the access on the territory of Romania of foreign citizens in relation to whom there are solid grounds to suspect that they might be involved in human trafficking.

In other respect, The Ministry of Labor, Family and Social Protection through its specialized structures at the central and territorial level, works out and applies special measures of integration on the labor market of the persons with a high risk of being trafficked, particularly for the women in the disfavored areas and for the socially marginalized persons. The National Agency for Work Force Occupancy assumes, by virtue of this law, the task of developing information programs regarding the labor market and the rights of employees, programs of professional formation, as well as of informing the economic agents for employing with priority the persons posing a high risk of being trafficked. It is also The Ministry of Labor, Family and Social Protection the one studying the opportunity of adopting measures of stimulating the economic agents employing both persons posing a high risk of being trafficked, and victims of the traffic, who have graduated from courses of professional formation. The Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sport draws up a complex of educational programs with the aim of

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8 Published in Romania’s Official Gazette No. 783 of December 11-th 2001
9 The Law No. 678/2001 on the prevention and fight against human trafficking, art.5, paragraph (1)
10 Ibidem, art. 5, paragraph (2)
11 Ibidem, art. 6, paragraph (1)
12 Ibidem, art. 6, paragraph (2)
13 Ibidem, art. 6, paragraph (3)
preventing the human trafficking and of raising awareness upon this phenomenon.

The pivotal institution – The National Agency against Human Trafficking

The setting up of this specialized structure was imposed by the magnitude of the human trafficking phenomenon and consequently, by the need for an entity which should gather together the endeavors and concerns in the field. The Agency was set up grounded on the Government Decision No. 1584 of December 8-th 2005\(^{14}\) by the reorganizing of the National Office for the Prevention of Human Trafficking and Monitoring the Victims Protection within the General inspectorate of the Romanian Police.

Having become operational on January 1-st 2006, the Agency was to lose its juridical personality on March 11-th 2009\(^{15}\) when it was reorganized within the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police. The negative impact upon the assistance offered to the victims of the traffic of persons, as well as the legitimate requirement of institutional capacity growth have determined the coming back to the initial situation. Thus, by the Government Decision no. 460 of May 11-th 2011\(^{16}\) the National Agency against Human Trafficking was withdrawn from the structure of the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police and included within the Ministry of Administration and Home Affairs, as an institution having juridical personality.

The competences incurred onto it accredit the National Agency against Human Trafficking as a pivotal institution in the anti-traffic device in Romania, having attributions of coordination, evaluation and monitoring at national level, in applying the policies in the field of human trafficking by the public institutions with responsibilities in this sense, as well as of those from the sphere of protection and assistance granted to the victims\(^{17}\). This central role in the afore-mentioned institutional whole justifies the wide array of main attributions:\(^{18}\) working out, together with other institutions, the project of the national strategy against human trafficking, subsequently subjected to the Government of Romania; monitors and evaluates the activities carried out by the public institutions having attributions in

\(^{14}\) Published in the Official Gazette No.5 of January 4-th, 2006
\(^{15}\) by Government Urgency Ordinance No.20 of March 11, 2009
\(^{16}\) Published in the Official Gazette of Romania Part I, No.331 of May 12-th, 2011
\(^{17}\) Government Decision No. 460/May 11-th, 2011, art.2, paragraph 1
\(^{18}\) Government Decision No. 460/May 11-th, 2011, art.3
the field of human trafficking, in relation to the objectives stipulated in the action plans for implementing the national strategy; it ensures the coordination of cooperation activities carried out by the public institutions with the non-governmental organizations; it works out the projects of the national standards in the field together with the public institutions and NGO-s involved, which it submits for approval to the Government; it establishes the indicators and criteria of appreciating the dimensions and characteristics of the phenomenon of human trafficking; it collects, stores, processes, analyses and discloses data and information referring to the situation of the persons trafficked, the assistance offered to the victims and their social reintegration; it carries out studies and research regarding the diagnosis and evolution of the traffic of persons; it facilitates the exchange of data and information with a statistical character among institutions with competences in the field in the country and abroad; it formulates proposals for the change and completion of the legislation in the field, it works out the answers to the questionnaires of international institutions and bodies, as well as country reports in the field of the traffic of persons; it formulates recommendations to the institutions with responsibilities in this area with regard to the development of anti-traffic policies; it monitors the functioning of centers for the assistance of victims according to the national specific standards for the specialty services of human trafficking victims assistance and protection; it offers guidance to the persons resorting to the cost-free Green line (Tel Verde) by the institutions having competence in the matter; it monitors the administration of the funds allotted; it works out and grounds programs of national interest regarding the prevention of human trafficking and assistance granted to the victims of it in view of social reintegration; it ensures the representation in specialized groups or EU structures, as well as in international organizations, under the coordination of the specialized structure of the Ministry of Administration and Home Affairs.

The director of the Agency is the national coordinator of the activity of implementing the public policies of human trafficking prevention and of monitoring the granting of protection and assistance of the human trafficking victims.¹⁹

The National Agency against Human Trafficking has in its suborder 15 regional centers, with a role of coordinating the activity in their areas of competence. Being set up in the areas corresponding to the Courts of Appeal, these centers have clearly defined attributions: the analysis of the phenomenon at the

¹⁹ Government Decision No. 460/May 11-th, 2011, art.4, paragraph 2
local level and informing upon the appearance of new ways of operating in the human trafficking; monitoring the application of the provisions of the National antitraffic Plan at local level; identifying the dis-functionalities and formulating proposals of improving the national system of identifying and referral; facilitating the local and regional communication among the structures involved in the anti-traffic fight; supporting the local anti-traffic initiatives; notifying the competent authorities for the sorting out of the problems the victims of the traffic confront themselves with in the process of assistance and of reintegration; correlating the activity of the NGO-s in order to avoid overlaps, so that the prevention activity should cover an as large number of population as possible.\\n
The National Rapporteur institution in ‘stand-by’\\n
At the EU level the need for development of a strategy consolidated for the fight against human trafficking is strongly felt. The Directive 2011/36/EU\(^2\) is extremely explicit in this respect. A vulnerable and non-synchronized point, generating dis-functionalities consists in the national monitoring systems. The regulation mentioned stipulates unequivocally that the Union must further on develop its activities with regard to methodologies and the methods for data collection in order to be able to produce comparable statistics, there being expressly mentioned the need for establishing general common indicators of the Union for identifying the victims of human trafficking by the exchange of best practices among all relevant actors, particularly the public and private social services.”\(^2\)

Based on such priorities, article 19 of the Directive 2011/36/EU stipulates that the EU member states take the necessary measures in order to institute national rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms. Their purpose is punctually defined: making evaluations of the tendencies in the matter of human trafficking; measuring the results of the actions of fighting the traffic; collecting statistical data in close cooperation with the relevant organizations of the civil society in this field and periodically, presenting reports.

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\(^2\) The National Agency against Human Trafficking, anitp.mai.gov.ro, the anitp page, Regional centers section
\(^2\) The Directive 2011/36/EU, Exposure of motives, point 4
The Directive 2011/36/EU mentions that, by the conclusions of the Council of Europe of June 4-th 2009, there has been created an informal network of the EU of national rapporteurs or equivalent mechanisms concerning the traffic of persons. The network of rapporteurs would not only absorb information from the EU member states, but also it shall furnish these objective strategic information, comparable and up-to-date in the field of human trafficking at EU level. Moreover, it is appreciated that the European Parliament itself should be entitled to take part in the common activities of the informal rapporteurs actions.\(^{23,23}\)

It clearly results a major aspect: the national rapporteur is an autonomous institution, with clearly defined missions, particularly in the field of improving coordination and coherence, of avoiding the overlapping of efforts among institutions and agencies and at another level among member states and international actors, trying to remove the existing information and communication deficit. It is obvious that the network of rapporteurs is meant to contribute to the development of existing or emergent EU policies and strategies, relevant for the fight against human trafficking.

How did Romania react to the requirement of replacing the national rapporteur? “This recommendation was taken over by the Romanian state and transposed into the National Strategy against Human Trafficking 2006-2010 by means of the National Action Plans\(^{24}\). In the context, it is relevant the working out of a National Mechanism of identifying and referral of the human trafficking victims, which has become operational on December 17-th 2008\(^{25}\), mechanism equivalent to a national *rapporteur*. The procedure of appointing the national rapporteur is under way, making the object of a process of inter-institutional consultation, according to sources in the Ministry of Justice\(^{26}\). The EU member states must conform themselves to the provisions of the EU Directive 2011/36 of the European Parliament and Council until April 6-th 2013\(^{27}\).

\(^{23}\) The Directive 2011/36/EU, Exposure of motives, point 27  
\(^{24}\) IGPR, ANITP, *Realizarea campaniilor de prevenire a traficului de persoane. Ghid practic/Campaigns for preventing the human trafficking*, Bucuresti, 2008, p.18, Editura Alpha MDN  
\(^{25}\) The Order No. 335 of October 2007, published in the official Gazette of Romania No. 849 of December 8-th, 2008  
\(^{26}\) The information was circulated by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Justice, Alina Bica, at the bi-lateral meeting held in February 2012 with Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, special representative of OSCE and Coordinator for the fight against human trafficking at the level of the respective institution  
\(^{27}\) The Directive 2011/36/EU, art.22, paragraph 1
The meetings of the national rapporteurs are biannual, held under the coordination of the European Commission. At the reunion of February 2-3 2012 from Brussels Romania was represented by the director of the National Agency against Human Trafficking, Romulus Nicolae Ungureanu. This forum has subjected to debate the implementing of the National mechanism for identifying and referral of the human trafficking victims at the level of participant states, aspects regarding the protection and assistance of victims of human trafficking. Within this framework, the representative of the Agency has presented the priorities concerning the improving of coordinating the actions against human trafficking as well as of data collection referring to this phenomenon at both national and European level.28

At the level of the institutionalized dialogue European wide, in 2011, the National Agency against Human Trafficking has made its voice heard among others, by including its initiative of working out a European Report on the evolution of the phenomenon in the European Strategy for the Fight Against Human Trafficking, document which shall be drawn within two years, using a set of common indicators for reporting.29

Conclusions

In the fight against human trafficking Romania avails itself from an articulate institutional framework, structured on the major directions of action: prevention, fight, assistance, monitoring. The key institution in this is the National Agency against Human Trafficking, strategic partner in the European institutionalized dialogue in the matter.

The institutional instability episodes (the reorganization of 2009 of the National Agency against Human Trafficking, as well as of other partner institutions), to which the sub-financing is added, the lack of personnel, of premises, restricting the activity of some NGOs involved in the assistance of victims, have triggered a particular institutional instability, meant to influence – even if temporarily – the reaction capacity and the degree of vulnerability in the traffic of human beings. On the background of such problematic “changes” and of dis-functionalities at the

28 anitp.mai.gov.ro, anitp page, section “activities”
29 MAI, ANITP, (Ministry of Administration and Home Affairs, the National Agency against human Trafficking, The annual evaluation of the activity of the NAAHT, 2011, p.28
level of the political decision-makers, not even at present was it approved the National Strategy against Human Trafficking for 2011-2015. Moreover, although since 2008 it has had a national mechanism for identifying and referral of the human trafficking victims since 2008, Romania has not designated yet a national rapporteur on this matter.
BOOK REVIEWS


Review by Magda DANCIU

This timely collection of studies, addressing the issue of migration and migrants’ identities within the context of an enhancing world fluidity, focuses on how places turn into very sites of identity development, both social and place-identities, generating those transmigrant identities to shift affiliation and to reconfigure subjectivities within this process of movement and mobility which seem to have become “the analytic key to understanding the modern world” (p.2).

The book is divided into four parts according to the perspective they use to demonstrate how people make sense of themselves while changing places within an apparently boundless global(alized) spaces in search of an ontological stasis. Part I, Migrants and the Politics of Land Ownership, gathers together ideas related to the individual’s link to the land, to the relational and contextual features of any locality, the moral dimensions of place-identity continuum, as well as the civic, political, and mostly cultural aspects that emerge from the migrants’ engagement in the dynamics of place making (see Chapter 3).

A suggestion for a critical rethinking of “the ‘local’ as a category of belonging for transnational migrants” (p.67) is the core of Part II: Landscapes of Belonging, presenting a research on how everyday practices in rural France become more value-laden within a context of experiencing difference at the level of
localities, foregrounding the difference in which individuals within transnational social fields combine ways of being and ways of belonging (see p.73), on one hand. On the other hand, Jacqueline Waldren’s findings reveal that space, place, identity fluctuate according to the circumstances, as perceived and values by outsiders and insiders against a Spanish background (Mallorca), in a general attempt of becoming aware of one’s own landscape or the landscape that one is hosted by. The connectedness between space and individuals is continuous and constitutive as people are defined by the space they belong to, nurturing certain ‘placed-based sentiments’ (p.102) and striving for gain control of space by reinforcing the concepts of *Houses and Home: Intimate Migrant Place* as referred to in Part III, which examines these particular issues within the globalised context of deterritorialization, the diaspora, the transnational, when place attachment is specifically and individually experienced. As a result, the politics of place, states Erin B. Taylor in her contribution on the issue in Santo Domingo, “may rest upon the production of locality”, but it highlights both the state and the transnational sphere when reflecting the “wide range of interests in the lives and livelihoods of residents” (p.116) who are all allocated a multiplicity of spaces to adjust to. An interesting reference is made to the concept of neighbourhood perceived as being characterized by “actuality and potential for social reproduction” (p.121) where the very sense of locality can be re/produced in a more concrete, personalized way than the rather abstract term related to locality in its common definition.

The last section, *Contesting Urban Place*, includes three studies covering three major dimensions in the analytical field of place identity, namely the local community as a resource for identity formation and expression, then citizenship experiences in case of migrants evolving in post-war times (i.e. Bosnians in suburban Melbourne), respectively, the condition of the campus migrant represented by academics working in a foreign university, a multinational institution with a multiplicity of scholarly backgrounds, international networks, and diversity of attitudes to scholarship (see p. 169). The last category points to the completion of one’s academic achievements with developing other abilities, such as to build local, as well as global networks of communication, or administrative skills to face the new emplacement requirements, to grasp to “campus contexts”(p.174), to be ready to explore, detect, read, and compare personal and new cultural codes. Nigel Rapport’s *Epilogue: The Cosmopolitan Justice of a Direction Home* foregrounds the way in which human beings make sense of their
own experiences related to their contribution to the construction of the ‘locale’, a space of identification and belonging, to the creation of a home locale, constantly demonstrating that “home is a directionality” (184) and that ‘home spaces’ continue to be vital to both migrants and locals, to both hosts and guests. He reveals several thematic dimensions of the present collection of studies particularly focused on migrants’ responses to the discourse of localization and on the process of their engaging with ideas of locality, namely, the physicality of localities consisting of the physical space of a locality, of its inhabitants, of the community’s everyday practices and relations, the way in which a locality gets globally mediated by accepting a glocal identity, the means by which “the local sets the discursive terms of its global appropriation” (185), the fact that the local is a product of exterior expectations existing prior to the decision to migrate, and the observation about the indeterminate nature of ‘locality, displaying how ambiguous and unstable the ‘local’ is (see p.186).

Examining and contrasting issues of identity, citizenship, and cultural diversity within migration theory are part of contemporary debates regarding building societies in which “all members are able to participate fully on a non-discriminatory basis” as their “ultimate objective of integration” lies in their permanent attempt to avoid “marginalization and fragmentation” (Issa&al. 2006: 1). The examples of migrant communities in the present volume represent cases where the process by which individual life gains its right to a home in a glocal space with all the promises of a future just global society is validated by recognition of the complexities and the anxieties that identity construction represents for uprooted, relocated people and of the essence of transculturalism and transnationalism.

References


Review by Lia POP

The book is printed by PIE Peter Lang, Brussels, Berlin, Frankfurt am Mein, New York, Oxford, Wien, in the Series “Europe of Cultures” no. 4, as a Europe of Culture Forum. It is a collective volume, which is trying to cover the issues specific to contemporary process of global mobility and of its effects: the encounters of the foreigners. The authors “come” in a forum and try to see how the encounters could not become conflicts. They plead for the concept of crossing, passage(s) from one culture to another. They develop the benefits of the crossing process, explore its roots – colonial experience – and figure its future.

The perspective of the studies is the inter-culturalism, taken as an epistemology not specifically questioned. (There is not an individual part devoted to analyze what the intercultural approach supposes to be done in terms of philosophy of society, in terms of guiding literature, and in terms of leading values.) That is why the literature quoted in the book is completely separate with each study. There are not crossed, but fully independent references there. The intercultural view is simply taken as a framework where a society with the mutual understanding of the inhabitants (irrespective of their roots, and memory) and their creative collective work is designed to develop, but the conflicts, the ghost of the past, and the unfair fight for a respectful group identities still act and still pervert the dream of a good place for all, even for immigrants. What is here disappointing on the Content is that the recent new social trends when the multiculturalism as a large and generous social contract is

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1 A volume funded by the Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations EMRI, Universidade Aberta, Lisbon, Portugal.
theoretically questioned and practically broken, is out of interest. The Content would be much more provocative if some studies would attack the new trends of politics in Europe. The discourse and the practice in the radical extreme Rightist political movements, as the Magyar Garda, or others like this in Italy; the substantial and systematic attacks against the Rroma people in the tabloids – from London and Paris, to Switzerland; the anti-immigrants declarations in elections campaign of the leaders from the moderate political parties, the anti-immigrants declarations at the state level – in Germany, in Netherlands, in France, in Italy; the domestic policies in EU countries abusing the Rroma people, EU citizens, are expelled as illegal immigrants - would be an issue of very contemporary life.

It would be also a signal for the foreigners on what could happen (In the earth quake of May, 2012, the Romanians inhabitants from Ferrara were not received in the municipality tents, because there were not enough places for Italians.)

The Content proposed by the editors is made by 13 different studies with an Introduction signed by Lenia Marquez, Maria Sophia Pimentel Biscaia and Gloria Bastos.

The Introduction is revealing the organizational framework, the main issues opened in the book, the context and some preliminary concepts. The perspective is the UNESCO one, which aims to promote intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding, to support the development of intercultural competences and to develop into the most desirable way of life of our time: THE CROSSING. The challenging points are: the cultural encounters and the fears associated to them; the Otherness in the binary logic Western Self; the history of West Europe colonialism – portrayed as the geographic discoveries. The authors reveal that the multiculturalism was an optimistic attempt of an optimistic world, but the serene world of pre- 9/11, is changed in an “age of terror”. What they did not emphasize enough is that the age is also multi-folded. It is an age of encountering and of networking combined with an age of terror; an age of openness – with the opportunities, resources, and ideologies of openness – hunted by the memories of the citadel life (with barbarous invaders jeopardizing and ruining anything).

The many-folded multiculturalism (rhetorically used, contributed to control societies and minority group accession to resources), the cultural diversity (which is not everywhere multicultural); the fears at the encounter with the other, as the main concept proposed by the authors bases the studies.
The chapters of the book are prefaced by a philosophical analysis, Dynamics of Cultural Landscapes. Identities and Diffusion Process, signed by the professor Joao Jesus Fernandez (a geographer. It is the single non descriptive, but prospective text. It forged the concept of a Cultural Landscape as a concept for mobile context for individual identity. The Dynamic of Cultural Landscape asserts that the new comers model the old territories of an old civilization with their specific markers. As results there appears a new geography of cultures, populations, territories .... What would be especially provocative in the analysis is concerning the evaluation. How the new geography is assessed by the old and new inhabitants? The text is really important, because it is defining the cultural landscape as multi-dimensions framework of human being life: as a landscape coined by the sounds, the smells ... With it, the researchers are invited to explore the real sites and to confirm/infirm the assertion.

The Coimbra professor attached the role of the major dynamic factor in changing culture and to establish the passing possibility to diasporas. The diasporas it is a term taken by professor Fernandez with the meaning of a large and active economically, socially and culturally group with foreign roots. (We do not embrace totally the concept as he coined it. We prefer – having in mind the Romanian history of mobility - to see a vertical dimension in the moving people process. The elites constitute diasporas, easy to relate to other elites in diasporas. They do not have their specific sites to live in, differently by the poor migrants, the unskilled as the literature identified them. The elites define their specific needs, clubs to networking and integration agenda. They are distant by burdening the poor coming from the same country. The poor constitute migrants groups, located differently and living differently.) He is considering a center enactment – in the Diaspora world – and peripheries where the center expands. The propagation of the center is a physical and a symbolical process, too. It is also an endless process.

The text proposed by professor Fernandez deserves a multi level academic lecture and as it deserves a specific analyze. It is also an invitation to a scientific dialogue, to a forum with a specific purpose to a particular approach on how the contemporary networking and mobility affect our landscape is done by the study of Christian Hummelsund Voie: Permeable Borders Lines, which explore the architectural styles expanding.

The other texts are the descriptive materials on global migration process and the stories generated by the status of otherness. Any of the study is instructive
and is fully recommended to be read and used in the scientific work. We would like to specifically emphasize the study on Womens’ Journey to Portugal, (Joana Miranda); “The Haviness of a History that Couldn’t Leave”: Diasporic Trauma in Multicultural Canada, (Belen Martin Lucas); Stories on Lebanese Migrations in the Brazilian Literature (Rosa Maria Sequiera)... There are also several studies dedicated to violence and conflicts. The Colonial Journey: Confrontation between Europe and Africa (Maria Isabel Joao), Colluding Strokes: Imperialistic Brutality and affection in Andre Brinks The Other Side of Silence. (MariaSofia Piementel Biscaia) One is dedicated on the perpetuation of violence and women un-consideration. It is pointed out how the manuals send by home, to educate children in the spirit of home culture is a source of values in conflict with the society where they have to integrate. The study signed by Lenia Marquez, on Nicolas Bouvier, Creating Stories, Mapping Memories: Nicolas Bouvier at Intercultural Crossing, is analyzing how he was learning the far East culture of being respectful to the Otherness and of self developing modesty as a large cultural experience result. Trying to classify scientifically, the texts of the volume proposed are: reflexive and explorative; descriptive. A step before being inquisitive or provocative, (specifically designed to provoke controversies would add interest in the lecture.

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The cover of Peter Lang, Printed House Collection is designed to become a brand. It is inviting the readers in a world of creation and innovation. The work of Massimiliano Fuksas, MyZeil is the symbol of the collection. The contrast of the colors is also a factor to give identity to it.

Concluding it is to recommend the book to the specialists, to the students and last but not least, to the politicians and politician advisers. It could suggest ways of living together in a world of the encountering: the crossing.
EVENTS

Trafficking of Human Beings Workshop - Call for Applications

The Research centre on Identity and Migration Issues, University of Oradea, organizes, in March 2013, the International Workshop:

The Fight against Trafficking of Human Beings in the EU: promoting legal cooperation and victims protections

This workshop is meant to share the information and experiences acquired in the framework of the project with the same title, managed by the University of Coimbra, Portugal, in which our research centre is partner, and financed by the European Commission through Prevention of and the Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union –Directorate Generale Home Affairs

Official language of the workshop: English

Fees: There is no participation fee to attend this workshop, but the travel and accommodation costs are to be covered by the participants.
Welcome to a New Open Access Scientific Journal

*Social Space* is an interdisciplinary Polish-English bilingual journal of monolingual texts. It includes articles, essays, review essays, progress reports, book reviews, discussions, and commentaries. Taking sociology as a departure point, the journal intends to promote a dialogue between scientists working in individual social sciences, including social anthropology, social psychology, social geography, political science, cultural studies, etc. It focuses on the interrelation of society and space by balancing between the sociologists’ finding that space does matter and the human geographers’ belief that space itself explains few, if anything. The journal enables rapid publication and discussion on research work for the benefit of each discipline involved.

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For more details please visit the journal’s webpage: [http://socialspacejournal.eu](http://socialspacejournal.eu)
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GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS

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