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THEMATIC ARTICLES – CHALLENGES OF IMMIGRATION: BETWEEN ADAPTATION AND RETURNING HOME

Romanian Immigrants Worldwide: What makes them Return Home?

Monica ROMAN, Zizi GOSCHIN

Abstract. Since economic factors cannot fully explain the determinants of bilateral migration, this study explores the social and cultural determinants that influence an individual's decision to migrate. Values, norms and interests in a given culture, may determine whether an individual's intention to move translates into actual migration. Work values inherent in different cultures could explain why people move or do not move under the condition of perceived economic advantages of migration. A gravity type migration model is used to incorporate variables related both to economic indicators and work values. It is perhaps the first migration study to use the World Value Survey (WVS) and the European Value Survey (EVS). We use 2000 stock bilateral migration dataset collected by the World Bank. Our findings indicate that if more aspects of work are valued in a country, this country sends more migrants. Also we show that countries with higher extrinsic work value orientation tend to send more migrants, while countries with higher intrinsic work value orientation tend to send fewer migrants. Our finding shows that the value of work and the level of job security in a country may significantly change migration decision.

Keywords: *return migration, Romania, migrants' profile, logistic regression model*

Introduction

Faced with workforce shortages in some economic sectors, prior to the global economic crisis Romania had started to give closer attention to the return migration, as an alternative to boarder opening for foreign workers. Enhanced skills and international knowledge diffusion through return migration have also been seen as additional benefits for the Romanian economy. Although the recent economic crisis temporarily diminished the interest for return migration, it is likely to re-emerge as a matter of interest in the post-crisis environment.

The return decision-making process, as well as the factors which influence the duration of temporary migration of Romanian emigrants is still to be researched. While emigration is generally acknowledged to be the driven by better conditions in the destination country (with wage differentials as a main factor of attraction) knowledge on return migration requires additional qualitative information on the immigrant and its family.

Although understanding the return migration decisions is important for shaping the appropriate migration policies, researches on this topic are scarce and inconclusive in Romania and one of the main reasons may be the lack of appropriate data. We contribute to filling this gap by bringing recent information on Romanian immigrants worldwide. Specifically, we aim to identify the main drivers of return migration in an economic crisis environment and for this purpose we are to model the return decisions of Romanian immigrants using the database issued from our 2010 online survey.

The remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section briefly reviews the literature on return migration. Section 3 describes the online survey which provided the data for this study. Section 4 explains the methodology we employ in the empirical analysis, alongside the selected variables, while Section 5 comments the key results from the econometric modeling. Last, Section 6 offers the concluding comments.

Literature review

Migration flows are neither one-sided nor irreversible. Even in the case of thought to be permanent migration, a large part of the immigrants may later decide to return in the sending country and, if a longer period of time is considered, return migration may reach proportions as high as two thirds of the immigrant workers in Germany and over four fifth in Switzerland (Bohning, 1984, Glytsos, 1988). For the United States, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) have measured the return-migration rates for immigrants coming from 70 countries, over a five year period, finding the highest values for European and North American immigrants (over 30%). They also found that largest part of the immigrants who decided to return home did so within the first five years of residence but, in contrast, immigrants coming from poor and geographically distant countries were less inclined to leave.

Given the diversity of issues brought about by migrants' return to homeland, a multitude of research angles have emerged: the magnitude and dynamics of this

process, demographic characteristics of the returning migrants, factors of influence, duration of stay, influence of the geographic region, reintegration in the homeland society, social and economic effects on the home country, etc. As regards the reasons for returning to homeland, empirical studies identified three main groups of factors that may influence, either directly or indirectly, the return decision: personal attributes of the migrants (age, gender, race, education, etc), family situation, and social, economic and political factors.

One of the most common reasons for return migration is the acquirement of the necessary capital to start a business back home. For instance, Callea (1986) finds out that returning emigrants to Southern European countries most often want to set up an independent enterprise. In the same register, Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) found two main explanations for the migrants' decision to return to their countries of origin, based on their **economic performance**. Firstly, economically successful emigrants return when they have accumulated enough financial resources. Secondly, erroneous information may entail economic failure of some migrants, further triggering the decision to return home (especially if the return costs are low) as earlier works of Da Vanzo (1983) and Pessino (1991) have already pointed out. Similar conclusions are reached by Edin et al. (2000) researching migration to Sweden. They confirmed that it is the least economically successful immigrants who leave. Discriminating between economic and political immigrants, they also indicated that the latter are much less likely to return. In sharp contrast with these findings, Gmelch (1983) questions the relevance of economic-based models in explaining return migration, based on the case of the Irish and Newfoundland returnees, which were motivated primarily by the attachment to the home country or social and familial considerations.

A number of studies have explored the role of the **family**-related issues in the household's decision-making process related to the return migration. Callea (1986) suggested that return decisions of the emigrants originating from Southern European countries are largely based on concern for children's education. Djajic (2008) addressed parents and children conflicting influence in the household's return decision, with the parents trying to keep the family united, while the children prefer to remain in the host country as they are usually better integrated.

Huber and Nowotny (2009) stated that **education**, as well as distance, are the most significant determinants for migrants' duration of stay, while networks are insignificant. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) also pointed to the importance of education: they reported that for the positively selected immigrant flows (i.e. above average skills)

the least skilled migrants will be the first to return homeland. Another aspect discussed in the literature is the potentially high reward in the homeland for the skills acquired abroad. For instance, Iara (2006) documented significantly increased earnings capability of East European immigrants returned from Western Europe.

Distance may also play a role in the return decision: the shorter the geographic distance, the greater the chances to maintain strong ties with family and friends in the homeland. However modern instant communication at low costs and the decreasing costs of transport tend to diminish the impact of this factor.

Exploring the determinants of return migration intentions among the guest workers in Germany based on survey data, Waldorf (1995) reported a strong influence of the satisfaction and **time**-dependent variables and a lesser impact of the personal attributes of the immigrants. In the same register, Dunstmann researched the return intentions of migrant workers in Germany and found three main reasons favoring temporary migration against permanent one: relative price differences between the origin and destination country, enhanced earnings in homeland based on the human capital accumulated abroad, and complementarities between consumption and the environment where consumption takes place. Van Baalen and Muller (2008), analyzing temporary migration to Germany, found that immigrants tend to extend their stay in the receiving country much longer than initially intended, the strongest reason being the delays in reaching their savings plan.

Several studies have focused on **ethnic** return migration specifics as well. For instance, researching the migration behavior of Estonian descendants after the Second World War, Kulu (1998) argues that ethnic return migration over a long period depends mainly on changes in people's values, habits, identity and it is not influenced, neither directly or indirectly, by momentary environmental changes. Tsuda (2010) compares ethnic return migration policies in European and East Asian countries and discuses the measures that can be employed in order to encourage emigrant descendants born and raised abroad to return to their ethnic homeland.

In Romania there are several strands of recent literature which discuss the determinants, scope and effects of the large Romanian emigration starting from the opening of the borders in 1990. Following a first wave of ethnic migration in the early 1990 (mostly Germans, but Jews and Hungarians as well) temporary work migration became preponderantly, increasing especially after the abolition of the Schengen visa and illegal forms of migration escalated as well (Constantin et al, 2008, Goschin et al., 2009). The amplitude of the migration phenomenon made it a matter of concern for

the Romanian society, fueling many public debates and empirical research (Constantin et al, 2004 and 2008, Silasi and Simina, 2008, Roman, 2010, Sandu, 2010 etc).

Return migration has also been approached in a number of studies. Although slightly increasing in the context of the economic downturn in the main destination countries for Romanian emigrants, return migration did not confirm the large figures that had been expected (Serban, 2009), as Romanian economy also faced crisis-related difficulties. Social attitude surveys conducted in countries with large Romanian communities, such as Italy and Spain, have revealed preponderantly negative perceptions of Romanian immigrants (e.g. McMahon, 2011) seemingly with little or no impact on the return flows.

Ghita et al. (2007) found a negative and relatively strong correlation between the return migration ratio and the education index. They emphasized that returnees may bring potential benefits for Romania in terms of work experience, improved productivity, financial capital, and even new technological ideas from developed countries. Sandu (2005) reveals the existence of a territorial clustering type of the return migration to Romania, with 4 percent of the villages accounting for above 60 percent of the total returnees. Building on a country wide representative sample of emigrants returned in Romania, Epstein and Radu (2008) documented significant wage premia for returnees, depending on the educational level of migrants.

The study realized by Sandu (2009) reveals interesting results in respect with Romanians decision to return. The survey *Romanian Communities in Spain* conducted in 2008 shows that a large share of Romanian migrants living in the region of Madrid have the intention to return (71%), while the rest of 29% wished to remain in Spain. In the same study, the author compares the results he obtained with the intentions to return expressed by Romanian migrants in the Enquesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (ENI) realised by the Spanish National Institute for Statistics at the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007. He found out that only 7% of Romanian migrants living in Madrid region wished to return to Romania. The difference is accounted for by the different ways the questionnaires were designed, but also by the fact that in 2007 the beginning of crisis has already been felt in Spain, while Romanian governments denied the existence of a crisis in Romania up until the very end of 2008.

Shima (2010) explored return migration of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants in connection to the labour market outcomes of the returnees. She conducted a model based analysis of wage premium, using data from World Bank surveys and concluded that the labour market upgrading among Romanian returnees has a positive

relationship with the intentions of a permanent return and the wage premium.

Therefore, the likelihood that the Romanian migrants return permanently is still low compared to circulatory or seasonal migration, conclusion that is also supported by other researchers (Barbulescu 2009, Marcu 2010).

The database

Any attempt to measure migration related issues is marked by the shortage of official data. Official Romanian statistics refer to permanent emigration exclusively; therefore they capture only a small percent of the real dimension of this phenomenon. More information on temporary migration came from the migration statistics of the main destination countries of Romanian migration, such as Spain, Italy, Germany, Canada, USA. Additional information may be provided by special surveys in countries hosting large Romanian communities, such are those financed by Soros Foundation in 2006, 2008 and 2011. Even combining all these data sources, it is difficult to draw a reliable picture of Romanian emigration, due to statistical shortcomings and measurement problems associated to temporary and illegal migration (Tompea, 2009).

In order to obtain the necessary data on Romanian emigration we conducted an online survey (Romanian Emigration Survey- RES henceforth) that covered a period of almost five months: between July 22nd and December 11th 2010. As it was started during the summer holidays, when the availability of respondents was low, most of the respondents completed the questionnaire in the autumn. The final database included information from 1514 respondents in 52 countries. Respondents were asked questions on a variety of topics covering a large research agenda: income, employment, remittances, regions of origin and destination, graduated studies both in Romania and in emigration country, length of migration and intention to return to Romania.

Due to limited financial resources and lack of data on spatial dispersion of Romanian immigrants, the research team turned to an online questionnaire, instead of face to face or postal survey methods. Moreover, the online format is the cheapest and quickest way to build an extensive, various and territorially dispersed database. The questionnaire employed in our survey accommodates a suite of 51 questions of various types: simple and multiple questions, questions with multiple listed answers, quantitative and qualitative questions, and also open ended questions that gave the respondents the opportunity to express freely their ideas.

The questionnaire was structured as follows:

- General information: personal attributes (age, gender, religion), duration of migration
- Geographic information: Romanian county of origin, destination country and region
- Family: total number of children and number of children under 18, the number of family members living in the immigration country.
- Education: last graduated studies in Romania, studies in the emigration country
- Professional status: profession, current occupation, economic sector of the first job abroad, current economic sector of activity
- Employment and earnings: monthly earnings for the first job abroad, current monthly earnings
- Remittances: remittent or not, top three reasons to remit, annual remitted amount
- Return intention and reasons.

Research methodology and variables

Our objective is to test, from an econometric modeling perspective, the influence of various factors on the return decision of the Romanian immigrants. We expect return migration intentions to be influenced by personal characteristics, social links to destination country, economic performance and space attributes as well.

In order to assess the impact of the relevant factors that affect the return decision of the Romanian immigrants we rely on the logit model, frequently used in the literature on return migration decision. For instance, Waldorf (1995) has used logit models of the intention to return to homeland of guest workers in Germany, while van Baalen and Muller (2008) employed a multinomial logit model to identify the determinants of the probabilities of revising the intended duration of stay.

The intention of returning to Romania was included in the econometric approach as a binary variable coded 1 if the emigrant has the intention to return and 0 otherwise, being the dependent variable of the logistic regression model. The variables, numerical or categorical, describe the personal characteristics of migrants, the social and economic links to destination country, the links to Romania and the space of emigration.

Demographic predictors are used to describe the **personal characteristics of Romanian migrants**, including age, gender and religion. In our data, the average age of migrants is 36 and they are 63% male. Religious affiliation is captured through a dummy, 1 if the migrant is orthodox, 0 - otherwise. The distribution according to religious affiliation is dominated by orthodox denomination (77%), whiles the rest of 23% is covered by other denominations: catholic, protestant, neo protestant and no religion.

Education, as a measure for migrants' human capital, is included in the same category that describes the individual characteristic of migrants. The last level of education attended is a scale variable ranging from 1 to 8 and coded as follows: 1- primary school, 2- vocational school, 3-secondary education (high school), 4- second level of secondary education, 5-first level of tertiary education, 6- higher education, 7-master degree, 8-doctoral studies.

Figure 1: Education of Romanian migrants



Source: processed by the authors using RES data, 2010

The migrants in the sample are university graduates and postgraduates in large share (64%) and another important part of migrants have secondary education (28%), while graduates of vocational school (4%) or primary school (3%) have small shares. This distribution is skewed to the upper education levels, which are over represented among Romanian migrants in the sample, as a consequence of the survey methodology. The questionnaires were

administrated on line, therefore all the migrants in the sample are computer and internet literate, having at least the basic knowledge. Their human capital is superior compared to Romanian population and it is expected to have a higher level of education.

The **social and family links to receiving country** were captured by a group of three variables. The level of integration in the receiving society is evaluated through the number of years spent in the migration country. The lengths of migration stay have an average of 6 years, confirming that most of the Romanian migration is new. The family integration in receiving country is described through dummies coded with 1 if the migrant has partner or parents in the same country, and 0-otherwise. Out of the migrants having a partner, 80% live with their partner in destination country household, confirming the family type of Romanian migration. Only 10% instead have at least one parent in the receiving country.

The **economic links to receiving country**, as a picture of the economic integration of migrants, are described by occupational status (0 = unoccupied person, 1= occupied person) and by migrants income. Income was described using 11 classes of income, with an average of 5.77, corresponding to an average monthly level of 2385 USD.

Additionally, the remitting behaviour was included in the analysis as a measure for the **links to the sending country**. It was employed as a binary variable coded 1 if the emigrant sends money to the relatives living in Romanian and 0 otherwise. Remittances are one of the positive outcomes of the economic activity of emigrants, since they are a financial support for the families left home and also increase their life quality. The share of Romanian migrants in the sample that remit money is 54%.

Furthermore, dummy variables for the main **countries of destination** were constructed; the migrants' distribution by receiving country is presented in figure 2. Most of the migrants are concentrated in nine countries, mostly European. Among non European countries with significant share of migrants there are, as expected, Canada (10%) and USA (8%). In Australia are living about 1% of Romanian migrants in the sample, while other countries receive less than 1% migrants. We assume migrants living outside Europe would prove lower probabilities to return compared to migrants from European countries.

Figure 2. Migrants distribution by receiving country



Source: processed by the authors using RES data, 2010

Empirical findings

The econometric model considers migrants' intention to return to Romania as being the effect variable. The model is statistically significant and the significance of Hosmer & Lemeshow test (0.255) proves that the model fits the data. At the same time, the model explains in a good proportion the return intentions across Romanian migrants worldwide (Nagelkerke R^2=0.155, Cox&Snell R^2=0.110).

Table 1 displays the results of the logistic regression analysis. The personal characteristics of migrants have different impacts on the propensity to return. Return intentions do not seem to be significantly affected by respondents' age, while gender is a significant factor in the model. Males have a significantly higher probability to return compared to females.

Religious affiliation is also a significant factor; the migrants with orthodox affiliation are 1.5 times more likely to return than migrants with other affiliations. The migrants with other religious affiliation than orthodox usually have another ethnicity than Romanian: the reformat or catholic migrants are mostly Germans or Hungarians, and their ethnic migration is most likely to be permanent, compared to Romanians.

Table 1: Logistic regression of return migration intention (N=1514)

	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Migrants personal characteristics				
Age	0,008	0,009	0,401	1,008
Gender	0,538	0,171	0,002	1,713
Orthodox	0,402	0,191	0,036	1,494
Education	-0,057	0,048	0,235	0,945
Social links to receiving country				
Partner	0,627	0,177	0,000	1,872
Parents	-0,329	0,334	0,326	0,720
Time in receiving country	0,007	0,014	0,624	1,007
Economic links to receiving country				
Income	-0,063	0,032	0,046	0,939
Occupational status	0,236	0,241	0,326	1,266
Links to Romania: Remitting behavior	0,570	0,159	0,000	1,768
Receiving country ("other countries" is the reference group)			0,001	
Italy	0,152	0,235	0,518	1,164
Spain	-0,111	0,271	0,682	0,895
Canada	-0,935	0,304	0,002	0,392
UK	-0,006	0,284	0,984	0,994
USA	-0,904	0,324	0,005	0,405
Germany	-0,754	0,333	0,024	0,471
France	-0,847	0,340	0,013	0,429
Austria	-0,568	0,525	0,279	0,567
Switzerland	0,290	0,450	0,519	1,337
Constant	-2,246	0,536	0,000	0,106

Source: processed by the authors using RES data, 2010

The level of education is not significantly affecting the intentions to return. We have also controlled for education evaluated through dummies, the resulted effect being the same.

Social links to receiving country provide significant and various effects. Attachments to people in the destination country (presence of a partner or parents in the same country) seem to play an important role in the likelihood of intending to return. The partner effect is the strongest factor, increasing the

probability to return with 1,8 times compared to the persons living without their partner. The result could seem surprising, but it reflects the family type of Romanian migration, characterized by the fact that both partners are migrating, mainly for economic reasons, with the intention to return when they are achieving their migration objectives.

On the other hand, the presence of the parents in the same country has a negative effect, though without statistical significance. The parents' presence suggests a stronger attach to destination country that decreases the probability to return.

The length of stay abroad is not statistically significant, but it should be mentioned that, against our expectations, it has a positive impact on the likelihood of intending to return.

Economic factors have contrary effects on return intentions. The occupational status does not seem to have a significant effect on return intentions. However, the income level has a significant and negative impact: the higher is the income; the lower is the probability to return.

The ties to the origin country increase the strength of the return intentions. The maintenance of the links with Romanian relatives by sending them money shows an unequivocally positive correlation with return intentions. Those who remit are more connected to Romania, being significantly more inclined to return.

Finally, the destination country included in the analysis as categorical variable is overall statistically significant. Destination country dummies indicate that Romanians living in Canada, USA, Germany and France are significantly more likely to intend to return than their peers from the group described as "Other countries". The intention to return does not seem to be affected by the distance to country of origin, since Romanians from both European and non European countries present the same returning pattern. The effect is negative for all of these countries, but, against our expectations, the effect is positive – though not statistically significant- in the case of Italy, the country receiving the largest share of Romanian migrants and a country with cultural and linguistic proximities to Romania. In the years following the Romanian accession the EU (2007) there were large media campaigns in Italy against Romanian migrants (Uccellini, 2010) that might have pushed them to consider the returning home.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to identify the main drivers of return migration among Romanian immigrants worldwide and to measure the impact of the relevant factors on the propensity to return. We used the database resulting from the online survey we have conducted from August to December 2010, allowing us to capture the influence of the recent global economic crisis.

In the line with neoclassical migration theory, according to which migration is a utility maximizing behavior by individuals, we found that income has a negative impact on return intentions, and some personal characteristics such as gender and religious affiliation to orthodox denomination have the same effect. The presence of a partner in destination country is increasing the probability to return. The destination country also has a negative and statistically significant effect for the case of Canada, USA, France and Germany.

The return decision-making process of Romanian emigrants is still to be researched. Although some Romanian migrants are recently returning home, there is no clear evidence in the literature that the crisis has provoked or will generate a significant return. Economic crisis has not caused a wave of mass return of the Romanians working abroad, and those who have returned to the country most likely will stay for a short period of time.

Our research could potentially brought about useful information for decision makers, as understanding the reasons behind the return decisions may help them design the best suited migration policies. Unfortunately, at this moment there are not being developed policy measures in managing return migration in Romania. Concerning the potential returnees, measures such is the signature of bilateral cooperation agreements with the subject to support returnees once back in Romania would be necessary for the sustainability of returning process.

In sum, the picture of the Romanian return migration is complex and changeable, making difficult to draw a clear image at this moment in time. Has Romanian emigration reached its peak and more return migration is to be expected in the future? Further research in a post-crisis environment will be needed to answer this question.

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Which Prospective Immigrants are Political Communities Morally Obliged to Include?

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Abstract. This paper begins by applying two "adverse impact theories of inclusion" in the literature in democratic theory to the situation of members of communities that have been shaped by U.S. intervention that later decide to immigrate to the United States. Both theories can be applied to respond to adverse impact claims arising from the solicitation of migrant laborers to serve the public interests of wartime production and infrastructure development. But they do not adequately address positive claims to inclusion by non-citizens who are already contributing to the welfare of the community they wish to join by supporting U.S. interests abroad or participating in civic initiatives as unauthorized residents. I argue that the contributions of both groups should be recognized as the basis for a priority claim to inclusion as legal permanent residents and eventual citizens of the United States.

Keywords: *ethics, policy, obligations, citizenship, United States, Mexico, regularization*

Introduction

The act of extending citizenship, or a pathway to citizenship through legal permanent residence to a new member at birth or through naturalization ordinarily represents a commitment on the part of a state to protect that person's civil, political and social rights throughout his life.

Nearly every nation accepts this responsibility towards the children of its existing citizens who are accorded citizenship status at birth through the principle of *jus sanguinis.* Most countries in the Western Hemisphere including the United States continue to accept additional responsibility towards children who are born within their territorial jurisdiction through the principle of *jus soli.* And nations assume the discretion to extend citizenship as a status and entitlement to its rights

and obligations subsequent to birth through their legal immigration and naturalization procedures. These legal principles for extending citizenship do not fully account for a state's potential obligations towards persons who have been shaped by its economic, diplomatic, and military interventions abroad to the extent that it would be difficult, if not impossible for them to continue to live in their country of origin. A sympathetic case in this class of persons could include military support personnel in Iraq who have been targeted for collaborating with the United States. Nor do they account for a nation's potential obligations towards non-citizen residents who are contributing to American communities as though they were citizens, such as unauthorized immigrant children who were raised and educated in the United States.

These examples raise larger questions that speak to the concerns of normative democratic theorists about who should be included in a political community, or at the very least, allowed to take part in its collective decision-making processes. Apart from its existing legal mechanisms for extending the rights and obligations of citizenship to new members, should nations assume further responsibilities towards persons who have been affected by its policy interventions abroad? How far should this responsibility extend? Should a nation be required to includeall non-citizens that it has impacted through its policy decisions as immigrants? Or should it prefer non-citizens who are already giving back to the community they wish to join?

In its simplest formulation, the "all-affected interests" principle in democratic theory suggests that a political community has a moral responsibility to extend the participatory rights that we ordinarily associate with citizenship to non-citizens who are affected by a foreign state's decision-making processes. The most effective way to ensure that a foreign national is included in a nation's democratic decision-making process is to include him as a potential citizen. This feature of civic membership and its rights and obligations forms the basis for Robert Goodin (2007) and Rogers Smith's (2010) proposals to extend a state'sobligations to all persons whose interests are harmed by its laws, policies and institutions. Both accounts could be useful as a way of describing why non-citizens might have an "adverse impact claim" against a state that has intervened in the affairs of their community, resulting in diminished economic opportunities or personal security for its citizens at home. An "adverse impact claim" stems from a moral argument that states which intervene in the affairs of other nations ought to provide compensation to

foreign nationals for any harm that can be directly attributed to their policy decisions over time. This compensation may take the form of economic assistance, preferential access to that country's labor market through a new guest worker program, or reserved visa quotas for citizens of the affected community. The form of acceptable restitution for an adverse impact claim will depend on the wishes of the affected persons, who may prefer economic assistance in their communities of origin over authorization to reside in the United States.

One problem with Goodin and Smith's proposals is that they treat foreign nationals who have been shaped by another state's laws, policies and institutions as unwitting victims. They do not fully account for a state's moral claims to non-citizens that volunteer to serve on its behalf. Nor do they fully recognize the claimsof non-citizen residentswho are already contributing to the welfare of the communities where they live without the legal right to stay in the country.

States have a greater moral responsibility to non-citizens who voluntarily contribute to their well-being at home and abroad than non-citizens who were passively affected by their policies. Some of them will want to remain in, or return to their country of origin. But if they want to immigrate to the country they served, or be permitted to stay in the communities they contributed to as residents, they should receive preference over other applicants for immigration benefits.

The Principle of All-Affected Interests

The all-affected interests principle is cited in a large body of academic literature devoted to the question "who ought to be enfranchised" or included as a full member of the political community with a right to participate in its democratic decision-making processes. Here, I redeploy the principle to apply it to a much broader set of moral claims that persons without a present or potential claim to legal citizenship status can make on a state that has shaped their present or future interests through its policy decisions.Non-citizens who are living in a country without a pathway to citizenship are particularly vulnerable to abuses of their basic rights if they either lack the ability to participate in a state's decision-making processes. Non-citizen residents also stand to be insufficiently compensated by giving back to the community in the same way as other members of society without obtaining the full rights and benefits that come from membership in that

political community. For instance, non-citizen workers might pay taxes without having the opportunity to elect representatives that share their priorities in how community resources will be distributed.

To avoid confusion in how I am applying the all-affected interests principle here, it is first necessary to separate the question of whom the political community should consider itself obliged to from the question of how it should discharge these obligations. Proponents of the all-affected principle often address both questions at once. They argue that the appropriate response to a political community's actions which harmed non-citizens is to include them in a state's process of democratic decision-making (Song, 2012: 48-50). This approach threatens to burden states with responsibilities that are not proportionate to the lasting impact of their policy decisions on non-citizens. A state should not be held as responsible for the impact of policy decisions that took place in the distant past, where its impact on a non-citizen was indirect, or where the harm in question can be attributed to multiple responsible parties. In such cases, a response short of including affected persons as prospective citizens can be justified. We also need to consider the impact of any decision to accept responsibility by providing non-citizens with compensation or immigration benefits on a state's stability, or its ability to meet its obligations to current members. Finally, we need to consider the interests and wishes of the non-citizens who were affected by another state's policy decisions. For instance, we might consider whether former guestworkers and their families in communities that are dependent on remittances from the United States really want to continue to migrate to the United States. Would they rather obtain the means to pursue a living in their country of origin? In the latter case, the United States could fulfill its moral obligations to former guestworkers and their families by providing development assistance to sending communities in Mexico.

In his response to one version of the question regarding who should be included in the scope of a political society's community of obligations beyond its formal members, Dahl (1990: 49) begins by stating that "every person who is affected by the decisions of a government should have a right to participate in that government." This formulation of the all-affected principle provides a response to the question of whom the political community is responsible to and how it should discharge its responsibilities at the same time. If we leave the "how" question open, we can restate the all-affected principle as providing that "every person whose interests have been harmed by the decisions of a government ought to be

recognized as having a potential claim on the state and its citizens." My substitution of "potential claim" for "a right to political participation" arises in part from criticisms of the all-affected principle that it does not possess an adequate mechanism for limiting claims based on harms resulting from past policy decisions. A nation like the United States that is heavily involved in world affairs has impacted persons in nearly every country in the world through its cultural influences, economic relationships, and diplomatic and military intervention to some degree. The problems that special claims and obligations are intended to address come to mind here. If the U.S. were to recognize every person's claim based on harms arising from its past policies equally by providing restitution to foreign nationals, or including non-citizen residents who claim to be wronged as immigrants, it might undermine its ability to honor its obligations towards its own disadvantaged citizens.

This presents us with the difficulty of weighting harms, as illustrated through the following example. By the early twentieth century, U.S. labor contractors began to solicit Mexican nationals to work on the railroads and in agriculture. Many of these workers and their families were deported when they were no longer needed during the Great Depression. A renewed demand for their labor during the Second World War prompted the U.S. government to institute a guest worker initiative known as the Bracero program which was renewed until 1964.(Reisler, 1976; Garcia, 1980). The solicitation of Mexican laborers by both the U.S. government and private business interests had a mixed impact on the workers in question. On the one hand, they agreed to the practice to obtain the immediate benefit of increased income. On the other hand, employers frequently violated the terms of their contracts with the Bracero workers. When their labor was not in demand, they were as vulnerable to deportation as their fathers who came before the Great Depression. Their families and communities became locked into a pattern of dependence on remittances from the United States as a pathway to economic advancement.

Should the United States government be held accountable for a policy that entrenched a pattern of dependence on remittances from the United States in migrant-sending communities? Who else ought to be held responsible, and to what extent? First, we need to account for the role of the decision-maker whose action was alleged to have harmed the individual, apart from the role of other decision-makers including the non-citizen and his own government. The U.S. government

enacted the legislation that authorized the importation of Mexican labor that became known as the Bracero program. It did so to serve a national interest during wartime, and to assist in agricultural production for the benefit of private interests until 1964 (Zamora, 2009; Vargas, 2011). But the arrangement resulted from a collective agreement with the Mexican government, and individual agreements with the workers, which were originally designed to serve the interests of both parties. If a claim from harms resulting from the agreement itself (inadequate wages, the possibility that the contract would not be renewed), the worker could not hold the U.S. government solely responsible. His own government was partly responsible for his situation, as was his own decision to take part in the program for his own benefit. The direct harm in question came when the agreement with Mexico was breached through the importation of laborers by business interests, with the collusion of U.S. officials, allowing for a deterioration of working conditions (Craig, 1971; Calavita, 1992).

Second, we need to account for the passage of time and the distance between a state's policy decision and the harm that it was alleged to have caused to foreign nationals today.

Apart from the Braceros themselves, the lives of entire communities were changed as the result of the program and the pattern of circular migration to and from the United States that it perpetuated (Massey et al, 1987). So,are the children of the guest workers who were left behind in Mexico while their fathers worked in the abroad justified in holding the United States responsible for how their interests may have been affected by the suspension of the Bracero program in 1964? They would have benefitted from the income obtained from their fathers in the form of remittances, but they would have suffered from the inability to follow the same path legally. After the suspension of the Bracero program and subsequent limitations that were placed on legal migration from Mexico in the 1960s, former guest workers had two unfavorable choices available to them. They could either suffer diminished opportunities at home in a community that was now dependent on remittances, or take the greater risks of following in their fathers' footsteps by entering and working in the U.S. without authorization (Feibelman, 2010). Those who remained in Mexico could claim that the suspension of the Bracero program harmed them by curtailing the opportunities that they expected would be available to them. But their claims are indirect. They do not result from an established relationship between the U.S. government and the affected foreign national,

whose harm was an externality of the former's decisions that it cannot be expected to have been aware of.

Insofar as prospective migrants in Mexico that were affected by the suspension of the Bracero program decided to follow in their father's footsteps, in spite of the lack of authorization from the United States government to do so, they entered into a direct, albeit not consensual, relationship with the state and its citizens. Theirclaims against the United States may be indirect and attenuated, if they were based on past decisions that did not act to directly encourage the children of the original parties of the contract to migrate. But they might have a more direct basis to assert claims against individual citizens and interest groups for soliciting their labor without sponsoring them for legal status or adequately compensating them for their work. They might also argue that the U.S. government sends mixed messages about their ability to work in the U.S. through the selective enforcement of its immigration laws.

Third, we need to consider the interests of citizens who believe they are being disadvantaged by the arrival of foreign laborers, whether as guest workers in the Bracero period or unauthorized immigrant workers today. A community of claims and obligations, as I am presenting the idea here, is a two-way relationship in which the interests of both parties that are affected by their interactions need to be accounted for. Unauthorized immigrants who continue to enter the U.S. and settle there may have been adversely impacted, to some degree, by a number of U.S. decisions from the initial intervention of U.S. business interests in Mexico to the suspension of the Bracero program. At the same time, some citizens may also claim adverse impacts arising from the decision of migrants to continue to follow in the footsteps of previous generations by migrating to work in the United States, even after the former withdrew its consent for the program. This is especially true of citizens who claim that they were disproportionately impacted by competition for scarce resources (i.e. low skilled jobs) with unauthorized immigrants (Briggs, 2003). But it is important that we account for the role of the decision-maker who is alleged to have brought about the adverse impact in question. The decision of unauthorized immigrants to continue to migrate, and then to settle in the U.S. cannot be attributed wholly to themselves. Other players, including the U.S. government in its haphazard approach to immigration policymaking and enforcement, have shaped the decision-making processes of the migrants turned settlers. Citizens who claim to be adversely impacted by unauthorized immigration

need to look to their own governmentin seeking redress for any damages they may claim to have incurred because they had to compete with migrants for resources (Smith, 2011).

On the whole, a limited version of the all-affected principle remains useful as a reminder to countries that benefit from guest worker programs that they may have continued responsibilities to communities that have become dependent on remittances after the program is suspended. I have already suggested that a country that benefits from a guest worker arrangement cannot be held completely responsible for its lasting impacts. In the case of the Bracero program, Mexico is responsible for its part in negotiating the agreement in the first place. The Bracero workers agreed to the conditions of the program, even though they might have reasonably expected that they would be able to continue to migrate to the U.S. every season indefinitely. These considerations might serve as a starting point for limiting the scope of the all-affected principle in this situation. The U.S. government and business interests might be held responsible for compensating migrants who were shut out from the U.S. labor market after 1964, in light of the benefits they obtained from the program during the twenty-two preceding years. This compensation might take the form of pension payments for service performed during the period, or economic assistance to communities that continued to send workers to the U.S. illegally after the program was suspended, so they can become self-sufficient at home. The U.S. government might provide workers who continue to follow seasonal migration patterns initiated during the Bracero program with immigration benefits, as it did for Special Agricultural Workers as part of the 1986 IRCA amnesty program (Kerwin, 2010: 7).But the Bracero program never came with the expectation that guest workers would be able to adjust to permanent residence. It is not reasonable to expect that their descendants who continue to migrate back and forth from Mexico should expect to be able to permanently immigrate to the United States, or have an eventual say in the formation of its laws as fully enfranchised citizens simply because they were affected by the U.S. government's past guest worker policies.

The Principle of "Constituted Identities"

So far, I have limited a state's responsibility to foreign nationals who claim to be harmed by its policies abroad by considering how theymay have benefitted

from the policy in question, and accounting for the role of other parties to the decision. I asked how states might tailor compensation claims to the wishes of the affected parties, the terms of original agreements between intervening states and affected non-citizens, and the assistance that non-citizens need to be secure and self-sufficient in their own community. The version of the all-affected principle we are working with now asks states to accept a moral responsibility to all non-citizens who might be affected by the externalities of past immigration and foreign policy decisions without demanding that they enfranchise and include affected persons abroad as potential citizens. But there are still issues of over-inclusiveness that must be addressed. Where do we draw the line in establishing who has been sufficiently affected by a foreign state's policy decisions to deserve some form of compensation? And how do we account for the interests of present-day citizens in limiting their responsibility for their government's past immigration or foreign policy decisions?

In an effort to respond to similar questions, political scientist Rogers M. Smith has proposed an adaptation of "the all-affected principle" that considers the degree to which an intervening state has "constituted the identities" of non-citizens through its policy decisions that have implications that extend beyond its enfranchised citizens. The principle of constituted identities begins from the standpoint that "constitutional democracies have obligations to assist and, in some cases, to include as full citizens persons they have coercively affected" (Smith, 2010: 280).A state's laws, policies and institutions can "coercively constitute" the identities of a non-citizen when they shape his future plans in ways that make it very difficult for him to conceive of his life choices as being possible and worthwhile in his country of origin.To aid in determining whether a state has shaped a person's context for future choices and aspirations, Smith asks whether the intervening state has shaped the person's scope of life choices in a way that would severely hinder his ability to follow the way of life pursued by previous generations in his family or community. These questions point to the possibility that an external political community can socialize a non-citizen living in another country to the point that it is difficult for him to conceive of himself as having a life worth living in his community of origin. This may be seen as an additional "pull factor" leadingprospective migrants to enter and settle in a country whether or not they are able to obtain authorization to do.

Smith argues that "a political community becomes unambiguously obliged

towards those outside its current boundaries of membership" when "governments assert the right to fine, incarcerate, or deport those who disobey pertinent governmental laws. . . thereby discouraging the formation of identities with the sorts of values, aspirations, and affiliations subject to penalty" (Smith, 2010: 283). The United States has special obligations to members of groups who can make this claim based on the lasting effect of U.S. occupation or intervention in a country's political and economic affairs. A potential application of this claim could be made by citizens of the Philippines who have to wait more than two decades to reunite with their U.S. citizen family members in the United States (U.S. State Department Visa Bulletin, 2012). Using Smith's principle of constituted identities, the citizens of the Philippines can make a moral claim that they ought to be given preferred access to immigrant visas to the United States based on the lasting impact of their country's occupation by the United States from 1898 to 1946. Citizens of the Phillippines with a special connection to the United States through their family's service in the U.S. military during World War II have an even stronger moral claim to immigration benefits based on their contributions to the United States. Until February 2009, hundreds of thousands of Filipino soldiers who fought alongside U.S. forces during the Second World War were ineligible for veterans benefits and naturalization privileges ordinarily extended to non-citizens for their wartime service (Raimundo, 2010). This case presents a potential claim to inclusion that extends beyond the constituted identities framework. In this case, the veterans were not just residents of a country whose lives were passively shaped by an occupying force. They went a step further by actively seeking out opportunities to serve in support of U.S. interests abroad. This should be weighed in favor of a veteran and his descendant's future claims to U.S. immigration benefits.

The "constituted identities" principle does not unambiguously define the outer boundaries of the United States' community of claims and obligations. But some groups on Smith's account clearly have a stronger claim than others. Distinctions that influence the scope of a community's obligation may be described in terms of passive versus active influences; indirect versus direct influences; and the bargaining power of the individual's community of origin. First, the strength of the non-citizen's claim on another political community is influenced by how direct and persistent his interactions have been with the latter entity, either as an individual, or through the mediation of his community of origin as its member.Citizens of a country that has not experienced direct and sustained U.S.

intervention in its affairs, like Nepal, could not claim to have had their identities constituted in the same way as the citizens of Guatemala, whose citizens are constantly being shaped by interactions with the U.S. and its citizens to their benefit and detriment (Menjivar and Abrego, 2012: 1391-1395).Second, the strength of a non-citizen's claims may be influenced by the bargaining power of the individual's community of origin in relationship to the United States, and the direct economic or political implications on the individual of being the member of a weaker state. For instance, using coercion as the determinant factor, the citizens of Canada have had their identities shaped by their interactions with the U.S. more than citizens of most other nations, owing to proximity, personal contact, and economic integration. But these influences have been mostly consensual, and have not undermined the development of a thriving economy with opportunities for its citizens at home, or a distinct political culture. Their claims on the U.S. are less urgent than the claims of El Salvador's citizens, which experienced U.S. intervention in that country's domestic affairs resulting in the mass migration of its citizens to the U.S. seeking political asylum during the 1980s (Coutin, 2011).

A state's obligations towards non-citizens should vary to the extent that they have been shaped and socialized by a foreign government's laws, policies and institutions. We can imagine a series of spheres of state influence and obligation centered on the community of persons who live within the state and are always subject to its authority. Foreign nationals that have experienced direct and sustained intervention by another state, like the residents of Guatemala in relation to the United States, can be placed in an intermediate circle of responsibility. In the outside circle we would place foreign nationals who are minimally shaped by that state's policies. The inner circle should include both citizens and persons who were brought to their country of residence at a young age, where they were socialized for an extended periods in public institutions to think of themselves as participants in the educational, social, civic, and economic life of their country of residence. They have legal citizenship status in another country, to which they are connected through their parents' remaining social ties. But their socialization in the U.S. and absence from the country where they have legal citizenship status and ancestral connections makes it difficult for them to conceive of the latter as an alternative context of choice where they can plan their futures. This is how the potential

beneficiaries of the DREAM ACT describe their situation (Rincon, 2008).[1] They will be deprived of their context of choice and at a loss to act on their claims as *de jure* citizens of their nationality of origin if they are discovered and deported (Durbin, 2011).

Recognizing Contributions: Civic Membership as Reciprocity

But DREAM ACTivists who have asserted themselves on the national political stage have chosen to make a more comprehensive claim to inclusion on the basis of their past contributions and willingness to serve their country of residence in the future (Perez, 2009; Soto, 2011).[2]They are not simply resting their claims on the adverse impact of immigration policies on their lives. Contribution-based advocacy informed by an assertion of their identity as members of the American political community underlies the political successes that DREAM ACTivists made in the 2000s towards convincing representatives of Congress to sponsor legislation that provides for a pathway to regularization and eventual citizenship (Bruno, 2010). This type of advocacy is an example that highlights the value of incorporating the ideal of civic membership as reciprocity into principles for extending civic membership that use other aspects of a state's responsibility in relationship with its members as a starting point, including the constitution of identities.

The principle of constituted identities would also benefit from a further account of the connection between how a non-citizen has responded to a state's identity constituting actions, and the degree to which the political community has an obligation to include. U.S. military intervention abroad over time will alter the context of choice of every person living in the affected country. A non-citizen's

[1]S. 952, "Development, Relief and Education for Minors Act of 2011," 112th Congress (United States), 1st Session, 11 May 2011. The DREAM Act is legislation that has been introduced in every session of Congress since 2001 that would provide a pathway to legal permanent resident status for unauthorized immigrants who entered the United States prior to their 16th birthday provided that they attend college or serve in the military. Although this legislation has yet to be enacted into law by Congress, the Obama Administration extended temporary relief from removal for DREAM Act eligible young unauthorized U.S. residents on 15 June 2012.

[2]The term "DREAM ACTivists" refers to young unauthorized immigrant residents of the United States who are engaged in a political advocacy campaign to encourage U.S. legislators to enact DREAM Act legislation that would provide them with a pathway to legal permanent resident status.

identity and the economic and political choices available to him may have been passively, if unwillingly constituted by the intervening state. But among those affected, the U.S. arguably has a higher level of responsibility to a person who, whether out of necessity or choice, has taken on the risk of working or fighting for the intervening country, and thereby separating himself from his community of origin. An Iraqi interpreter in Operation Enduring Freedom has not only had his identity constituted by the U.S., but has acted upon this identity by assumingobligations that benefit the intervening state. Within the United States, migrants who served as soldiers in wartime differentiated themselves from persons in their countries of origin whose context of choice was passively, if involuntarily altered by U.S. intervention. In all cases, the assumption of obligations by the adversely impacted party should be taken into consideration when accounting for the state's responsibility to affected non-citizens.

Civic membership is based on more than the right to political enfranchisement in order to take part in the decision-making process by which one is governed. It is informed in part by one's socialization and identification with the community's values forged from its past experiences. But these values do not just pertain to a community's commitment to take responsibility for those whom it has adversely affected. They also point to the responsibilities of members of society to contribute to the common good. From this perspective, what is missing from Goodin's formulation of the "all-affected" principle and incompletely addressed in Smith's "constituted identities" principle is an account of the obligations that citizens should be expected to perform for the benefit of their community. We need an account of what both existing and prospective citizens are doing, or should be doing to ensure that their collective institutions are able to keep fulfilling the tasks that members of society expect from the state as entitlements.

We also need an account of how the community ought to respond to cases in which members of society are contributing to the common good in extraordinary ways. This might involve rewarding the service of persons who continually perform acts of public service that are personally demanding to a degree beyond what we expect of any given citizen to maintaincollective institutions. In countries whose national identity has been shaped by the ideal of the citizen-soldier tradition, military service in wartime might serve as an example that could fulfill this requirement (Krebs, 2006). This might also involve recognizing the service of persons who contribute to collective institutions, even though they cannot in turn

make the same claims to rights and benefits as other members of society simply by virtue of their status. This would help to account for the example of young unauthorized American residents who are already participating and contributing to the broader political community without the assurance that they will be permitted to remain there, much less claim the full range of rights and benefits that their citizen peers are entitled to.

Potential Implications for U.S. Immigration Policy

How then should the United States respond to claims to immigration benefits by persons who have been shaped by its laws, policies, and institutions, either as U.S. residents or as foreign nationals in communities directly affected by U.S. intervention? First, we should prioritize claims to legal permanent residence on the basis of a non-citizen's actual or prospective contributions to the nation that they wish to join. In many cases, prospective immigrants abroad, and unauthorized residents in the U.S. are not just victims of that country's foreign policies that undermined their personal security or ability to pursue a livelihood in their home country. They are already participants, and in some cases, initiators, of a two-way relationship in which they have made significant economic, social, and civic contributions, for which they have only received partial benefits and limited recognition in the form of wages and services. This describes the position of non-citizens abroad who incurred risks in supporting U.S. military interests. Special immigrant visa programs that provide immigration benefits to a limited number of Iraqi and Afghan nationals who fear they will be subject to retaliation based on their service to the U.S. military are valuable as a first step linking service to the U.S. overseas to a pathway to residence in the United States (Government Accountability Office, 2010). This population-specific program should be extended to all similarly situated persons who have risked their lives in serving U.S. diplomatic or military interests abroad. Some unauthorized long-term residents of the United States may also have strong contribution-based claims to immigration benefits based on favorable equities including military service and extensive civic engagement. There is a bipartisan consensus emerging that unauthorized immigrant youth should be allowed to serve in the military and that after two years of honorable service, they should obtain permission to permanently reside in the United States. Their willingness to serve their adopted community gives them a

stronger moral claim to inclusion than if they simply asserted that their future plans and interests were shaped by their socialization in U.S. schools alongside citizen-peers and native-born younger siblings.

Second, we might introduce a new category of eligibility for legal permanent resident visas to members of communities living abroad that have been extensively shaped by U.S. intervention leading to a high demand for immigrant visas. By this, I do not intend for the creation of yet another population-specific legalization program for the benefit of a group of foreign nationals that has the support of a politically powerful U.S. interest group (Kerwin, 2010: 4). Rather, I am calling for a new general rule that links a country's immigration visa quota to a quantitative measure of its demand for immigration visas and a qualitativeassessment of that country's ties to the United States. A demand-based per country visa quota would help to mitigate the unintended impact of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act's abolition of per-country visa quotas and institution of a Western Hemisphere visa quota. This measure has the benefit of eliminating racial and ethnic quotas in visa allocation. But by assigning visas equitably to countries without regard to demand, population, or ties of interdependence with the U.S., otherwise eligible migrants from Mexico and the Philippines have to wait over a decade longer in some categories to reunite with citizen relatives in the United States. A qualitative assessment of a country's interdependence with the United States for the purposes of visa allocation could account for factors such as trade agreements and the number of its former nationals living in the United States. In keeping with the "all-affected interests" and "constituted identities" principles, the qualitative assessment might account for the lasting impact of U.S. policy intervention on the livelihood or personal security of a country's citizens, and the extent to which migrants have been leaving the country for the U.S. as the result of its past military and economic interventions.

Third, we need to recognize that not all persons who have been affected by U.S. policies outside the United States want to leave their country of origin to improve their standard of living or sense of personal security. For instance, many Mexican small landowners that faced increased competition from U.S. agribusinesses in the wake of NAFTA opted to sell their land and move to the United States to join family and community members already there (Lopez, 2007: 42-63). But the displaced farmers might rather benefit from development and retraining assistance financed by both the U.S. and Mexico to help him compensate

for the impact of trade policies that benefit foreign interests at the expense of small landowners. And the United States should not be required to admit every person as an immigrant who has been affected in some way by past foreign policy decisions without regard for its interests in providing for its own disadvantaged citizens over necessitous non-citizens or the degree of harm it has inflicted upon a non-citizen through its direct actions. We might also differentiate between a state's short-term responsibilities to provide immigration benefits to persons fleeing from violence connected to its intervention from a long-term commitment to allowing them to remain in the country after the immediate threat to their livelihood and security subsides. For instance, the United States may have had a strong moral obligation to provide asylum to Guatemalans, Salvadorans and Nicaraguans fleeing the violence in their home countries in the 1980s given its intervention on behalf of the Contras in support of U.S. geopolitical interests (Garcia, 2006: 84-118). But with the cessation of hostilities, it might now be more advisable for the U.S. to respond to its moral obligations to affected persons from the region by providing those who want to return home with reintegration assistance. This might be coupled with development and security assistance for regional governments that are still struggling to recover from the legacy of the conflict (Bradley, 2010: 109-110).

Conclusion

In this paper, I have suggested that the all-affected principle is valuable as a basis for recalling states to their moral obligations to non-citizens whose security and livelihood has been undermined by an intervening state's past policy decisions. A global power like the United States has some responsibility for the welfare of persons in countries that have been affected by its foreign policy interventions to the point that they feel compelled to migrate to the United States to regain their livelihood and personal security. This responsibility may become more pressing when foreign nationals voluntarily take on risks to support U.S. interests abroad, or contribute as non-citizen residents to their adopted communities in the United States.

But we should resist the more radical suggestion made by some democratic theorists that all affected foreign nationals should be enfranchised with a voice in future U.S. policy decisions, or provided with immigration benefits leading to their eventual inclusion as U.S. citizens. U.S. citizens should not be burdened with the

responsibility of accepting every person who may have been incidentally harmed by a past policy decision as a potential immigrant. And many affected persons would rather stay in their country of origin. The provision of immigration benefits may be justified where persons fear for their lives or cannot pursue their livelihood at home in cases that can be directly traced torecent U.S. economic or military intervention. Preferential access to U.S. immigration benefits may also be justified as a way of honoring the contributions of non-citizens to U.S. interests at home and abroad. Otherwise, the United States as an intervening state should be permitted to discharge its moral obligations to affected foreign nationals by providing them with assistance tailored to helping communities return to a previous state of economic self-sufficiency and personal security.

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Conundrum of an Immigrant: Assimilation versus Cultural Preservation

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Abstract. As immigration continues to describe the reality of virtually all industrialized countries, the discourse about its phenomenology and permutations of character as well as policy responses in open, industrialized and market-driven societies related to immigration continue to be among the most heavily researched issues as they drive social and demographic change in significant ways. The fundamental polarity remains between the traditional model of assimilation as compared to the cultural preservation under various models of multiculturalism – aside, of course, from hybrid forms and structuralist approaches. This article examines broad issues of cultural identity, bilingualism, the benefits of membership in a minority group, the changing and increasingly relevant role of religion (primarily of Islam), education and intermarriage, and the significant deviations from the legacy culture minority groups sometimes develop in the process of acculturation without making a full transition to majority culture. At a time when economic benefits of assimilation appear to be increasingly less controlling in struggles for cultural identity and immigrant rights, a number of paradoxes becomes visible only by taking a historical view over the last twenty years at both the American and European experiences to understand socio-political backlashes from majority voters as well as the immigrant responses thereto.

Keywords: *Assimilation, cultural preservation, multiculturalism, immigrants, bilingualism, hybrid traditions*

Since the late 19th century, many western societies debate and study integration patterns of immigrants under the aspects of cultural diversity and identity. As the stream of immigrants to societies perceived as more prosperous or offering more opportunities or simply shelter from persecution or hardship anything but abates and much rather continues to increases, these host societies face challenges from ethnic and cultural heterogeneity that results in frictions and high cost of integration that are virtually never borne by employers clamoring for ever cheaper labor. As a result, the discourse about the cost and benefits of cultural diversity is intense[1] and has become a major driving force of political

[1] Albertp Alesina and Eliana LaFerrara. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance." National Bureau for Economic Research Working Paper 10313 (Washington, D.C, 2004).

contests in virtually all industrialized countries, but particularly so in North America, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, but also in some of the better developed countries in Africa and South America.[2] The social sciences have developed three principal theoretical and conceptual approaches to cultural integration: assimilation, multiculturalism, and structuralism. Predictably, synthetic perspectives formed more recently that are known as segmented assimilation. Because the Americas, and especially the North American half of the continent has been populated systematically by international immigration since 1492, the context of immigration into the United States and Canada is of particular significance to observations testing such theoretical concepts in the representation of minority interests within the majority culture[3] while the European experience is somewhat different and, at least in the postcolonial era, less reflective of global immigration.

The contemporary population of major American urban centers like the metropolitan New York area embraces its multicultural and ethnic inclusiveness more than it ever had during the last forty to sixty years. Under these circumstances, it might seem that assimilation and cultural preservation are perfectly compatible as they both taken together create the cultural richness that characterizes life in a vibrant metropolis. Italian restaurants, the St. Patrick's Day Parade, Cinco de Mayo, Chinese New Year's celebrations, Indian Ratha Yathra became as much a part of American urban life as Halloween decorations and the Macy's Thanksgiving Day parade.[4] And yet, a closer reading of studies that surveyed successive generations of immigrants shows the reality of an ongoing conflict between their desire for cultural preservation and a tendency to conform to host country culture. All these personal and group identity struggles reveal inherent mutual exclusivity between assimilation and cultural preservation within immigrant groups. "Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning."[5]

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[2] Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut. *Immigrant America: A Portrait* (2nd ed., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
[3] Lani Guinier, *The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 157 *et seq*.
[4] Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
[5] Clifford Geertz, "Thick Descriptions: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture" in *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5.

1. Melting pot culture

At the core of the "melting pot" analogy is the power of the host society and culture to serve as a standard and role model through an inter-generational process of social, cultural and economic integration that leads members of diverse ethnic groups to adopt a common culture resulting in identical or highly similar access to opportunities on all levels of life. Throughout a significant part of the last century, the efficiency of assimilation of immigrants into the host culture was considered the best measurement of their success. Similitude is achieved by incremental relinquishment of previously practiced culturally (i.e., not individually) motivated behavioral patterns and the adoption of the standards and practices of the host culture by way of conscious or subconscious imitation or response to standards and demands, for example as a condition to employment or educational and professional success through the process of acculturation.[6]

Cultural identity is formed by simple binary choice: either to identify with the dominant culture or with one's legacy minority culture. Stronger identification with the majority culture implies weaker identification with the legacy minority culture. And that makes sense because, at least in the majority's view of the hosts, its educational and economic superiority in overall terms is the reason for the presence of the great majority of immigrants who are not political refugees or arrived solely on grounds of family reunification.[7] These views have over time been criticized as overly simplistic and it has been said that they fail to capture the multitude of possible patterns of acculturation of minorities. Cross-cultural psychology suggests a more complex model of identity formation.[8] The degree of identification with the culture of the majority is treated as separate and independent from the degree of identification with the minority culture. Individuals

[6] Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City* (2nd ed., Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1970).

[7] Amelie Constant, Liliya Gataullina, and Klaus F. Zimmermann. "Ethnosizing Immigrants." *IZA Discussion Paper No. 2040. (*Bonn: University of Bonn, 2006).

[8] John W. Berry, "Social and cultural change." In H.C. Triandis & R. Brislin (eds.), *Handbook* of *Cross-Cultural Psychology,* Vol. 5**.** *Social* 211-279. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1980; *Id.* "Multicultural Policy in Canada: A Social Psychological Analysis." *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science* 16 (1984):353-370; *Id.* (1997), "Immigration, Acculturation and Adaptation." *Applied Psychology International Review* 46 no.1 (1997): 5-68.

may sense a strong affinity for the majority and at the same time for a minority culture.[9]

At first sight, cultural preservation in conjunction with assimilation is not only possible but indeed advantageous to an individual able to draw strengths from two divergent cultures.[10] As sociologist Min Zhou explains in "Growing up American": "The pluralist perspective offers an alternative way of viewing the host society, treating members of ethnic minority groups as a part of the American population rather than as foreigners or outsiders and presenting ethnic or immigrant cultures as integral segments of American society."[11] The ability to navigate two different ethnic backgrounds with integrity creates a unique cultural niche for a person enabled to serve as an intermediary between two worlds. An option to mix and match qualities drawn from both backgrounds to create the most successful combination of the two within the framework of the dominant culture seems to be a tangible advantage of all bicultural individuals. Since language fluency is one of the most prominent measures of acculturation, but also of ethnicity, scholars have dedicated much attention to bilingual immigrant youth and its academic performance as yet another quantifiable objective measure of effective assimilation. A series of studies on immigrant children in the U.S. published by Min Zhou quotes sources like Maria Eugenia Matute-Bianchi who claims that "fully bilingual young Mexican-Americans tended to perform better in school than those who lacked proficient bilingual skills."[12] Another research by Zhou & Bankston on Vietnamese in a poor neighborhood of New Orleans confirms that biculturalism often proves to be a genuine asset: "being both Vietnamese and American frequently caused children to achieve superior levels of performance."[13] Similarly, a study of immigrant children living in New York City's Chinatown "found

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[9] Jean S. Phinney, "Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults: Review of Research." *Psychological Bulletin* 108 (1990):499-514; Jean S. Phinney, Gabriel Horenczyk, Karmela Liebkind and Paul Vedder, "Ethnic Identity, Immigration, and Well-being: An International Perspective." *Journal of Social Issues* 57 (2001):493–510.

[10] Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 530 (1993):74-96.

[11] Min Zhou, "Growing Up American: The Challenge Confronting Immigrant Children and Children of Immigrants." *Annual Revue of Sociology* 23 (1997):63–95, at 73.

[12] Zhou, "Growing Up American," 88.

[13] Zhou, "Growing Up American," 86; Zhou, Min and Carl Leon Bankston. *Growing Up American: How Vietnamese Children Adapt to Life in the United States* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999).

that bilingual students had higher student retention rates, more graduates, and higher self-esteem."[14] These findings just confirm a popular perception: that cultural diversity is an asset that can be maintained even in the presence of full assimilation. Higher cognitive skills, better school performance and increased motivation all seem to flow from the distinct trait of being able to negotiate two different cultural spheres and combine their distinct and separate qualities, but also their similarities into one uniform, bilingual, successful reality.

2. Bilingualism

However, a closer look at this encouraging picture quickly shows its inherent imperfections. First of all, government statistics and reports do not necessarily confirm these perceived academic advantages of bilingualism. A review of studies on the subject by the U.S. Department of Education in 1981 "concluded that bilingually educated students scored below average in both English skills and general academic achievement." In fact, the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 used 'reluctant bilingualism' as its official policy, marginalizing ethnic languages, as Zhou phrases it, as "the source of hindrance rather than an asset."[15] The doctrine of 'forcible assimilation' even "insists that English language skills compete with non-English skills,"[16] often causing inevitable confusion and conflicts in children exposed to both languages in equal measure. Consequently, there came into existence an 'English Only' movement that advocates strict monolingualism in schools. According to this theory, bilingualism "can inhibit social adaptation in a predominantly English-speaking society, creating a 'new apartheid.'"[17] In view of these irreconcilably opposed educational doctrines, biculturalism expressed as bilingualism is not only incompatible with assimilation, but it even poses a direct threat to the process of assimilation of recent immigrants. The classical assimilationist viewpoint treats "distinctive ethnic traits such as old cultural ways, native languages, or ethnic enclaves" as "sources of disadvantages."[18] It is not clear if this assessment can indeed be justified.

[14] Zhou, "Growing Up American," 89.
[15] *Id*., at 88.
[16] *Id*., at 87.
[17] *Id*., at 87.
[18] Child cited in Min Zhou, "Segmented Assimilation: Issues, Controversies, and Recent Research on the New Second Generation". *International Migration Review* 31(4) (Winter 1997): 975-1008 at 977.

The inherent conflict between assimilation and cultural preservation is more clearly pronounced in groups at risk of facing downward assimilation, thus replacing the set of materially advantageous values of old country ancestors with a fatalistic apathy of downtrodden local minority groups. In the case of Haitian immigrants settling in inner-city ghettos, the parents' values of hard work and education expected to lead their children to success in the U.S. are confronted with the biases African-Americans children face in school.[19] As a consequence, the perceived victimization of their entire racial group draws young Haitians into a community of local peers who ostracize good academic performance as 'acting white' and as betraying the truly shared values of the group. "A common message is the devaluation of education as a vehicle for the advancement of all black youths, a message that directly contradicts the immigrant parents' expectations."[20] In such circumstances, assimilation does not mean acceptance of the mainstream values of the dominant host society, but rather an embrace of the values of a marginalized minority group that may itself not be deemed fully integrated. Similarly, Matute-Bianchi studied immigrant Mexicans who often integrate not into mainstream American society but into the marginalized groups of Chicanos and Cholos, in the process replacing their national pride and academic work ethics with 'oppositional culture' that identifies "school administration with oppressive authority," perceives their entry into the middle class as "almost impossible," and strongly discourages learning to a point where "high achievers are seen as sell-outs to oppressive authority."[21] Thus, groups of Mexican descent "were faced with what they viewed as a forced-choice dilemma between doing well in school or being a Chicano."[22]

3. Minority superiority

In the example of the Vietnamese youth discussed earlier, deliberate cultural isolation, rather than willful assimilation, seems to lie at the root of the academic successes of the surveyed group. Immersed in an ethnic enclave where interactions with non-Vietnamese are severely limited and the observance of

[19] Zhou, "Growing Up American," 81.
[20] *Id*., at 81.
[21] *Id*., at 70.
[22] Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou. "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 530 (1993):74-96, at 89.

traditional values as well as of behavioral standards is enforced not only by the family but also by their community at large, young Vietnamese in New Orleans found themselves immune to pressures from their underprivileged American peers and excelled at schools where Americanization did, in fact, mean underperformance. "In the case of the Vietnamese, being part of a Vietnamese network appears to offer a better route to upward mobility than being Americanized into the underprivileged local environment, or for that matter into the native-born mainstream youth subcultures."[23] Children from various Chinatowns across the country experience a similar phenomenon. "[Ogbu] attributed their academic success to the integration of these students into the family and the community which placed high values on education and held positive attitudes towards public schools."[24] A study of Californian Punjabi Sikhs unveiled an even more drastic example of resistance to assimilation as their secret of success. In this rural 'redneck country,' Punjabi students were physically abused by their American peers for their 'otherness' - and yet, "despite these attacks and some evidence of discrimination by school staff, Punjabi students performed better academically than majority Anglo students."[25] Besides higher graduation rates, their election of more advanced math and science classes, and a superior grade point average, Punjabi students "expressed aspirations for careers in science and engineering" as well as in business.[26] The isolationist pressure of the local Indian community is justifiably credited for the academic successes of its children, especially in connection with its strong encouragement for education. "Through this strategy of selective assimilation, Punjabi Sikhs appeared to be winning the race against the inevitable acculturation of their children to American-style aspirations."[27] When recent immigrants arrive in their new host country, the level of education and the amount of ethnic group-specific versus general human capital[28] they possess is an important predictor of the acculturation strategies they will adopt.[29] Higher educated migrants tend to intermarry more

[23] Zhou,"Segmented Assimilation," 996.
[24] Zhou, "Growing Up American," 77.
[25] *Id*., at 90.
[26] *Id*., at 90.
[27] *Id*., at 89.
[28] Slobodan Djajić, "Assimilation of Immigrants: Implications for Human Capital Accumulation of the Second Generation." *Journal of Population Economics* 16 (2003):831–845.
[29] George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton. "Economics of Identity." Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 no. 3 (2000):715–53; Akerlof George A. and Rachel E. Kranton. "Identity

readily with natives.[30] Education affects intermarriage by three mechanisms through which education affects intermarriage: the cultural adaptability effect, the enclave effect and the assortative matching effect.[31] The effect of cultural adaptability is based on the conclusion that educated people are better able to adapt to new customs and cultures. Therefore those immigrants that already arrive with higher human capital possess better adaptive skills and are more likely to marry natives. The enclave effect reflects the fact that educated immigrants will more likely move out of their ethnic enclaves because they can avail themselves of better economic opportunities outside their group. They are, therefore, less likely to meet potential spouses of their own group and so, less likely to marry them. Finally, gains from marriage are larger when the spouses' education levels are similar. Furtado calls this the "assortative matching effect." Because the search process for partners entails substantial cost (as, of course, does education),[32] educated immigrants are more willing to substitute the benefits of ethnic homogamy for assortativeness on the education dimension, *i.e.*, maximizing similarities in that regard.[33] Based on 1970 U.S. Census data, assortative matching is more important than cultural adaptability in explaining marital choices of second-generation immigrants, although the empirical evidence tends to support both the cultural adaptability and assortative matching hypothesis.[34]

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and Schooling: Some lessons for the Economics of Education." Journal of Economic Literature 40 no. 4 (2002):1167-1201.

30 Stanley Lieberson and Mary C. Waters. From Many Strands: Ethnic and Racial Groups in Contemporary America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1988); Robert Schoen and John Wooldredge. "Marriage Choices in North Carolina and Virginia, 1969-1971 and 1979-1981." Journal of Marriage and the Family, 51 (1989):465-481; Gary D. Sandefur and Trudy McKinnell. "American Indian Intermarriage." Social Science Research 347 (1986):347–48; Xin Meng and Robert G. Gregory, "Intermarriage and the Economic Assimilation of Immigrants." Journal of Labor Economics 23 (2005):135-175; Daniel T. Lichter and Zhenchao Qian, "Measuring Marital Assimilation: Intermarriage Among Natives and Immigrants." Social Science Research 30 (2001):289-312; and Barry R. Chiswick and Christina A. Houseworth. "Ethnic Intermarriage among Immigrants: Human Capital and Assortative Mating." IZA Discussion Paper No. 3740 (Bonn: University of Bonn, 2008).

31 Delia Furtado, "Human Capital and Interethnic Marriage Decisions." IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 1989 (Bonn: University of Bonn, 2006).

32 Michael Olneck, "Terms of Inclusion: Has Multiculturalism Redefined Equality in American Education?" American Journal of Education 101 (1993):234-260.

33 Matthijs Kalmijn, "Intermarriage and Homogamy: Causes, Patterns, Trends." Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998):395-421; Alba, Richard D. and Reid M. Golden, "Patterns of Ethnic Intermarriage in the United States." Social Forces 65 (1986):202-223.

34 Delia Furtado and Nikolaos Theodoropoulos, "I'll marry You and You get me a Job: Marital Assimilation and Immigrants Employment Rates." *International Journal of Manpower* 30 no. 1/2 (2009): 116-126.

4. Assimilation as inevitability

That notwithstanding, the assimilation perspective predicts that assimilation is an inevitable development. According to this view, "this process consists of gradually deserting old cultural and behavioral patterns in favor of new ones" in order to gain equal access to opportunities within society.[35] Indeed, research shows that seemingly integrated – or separated - immigrant groups are rarely able to preserve their original culture without adapting it to an array of influences of the host country. In the case of immigrant subgroups dominated by East-Asian philosophy and religion, such as the Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese and Japanese communities, the surrounding American society provokes public displays only of those traits that are inherently similar and thus acceptable to the dominant WASP mentality. As Min Zhou explains, they "often selectively unpack from their cultural baggage those traits suitable to the new environment, such as two parent families, a strong work ethics, delayed gratification, and thrift. Also, they either bury at the bottom of their trunks or keep strictly to themselves other things considered not so fit, such as non-confrontation, passivity, submissiveness, and excessive obligations with the family."[36] In this way, the host country environment encounters only a mitigated demo version of various Asian cultures, a version that is more palatable and therefore easier to accept. Some communities, however, seem unable to control the internal and external aspects of their culture in this fashion, and the identity of the entire ethnic group in time becomes affected by the expectations and influences of the host country.[37] One example of an only seemingly traditional society is the community of Garifuna (Black Caribes) immigrants described by Nancie Gonzalez in "Garifuna Settlement in New York: A New Frontier."[38] The customary lifestyle of the Garifuna community included migratory work of multi-lingual young men, with women taking care of their typically rural households. Immigration to the United States not only increased the numbers of women actively pursuing gainful employment, and as a result achieving greater independence, but it also changed important social patterns within Garifuna society. For example, "several informants commented that they were 'forced'

[35] Zhou,"Segmented Assimilation," 976.
[36] *Id*., at 994.
[37] Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures.* New York: Basic Books, 1977.
[38] Nancie L. Gonzalez, "Garifuna Settlement in New York: A New Frontier." *International Migration Review* Special Issue: International Migration in Latin America. 13 no. 2 (1979): 255-26.

to marry by the Immigration Service."[39] The strict immigration laws of the United States encouraged if not demanded a formalization of the traditionally loose relationships within Garifuna society that were closer to cohabitation and common law marriage than to the predominant American family model and as a result changed the definition of family for the entire ethnic group, while the work demands and economic constraints of city life altered its traditional hospitality towards the extended family. As Min Zhou confirms, "if a group displays characteristics that are not compatible to the ideas of the mainstream, or seem similar to characteristics identified with or projected onto native-born minorities, such as matriarchal families, these traits will be … seen as 'deficient' cultural characteristics and thus stigmatized."[40] Another example of adaptive cultural patterns is Cheikh Anta Babou's study of "Brotherhood Solidarity, Education and Migration: The Role of the *Dhiras* among the Murid Muslim Community of New York". Upon their arrival in New York, the otherwise traditional Murid Muslims of the Peanut Basin of Senegal changed their usual craft-based professions to more economically viable trades and informal financial services for the immigrant African community. More importantly, however, Murid family life was profoundly affected by their relocation. Not only did they find their traditional polygamy to be illegal in the United States, but their women, suddenly free to seek and engage in gainful employment and to enjoy exposure to the realities of a more liberal society, started to demand more rights from their husbands. These trends resulted in an increase of family disputes and a divorce rate previously unheard of in Senegalese society, with fewer than 50% of marriages lasting longer than four years.[41] Sometimes it is almost impossible to preserve the culture of the country of origin in the host country whose culture is often diametrically opposed to important values of the former.

5. Hybrid traditions

But one does not really need to look beyond European ethnic communities to notice that 'tradition' does not ordinarily withstand the factual pressures of assimilation. In particular, the one European ethnic group perceived as the most pronounced one in the U.S., the Italians, went as far as to virtually reinvent their

[39] *Id*., at 260.
[40] Zhou,"Segmented Assimilation," 994.
[41] Cheikh Anta Babou, "Brotherhood Solidarity, Education and Migration: The Role of the *Dhiras* among the Murid Muslim Community of New York." *African Affairs* 101 (2002):151-170, at 163.

own culture in the process. An extensive study of Italian-American customs conducted by Simone Cinotto in "Lenoard Covello, the Covello Papers, and the History of Eating Habits among Italian Immigrants in New York"[42] concluded: "[w]hile transforming festive food into the everyday, Diner argues, Italian Americans invented from scratch an ethnic pattern of sociability and conviviality based on the consumption of Italian food, which was pivotal in the definition of their ethnic identity."[43] Dishes that were festive or unknown in the old country became downright staples of Italian-American cuisine that itself came to form a large part of Italian-American identity; family values were distorted towards strict control of the younger generation for the preservation of tradition's sake; family gatherings, modeled after American Thanksgiving celebrations, became a favored way of expressing membership in the ethnic group. "That identity was largely 'invented' by mixing high and popular culture, readings of Dante with folkloristic performances and dances from different Italian regions."[44] Even their new body image had to reflect the Italian-American cult of abundance: "immigrants believed that slenderness in nubile young women denoted their frailty and feebleness, thus dwindling their marriage prospects."[45] Gender roles changed as well: "Because of their domestic skills, women supervised the emerging ethnic domesticity. The dominant identifications of family reputation and of the respectability of its women merged with new gendered meanings."[46] In particular, a girl's suitability for marriage was determined by her preference for Italian food and her demonstrated ability to prepare it. These changing social patterns do not have much in common with actual cultural preservation. Rather, they reflect the increasing influence of assimilation and integration.

6. Dual or alternating identities

Contrary to the propositions of advocates of ethnic plurality, confrontations between old and new cultures are more likely to produce irresolvable conflicts than a peaceful coexistence of both models does. This aspect

[42] Simone Cinotto, "Leonard Covello, the Covello Papers, and the History of Eating Habits among Italian Immigrants in New York." *The Journal of American History* 91no. 2 (2004): 497-521.
[43] *Id.*, at 499.
[44] *Id.*, at 507.
[45] *Id.*, at 515.
[46] *Id.*, at 518.

of the immigrant experience is especially prominent in classic generational conflicts within ethnic groups. Research documents known as the "Cavello Papers" that documented the lives of New York Italians in an East Harlem neighborhood in the 1920s may serve as a colorful example of it. The adult generation clearly displayed separated identities: it tried to preserve original Italian notions of tradition and to impart the same to their children while shielding them from the perceived dangers of cultural Americanization ("the importing of so-called American values and behavior was a typical cause of conflict in the family."[47] Their school-bound offspring, on the other hand, suffered a definite lack of acceptance by their American teachers and peers ("The conflict between the notions learned in school and the principles with which the children were socialized within the family is presented as the main cause of high levels of truancy, school dropouts, and maladjustment among second-generation adolescents."[48] Children of East Harlem immigrants developed what could be interpreted as an alternating integrated identity, with their Italian facet carefully hidden from the American environment and the American facet kept secret from their Italian relatives ("This split was attained by creating a veil of secrecy that preserved a certain amount of autonomy in each of the two worlds"[49] – hence an identity conflict arose. Similar experiences of Latvian youth in the Midwest described in "Close Encounters with the Midwest: Forming Identity in a Bicultural Context" by Alison Smith *et al.* appear to confirm that pattern: children who were expected to uphold traditional Latvian values while in the U.S. felt conflicted about contrary expectations of their respective American and Latvian societies, and even years later they confessed to hiding their American activities from the Latvian community, while decreasing the impact of their Latvian culture among American peers.[50] Some of these necessarily conflicted young people grew up to reject the continued pressures to conform to the culture of their parents, and as a consequence they became fully assimilated because "immigrant groups that are particularly strict about maintaining cultural traditions may ultimately push away some if their members."[51] Thus, vigorous efforts to preserve a culture alien to the place and country people inhabit may ultimately have an effect opposite to the one intended.

[47] *Id*., at 514.
[48] *Id.*, at 505.
[49] *Id*., at 503.
[50] Alison G. Smith, Abigail J. Stewart, David G. Winter, "Close Encounters with the Midwest: Forming Identity in a Bicultural Context." *Political Psychology* 25 no. 4 (2004):611-641.
[51] *Id.*, at 634.

Of particular importance is the link between preferences for redistribution in any form.[52] As diversity can affect the sense of national community, this goes directly to the social consensus for redistribution, especially when the poor (the beneficiaries of redistributive programs) are predominantly minorities and, conversely, minorities are predominantly poor.[53] In this case, economic redistribution may become linked with cultural redistribution by majority voters, further correlating socio-economic and cultural differences.[54] Political support for universal social programs can erode as cultural minorities prefer private or communal provision of public services that better fit their cultural preferences. Minorities' focus on group specific public goods can divide coalitions advocating welfare.[55] Therefore support for affirmative action, group rights, or increased autonomy for the expression of cultural differences can dangerously weaken minority links with members of the majority community and undermine their ongoing support for effective welfare policies.[56] Furthermore, divisions among different minority groups can further impede processes designed to form coalitions.[57]

7. Religion as Identity

As assimilation progresses, ethnicity and language diminish as unifying and solidifying markers of identity.[58] As multiculturalism increasingly becomes the

52 Alberto Alesina and Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln., "Good Bye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of Communism on People's Preferences" American Economic Review 97 no. 4 (2007):1507-28.
53 Erzo F.P. Luttmer and Monica Singhal, "Culture, Context, and the Taste for Redistribution" Working Paper John F. Kennedy School of Government - Harvard University (Boston, Mass. August 2008).
54 Yann Algan, Alberto Bisin and Thierry Verdier (eds.), Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe (Studies of Policy Reform) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
55 Moses Shayo, "A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class and Redistribution". American Political Science Review 103 no. 2 (2009):147-174.
56 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, "Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode the Welfare State?" Paper presented at the Conference on New Challenges for Welfare State Research, RC 19 of the International Sociological Association, Toronto, Ontario, August 21-24, 2003.
57 Algan, Bisin and Verdier (eds.), Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Europe.
58 Harold R. Isaacs, "Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe" in Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (eds.) Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975) 29-53; Laura Zimmermann, Klaus F. Zimmermann and Amelie

prevailing form of integration in Europe and preservation of the language of immigrants becomes the object of bilateral agreements between home and host countries, claims to bilingual education are becoming accepted as par for the course, particularly in Germany[59] but also in the Netherlands,[60] Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Islam, the religion of the large majority of post-colonial immigrants, moves to the center of their reassertion of identity in lieu of other factors such as ethnic traditions, language or dietary habits. The hope of people intent on preserving minority identity accepts the fact of assimilation with regard to language, education and all other elements of culture[61] – save religion that is being stylized as a source of ethnic pride, a communitarian sentiment derived from its practice.[62] In accordance with a world-wide trend reviving fundamentalist Islam, its outward symbols of modest feminine dress and headscarves challenge the balance of power between the secular state and *shari'a*.[63] Scholarship on Islam and Muslims presents a remarkable Atlantic divide that is particularly significant in the area of integration studies. While a continually developing body of research and literature on Muslims in the West has emerged in Europe after WWII, but especially during the last thirty years, it must be acknowledged that it was not until the

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Constant. "Ethnic Self-Identification of First-Generation Immigrants." International Migration Review 41, no. 3 (2007):769-781.

59 Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities. States and Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Riva Kastroyano, "Cultural Preservation and Empowerment of Immigrant Community." Presentation at the ICSW Expert Meeting on Cultural preservation and Empowerment of immigrant communities - a contributor or obstacle to successful integration? International Council on Social Welfare, April 30 - May 2, 2007, Jerusalem.

60 Steven Erlanger, "Amid Rise of Multiculturalism, Dutch Confront Their Questions of identity." New York Times, August 13, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/14/world/europe/14dutch.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

61 Danny Cohen-Zada, "Preserving Religious Identity through Education: Economic Analysis and Evidence from the US." Journal of Urban Economics 60 no.3 (2006):372-398.

62 Amelie Constant, Liliya Gataullina and Klaus F. Zimmermann, "Clash of Cultures: Muslims and Christians in the Ethnosizing Process." IZA Discussion Paper No. 2350 (Bonn: University of Bonn, 2006); Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier, "Beyond the Melting Pot: Cultural Transmission, Marriage and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious traits." Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2000):955-88.

63 Riva Kastoryano, "Transnational Participation and Citizenship. Migrants in the European Union" in Mabel M. Berzin and Martin Schain (eds.), Europe Without Borders. Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in a Transnational Age (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Riva Kastoryano, "French Secularism and Islam. France's Headscarf Affair" in Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou and Ricard Zapata Barrero (eds). Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship. A European Approach) (London: Routledge, 2006), 57-70.

watershed event of September 11, 2001 that the area has met with a comparable level of interest in the United States. European research has centered largely on integration of recent waves of immigrants, with an emphasis on the social sciences, particularly anthropology, political science and sociology whereas only a small number of American Islamicists and anthropologists pursued an interest.[64] It seems significant that, in North America, Islam has developed a particular following among minority groups (a fact historically known from the days of Black Muslim activism during the Civil Rights era), but also especially among women, notably Latina immigrants. Muslims and Hispanics frequently live side by side in urban neighborhoods across the country, particularly in the states of California, Texas, Florida, New York and Illinois that collectively account for 72.5% of the entire foreign-born Hispanic population in the United States, according to data from the Migration Policy Institute.[65] Reasons for this trend are sought in the higher status afforded women in Islam, their modest dress, their valuation by other than outwardly apparent criteria, altogether a response to a need for protection and respect. Although not raised in an Islamic culture, and without the faith being part of their upbringing, Latina and other immigrant women flock to Islam as a result of contacts and exposure made in immigrant communities, a curious form of cross-cultural influence occasioned but not intended by their immigration to the United States. Islam's relationship with modernity is often complex, nuanced, and above all variable. This is particularly evident in the conflicting positions taken by different movements in Islam, some of which, like the jihadists, reject modernity as a Western import whereas others actively embrace and endorse modernity precisely for its Western character.[66]

8. Conclusions

Traditional values are continuously redefined and updated in response to a changing environment, even within the country where they originated; the same must be even truer in a country where those values and customs are inherently

[64] Jocelyn Cesari, "Islam in the West: From Immigration to Global Islam." Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 8 (2009) 148-175, at 149.
[65] Wendy Diaz, "Latina Immigrants: The New Ambassadors of Islam." *New American Media / The Muslim Link*, January 18, 2013. http://newamericamedia.org/2013/01/latina-immigrants-the-new-ambassadors-of-islam.php
[66] See Fajsal Devji, *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity.* London: Hurst 2005.

foreign and hence create tensions with the expectations of the local population. The answer of immigrant groups is either to resolve this conflict by an eventual assimilation and seamless blending into the surrounding culture, or by attempting to preserve a marginal ethnic identity through a mix of old and new values and by making efforts to project old values and traditions in a fashion more palatable to the hosts.[67] This is often achieved by creating a not necessarily authentic exotic flair in order to attract the curiosity of, and to increase the appeal to, the surrounding ethnic group. In this way, values and customs both experience accelerated permutation and, under the guise of upholding traditional values, they come to represent a new and almost freely 'innovated' culture – like the one of the Italian-American community. Therefore, no genuine and pure cultural preservation remains possible whenever a group faces assimilation. What appears to be an expression of determined cultural preservation is, in fact, merely another expression of assimilation actually occurring.

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[67] Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, "Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20 no. 2 (2006):23-48.

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RESEARCH ARTICLES

Cultural Identity as a Specific Dimension of the Socio-Cultural Dynamics: Refugees in Temerin

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Abstract. The paper is based upon research that consisted of a series of interviews conducted with refugees in the municipality of Temerin in Serbia, during the fall of 2011. The objective of this research was to analyze the identity of refugees and the degree of their social integration. The assumption was that dimensions of their identity may show and point to the problems and difficulties of their social integration. The identity of the refugees is analyzed within the socio-cultural context, because migration always occurs in a specific spatial and socio-cultural configuration. Refugees as migrants are exposed to the influences of economic, political and cultural structures of the society. The data shows that the circumstances of war and exile contributed significantly to strengthening the ethnic identity of refugees and that it is still a very important dimension of their cultural identity. Refugees have, in most cases, a positive experience and feelings of acceptance by their neighbors, friends and other inhabitants of Temerin, which indicates a high degree of their social integration.

Keywords: *socio-cultural dynamics, cultural identity, ethnic identity, refugees, Temerin, Serbia*

Introduction – general data and the methodological framework of the research

Temerin is a town and a municipality center in the south Bačka region of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. In the east Temerin borders with the municipality of Žabalj, in the north with the municipality of Srbobran, in the west with the municipality of Vrbas, and in the south with the municipality and town of Novi Sad. According to the census of 2002, the Temerin municipality had the population of 28,275 (together with the villages of Bački Jarak and Sirig) and the

town of Temerin itself had the population of 19,216.[1] The majority population in the ethnic sense are Serbs (9660) and Hungarians (8187). The data from the census of the population in Serbia held in 2002 indicated significant changes in the ethnic structure of Vojvodina, which is also reflected in Temerin, where Serbs became the majority population for the first time. The ratio of Serbian and Hungarian population in Temerin was changed because of massive migrations, i.e. the arrival of refugees (primarily of Serbian ethnicity) after the wars in the 1990's in the areas of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main goal of the research conducted in Temerin was to investigate the identity of refugees and the degree of their integration into the community.

The research was conducted in 2011 in a series of interviews with Serbian refugees who migrated to Temerin in the 1990's. The sample was random and all the interviewees agreed to be interviewed if they remained anonymous. The interviews were done with the interviewees who live in the part of Temerin primarily inhabited by refugees (the part of the settlement where the largest number of houses were built because of the help of the municipality). The interviewees were asked questions concerning their identity (ethnicity) and problems and difficulties they encountered during the period of adaptation. The total number of interviews is twenty (the equal number of male and female interviewees), of which seventeen were conducted with refugees and three with local inhabitants from Temerin. The interviews were structured, with a few basic questions posed to all interviewees. The questions were related to the place of origin, ethnic identity, reasons for coming to Temerin, way of life (job, financial situation, etc.) that they had led prior to the arrival to Temerin, their relationships with neighbors and other inhabitants of Temerin.

The first part of the paper presents the theoretical framework of the research which discusses the issue of identity formation and social-cultural dynamics, as well as the meaning of the subjective and objective dimensions in the construction of identity, so that the later interpretation of empirical data could be put in a wider theoretical context.

[1] Data given after: *Stanovništvo* – nacionalna ili etnička pripadnost, vol. 1. Republika Srbija, Republički zavod za statistiku, Beograd, 2003, p. 42. The last census was done during 2011 and preliminary results show that there are 28,308 inhabitants in the Temerin municipality. For more details see: http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Public/PageView.aspx?pKey=82 (Statistics Yearbook of Republic Serbia 2011).

Identity and the socio-cultural dynamics

The concept of identity, whether individual or collective, usually means different things. Cultural identity as a form of social identity, i.e. collective identity, is often deduced to ethnic identity. In other words, it is often explained from the perspective of other social phenomena which are less characteristic of culture and more characteristic of certain interests imposed upon culture (Koković, 2005. 289). In the widest sense, cultural identity represents (reflects) a special dimension of the socio-cultural dynamics of a society. The processes that produce, reproduce and organize the borders of identification and differentiation among social groups and collectivity can be observed in the light of different "ideologies of identification" (Dženkins, 2001). In that sense, one can speak about at least two parallel processes of the socio-cultural dynamics, i.e. two kinds of "attribution": one is the process of *group identification* and the other is the process of *social categorization*. In the first case identification occurs "from the inside" (in relation to borders or boundaries of a group), whereas categorization comes "from the outside" (i.e. it is directed from the society towards a group). These two processes represent the bases of both collective and individual identity and represent the essential dimensions in the processes of subjectivization and objectivization, i.e. subjective and objective (social) dimensions in the formation of individual and group identities.

Ideas or concepts about the consistency of identity rely on the claims that identity is essentially finite, or that this is the identity in itself (Castells, 2002). Yet, it seems that changeable boundaries saturate the discourse of constructions which we believe answer the questions about *who we are*, the question of our identities. The probability of a successful construction of a political community should be greater if the identity is wider, because it decreases the diversity and increases the capacity of our action, says Paić (1999). In this kind of a "game" identity cannot be considered a stable thing. A tendency is noticeable in research not to observe identity as an essential, unchangeable attribute of an individual or group (Ruano-Borbalan, 2009: 6).

In order to analyze the concept of cultural identity, it is important to make a distinction between the so-called "strong" and "weak" concepts of identity that include many different questions: identity as the basis of self (psychological and socio-psychological dimension of identity), hybridity of

identity, continuity, changes and fluidity of identity, structural determinism and action (experience) as the basis for the construction of identity, etc. (Grad, Rojo, 2008: 4). Many different dimensions of identity are studied in a particular way in discourse analysis. Social-constructionist positions accentuate the active process of production and transformation of social realities in discourse. The diversity of identities is still limited whereas the processes such as formation, context and resistance are included in their analysis. Critical perspectives in the discourse analysis of identity pay special attention to the relations of discourse, power and knowledge (Grad, Rojo, 2008: 5). The next part of the article will present some important theoretical aspects of cultural identity that will be operationalized later in the paper through the interpretation of research data.

In order to define more precisely the meaning of the term 'cultural identity', one must take into consideration various elements that are its components, such as: the simultaneous attachment of identity to an individual and to a group, understanding identity as a relationship with the other and other people, its historical nature and changeability, as well as the relativity of identity in relation to the social context and other identities. Cultural identity, therefore, is "self-awareness of members of a group which is historically created and develops depending on the criteria that group establishes in the relations with other social groups" (Stojković, 2008: 26).

Despite the fact that culture, i.e. cultural identity, represents a kind of differentiation among individuals and collectivities, it should be stressed that social processes are the ones that produce and reproduce, i.e. arrange and organize the borderlines of identification and differentiation among various collectivities. Cultural identity is always manifest in social interaction and it should be understood as a *relational concept*, or a form of practice that develops through social action. Besides that, cultural identity can be interpreted as a variable of political behavior. Anthropologist Frederik Barth contributed greatly to theories on ethnicity claiming that culture and cultural differences should not be treated as important in their own right, i.e. beyond the field of social relationships in which they are organized. When writing on boundaries and ethnic groups, i.e. when developing his own theory of ethnicity, he claims that a specific *cultural content* is not a decisive factor, but the *process of codification* of cultural differences which leads to the treatment of ethnical identities or ethnical categories as socially relevant (Bart, 1997).

The features that are the foundation of identity can be socio-cultural as well as territorial (spatial) and can be mutually actuated or cancelled (Stojković, 2008: 25). Important processes that influence defining identity, i.e. processes that influence its creation and disappearance, are termed *deterritorialization* and *reterritorialization* of identity. They are particularly important in the context of analyzing cultural identity of migrants (refugees).

Migrations and, generally, all important demographic movements drastically change the social and cultural composition of population (societies) and thus force us to re-examine the meaning and value of cultural identity and cultural diversity (Robins, 2008: 358). It should be stressed that the analysis of the relations of (cultural) identity and space in social sciences is quite problematic but territory, as a defined geographic space, surely represents one of the "identifiers", i.e. ways to operationalize cultural identity by translating it into empirically ascertainable facts. This refers to connecting a certain territory (as a carrier of meaning) with cultural identity. The said processes of *deterritorialization* and *reterritorialization* of identity are essentially contradictory processes. On the one hand, the meaning of territory is weakening and cultural identities are somewhat threatened. This is seen in the lack of awareness of belonging to a particular territorial identity due to the processes of globalization and fast development of information and communication systems. We, therefore, speak of transnational or deterritorialized identity as well as a general endangerment of identity which occurs not only at the level of individual places, regions, minorities, etc. but also in dominant (the most influential, the biggest) national states (Mlinar, 1990: 20).

The identities of migrants in that sense (as well as the identities of non-migrants) become more elastic and fluid because they are under the multiple influence of both the society to which they belong and the said global processes. As opposed to that trend, it can be said that migrations always occur in particular spatial/social configurations and that migrants (i.e. their identities) are influenced by economic, political and cultural structures of the given (new) spatial and social context. In that sense, territory (space) does not lose its importance. Hence, the reverse version of deterritorialization is reterritorialization, i.e. the new rooting of migrants in particular locations. These processes testify of the survival of the importance of territory and its influence on the formation of identities, especially cultural identity, through particular dynamics of physical (geographic) spatiality and socio-cultural dynamics of a specific society.

Representations of (cultural) identity

The process of identity formation has its subjective (individual) and objective (social) dimension. Identity construction, as a representation of the self, is one of the crucial ways of practice and individual presentation (Ruano-Borbalan, 2009: 16). Determined by psychological means, individual identity is constructed on the basis of individual experiences. This implies that an individual is part of the institutions that channel his/her activities and offer a symbolic foundation of his identification and action. In that sense institutions channel the processes of acculturation, cultural identity construction in the new social setting and, in a certain way, represent resources and the setting which the individual must count on. Identity is based on the relationship with "other".

Generally speaking, today considerations of individual identity are established on the study of the term "self" (image of self, representation of self, construction of self, control of self, etc.). "I", according to L'Ecuyer, can be defined as a "set of characteristics (tastes, interests, qualities, flaws, etc.), personal traits (including bodily characteristics), roles and values, etc. that the person ascribes to him/herself, sometimes values them positively and recognizes them as part of him/herself, on the basis of an intimate experience that he/she exists and identifies him/herself despite changes" (Ruano-Borbalan, 2009: 7). In the 1970's many studies were written that discuss the influence of social relationships on the mental life of an individual. Part of those studies that developed under the influence of Erving Goffman (especially those that deal with conversation analysis) starts with interpersonal communication in the explanation of identity construction. Representations of self, or self-image, can be positive or negative. The key concept is the "self representation", i.e. a set of activities, behaviors or artifacts that an individual uses so others could evaluate him/her positively (ibid, 8). In that sense, individuals often distort their memories and adjust their opinions to the new circumstances and situations. The cognitive component of that process is constructed on the basis of memories, information and representations of self. "I" (self-image) is the inner, important side of individual identity which is constructed through the relationship with the environment and with others inside the groups we belong to. The concept of "subjectivity" is part of the process and a condition for the development of an individual. It implies the way in which we develop and become *subjects* (personalities, actors) in the social processes to which we are exposed. Research dealing with this problem offers explanations that, in the symbolic order which allows interpersonal communication and

interpersonal action among all subjects that *socialize under its power*, acts an internal shaping power of *identity and subjectivity* construction and the ways certain this are *represented*... (Paić, 1999: 126).

On the other hand, identities can be understood as discursive and performative in the sense that they are formed (construed) during discursive practice and exposition to different norms and conventions (Barker, Galasinski, 2001: 28), i.e. through adoption and entrenchment in certain cultural, religious, political and other practices that are imposed by social institutions.

For the purposes of our analysis we point out two dimensions of identity: on the one hand, it is the seemingly paradoxical relationship between personal and collective identity, and on the other, it is the fact that identities are, essentially, of sociogenic character. The paradox is seen in the fact that the self develops from the outside within, because it is constructed by the power of its share in interactional and communicational patters of the group to which someone belongs; collective identity has advantage of personal identity of an individual. Yet, collective identity ("us-identity") does not exist beyond individuals that constitute and bear the "us", because it is the matter of individual knowledge and awareness (Assmann, 2008: 153). Since personal identity refers to social recognition, the aspects of "self-identity" (individual and personal) are sociogenic and culturally determined (ibid, 155).

In order to fully understand the concept of cultural identity and transfer it from the cultural-political level to a more exact level of analysis, it is important to establish *identifiers* and their function in identity construction. With the use of indicators, i.e. identifiers, cultural identity is operationalized and transferred to empirically ascertainable facts – carriers of meaning (Stojković, 2008: 26). Identifiers are, therefore, some sort of markings or resources which social groups use to construe their own identities or ascribe them to other social groups. By introducing the concepts of discourse analysis into the analysis, cultural identity identifiers could be understood through representations of certain discourses. Discourses produce reality and contain a dominant reality (or representation), as well as a set of alternative representations, which testifies of the politics of a given discourse (Nojman, 2009: 74). Representations in discourse are constitutive in the sense that they determine what is noticed and communicated but they do not necessarily contain everything that needs to be understood in order to fully grasp certain actions (or practices).

It is crucial, however, that we can treat the concept of cultural identity as part of social reality which can be represented and analyzed through certain indicators.

Participants "testify" of these indicators through the representation of self and the group (community) to which they belong.

Data interpretation

The previous theoretical framework implies that the way people see themselves and their identity is to a great extent the product of the socio-cultural dynamics and one of its presuppositions. The analysis of interviewee responses is an attempt to present ways in which the refugees from Temerin see and describe their identity. In order to better understand the social context of their present life, a decade or more since their migration to the present place, it is important to bear in mind that the process (or continuity) of the formation of their cultural identity has had a significant cut. This surely refers to the violent change of their entire way of life. On the other hand, although the refugees of Serbian ethnicity came to a setting where the majority population is also of Serbian ethnicity, which can be interpreted to a certain extent as a facilitating factor when it comes to the process of acculturation, still they found a different social and cultural setting from the one which they came from.

We will present interviewee responses with respect to three aspects of their self-representation: the first concerns their own cultural identity and the interviewees' need to declare or not declare their ethnicity; the second concerns the external (social) identifiers that the interviewees rely on in the construction of their ethnic identity (the question of the citizenship of Serbia); the third the problem of fitting into the wider social community, the way they see that they are accepted in the setting as "refugees" and the way they see their present place of living.

The problem of identity

Although the interviewees declared themselves as Serbs when asked about their cultural and ethnic origin and identity, the analysis indicates that the war and exile contributed greatly to the strengthening of ethnic identity which had not been as prominent before. This can be seen in an answer of an interviewee (age 61), who is a refugee from Croatia and who arrived to Temerin in 1997: "*I had high respect for the state in which I lived, in my military card I was noted as Yugoslav*." When asked if he felt Yugoslav today, he answered: "*No!*

(energetically) I was betrayed by the YNA (Yugoslav National Army) and Yugoslavia… I am a Serb from Slavonia… Serb from Slavonia and I am not ashamed of it."

Another interviewee, also a refugee from Croatia (aged 69), described the situation before the war in Croatia and said: "*My wife is Croatian in origin and we knew from the start that there would be problems, because I am a Serb. We led a normal life, it was a peaceful environment. But somehow, that nationalism was latent, it was all latent, do you understand? You could not exactly feel the tension but there were some stings. Even back in 1971 they made first attempts to show us, Serbs, who they were and they managed to cover it all up… It all initiated some things, do you understand? I cannot say there was no tension, but you could feel it in the air that it wasn't quite right*." When asked how he declared his ethnicity today, he answered: "*I am a Serb! (energetically) I am an ethnical Serb and I am married to a Croat… I am proud of that*."

Similar experiences were mentioned by another interviewee, a female refugee from Croatia, who came to Temerin in 1993: "*Until Tuđman was elected president we had a very nice life in Croatia… both economically and in the sense of human relationships. After that provocations started… They simply first started a psychological war through intimidation*." When asked *What are your memories of your life in Croatia,* she answers: "*Wonderful! It was really beautiful… for years we were building the family house… we made another room for our son. When the war came, we lost everything. Our house was burnt down in 1992*." When asked about her ethnicity, she answered: "*I am a Serb from Croatia, I was born there and I am not ashamed of it. I judge someone by their soul and their behavior, not by their ethnicity*."

Younger female interviewees gave somewhat different answers. Their memories of the pre-war period of their lives were mostly positive. One interviewee (aged 24), a refugee from Croatia who came to Temerin in 1995, said: "*My parents worked there, they earned a good living… I can say we lived a very good life. Everything was great*." When asked about the ethnicity of herself and her family, she responded: "*Both of them (parents) are of Serbian ethnicity. They had a traditional Serbian wedding and we were raised according to our customs… I am a Croatian Serb… more precisely, a Serb born in Croatia. I am proud of my origin… I am not ashamed of the fact that I am from Croatia… I would always like to go back to the place where I spent my early childhood*."

Another female interviewee (aged 23), also a refugee from Croatia who fled in 1991 and came to Temerin in 1996, said: "*I was only two at the time but on the basis of stories I later heard from my parents I can tell you what was going on…*" When asked if she had any relatives, friends or neighbors in Croatia with whom she or her family maintain contact, she responded: "*Yes, we do… My mum has a friend. Here's an example. Although the war broke out, she kept contact with her two cousins who are of Croatian ethnicity… they worked together… They are very good people, she even has one friend of Muslim ethnicity so I do not see any obstacles to continue those friendships in the future.*" When asked about her ethnicity, she said: "*We are a Serbian family ethnically… What happened, happened, people are generally not to blame, but politicians who caused conflict among all three sides. Ordinary people suffered there. Of course, there are other opinions, for example, because of some things from the past I wouldn't like to have a Muslim or a Croat for a husband… that is a different matter, but for a friendship there are no problems.*"

The answers above testify of the fact that the ethnic identity of the interviewees, despite significant variations in their answers (especially when it comes to the relationship with other nations and ethnic groups), is a very important factor in cultural identity. This is quite understandable in the context of war devastations, exile and tribulations. These experiences of endangerment have contributed to the maintenance and development of the national awareness and identity of refugees. On the other hand, the socio-cultural dynamics of the new, ethnically non-homogeneous setting, Temerin, also affects their feeling of ethnic belonging in a special way. This will be elaborated in the part of the paper that deals with the problem of social integration of refugees and their relationship with the inhabitants of Temerin.

The problem of citizenship

During the interviews the interviewees were asked a question about whether they managed to become Serbian citizens after the arrival to Serbia, and how. In our context this is seen as an identifier of cultural and national identity since the possession of citizenship, besides providing conditions for a better economic status (the issue of employment), symbolically signifies the belonging to the state and the national community. When it comes to refugees, it can have a special dimension of political and economic integration into the

society. The answers of the interviewees testify of the significance of Serbian citizenship for them.

One interviewee, a refugee from Bosnia and Herzegovina, answered the citizenship question: "*I have a dual citizenship, both the Bosnian and… we had to have it, we could not get this one. After that we got this one, we will keep that one for a while, I believe, and that will disappear…*" When asked if other members of his family have Serbian citizenship, he answered: "*Yes, my wife has a Croatian, Bosnian and this (Serbian) citizenship. She has this and that, but this one (Serbian) is a priority.*"

A female interviewee, a refugee from Croatia (aged 39), when asked about citizenship, answered: "*… Of Croatian documents I had a birth certificate and a Croatian citizenship certificate that I needed to get the citizenship. I do not have a dual citizenship, just Serbian, I don't need anything that is theirs.*" A similar answer was given by another interviewee, a refugee from Croatia (aged 69), who said: "*Now both my wife and I have Serbian citizenship…*". When asked if he had a dual citizenship, he answered: "*No! (upset) I don't need anything that is theirs… I have seen how they handle things…*"

Besides the symbolic identification, i.e. the need to belong to a state and a community (reterritorialization of identity), we emphasized that getting a citizenship is a practical issue that affects the realization of certain rights (and obligations) on the territory of Serbia. The interviewees have also stressed that dimension in their answers.

Thus an interviewee, a refugee from Croatia who came to Temerin in 1995, said: "*We got it (the citizenship) because our older son wanted to go to the army, to do his service, and he got it before us… then the three of us got it, too…*" An interviewee, a refugee from Bosnia who came to Serbia in 1992, said: "*… and then the children got it (the citizenship), I still haven't… I need it for work, I was registered… now according to the new law we have to… I need it for work.*"

The interviewees' answer indicate their needs to confirm their cultural (national) identity in a "formal" sense, by receiving the status of a citizen of Serbia. Yet, we cannot entirely rely on the claim that the issue of citizenship is the most important identifier of cultural identity, i.e. the indicator of the feeling of national belonging.

The problem of identity and social integration

The development and stability of cultural identity is to a great extent determined by the total social status of an individual. When refugees are concerned, the issue of social integration and incorporation into a new setting plays an important role in whether they feel accepted by the community to which they came. The degree of social integration significantly affects the stability of their identity and the feeling of belonging.

The issue of social integration can be observed through several dimensions. the first important fact is the that most of the interviewees had fled to Temerin precisely because they had either friends or family living here. The second dimension of this issue concerns the acceptance of refugees by the wider social community (neighbors, acquaintances, work colleagues, etc.), whereas the third dimension refers to their subjective feeling whether they consider Temerin to be their home, i.e. if they feel like foreigners or "at home" in Temerin.

Most of the interviewees say they did not have any problems with integrating into the community in Temerin and that negative reactions of the local population were mainly occasional. These answers, which testify more of their subjective feelings and less of objective circumstances, are most likely motivated by the fact that, upon the arrival to Temerin, they had either relatives or friends here who took them in and helped them.

An interviewee, a refugee from Croatia, commented on this: "*A family relation influenced our move here*" and later continued: "*Temerin is our home now… I think we are well accepted, I know a lot of people, we have relatives here, we managed to get by and that works well.*"

An interviewee from Croatia, who fled to Temerin in 1992, said: "*… here in Temerin I had a relative and since she had a house in our old neighborhood, she asked us if she could help us somehow…*"

Another interviewee, a refugee from Bosnia who came to Temerin in 1995, when asked about the reason for moving to Temerin, answered: "*Well, yes, my family is in Srpska Crnja and his (husband's) relatives are here and so we decided to move here because of the location and because of work… and we like it here…*" and she added: "*Yes, I feel at home here…*" The fact that a large number of refugees had some kinds of social ties and that was one of the main reasons for their move to Temerin was mentioned by one interviewee, a local inhabitant (aged 60): "*Many had relatives in Bosnia, Croatian and that first wave came in 1995. Here people*

rushed to help, brought them water and food to collective housing… They really were helping them. My uncle, once removed, fled from Bosnia in 1995. We took him in here and gave him a roof over his head."

An interviewee, a refugee from Croatia who came to Temerin in 2001, when asked for her reasons to move to Temerin, besides having relatives here, nameed reasons of economic nature: "*Cheaper real estate, close to Novi Sad, in future for my child's education, for work, and that's it. My dad's cousin is here in Temerin, so, simply, a feeling that I have someone here…*".

An interviewee, a refugee from Bosnia who came to Temerin in 1991, said his reason for coming to Temerin was an acquaintance: "*I had a few acquaintances, not many important ones, but I simply came here by chance. I have more possibilities close to Novi Sad, more chances to find a job, it's all closer to a center…*" When asked if he had any bigger problems and any reactions by people from the surroundings, the same interviewee answered: "*Well, I did not have any greater problems, it was a bit awkward, you know, new faces and all that, but time goes by. You know, through work you get to know people, there weren't any problems.*"

An interviewee, a refugee from Croatia who came to Temerin in 1994, said: "*We managed to find quite cheap real estate here in Temerin through some friends. Actually, my father's relatives from Novi Sad recommended Temerin*."

An interviewee, a refugee from Croatia who has lived in Temerin since 1995, said her reason to move here was a job: "*… I went to Sombor with a colleague and my husband and two children. And in Sombor neither my husband nor I could find a job. He found a job in Temerin and we came here.*" When asked how they fit in Temerin, she responded: "*For me this setting is quite ok, quite good, wherever we lived, and we lived privately, we did not go to collective housing…*"

An interviewee, a refugee from Bosnia (aged 70) who came to Temerin in 2001 (previously he had lived in other places) said: "*The local population accepted me perfectly well. We live normally. I have a lot of acquaintances here, both Serbs and Hungarians, there are no problems. I feel at home here, we even received help from the Secretariat for Refugees, and to tell you the truth, any help means a lot… To tell you the truth, my home today is Temerin…*" The help provided for refugees was also mentioned by another interviewee, a local inhabitant of Temerin (aged 53): "*Since I used to work in the Secretariat of Defense, I was one of the first to become active in welcoming refugees and I was quite involved in the whole story.*

Since 1991, when the first wave of refugees came from Croatia, we became very active to help these unfortunate people." And he continued: "*… The local community helped as much as they could… we did all we could*."

Yet, some interviewees testified that they did not have only positive experiences of acceptance by the local population. One interviewee, a refugee from Croatia who came to Temerin in 2004 (until then she had lived in Surčin, since 1995), when asked how the local population accepted her, said: "*It depends. Many said 'Here, another refugee came, another problem. It was hard for me to find a place to live, I was alone with two children*."

Conclusions

One of the most important goals of the research presented in this paper was to use a thorough interview to investigate the identity of refugees in Temerin, as well as the degree of their integration in the new social setting. The paper started from the assumption that identity research through representation can detect problems and difficulties that refugees encounter during adaptation, i.e. acculturation and social integration. Identity is analyzed as a consequence and a presupposition of that dynamics. Important identity dimensions are its historical character, processability, changeability, as well as relativity. Yet, it still represents the awareness of a member of a group as well as the process of codification of cultural differences by the social community. We have thus emphasized the fact that migrations always happen in certain spatial/social configurations and that migrants (i.e. their identities) are influenced by economic, political and cultural structures of the given (new) spatial and social context. The interviewee responses in this research reflect to the greatest extent the subjective dimension of identity construction. Collective identity of a group (ethnic, i.e. national community) has advantage over personal identity so the focus of attention was put on that identity. Personal identity also refers to social recognition so in that sense it is sociogenic and culturally determined.

In order to transfer the concept of cultural identity from an abstract to a more concrete level of analysis, we established identity identifiers, i.e. indicators which the interviewees testify of by representing themselves and the group (national community) to which they belong. Three aspects stand out: the

first one relates to the need and the way in which the interviewees declare their ethnicity; the second aspect refers to one of the external (social) identifiers which the interviewees rely on when construction their ethnic identity (the issue of Serbian citizenship); the third one refers to their perception of how much they fit in the wider social community, the way they perceive their acceptance as "refugees" in Temerin and the way they perceive their present place of living.

The analysis of interviewee responses indicates that war circumstances and exile have to a great extent affected the strengthening of ethnic identity which had not been too prominent in a previous period of life. Interviewee responses have also indicated that, despite certain variations (especially in the relationship towards other nations and ethnic groups), ethnic identity represents a very important dimension of their cultural identity. War experience and exile have contributed to the development of national awareness and identity. The fact that (with more or less problems) they managed to become Serbian citizens contributed to that awareness and feeling of symbolic identification, belonging to a state and a nation, i.e. a kind of reterritorialization of their identity.

On the other hand, the socio-cultural dynamics of the new setting also affects the stability of identity and a sense of belonging in a special way. The relationships in the new social setting have been operationalized and represented through the interviewees' answers to the questions concerning the reasons for coming to Temerin and how the local population accepted them. The answers indicate that these experiences are mainly positive. As refugees, their position was facilitated by the fact that many of them had relatives, friends or acquaintances here. Yet, there were also those who listed economic reasons, i.e. employment, as the main reason for coming to Temerin.

The results of the research presented in this paper represent to the greatest extent a subjective dimension of identity construction and a sense of belonging to the environment, which is a consequence of a personal experience. Overall, it can be concluded, based on the data, that there is a developed sense of social integration among the refugees in Temerin and that it is a reflection of the changes in the socio-political, economic and cultural life of Temerin.

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Endorsing an Additive Pluricultural Identity Formation for Socio-ethnic Integration in Diasporic Caribbean Societies: An Insightful Culturometric Philosophical Re-examination of Trinidad Ethnic Diversity

Béatrice BOUFOY-BASTICK

Abstract. This paper looks at Caribbean social spaces and their plasticity within an ontological perspective and how emergent Caribbean identities are arbitrarily constructed, interrogated and restructured at the individual level, artificially fashioned at the collective level and covertly created at the national level. From an ethno-national standpoint, the paper critically explores the process of identity formation from an original ethno-cultural deconstruction segregating ethnic groups by phenotypes to a cultural *bricolage* of culturally diverse fragments from which emerge the modern pluricultural Caribbean individual, pluricultural ethnicities and the competing cultural allegiances that can threaten to shatter the family unity of the nation state. The paper first explains the additive process of pluricultural identity formation then highlights subtractive multicultural socio-political threats to achieving national unity within a pluricultural Caribbean. This position is discussed here using the results of a survey assessing multicultural allegiances in the predominantly bi-ethnic African/Indian Trinidadian population.

Keywords: *Culturometrics, diaspora, ethnic identity, pluriculturalism, Caribbean identities*

Introduction

Ethnic diversity residual from past slavery, indenture ship or contemporary economic migration characterizes the Caribbean and contributes to its unique ethno-cultural richness. These economically-driven colonization movements of the past and globalization policies of the present shape the ever-changing social make-up of Caribbean societies which is evinced in the continual attempt at reassembling ethnically diverse cultural fragments of inherited migration identities. While ethnicity in diasporic Caribbean societies is somehow overtly exhibited through rituals and ancestral ties to some elusive mythical space of epic memory (Alexander

1997; Bell 2003; Walcott 1993) it is no longer a distinct nominal cultural marker in ethnically heterogeneous communities in which inherent ethno-cultural mixing has engendered new cultural allegiances expressing the multiple cultural influences on individuals' increasingly complex cultural identities (Boufoy-Bastick 2003; 2009; 2010; Clifford 1994; Ghorashi 2004; Gregg 2006; Huat 2009; Ignacio 2005; Ortiz 2005; Premdas 1996; Puri 2004; Tarling & Gomez 2008). These emergent idiographic cultural identities are the quintessential groupings of cultural fragments strewn throughout modern Caribbean societies in which each fragment potentiates an embryonic cultural composite brought into being from both its individual and collective historical legacy and within a context of social need for identity completion " The result is an extremely pregnable Caribbean, constantly penetrated, while struggling to maintain its own sense of integrity and the notion of a definitive character" (Hintzen 2002: 475). The reassembling of these fragments, through an inescapable on-going cross-fertilizing enculturation, fabricates shifting multi-layered, multi-facetted Caribbean identities.

The paper first explains the additive process of pluricultural identity formation then highlights subtractive multicultural socio-political threats to achieving national unity within a pluricultural Caribbean. This position is discussed here using the results of a survey assessing multicultural allegiances in the predominantly bi-ethnic African/Indian Trinidadian population.

Background

Caribbean island states, like Trinidad and Tobago, are often characterised by ethnically fragmented diasporic communities. Trinidad is a nation in which higher value is proudly placed through prominently claiming African or Indian ethnic membership. While "nationalism can… be considered to have developed out of existing ethnicities" (Edwards 2009, 163) national unity in bi-ethic Trinidad expresses itself through a *re-assemblage* of African and Indian ethnic fragments metaphorically portrayed by Walcott in his Nobel prize address (1997):"Break a vase, and the love that reassembles the fragments is stronger than that love which took its symmetry for granted when it was whole. The glue that fits the pieces is the sealing of its original shape." While endorsing Walcott's cultural deconstruction process, we argue that the sealing of the pieces is the *assemblage* of pluricultural fragments - rather than mono-cultural fragments or multi-cultural fragments - producing new unique shapes, embodying what makes Caribbean individuals

pluricultural rather than mono-cultural or multi-cultural individuals. Notwithstanding the naïve romantic commitment to 'sealing' the fragments together, recreating the original shape is evidently unattainable and it would seem futile to suggest that an original ethnic shape could be recovered given the initial disparity of the cultural fragments within and between each ethnic Trinidadian substrate. Ostensibly, both African and Indian ethnicities in Trinidad are cultural constructions emerging from an attempt to create unifying ethnic memberships associated with an indeterminate African or Indian ethnic phenotype. These cultural ethnicity (re)creations are part of group identities grounded in naïve eternal myths of ancestry (Bell 2003; Boufoy-Bastick 2010a) which have the potential to trap individuals into ethnically bounded groupings and ignore the emergent cultural plurality of Trinidadian identities.

Now, the use of ethnicity as the 'glue' for sealing fragments into some visionary original shape can be disputed as not only being adverse to recognising the pluriculturality of Afro/Indo Trinidadian identitiesbut as being dangerously inimical to Trinidadian bi-ethnic national identity formation through inducing stronger allegiance to ethnic fragments. So in order to support pluri-ethnic societal construction and national unity this paper proposes to revalue the sealing of fragments by giving an additive rather than subtractive process interpretation to Walcott's (1992)[1] selective poetic associations of cultural identity construction.

Processes of identity formation – Building nations from fragments

From the perspective of Culturometrics, Cultural Identity is 'Values in context' (Boufoy-Bastick 2007, 20020a, 2010b, 2011, 2012). A person's identity is displayed by his/her behaviours which are generated to serve their values in the context. Observers infer the person's cultural identity through their own value-laden interpretation of the behaviours. The observer's interpretation can result in an accurate communication where both share a common culture

[1]"And here they are, all in a single Caribbean city, Port of Spain, the sum of history, Trollopc's "non-people". A downtown babel of shop signs and streets, mongrelized, polyglot, a ferment without a history, like heaven. Because that is what such a city is, in the New World, a writer's heaven. A culture, we all know, is made by its cities." (p. 64)

bound by common values because the person and the observer would associate the same shared values as the meaning of the behaviour. Normative enculturation is the lifelong learning process of incorporating experiences into one's changing components of identities. These changing developing identity components are roles that each person negotiates with their society through alignment of shared values served by behaviours in common.

Enculturation is nothing more than developing component roles which are sets of values/intentions/attitudes that can be reliably communicated through their negotiated association with behaviours aligned to shared values. A mono-cultural ethnic identity (e.g. African, Indian) is a major role, itself comprising minor roles (e.g., mother, teacher) recognised (by aligned behaviour and shared values) within the society of that ethnic culture. In established pluricultural societies, comprising peoples with different inherited cultures, each person's cultural identity is a meta-role that can be compartmentalise into the roles of citizen and other ethnic identities, each with their own strength of allegiance and contextually appropriate aligned values and behaviours. In mature pluri-cultural societies, the differences between some fragments of the mix have outgrown their social and personal value and amalgamated, thus their ethnic cultural ancestry is no longer tracked but assimilated.

We start at the individual child. Each experience is a fragment of a possible role. Let us consider, for example, the gender component of identity comprising fragmentary experiences of proto gender roles.

The gender component of your identity can strengthen or weaken depending on the fragmentary experiences you continue to incorporate into it. Another person might have a stronger or a weaker gender identity than you depending on the fragments of gender experiences each incorporates into their changing gender identity. If we could measure the strength of gender identity, we could compare two groups of people to see which group has the stronger gender identity – e.g. We could answer questions such as *'Who are, on average, more feminine, (i) male secondary school teachers or (ii) male primary school teachers?'*

Figure 1: Mono-cultural enculturation of gender identity - incorporating experience fragments of prototypical gender roles



Identity has many components. Let us consider the academic component of identity comprising fragmentary experiences of possible academic roles.

Figure 2: Mono-cultural enculturation of academic identity - incorporating experience fragments of prototypical academic roles



Fig. 2 has the same structure as Fig. 1 because the enculturation process is the same. In this parallel example, which is chosen to endorse the common process of normative enculturation, the academic component of your identity can strengthen or weaken depending on the fragmentary experiences you continue to incorporate into it. Another person might have a stronger or a weaker academic identity than you. If we could measure the strength of academic identity we could compare two groups of people to see which group has the stronger academic identity, e.g. we could answer questions such as *'Who are, on average, more academic, (i) male secondary school teachers or (ii) male primary school teachers?'*

However, modern globalised societies offer fragments of both experiences to the individual's lifelong process of enculturation and so the individual's cultural identity can include both of these identity components.

Figure 3: Pluri-cultural enculturations of gender and academic identities - incorporating experience fragments of both prototypical roles



To the extent that these components are socially defined as being mutually independent one component can strengthen or weaken independently of the other. For example, both components can strengthen without one taking its strength for the other. This is the additive model, in which it should not be the case that if you have a stronger academic identity, then this will correspondingly weaken your gender identity. That would be the subtractive model. These two models were once common in language learning. Some teachers ascribed to the subtractive model, thinking that learning a second language would interfere with first language learning and so to prevent this subtractive effect children should only be taught

one language at a time. Other teachers ascribed to the additive model of language learning (Cummins 1984; 2000). They thought that the skills learnt in learning one language would transfer to the learning of a second language making it easier if both languages were learnt at the same time. So which is the better model? Some people can speak many languages. It is clear that learning a new language does not detract from knowing other languages they have learnt (Adesope 2010; Bialystok 1988; Cenoz 2003; Cook 1992; Cummins 1984; 2000; Rothmans 2011). In fact, the more languages one has learnt then the more language learning ability one can apply to learning the next language so, all things being equal, it is generally easier for a multilingual speaker to learn a new language than it is for a mono-language speaker to learn a new language (Tremblay 2006; Vaid1986). It is a matter of 'optimum chunking'. Culturometrics ascribes to the additive model of identity because normative enculturation requires larger chunks of time than does skill training.

Hypotheses

We now use the Culturometric conception of additive identity components to distinguish between mono-cultural, multicultural, pluri-cultural and nominal ethnicities. These are mostly semantic hierarchy definitions. That is the definition given as the structure between its parts, but, in any one specific case is semantically dependent on the hierarchy of exemplars included in the parts. For example, some ethnicities might include other ethnicities. Nominal ethnicity is a label used to categorise visible minorities based on an observable stereotypical phenotype. A pertinent example is the self-labelling of Trinidadians into Afro, Indo or Mixed categories depending mainly on hair and facial features matching those of an assumed stereotypical African or stereotypical East Indian phenotype. A lay term for these category labels used in this context is 'race'. Mono-cultural ethnicity is an ethnicity defined by only one ethnic identity component. It is the result of unrestricted enculturation in a society defined as only having that one ethnic culture. Pluri-cultural ethnicities result from unrestricted enculturation in culturally diverse societies. It is an identity comprising all the ethnic components of society in varying strengths. This is a hierarchical conception of identity, a role which is fragmented into mono-ethnic cultural component roles, which are themselves enculturations of fragments of their own experience. Because pluri-cultural identities are additive they lead to cooperation based on self-interest between nominal ethnic groups, as each person has a stake in benefiting all ethnic groups of which his or her identity is comprised.

Multicultural ethnicity is pluri-cultural ethnicity in which each person is restricted to the expression of only one of their ethnic identity components. The other 'fragments' of their identity have been devalued and eradicated. A pertinent example of this restriction would be 'first-past-the-post' voting for ethnically based political parties. In this case, each person usually aligns their allegiance to their strongest ethnic identity component, which mostly matches their nominal ethnicity label. Thus, multiculturalism further fragments the Nation (Barry 2002; Deosaran 1981; Fulford 2006; Goodhart 2008; Gregg 2006; Jagland 2011) keeping citizens apart by forcing them to relinquish any cultural component of their national identity that does not match their nominal ethnic categorisation. This subtractive conception of fragmented identity results in competition for scarce resources between nominal ethnicities which undermines National unity. It is subtractive because if one nominal ethnic category receives a scarce resource then that resource is subtracted from the potential resource benefits of the other nominal ethnic category. An example might be if the government could finance the building of only one secondary school in either an Afro-Trinidadian area or in an Indo-Trinidadian area. Competition based on self-interest arises because one's gain is the other's loss.

The life experiences we incorporate into the enculturation of our changing identities are always fragments of possibly more developed roles. Our personal enculturation is our radical construction of those possible roles which we continually socially negotiate as our membership of society.

The Fragments: Walcott's contribution to building Afro-Caribbean cultural identity

The 'Fragments' from Walcott's 48 minute Nobel Lecture on December 7, 1992 *"The Antilles: Fragments of Epic Memory"*[2] has become an icon poetically

[2]Break a vase, and the love that reassembles the fragments is stronger than that love which took its symmetry for granted when it was whole. The glue that fits the pieces is the sealing of its original shape. It is such a love that reassembles our African and Asiatic fragments, the cracked heirlooms whose restoration shows its white scars. This gathering of broken pieces is the care and pain of the Antilles, and if the pieces are disparate, ill-fitting, they contain more pain than their original sculpture, those icons and sacred vessels taken for granted in their ancestral places. Antillean art is this restoration of our shattered histories, our shards of vocabulary, our archipelago becoming a synonym for pieces broken off from the original continent.

summarising the Zeitgeist of Caribbean identity from the previous three decades as non-functional remnants of a mythic culture potently symbolising a sense of loss and a search for completeness through the cultural artefact of a vase which is now in fragments.

Walcott's earlier work significantly contributed to this Zeitgeist of fragmented Caribbean identity – particularly articulation of fragmented allegiance to his 'African blood' and his 'English culture' in his *poem 'A Far Cry from Africa'* on the 1950s Mau Mau uprising in Kenya:

> I who am poisoned with the blood of both,
> Where shall I turn, divided to the vein?
> I who have cursed
> The drunken officer of British rule, how choose
> Between this Africa and the English tongue I love?
> Betray them both, or give back what they gave?
> How can I face such slaughter and be cool?
> How can I turn from Africa and live? (Walcott 1962, p.18)

This work is quoted 15 years prior to Walcott's *'The Antilles: Fragments of Epic Memory'* in Jack Alexander's excellent ethnography of 'The Culture of Race in Middle-Class Kingston, Jamaica' (Alexander 1977) which Alexander himself summarises as:

> This contribution to the understanding of race as a cultural phenomenon in the Caribbean analyzes the reality created by a racial terminology that has bewildered observers by its many terms and their uses. The analysis shows that race symbolizes mythological time and thereby anchors in the past a belief in the fragmented nature of society. (Alexander 1977, 413)

So here, we already see the Caribbean constructed as a fragmented society (Fragments) anchored in a past mythological time (in Epic Memory). We explained that all life experiences we incorporate into the enculturation of our changing identities are fragments of possibly more developed roles – proto-roles. The contribution of Walcott's iconic fragmented vase is to potentiate enculturation into epic culture by identifying the fragmented experiences of possible ethnic proto-roles as inherited fragments of a once existent epic ancestral culture;thus giving a motivated role-modelling direction to what was

only open vague possibilities of emergence. Most of the Afro-Caribbean diaspora are Christianand so, would have already found solace and motivation for identity development in the similarly purposed Christian concept of 'The Kingdom of Heaven'. A germane parallel is that Christians want to return to a mythic garden of heaven and diasporic Africans want to return to a mythic garden of Africa (Crowder 1984; Walters 1993). Christian devotees build their religious identity by also incorporating experiences which are fragments of epic biblical memory– the shattered fragments of the perfect Eden. Defining the pre-existence of this ancestral 'Kingdom of heaven' gives needed security of its certainty and describing it as 'Epic' motivates the identity change that ensures its attainment. Hence, a possible explanation for the successful acceptance of Walcott's icon is that it resonates with the common purpose of an already well accepted Christianconcept in the same demographic.

Figure 4: Walcott's iconic fragmented vase of epic memory illustrating directed radical constructivist mono-cultural (separated) ethnic enculturations of diasporic African-ness and of diasporic Indian-ness.



Figures 4 to 6, parallel for the construction of ethnic identity, the same nominal enculturation process that was illustrated for gender and academic identity construction in Figures 1 to 3. The major difference is the use of Walcott's icon for attributing the source of the fragments as an agent directing the enculturation process towards a role emulating the source rather than towards the construction of a vague emergent role. Figure 4 represents mono-cultural ethnic enculturation of diasporic African-ness and of diasporic Indian-ness, respectively, from the fragments of experience identified with Walcott's iconic fragmented vase of epic memory. However, Trinidad is a pluri-cultural society where we can build both Indo-Trinidadian and Afro-Trinidadian components of ethnic identity from conjoint experiences of fragments from both cultures.

Figure 5: Walcott's iconic fragmented vase of epic memory illustrating the radical constructivist pluri-cultural (conjoint) ethnic enculturation of diasporic African-ness and of diasporic Indian-ness in Trinidadian society.



From the perspective of this Culturometric deconstruction of ethnic identity, Walcott's major contribution to the building of Afro-Caribbean identity

was to identify the source of the inherited fragments of migration culture as part of a pre-existing epic African culture.

Enculturation is the socially negotiated building of hierarchical roles that emerge by incorporating fragments of their own experience. The icon of Walcott's fragmented vase of epic ancestral culture potentiates Afro-Caribbean enculturation motivating its emergence, giving solace and closure by defining experiences of inherited fragmentary migration culture as fragments of a pre-existing and therefore more possible epic African culture.

In the additive model of culture,the strength of identity components within each individual, regardless of nominal ethnic self-labelling, can increase or decrease independently of each other. In the subtractive model, an increase in one component is matched by a decrease in the other component(s) .So, as illustrated below, in the additive model the Afro-Trinidadian identity component of a highly dual-cultured Trinidadian (8) with Nominal Indian ethnicity could be more strongly Afro-Trinidadian than the Afro-Trinidadian identity component of a weakly cultured Trinidadian (4) who has a Nominal African ethnicity. In other words, ethnicity as a nominal category no longer serves as a major determinant marker of identity.



The strength of one's identity components are of practical importance in determining the priority of one's cultural allegiances. This brings us to the important practical issue of the family unity of the nation state.

Family unity of the nation state

Walcott's icon identifies the sources of the two major cultural identity components of pluricultural ethnicity in Trinidad. However, beyond ethnic identities there is also civic identity the source of which is the state. The fragmented experiences of ethnic identity and civic identity together enculturate one's National identity. We extend figure 5 to include this third component of Trinidadian National Identity.

Figure 6: Sources of three components of enculturation into Trinidadian pluricultural National identity.



The relative strength of identity components indicates the priority of a person's cultural allegiances. However, under the limiting social conditions defining multi-cultural societies each person is restricted to the expression of only one of their ethnic identity components, which is reasonably the strongest and most probably, in the restricted enculturation of inter-culturally completive of multicultural societies, this single strongest identity component is likely to match the mono-ethnic culture of people's nominal ethnic label. So, for example, in 'first-past-the-post' Trinidadian elections the electorate reverts to voting along ethnic lines, with the equality of civic identity being associated with 'mixed race' nominal ethnicity.

Culturometrics allows us to measure and objectively compare the strength of identity components for respondents and for groups. Thus, we can anticipate effects of relative cultural allegiances for nominal groups in multicultural societies. This includes measuring threats to National Unity.

Method

The key to assessing national unity lies in measuring the cultural fragmentation of ethnic identity.

We can determine the support for national unity in nominal groups from the relative strengths of their aggregated cultural allegiances. In this research, we compared the national unity in Trinidad of the three main nominal ethnic groups (Afro-Trinidadians, Indo-Trinidadians and Mixed-Trinidadians). We also compared the National unity of the two main nominal religious groups. The planned religious group comparison was Christian (Protestant + Roman Catholic) 61.3% vs. Non-Christian (Muslim/ Islam + Hindu+ Jewish+ no religion) 38.7%, not all of whom responded to all comparison questions. However, there were no Jewish respondents (0.0%) and only 7 respondents with no religion (2.7%), so these two categories were removed from the Non-Christian religious group which was then precisely labelled as the Hindu/Muslim religious group (36.0%).

Assessing a group's support to National Unity

The following fictional figure displays supposed strengths of the three main cultural components of national identity for some nominal population

group – it could be for Teachers or for Elderly Indo-Trinidadians or it could be for all Afro-Trinidadians.

Figure 7: Assessing national unity of a population sub-group



National unity is represented by the superiority of allegiance to the Civic component of their identity (A=12). Under Multiculturalism the group must choose allegiance to only one identity component. We can assess the group's support for national unity by comparing their Civic identity allegiance with their strongest competing allegiance (B=8). We do this by comparing the two highest points of the graph – Civic (A=12) and Afro (B=8).

It is clear that Civic allegiance=12 is the strongest. Hence, the single choice for this group will be Civic allegiance i.e. to support National Unity. To assess degree of their support to National Unity we compare this 12 with the strongest competing allegiance which is Afro=8. The percentage difference gives the group's support to National Unity; (12-8)/12=+4/12=+33%. A negative outcome would result if their strongest allegiance was not to their Civic identity component. A negative outcome indicates a threat to National unity. We can also assess the greater support to National Unity that would also have been afforded from their Indo Identity component (C=6) if pluri-culturalism had been maintained vis. (A-C)/C=(12-6)/12=+6/12=+50%

Support to National Unity = (Civic allegiance-strongest competing allegiance)/Civic allegiance x 100%

Assessing the fragmentation of Ethnic identity

Respondents are able to report the fragmentation of their ethnic identity. Psychologically, the cultural groupings of one's mixed fragments are recognised because their differences are maintained through a sense of social and historical tracking of fragments. These fragments are "mixed without amalgamating" (Alexander 1977, 432). When the components of identity are assimilated it is because those fragments are amalgamated so their differences are no longer discernable or groupable by stereotypical mono-cultural origins.Alexander reports a Chinese respondent, Chung, quantifying the fragmentation of his identity while distinguishing between Nominal Ethnic Labelling and Ethnic Cultural Identity:

The identity established for my informants more commonly focuses on their group membership, as in Walcott's poem *('A Far Cry from Africa'*). A typical observation is the following by Chung:

> I: I'm considered Chinese. I am really in a sense three-quarter Chinese. Am I? Yes, three-quarter I am. Of course, our physical features stamp us Chinese. (Alexander 1977, 246)

And so, we simply asked our respondents – a representative sample of 348 Trinidadian households - to similarly quantify the fragmentation of their national identities on a scale 0 to 10 as follows:

How Trinidadian do you feel?
How Indo-Trinidadian do you feel?
How Afro-Trinidadian do you feel?
How American-Trinidadian do you feel?

We also asked respondents to endorse one category of nominal ethnicity and one category of religion so that we could aggregate their responses by these nominal labelled groups to make group comparisons of National unity.

Now, there is a very complex problem that prevents these subjective ratings from being compared in the normal way. This is the confounding of respondent's expectations with their judgements. For example Chung (above) reported that he was ¾ Chinese. To arrive at this judgement he would have compared his Chinese fragments to all the Chinese fragments needed to be completely Chinese. Now, if he expected this to be a high number then his few

fragments would represent a smaller fraction. If however, he expected there were only a few fragments needed to be completely Chinese then his fragments would represent a much larger fraction. The complex problem is to quantify his expectation, and everyone else's expectations, and use these expectations to 'regulate' each response so that the responses can be turned into indices which are all fractions of a common expectation. Then these indices could be objectively compared, which was not possible using the original responses. This is a problem that has plagued the ubiquitous use of Likert type questions since Likert devised the method for his PhD in 1932. However, Culturometrics has found the simple solution of using a common 'public object' as a common scale to remove the confounding personal expectation biases from the responses. It is called the Cultural Index Regulator and this is how it works. Not only is each respondent asked to quantify how Afro-Trinidadian he or she is, but the respondent is also asked to rate on the same scale the Afro-Trinidadian-ness of a public object such as a famous person with whom all respondents are familiar e.g.:

Q1 How Afro-Trinidadian are you, and on the same scale ..

Q2 How Afro-Trinidadian is 'George Maxwell Richards', the President of Trinidad and Tobago.

So the Q1/Q2 gives each respondent's Afro-Trinidadian-ness as a fraction of how Afro-Trinidadian George Maxwell Richards happens to be. To find the consensus value of that we simply take the average of all the Q2 questions (average of all Q2s).

Each respondent's Cultural Index of Afro-Trinidadian-ness (CIAf) is given by their answers to: CIAf = Q1/Q2 x (average of all Q2s).

In a similar way, we can calculate the CI for each component of each respondent's Cultural Identity. We can aggregate these for all the respondents in a nominal group to quantify the cultural allegiances of the group. We can then assess the groups support to National Unity as shown above. There are many new Culturometric methods that resolve similar cultural research problems that are now exacerbated by the importance of cultural diversity. More detailed accounts of this method, the Cultural Index Regulator, are given in Boufoy-Bastick 2007, 2010b and 2012. Other Culturometric methods for solving other fundamental cultural research problems are made available at www.Culturometrics.com as they are discovered and tested.

Participants

The sample which was representative of the adult population of Trinidad was a random selection of 348 Trinidadian households stratified by population density and ethnicity from 10 major Trinidadian constituencies across the island. The sample comprised 152 males and 196 females whose age ranged from 13.99 years to 91.75 years with a mean of 46.15 years. 56% (195) of the sample were heads of households. The households were contacted by telephone and survey was read to the respondents by 33 trained interviewers. The interviews took a total of 195 hours 27 minutes.

Results

The results are presented in two sections; first for two nominal religious groupings and then for three nominal ethnic groupings. Firstly in each section, the cultural allegiances of the Nominal groups will be compared. Then the comparison of these allegiances to their group's Civic allegiance will be interpreted in terms of their group support of National Unity.

National Unity and Religion

Figure 8: Civic and cultural allegiances for the two main religious groups in Trinidad



There are large and statistically significant differences in the ethnic identities components of Christian and Hindu/Muslim followers. Hindu/Muslim followers have much higher Indo-Trinidadian identities than do Christian followers at the level of medium effect size. The strength of Afro-Trinidadian identity is significantly stronger for Christians than for Hindu/Muslims. However, the Civic identity of both religious groups is equally strong.

	Indo	**Afro**	**US**	**Civic**
Christian	6.487	7.278	4.402	10.350
Hindu/Muslim	10.174	4.473	3.332	10.571
n1	125	141	147	151
n2	73	81	88	84
difference	3.688	2.805	1.069	0.221
sig of differences	0.000	0.000	0.019	0.609
effect size	0.414	0.338	0.154	0.034

SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL UNITY

	Indo	**Afro**	**US**
Christian	37%	30%	57%
Hindu/Muslim	**4%**	58%	68%

The most noticeable result is the lack of support for National Unity from the Hindu/Muslim community at only 4%. This means that the Hindu/Muslim community, particularly the Indo-Trinidadian Hindu/Muslims, give almost as much support to their own ethnic and religious interests as they do to those of the nation; the difference being only 4%. This is not the case for the Christian community who has a much higher support for National Unity of 30%.

There is only 6% advantage in mean allegiance of Hindu/Muslims over Christians. The problem is in the uneven distribution of Hindu/Muslims between the two main nominal ethnic groups (Indo and Afro), whereas Christianity is more evenly distributed among the two main nominal ethnicities. The greatest immediate impact on National Unity would result from lowering the Indo-Trinidadian-ness of the Hindu/Muslim group. For example, if the Indo-Trinidadian-ness of Hindu/Muslims was lowered by only 2 points from 10.174 to 8.174, then theNational Unity for the whole country would increase from 4% to 27%. If it was lowered to the same level as the Afro-

Trinidadian-ness of the Christians, i.e. to 7.278, then support for National Unity would increase to the maximum possible for this single change effect to 31%. Alternatively much greater Civic support could be given to both religious groups, raising their Civic allegiances way above the Indo-Trinidadian-ness of the Hindu/Muslim group which would require many more resources for lesser effect.

National Unity and Nominal Ethnicity

Figure 9: Civic and cultural allegiances for the main nominal ethnic groups in Trinidad



These results show the Ethnic Cultural Identity components of the three main self-labelled Nominal Ethnic groups. The Indo-Trinidadians are slightly more Indian than the Afro-Trinidadians are African (9.996 vs. 9.761). The Ethnic cultural identities components of both these self-labelled ethnic groups are only very slightly less than the common civic identity of the sub-groups. Except for the mixed group, that comes mid-way between the other two groups, but highest on Civic allegiance.

Interestingly, in terms of valuing each other's culture, the Africans embrace Indo-Trinidadian culture (4.805) slightly more than the Indians embrace Afro-Trinidadian (4.420) culture. All three ethnic groups have very low American-Trinidadian-ness, although they all share a similarly high Civic identity component.

The most striking result here is the very low, but just positive, support of National Unity from the two nominal ethnic groups, at 5% for the Indians and only 3% for the Africans. However, the Mixed group has a much stronger support for National Unity

of (10.681-6.801)/10.681=36%. The direct solution to this low national cohesion is not to revalue each other's culture, as this will lift the lower points and not lower the higher ethnic cultural identities components that compete with allegiance to Civic identity. The solution is to raise the Trinidadian-ness of all three groups. For example, increasing the Civic identity component of the Africans and the Indians by only 2 points to 12.067 and 12.545 respectively will lift their support for National Unity from 3% and 5% to 19% and 20% respectively.

	Indo	**Afro**	**US**	**Civic**
African 1	4.805	9.761	4.261	10.067
Indian 2	9.996	4.420	3.652	10.545
Mixed 3	6.801	6.690	3.746	10.681
n1	92	101	105	108
n2	108	128	133	130
n3	53	61	65	66
sig of differences	□ □	□ □	□	□
	0.000	0.000	0.307	0.358
effect size	0.541	0.567	0.089	0.082

SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL UNITY

	Indo	**Afro**	**US**
African 1	52%	3%	58%
Indian 2	5%	58%	65%
Mixed 3	36%	37%	65%

However, revaluing each other's cultures might be an indirect solution as it might contribute to each group's civic identity without strengthening their own Ethnic cultural identity component. It was found as an adjunct to this study that the sex by age by ethnic group that most valued the other culture was elderly Indo-Trinidadian women. This may be related to the sense of oppression these women feel within their ethnic group (Barriteau 2011; Mohammed and Shepherd 1999). Hence, these ladies would be the best emissaries for increasing civic cohesion by encouraging the revaluing of the other groups' cultures.

Conclusions

This paper presented a culturometric deconstruction of ethnic identity using the symbolism of Walcott's *'Fragments of Epic Memory'*. It then used the

symbolism as an agent of normative enculturation to reconstruct the concept of Caribbean pluri-culturalism from which our notions of mono-culturalism, multi-culturalism and nominal ethnicity were then derived. This process of deconstruction and reconstruction distinguished Walcott's contribution to the construction of Afro-Caribbean identity, highlighted the dangers to national unity of promoting multi-culturalism and applied the insights to an empirical study of National Unity in the predominantly bi-ethnic society of Trinidad. In particular, it showed how multi-culturalism reduces National Unity by deselecting and devaluing aspects of ethnic identity. It measured support for National Unity at only 3% and 5% from Afro-Trinidadians and Indo-Trinidadians respectively, compared to 36% support for National Unity from ethnically 'mixed' Trinidadians. Government policies were suggested that would enhance support for National Unity through actions targeted to differential cultural and civic allegiances. Results from this study of cultural allegiance warn that Trinidad could revert to a fundamentalist religious state if people started to vote on religious allegiances as they now vote on ethnic lines. In other words, should there be a two-party choice between a Hindu/Muslim or a Christian party, the Hindu/Muslim party would win. Any additional Afro Muslims would add to this result by voting for the Hindu/Muslim party although this majority would be reduced should more Indo Christians vote for the Christian party. Further, if we postulated a four-party choice based on a religious and an ethnic splits, then the Hindu/Muslim party would again win because the ethnic parties would remain evenly split.

The paper showed how the fragmented identities of Walcott's imagery that are dangerously devalued by muticulturalism can be revalued by practices promoting pluriculturalism – such as alternative voting in Trinidad – and that these also increase National Unity. A pertinent conclusion from this Culturometric deconstruction of ethnic identity was that Walcott's major contribution to the building of Afro-Caribbean identity was to identify the source of the inherited fragments of migration culture as part of a pre-existing epic African culture. Enculturation is the socially negotiated building of hierarchal proto-roles that emerge by incorporating fragments of their own experience. The icon of Walcott's fragmented vase of epic ancestral culture and object of unrequited love potentiates Afro-Caribbean enculturation motivating its emergence, giving solace and closure by defining experiences of inherited fragmentary migration culture as fragments of a pre-existing and therefore more possible and achievable epic African culture.

Walcott's statement *"either I am a nobody or I am a nation "*which he vividly proclaimed in "The Schooner Flight in the Star-Apple Kindgdom" (1979) poetically, although imprecisely, expresses the richness of his constructed identity. His statement does not distinguish between multiculturalism and pluriculturalism, or their subtractive and additive identity enculturation processes. Nor does Walcott mention multiple vases that are fragmented. In contrast, this paper takes Walcott's symbolism further by bringing an important new structure to identity construction through defining and applying the concepts and enculturation processes of multiculturalism and pluri-culturalism to the re-building of fragmented identity. These important distinctions between multicultural and pluri-cultural identity have thus far been ignored as have their implications for an individual's national identity - such as when Walcott refers to himself as being a 'nation'.

A lesson we can generalise from this paper is that to classify Walcott under a single multicultural category as Dutch because of his blue eyes, or as English because of his education, or as African because of his hair, or St. Lucian because he was born there, is to deselect, devalue and destroy most of the fragments of his identity. To describe him as a pluri-cultural poet and philosopher is to revalue the many and shared fragments that became Walcott.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Around the book: *Crossing and Controlling Borders. Immigrations Policies and their Impact on Migrants Journeys* – 2011

Review by Lia POP

The book **Crossing and Controlling Borders. Immigrations Policies and their Impact on Migrants Journeys**[1] is a collection of the case studies resulted from a project design to cover the topic underlined in the title: borders regimes and migrants. As consequence, each study is meant to debate a particular aspect of the general topic. Their concrete analyses, as it was assumed by the individual and small collectives of researchers, results from the *Table of Content*[2].

[1] *** **Crossing and Controlling Borders. Immigrations Policies and their Impact on Migrants Journeys,** Eds. Mechthild Baumann, Astrid Lorenz, Kersin Rosenow (Eds) issued at Budrisch UniPress, Ltd Opladen &Farmington Hills, MI 2011, ISBN 978-3-940755-76-6 and it have 330 pages,

[2] The **Content** – with all the aspects of the topic covered - is:

Linking Immigration Policies and Migrants Journeys . An Interdisciplinary Endeavor by Mechthild Baumann, Astrid Lorenz, Kersin Rosenow

Part One: Linkages between National and European Migration Policies and their Impacts on Migrants Journeys

Reinventing Europe Borders: Delocalization and Externalization of the EU Migration Control through Involvement of the Third Countries by Sandra Gil Araujo

Success of Second Glance: Regularization of Irregular Migrants in Spain by Axel Krigenbrink

"It 's been the best journey of my life". Governing Migration and Strategies of Migrants at Europe s Borders : Morocco by Gerda Heck

The Senegalese Predicament . Migration From Senegal to Europe: Policies Control, and Implementation by Florence Tsague Assopgoum

Dead End for Migrants? The Europeanization of Ukraine Migration, by Marianne Hasse

I. Some introductory remarks

The volume structure is: an ***Introduction*; Part One: Linkages between national and European Migration Policies and their impacts on migrants journeys; Part Two: Experiences from US Migrations Regime; Part Three :"Illegally" Discourse and Spaces of Political; Part IV: and the Conclusions.** The structure suggests that the book planners had the ambition of a volume with a geometrical architecture in three parts. (The core content is respecting the exigencies of a symmetric formula. It is comprising: Theoretical approaches, Study cases in Europe, Study cases in the US and the political discourse and on "illegal migrants". It is preceded by an *Introduction* and ends up into *Conclusions.)* The geometry is blurred by too long titles; by the metaphorical titles preferred for *Introduction* and *Conclusions.* It is also a little bit confusing for the reader that the specific part *Conclusions* look like as a subchapter of Part IV.

To reach the real geometrical structure, a deep internal symmetry is requested. At minimum level, the exigencies of such a structure are: a) the *Parts* must prove an obvious equilibrium (at least, comparable parts divisions [3]); b) the set of the issues raised in the articles - devoted to the same major problem- must be comparable; c) the extent of the articles proposed in each Part must be symmetrical; d) the perspectives in interpreting the reality of migration[4] must be

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Turkey at the Crossroads between the Middle East and the EU: Changing Border Control and Security Policies by Basak Bilecen –Suoglu

Part Two. Experiences from US Migrations Regime

Undocumented Immigration between the US and Mexico: The Complex Development of Militarized Borders and Social Responses by Avital Block and Ma. Alejandra Rocha Silva

Evaluation US Recent Migration Policy. What Mexican Migrants can Tell Us? By Wayne Cornelius

Economic Policies Matter. Incentives that Drives Mexican North Ward by Katlelen Staudt and Sergio Garcia Rios

Part Three: "Illegally" Discourses and Spaces of the Political

Caught into Mobility: An Ethnographic Analysis of the context of Knowledge Production in Southeast Europe by Sabine Hass

The Limits of Hospitality. Undocumented Migration and the Local Arena: The Case of Lampedusa by Heidrun Friese

Unintended Effects of Immigration Policies for Government and Migrants. Conclusions by Mechthild Baumann, Astrid Lorenz, Kersin Rosenow

[3] The less sophisticated way of respond to such a requirement is to appeal to equal numbers of studies in each division, and with quite the same extent for each study.

[4] A minimal presentation of the political discourse on migration as a biased discourse - would be appropriate. With such a bit of theory the Part I would be more comprehensive.

also symmetrical – symmetries of the theories of migration –; e) the number of cases collected from the EU and US must be at least comparable, if not similar; f) the political discourses on "illegality" must cover EU as well as US; g)the *Introduction* and the *Conclusions* must be in an obvious equilibrium in contents and formulas (issues raised with the solutions discovered or figured by the researcher);h) the *References* recommended in the *Introduction* (or at least part of them) and also the basic theory proposed by the editors must be a compulsory part of any study.

The printed form of the project - as the *Content* of book - unveils a failure to reach such standards. It also failed in using common literature and common concepts. Foucault is far away from the majority of the case studies.

But, what the collective succeeded is to respond to high standards in conceiving, documenting and writing some of their individual work. Each published study fulfilled epistemological exigencies[5] of a written academic text.

The fundaments of the researches are to be welcomed for their specific contribution in unveiling the practical and theoretical damages nurtured in the replacement of the individual actors with an imagined *collective actor* and with an imaginative and biased political discourse (empathy with the migrants position); in the rejection of the drawing of the borders regimes without the field analyzes .

The book thesis is : "*The comprehensive domestic security does not result from the cumulative effects of the strengthening of the borders' control and with the policies of deterring the migrants to get in the destination countries.*" In spite of the claiming of the current Rightist political discourse , the strengthening the borders control and the deterring the migrants attempts to reach a more promising labor market cause only a more longer and more dramatic journey for the individual migrants. (In some cases, some individual journey became dramatic or even tragic events.)

The theory in **Crossing and Controlling Borders**… is devoted to offer a basis to compare the EU and the US policies in illegal migration management. It provides case studies from EU and US.

The philosophy of methodology is an interdisciplinary one, as the initiators

[5]It is looking for a broader context in defining the problem; it is guided by a central concept; and it is not pushing for a "constructive" solution and imposing resolution, but for an adequate way of understanding the process.

announce[6] it, at the very beginning .

All the studies are to be remarked by the mastering of the method of a qualitative analysis; by an obvious familiarity with the topics; by a capacity of interpreting the facts in broad perspective . To a reader with philosophical sensitivity , it is obvious that, for at least one of the contributions, the perspective is nurtured in a philosophical culture, with specific devotions to the philosophy of Foucault[7], to his coined concept of *"conduire les conduites"* . It is the case of the second article.

The concrete methods differs with the type of articles: for the theoretical approach – focused on an in-depth analysis of literature, on the defining basic concepts, on the new hypothesis launched- the methods are appropriate for theory ; for the field studies, they are harmonized with the requested ways of data collections in ethnography . Some of them, open the windows for the appeal to the political and normative frameworks. The field studies make use either of the direct empirical data collected by the authors, either by a secondary empirical data collection provided by prestigious international organizations – as UN or YOM – or by the validated national data.

The *References* of each article are updated, specific, and large. But, not all the articles contain references and pay enough attention to the political and normative framework which regulate the field; they did not comprise the normative and political references, despite the evidences, that the laws and norms on illegal migration management are the main topic in the study.

II. The book *Introduction* and Theoretical approaches on the Immigration Policies to Illegal migrants and the Migrant Journey

A.

In the introductive chapter of the book, the editors build the perspectives of the inquiries (the philosophies). They also precise the topics which are to be scrutinized, and the specific areas of interest. They also select the main concepts and recommend the methods in researches.

The concepts proposed by the editors are designed to fill the theoretical

[6]Mechthild Baumann, Astrid Lorenz, Kersin Rosenow - *Linking Immigration Policies and Migrants Journeys . An Interdisciplinary Endeavor* in the volume **Crossing and Controlling Borders. …** p. 9.

[7] Foucault is directly quoted in the first article – p. 23 - with a book ***Security, Territory, Populations.*** Lectures at College du France 1977-1978.

gap[8] between two rocks. The first is the field research approach, expressed in multiple descriptions, a non-conceptual story on migration (focused on individual migrants or on their medium and small groups associated as a collective actor). With its focus in a large diversity of cases, the descriptive way of working is creating difficulties in comparing and synthesizing a set of ideas ready to produce practical recommendations for decision makers and for the global society as a whole . The field's researches should direct their conclusions to a conceptual construction, to a Weberian ideal-type of Migrants' Journey in our case, a concept ready to help the policy making process.

The second rock is that the theories and reflections operate with an artificial concept of migration, migration as a concept for a *collective movement*, coherent and persistent, without peculiarities diverging case by case . According with the mentioned authors, the migration institutions and regimes are based on a such forged concept as collective and invariable movement. (It is – in the main cases - the fundament of the policies in border regimes; it is the core of the norms enforced by the receiving countries.) Or, an effective policy should operate with the reality, in our case with its diversity.

In brief, it is to admit- according to the authors - that the main fault in the process of looking for reasons in projecting migration policies is to define the migration concept. It is relying on the assertion that the migrants are a definite, perpetual and quasi-homogenous group.

In reality, the migration's concept must encompass the individuals' attempts and general flows of people in search for a better life; the movement from the poorest to the richest countries/places in the world; the flexible and increasing number of people with extremely different national and ethnic roots, and directed to very different countries all around the world, with extremely variable political regime of migration. It is also to admit that each of the migrants is individually deciding its own journeys .

The border regime and the other policies against "illegal" migrants instead of being a way to temperate migration flows in correspondence with the social conditions in the destination country, it is only a new obstacle in the migrant

[8] See the introductory study, signed by Mechthild Baumann, Astrid Lorenz, Kersin Rosenow (E*ds) - Linking Immigration Policies and Migrants Journeys. An Interdisciplinary Endeavor*, in **Crossing and Controlling Borders. *Immigrations Policies and their Impact on Migrants Journeys, (2011)*** *Budrisch UniPress, Ltd Opladen &Farmington Hills, MI 2011, 2011 ISBN 978-3-940755-76-6*, … , p.11.

journeys, not a factor to determinate the renouncement.

In continuity of the authors' thesis, and in order to comply with the reality, it is to accept – theoretically and politically – that a *collective actor* in migration is emerging aside the individual adventures . It emerges in response to the restrictive political institutions, laws, policies and borders procedures (also supported by political discourse on "illegality"). A more restrictive border regime will end up in the new segmentation in the countries of destinations. (The last one could be the segmentations among the people in solidarity – passive or active – with the migrants, and the people in adversity to them.[9]) The new restrictions and rejections will results in much more coherence and persistence in the aggregation and solidarities across the illegal migrants, in their transformation in collective actor with the self coordination and strategy. The worst (dangerous) result will be the entering of the migrants in the networks mastered, directed (even to criminal acts) and exploited by the traffickers.

Refusing to act on the main causes of migrations (of the economic migration)[10] – the extreme poverty at home and the economic injustice at the global scale - will determine new development of the migrants collective actors in the destination and transit countries. In the political field, it could produce new unattended and unintended effects.

The editors test the hypothesis as: a) that the real actors in migrations process are not the definite and homogenous group / groups; b) that the migration is not a social process; and c) that the laws, policies, and public institutions which are operating with such inexistent entities jeopardize their opportunity to be effective in the enforcement process .

The real actors are not abstract entities, but concrete human beings which are acting as individuals, according to their own incentives, interests, preferences. The migration is an individual choice of the migrant, in spite of the attempts to deter him/her . The policies designed to influence / to control migrants' behavior are of limited use, because the migrants take such policies as circumstances/ obstacles which are to be over-passed by new smarter strategies.

[9] In case of Romania, a movie, *Morgen* by the filmmaker *M*arian Crisan in 2010, based on a reality case, is illustrating a case of grass root solidarity between a Romanian peasant and Turk peasant illegal migrant, unable to verbally communicating.

[10] The political refugees and the asylum seekers represent a tiny part of the total contemporary migration flows and they are viewed as humanitarian case in the public discourse and in the public opinion.

Commenting the basic thesis, it is to question:

a) if the real actors are individuals hazardously acting in following exclusively individual incentives, interests, preferences ... and[11] … illusions or are they the best responses to promotional campaigns (active recruitments efforts) in the origin countries now or in the other times …;

or b) if the process of migration does not involve the collective actors as migrants, as the entrepreneurs; as the Unions; as media players; as public policy makers and takers, as the general public as well.

The domain of research is politics of borders control, in EU and US. It is an applied political science[12] collections of studies, resulted by two consecutive workshops, guided by editors hypothesis, and followed by individual field's researches. As political science product, they are looking to the effectiveness of the public policy in the field. They try to provide some basis to compare the EU strategies and policies the US ones. They criticize the approach for the presumptions far away from the reality itself.

III. Illustrative case-studies

A) EU case' studies

To illustrate the largest part of the volume, **Part two** two articles have been selected. The first one is: Sandra Gil Araujo - *Reinventing Europe Borders: Delocalization and Externalization of the EU Migration Control through Involvement of the Third Countries* [13]*….* The second one is Gerda Heck - *"It s been the best journey of my life". Governing Migration and Strategies of Migrants at Europe s Borders :* Morocco.

In the article *Reinventing Europe Borders: Delocalization and Externalization,* the author starts with the thesis that, after the 70s, three main

[11] *It is to adapt science to reality and to add to the general locus communis used by scientific literature in explaining the migrant endeavor, new dimensions. At first glance, two pull factors to be added are: the personal and family* ***illusions*** *on the net and endless sustainable benefits of the new individual enterprise of working abroad; and the* ***seductive effects*** *of promotional campaigns of consumerism (done through the telenovelas and other popular movies) on easy and extremely prosperous life for anyone in the wealthy countries.*

[12] The collection - in which the book is issued - is one with the same nature: Political Science.

[13] Sandra Gil Araujo - *Reinventing Europe Borders: Delocalization and Externalization of the EU Migration Control through Involvement of the Third Countries* published in the volume ***Crossing and Controlling Borders. …** Eds. pp. 21-44.

transformations were operated in the EU[14] policy: a) weakening the workers status, immigrants workers are also to be included; b) the rise– after the end of cold war - of trafficking, of terrorism, illegal immigration and organized crime as a source of conflicts, c) the measures taken after nine eleven have strengthened the linkages between migration and terrorism. In coordinating immigration policies it was too little progress. There were just some agreements in the "frontier regimes" with the neighboring state.

In the same time, it emerged in EU the increasing externalization[15] of migration control[16] - inventing the " government at a distance", from the countries resources of immigrants; integrating the countries of origin(of immigrants) into the EU migration control. The authors provides a summary of the documents that promote the delocalization of migration control and of the EU recent initiatives in migration control. In the end of her article, she is exploring the implication of the regime of migration control, as a sample, of political rationality specific to advanced liberalism[17].

She also underlines, that the normative documents of EU in the migration field, gradually but systematically, succeed to implement the externalization of the frontiers' control.

Concerned with the delocalization policies, Sandra Gil Araujo is proving that the EU policies in the field of migration implies an advanced control in order to respond to the transnational migration. In terms of management, she quotes the Commission's points of view[18], namely that the migration is now much more integrated in the EU foreign policy. She finds out that The European Neighborhood Policy is a new technology of government migration .

[14] It is, in fact, the Economic Community functioning before the *Maastricht Treaty, and the European Union after.*

[15] The externalization signs are: the extensions of visas; the setting up of the immigration liaison officers institution; the imposing of *Schengen Regulations* to the non-Schengen countries (the EU candidates countries, and others under the Neighboring Policies – Morocco, or Libya); the readmission agreements (According with such Agreements, the migrants expelled from EU are readmitted in the country of origin); the pressures to transport companies to implement inspections in the ports of embarkment.

[16] Sandra Gil Araujo - *Reinventing Europe Borders: Delocalization and Externalization … in the volume* **Crossing and Controlling Borders.** p. 21.

[17] The meaning of advanced liberalism is established following the literature of Foucault, of Nicolas Rose - ()

[18] The quotation is from the Commission document: An evaluation of The Hague Program and Action – 2009 – Communication to Consillium and to European Parliament (2. Com. 263. final)

Sandra Gil Araujo is also analyzing the Instruments of Government at a Distance. According with her analysis, the general trend of the new policy is Externalization through Prevention. The prevention means, practically : economic transfers in the countries of origin; assistance of the countries ready to enforce the EU policy; early warning systems; humanitarian aid; the creation of safe zones in the vicinity of conflicts, or the detriment of the third countries as ”Safe countries” vs” ”Unsafe countries”. In the process of establishing the new space of control, besides the traditional level and forms of managing the migration countries, new actors emerged: private actors, as business, or international and supranational companies.

The Conclusions of the study are:

a) the trends of policies in migration's control can be seen as an example of the political rationality and of technology of government that are characteristics of advanced liberalism[19];
b) ”the North-South migration is a structural component of colonial power still in force”[20], as consequence, there is a connection between the colonial order and migratory order…;
c) the borders have not disappeared, but they are displaced, mutated and multiplied[21] and the borders control is redefined;
d) the freedom of movement is attained by one class, is complementary to the other class immobility;
e) ”While the national borders are being abolished for the EU citizens, the walls of migration control, immigration law, readmission agreements, external detention camps, internments centers, security policy, and integration exams and contracts against postcolonial migrants are on the rise and are multiplying.”[22]

The References part is extremely large. In a way, it is excessive. It does not separate in Reference the normative and political literature (as *Directive …, Recommendation, Laws)* by the Report on Implementation of a Document)

[19] Sandra Gil Araujo - *Reinventing Europe Borders: Delocalization and Externalization …*in **op. cit**. p. 40.
[20] Sandra Gil Araujo - *Reinventing Europe Borders: Delocalization and Externalization …*in **op. cit**. p. 40.
[21] Sandra Gil Araujo - *Reinventing Europe Borders: Delocalization and Externalization …*in **op. cit**. p. 40.
[22] Sandra Gil Araujo - *Reinventing Europe Borders: Delocalization and Externalization …*in **op. cit**. p. 40.

analyzed, as it does not separate the institutional analyses of internal evaluations by the interpretations, coming from academic literature. From the perspective of this study, the distinctive chapters in References, it seems to be useful and clarifying.

Commenting the study, it is to appreciate its broader perspective, the courageous thesis and conclusions. It is also to take a distance from the idea of mixing different types of literature, which is an obstacle, in formulation recommendations of a desirable regime of borders control.

To illustrate the same **Part two** of the volume, the second study chosen – as already was pointed out - is the presentation: *"It 's been the best journey of my life". Governing Migration and Strategies of Migrants at Europe s Borders :* Morocco[23] by Gerda Heck[24]

The article on migration to Spain from Morocco, is one of the best in responding to the main question of the volume: " Does the border control policies affect the migrants' journey?"

She is describing which are the changes in the EU migration policies to the situation of the sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco – as a country of transit to EU and she illustrates the migrant strategies - in the period 2006-2009 – to cross the fence in Ceuta and Melilla. It is a field research done with the tools of an ethnographer: interviews, direct observation.

Morocco is a country of emigration, transit and immigration. According with estimations done by researchers there are 2,5 millions of Moroccans in the EU; there are (in 2007) around 10.000 of sub-Saharan migrants trying to cross the borders to EU.

The migrants' lives are deeply influenced by the European policies in managing migrations[25] and to limit the illegal migration.

The most influent was the policy of governing at distance. In 2003, by collaboration with EU, Morocco was adopting a law for foreigners. It was an effective tool to obstacle the migrants and a piece in The EU and African Plan, to

[23] Gerda Heck - *"It s been the best journey of my life". Governing Migration and Strategies of Migrants at Europe s Borders: Morocco*, article published in the volume **Crossing and Controlling Borders …** pp. *73-87*.

[24] Gerda Heck is a Ph.D. Researcher in the Institute for Cultural Studies in Cologne (Germany).

[25] The author notes that after 2005, the EU changed the name of policies related to migrants from "controlling borders" to "managing migrations". p. 75; p.79 …

fight illegal migration[26].

Morocco as a transit country, with special mission in fighting illegal migrants, received , 67 millions EU in 2007, from a total of 600 millions offered by the European Commission[27], in exchange for its major contribution to borders security.

EU is developing in Morocco, in the current multiannual budget, five programs to fight illegal migration: - promoting legal migration; migrants protection; the preparation of a legal framework; combating illegal migration; Measures for repatriation and home integration at home countries …[28]

The king of Morocco is accepting the EU policies, because of the economic reasons – the money, the opportunities for Moroccans to work legally in South of Spain in seasonal work …

The Effects of Restrictive Migration Policies – according with the data provided by Gerda Heck[29] - are not the cancelation of the journey to Europe as a strategy of life. The restrictive policies produce only more complications and risks to migrants.

The person who accepted to speak to the researcher, was caught and sent beck in Algeria, two times. (The "rule" – he said - is three /four times returns before succeeding to cross the border.) He accepted the rule, and came back to the border. Finally, after four years of failed attempts and long waiting, he succeed to get in the Spanish enclave, and from there, in the main land Spain.

Other sub-Saharans immigrants, sent back from Morocco, kept the same goal: reaching Europe, in spite of the more and more of sophisticated obstacles. One large part, comes back in the North, by food, traveling in the night, having as guide the train lines. An another one, rejected many times, tried again and again, using different ways. Some of them landed direct in the western African Ports, in Senegal and were trying to reach Canarias Island. They took an abandoned ship- completely insecure – *the cayucos* - and they proceed to the ocean. The Asians make use of the forged documents, or they swim alongside the border of the enclave. A number of 15 - 20 of migrants arrive weekly in Ceuta, according to an NGO activist.

[26] The researcher does not quote the EU documents.
[27] Gerda Heck - *"It s been the best journey of my life". …* p. 77.
[28] Gerda Heck - *"It s been the best journey of my life".* p. 78.
[29] The data are resulting from interviews with a migrant and with a NGO activist, in Oudja – Moroco, 2007.

As transitory inhabitants, the migrants learn the lessons of surviving. They found places to live in; they learn to find - *tranquilos*[30] - in the woods, nearby the borders ; they communicate with their families; they collect information from travelers; they organize themselves in order to get some protection, to solve the crisis, to take easy decisions … They are earning their living extremely precariously and, sometimes, in activities which are not compatible with human dignity: beggary, prostitution …

Concluding, the author assumes from the literature that the externalization of EU migration policy is an neo-colonial act[31]. She sends to the European policy makers a message in the word of an African, migrant: " We are sent by our families in a journey which changes us so much that we cannot go back. I came here by accident. And it has been the best journey ever …"

The References are pretty large and undoubtedly consistent . But, they are organized in a manner which is excluding the main support of the study: the author's research – the interviews, the personal documentations on the field …. The field research reports contributions are difficult to be seen at first glance . All of these could be avoided if the final point would get the title and the content: **Sources and References.** Introducing Sources, it has the special goal of including the authors direct sources together with the references. Some minor aspects in quoting a News Paper[32] are to be fixed.

It could be taken into consideration, (by the Editors) the suggestion to consider the **Bibliography** as **Sources and Bibliography,** or simply **References** in order to encompass the documents with information collected from political norms and regulations; from the field research; from archives; from media and sociological report … Such a complex collection is to be organized and separated into: **I.** a section with distinct **normative literature** relevant for the field regulation/regime and policy enforced and consulted by the author**; II.** the section with the **reports and other results** directly collected by the authors in the field researches and with the reports done by other researchers directly on the field; **III literature configuring the field state of art (**comprising the academic interpretations and synthesis starting from the primary sources; essays; media reports or editorials, …).

[30]The camps of migrants in Morocco. The researcher notes that a large and well known *tranquillo* is organized in the campus of the University of Oudja ; Gerda Heck - *"It s been the best journey of my life"…* p. 82.
[31] Gerda Heck - *"It s been the best journey of my life".* p. 83, apud Duvell, 2002.
[32] She quotes an article from *"El Pais".*

Commenting Gerta Heck study, it is to be noticed, she is not enough experienced to keep the axiological neutrality all along her study. She is embracing the migrants' cause in the expression, but in content, she keeps the migrants' receivers concerns – maybe without any conscious intention. The study does not explore the unintended and perverse and adverse effects of the migrant journeys on himself; on his/her families; on their country of origin …

She does not question– or only she did not let the readers know of it - the people aware, the migrants, the HR activists, … on:

1) How many lives are lost in the attempts to cross the border, in the transit life (police's victims, the victims of the violence among the migrants, of the accidents in the browsing, of the fights with the burglars.)?
2) How many lives are destroyed by the trafficking of human beings, by the trafficking of organs, by the raping, by the exploitation? (It is impossible to not catch some rumors about them in Morocco …)The migrants' life in Europe is good enough to take all these risks or, on the contrary, the mirage of Europe is a profitable illusion nurtured by the profiteers?
3) She does not open the discourse on the main concern of the receiving country: What about the future? (The importance as the small entrepreneurs use the cheap migrants work to make easy money and to sell cheap produces; the large public take advantage of the less expensive produces and get access to a better individual life; the migrants earn as never in their life … . But, after a while, the payment comes. Are they all ready to pay? Are the ex- native profiteers determined to redefine their identities in order to solve the problem of the significant part of their new attached people? Are the new fellows ready to contribute - even with personal sacrifices – to the citizens , of the second generation of ex-migrants[33] future.

We could not found comments on trafficking forms[34], on prostitutions, on children left home, of dying little towns because of missing creative labor …

[33] The foreigners' children born in the receiving country and having in EU the EU citizenship.
[34] Trafficking of human beings, of children, of organs, of pornographic images on the internet …

B) *US - case studies*

In order to illustrate **Part Three** of the book, **Experiences from US Migrations Regime,** the study preferred in this analysis, is Avital Block[35] and Ma. Alejandra Rocha Silva - *Undocumented Immigration between the US and Mexico: The Complex Development of Militarizated Borders and Social Responses*[36]. It represents the best part of the volume. The section proves a consolidated experience in academic writing, a clear definition of the studied problems , a capacity to focus on the facts[37] (and to add the opinions as a subsidiary effects of the facts' dynamic); an authentic style to appeal to the sources and proves for any statement and a competence of preserving the axiological neutrality. It displays a deep analysis of the effects – even of the adverse and perverse effects of the traditional migrations from Mexico to US, and on the new fact of "Berlinization" the southern border of US -. It concludes firmly and concisely, in few phrases . The text and final References are, obviously, coherent.

The general thesis supported by the American scientists is: the market dictates the immigration flow, and it should do it! The migration regime – at the state level - only influences subsidiary aspects of it and it transforms the illegal passing of the borders and the undocumented immigrants life in risky adventures.

The - *Undocumented Immigration between the US and Mexico: The Complex Development of Militarisated Borders and Social Responses* by Avital Block and Ma. Alejandra Rocha Silva – is a large synthesis on American policies towards Mexican migrants, since 1990 to 2010. It is also a complex picture of the today effects on several traditional culture of exchanges along the US Southern borders, on the migrants life, on the American society division along the migration issue, and on the Civil Society mobilization to respond to the restrictive new regime.

[35] Avital Block is a professor at the University of Colima Mexic and the director of the University of the University Center for Social Research.
[36] Avital Block and Ma. Alejandra Rocha Silva - *Undocumented Immigration between the US and Mexico: The Complex Development of Militarizated Borders and Social Responses*, published in the volume **Crossing and Controlling Borders. …** pp. 159-190.
[37] It is a study, based on the academic literature devoted to the Border Regime; it is a study on the studies.

It starts with a history[38] of the US Migration policies, and with the *Acts on migration* (1990). The US policies were basically the policies of a nation of migrants. But it includes black episodes with discriminatory provisions as the – 1882, *The Chinese Exclusion Act;* 1924, *The Johnson Reed Act,* "establishing the national origin quota system" ; establishing the legal category of "illegal alien"; the Border Patrol instituting and the criminalization of the undocumented people along the US . In 1965 the US legislative passed the 1965 the *Immigration and Nationality Act*, which has abolished the main provisions of the Johnson Reed Act.

The policies' philosophy of the epoch – active till 1970 - were: the duty to observe the Anglo-Saxon culture in public life, and the liberty to follow the native habitudes and liaisons in the private ones. After 1980s, the multiculturalism, which expended the minority rights; which redefined the very concept of the minorities new life as inclusion; and which identify the US as a country in reinventing its own profile[39].

Among the historical policies, the study refers also to the liberal *Bracero Program 1942-1964*, which is recruiting, in Mexico, seasonal workers for California agriculture and established an increasing flow of Mexicans to California[40]. The Bracero Program continued with a guests workers program.

The social consequences of the liberal policies on migration, was not so rewarding as they looked in the promising presentations of supporters in the optimistic economic developments periods. The assimilation process was not rapid enough, and the benefits of the liberal policies did not show up to the extent to which the optimistic supporters believed.

Reading the numbers of the immigrants in US[41] – in the historical legal contexts – it is to conclude that they prove that the policies – the migration regime - did not determine the migrations flow and structure. The main driving factor continues to remain the market. Before the economic crisis – in 2007 – the total number of immigrants in US reached 40 000 millions, half of them are illegal

[38] Avital Block and Ma. Alejandra Rocha Silva – *Undocumented Immigration between the US and Mexico: The Complex Development of Militarized Borders and Social Responses* in published in the volume **Crossing and Controlling Borders. …** pp. 159-160.

[39] Reinventing US profile is to *renounce to the - standards of White, Anglo Saxons and Protestants – with the core in the Episcopalian perspectives – and to include all the cultures and religions of each group living in US into a "melting pot", or "tomato soup", to create dynamic concept of the social ideal.*

[40] California is annexed to US in 1846. Before, it was a Mexican state, as Texas too.

[41] As the authors provided them.

immigrants[42]. (It is twice the Romanian population, and equal with Poland's population.) The structure of the Mexican migrants group in US changed: from *"paysanos"* to the inhabitants from urban areas. Their percentage in total illegal migration increased to 67%. The Mexican illegal immigrants in total number of illegal aliens in US – according with the estimates – is around 11, 7 millions, decreasing from 12 million with the economic downturn.

The next part of the study is devoted to the Social and Cultural Attitudes toward Mexico and Mexicans. The *Proposition 187*[43] - passed by the Californian State, in 1994 -, the *Proposition 200,* passed in Arizona, in 2004, produced xenophobic effects at the borderlines[44].

In the main part of the article – US Federal and Local Anti-Immigrations Laws, Border Control Policies, and Militarization[45] –the authors synthesized the normative and primary literature and in order to offer a general and real image of the US policies in Border Control. They verify the hypothesis that the anti-immigrations sentiments prevent free movement to US and mass legalization of undocumented immigrants.

In the post 9/11 atmosphere with the War of Terror policy, the immigration policy and border control were defined as national security issues[46]. The *USA PATRIOT Act, 2001* is its expression. The new national institutions were created – as in 2003, Department of Homeland Security – and the old ones reformed – as Departments of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). As consequences, the Borders Officers number increased from 4000 in 1993 to 20 000 in 2009[47];

[42] Avital Block and Ma. Alejandra Rocha Silva – *Undocumented Immigration between the US and Mexico: The Complex Development of Militarized Borders and Social Responses* in **op. cit.** p. 161.
[43] It is an Anti-migration act. The critics call it "institutional rasism", and the propents Save Our State (SOS)!
[44] Avital Block and Ma. Alejandra Rocha Silva – *Undocumented Immigration between the US and Mexico: The Complex Development of Militarized Borders and Social Responses* in **op. cit.** p. 165.
[45] Avital Block and Ma. Alejandra Rocha Silva – *Undocumented Immigration between the US and Mexico: The Complex Development of Militarized Borders and Social Responses* in **op. cit. p**p. 167-175.
[46] Avital Block and Ma. Alejandra Rocha Silva – *Undocumented Immigration between the US and Mexico: The Complex Development of Militarized Borders and Social Responses* in **op. cit.**
[47] Avital Block and Ma. Alejandra Rocha Silva – *Undocumented Immigration between the US and Mexico: The Complex Development of Militarized Borders and Social Responses* in **op. cit. p**. 168, apud Preston article of 2009, *Detentions at Borders are Down*, Published in *"New York Times"*, 2009, November, 26.

Smart Borders Agreements[48] were signed with Canada and Mexico…, *Merida's Initiative* for transnational regional security starts to train Mexican officers… (2008) .Mexico enforced *Operation Sentinel (2003-2006)* which employed 18.000 federal armed troops.

The erection of wall in US South California, (San Diego -Tihuana), and in other South States[49], is reinforced with high tech, Smart Border[50], in spite of the criticism of being in itself a Tortilla Wall.

Border controls become de-territorialized and assumed also by the vigilantes. Since 2008, the internet users have volunteered to use virtual border patrol system to support Texas Border Sheriff s Coalitions. When they had suspicions they sent an e-mail to authorities.

The security control started to be transferred from federal authorities to local agencies, which organized local patrols. They expend under local[51] laws and ordinances. The local authorities, under the policies of Secure Communities, take actions and detain immigrants not only for visa violations, but also for minor problems in traffic, for petty theft, for prostitutions, for shoplifting … In 2010, the policy of Secure Communities has been implemented in California, Oregon, Michigan, Texas, Arizona, Florida, North Carolina, Maryland, Virginia, Illinois and Hawaii – the authors reiterate after three reliable and independent sources[52]. Even legal aliens could be subjected to administrative detention and to deportation. In such states, under the pressure of public feelings, there are too little concerned to establish the minimum standards for the treatments of detainees. In some of them, proposal is refused to be enacted.

The Social and Humanitarian Effects of Adversity have generated Pro immigrants actions in the Catholic Church and Jewish Synagogues: *The Sanctuary Movement.* The Los Angeles Cardinal in Roger Mahony instructed (since 2006) his priests to provide humanitarian aid to illegal immigrants. The immigrants – legal and illegal – organize and defend their rights.

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[48] It is a de-territorialization of the control.

[49] *The plan to secure the borders, provided a wall alongside the entire South Border. It is to be finished by the end of 2013.*

[50] ABIS – Automatic Biometric Identification System.

[51] The attempt to pass an anti-immigration law *The Border Protections, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act* (H. R. 4437).

[52] Avital Block and Ma. Alejandra Rocha Silva – *Undocumented Immigration between the US and Mexico: The Complex Development of Militarized Borders and Social Responses* in **op. cit.** p. 173.

In public opinion, the pro-local laws prevail (51% in favor), constituting a pressures to legislators, especially in the South West part of US.

Concluding the authors affirm: "The zero tolerance policy has forced migrants to take dangerous routes, shaken the stability of legal and illegal aliens of Mexican origin, and disturbed the traditional relationship between the communities of both sides of the border"[53]. In the literature of the problem and in the data concerning the issue, they did not find evidences for supporting the Rightist thesis: much homeland security with more anti-migrant policy. They did not find scientific arguments that the policies towards the Latino migrants determined the flux of migrants, as the market does.

The references are large – approximately 150 titles - and they are properly mentioned in the text, as well as in the final a ***References*** section is provided.

To illustrate **the Part Four** of the volume**: "Illegally" Discourse and Spaces of Political,** the option was for the study of Heidrun Friese[54] - *The Limits of Hospitality. Undocumented Migration and the Local Arena: The Case of Lampedusa*[55].

The topics, of the researches chosen in the study, reflect the situation of illegal migrants in Lampedusa (Italy), the policies and the political discourse on the effects of their flows . Together with the flashes on the illegal migrants conditions, the study gives some accounts on the island economy of our days. But, as the researcher noticed, the case is a symptomatic one for the entire Mediterranean area of immigration to Europe, for Ceuta and Melilla, firstly.

The study is developed in five sub-chapters, namely: Mapping the Field; Routes and Dwelling; Borders Regimes and Legal Impasses; The local Arena as Borderland; Opening the Space of the Political.

In the introductory subchapter, she describes the perspectives of analysis, the main problem selected (the migrants problems at borders and borders areas with migrants problems), the main thesis defended. The thesis is: a) the

[53] Avital Block and Ma. Alejandra Rocha Silva – *Undocumented Immigration between the US and Mexico: The Complex Development of Militarized Borders and Social Responses* in **op. cit.** p. 182.
[54] Heidrun Friese is a Ph.D. researcher and the Chair of Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology in the Ruhr University in Bochum (Germany)
[55] Heidrun Friese - *The Limits of Hospitality. Undocumented Migration and the Local Arena: The Case of Lampedusa*, *published in the volume* **Crossing and Controlling Borders.** … pp.249-272.

contemporary European border management, which results into a distinction: friends and enemies, is the reiteration of the philosophical problem of the "Otherness"[56]; b) the contradictory configurations in the borders arena make up contradictions between the policies and political discourses; c) a new approach on borders area problems should be developed, in order to gauge the complexity of borders regimes in nowadays times . (The new approach should take into account local arena, its various practices and actors, as well as, its conflicts[57].) The enlarged views on borders arena problems could be the grounded cosmopolitanism.

After the Introduction, she enters in a presentation of the local Lampedusan circumstances and interests – economic, social and political -; in the report on the views of the natives on the migration and their life; in a description of the conflicts with national authorities and with the mayor arrested for bribery[58].

The author contextualized her study case. She is mentioning, as the main variables which influenced the Lampedusa socio-political environment, after 2000:

- the large migration flows[59] (It is to be noted, that Lampedusa and Linosa have a population of approximately 5000+1000 inhabitants)[60] ;
- the very old traditions of mobility on the Mediterranean shores[61];
- the traditional hospitality ethos and religious beliefs, shared all around the Mediterranean sea[62];
- the intense relations and interdependent economies of borderlines area, economies of interactions with other people;
- the ambiguity in the ethos of receiving a new comer, with

[56] It is to subscribe to her first part of the thesis, reminding that in the Romans' practices and culture, *alter* (the other) has the same linguistic roots with alterare (from Latin altero) with the meaning *alteration*.
[57] Heidrun Friese - *The Limits of Hospitality. ...,* p. 251.
[58] Heidrun Friese - *The Limits of Hospitality..*, .p. 265.
[59] How large the migrations flows in Lampedusa, Liosa, and Sicily it is shown in a Table with annual migration figures, Heidrun Friese - *The Limits of Hospitality. ...*The Table #4, p. 260.
[60] To give more relief to the problem in an over-crowded space, it is to mention that in the *Italian Census of 2011*. http://www.citypopulation.de/php/italy-sicilia.php?cityid=084020. According to the book, the migrants' number of 2001 was 5,505 (referred p. 260) . They already represented around 90% of the entire population of the isle. The number of 2008 rises up to 31.000. of migrants (p.260).
[61] It is to add that the Lampedusa religious patron is the Virgin Mary of the Safe Harbor: Madonna di Porto Salvo.
[62] Heidrun Friese - *The Limits of Hospitality…* p. 250.

hospitability/hostility[63].

Schematizing the factors that should be decisive for the policy on managing migration and border security , the authors appeal to: local context; to the current a-local and transnational border regime; and to the people – migrants and natives – telling about their life in a such overcrowded location and acting surprisingly.

The borders regime seems to be out of their control for the inhabitants and for their overwhelming number of hosts . The new borders policy designed far away, imposed to the island administration with no local consultations and enforced by the people unfamiliar with island traditions of hospitality, create a concrete enemy, both for local people and for the migrants. It is the Government Maroni, which takes the responsibility for the strengthened borders regime – with the fortress policy which lead to the refugees and undocumented people sent to ”prisons” !But, it happen in an harbor of Salvation, with an ethos of hospitality! That it is why, in the isle territory emerged unattended solidarities: solidarity between the native and the migrants protesting against the government (*“Grazie Lampedusa”*); solidarities of Mafia with migrants[64]; .

Although the research is done from an ethnographic perspective, its results rise basic political questions and illuminates significant local problems as well as tested solutions to them.

Reading her evidences in a political key, it is to decipher the Lampedusa blockage as multi-levers one as created by the double clash in managing the migration flow. She underlines, that the local values, interests and practices in managing migration of the Africans to EU is now in opposition with the national and supranational politics of fortifying the European borders against the East and South people in mobility; the local authorities (the Mayor)politicians join the population and control and of imprisoning the sea saved and people and it could be seen as the first crossing and via Lampedusa – one can notice that ;

Traditional ethos and religious beliefs, all around the Mediterranean sea;

The economy of borderland areas;

– are conflicting.

In the first subchapter, the author pointed out that fact underlining that the ethos of sea is to give help to any boat and to any endangered people, irrespective if he is a friend or not. , l

[63] Heidrun Friese - *The Limits of Hospitality.* p. 259.
[64] Heidrun Friese - *The Limits of Hospitalit*. p. *267.*

IV: Book's Conclusions

For the editors, the Conclusions are to be seen in the final study of the volume: *Unintended Effects of Immigrations Policies for Governments and Migrants: Conclusion*[65] by Mechthild Baumann, Astrid Lorenz, Kersin Rosenow .

A more appropriate design of the *Content,* would help the readers to simply indentify the *Conclusions.* But, anyway, such a compulsory logic unit exists and it is clearly meant to express if the hypothesis were confirmed or not. It is signed by the editors.

As corpus of ideas, the editors' final text it is to be separated into to two sections: the first consists in an attempt of a synthesis of the studies dedicated to the phenomenon of illegal crossing borders and the other one in a specific socio-political message doomed to decisions makers .

A.

The scientific part of the text – practically, the scientific synthesis on the specific findings – is underlining in the following assumptions:

a) The policy of externalization border and migration policy in preventing illegal migrants to arrive in EU countries is of little results and large costs.

b) The EU attempts and policies to keep illegal migrants out of EU borders in the transitory stations in migrants journey, (in the countries of transit as Ukraine, Turkey and Morocco) do not prove their effectiveness (more than 3 millions of illegal immigrants are wandering in EU countries). The migrants countries of origin and the transit countries are rational –interested – actors, and firstly, they serve their own interests. Ukraine negotiated pretty well its readmission accords vs EU visa-free's policy for its own citizens. The strengthening of the external borders of EU, the politics of "concentric circles of safety" will fail to keep out the future EU illegal /undocumented migrants in the future, too.

c) The migrants are encouraged to engage in their journey by the economic interests in growing times when they produce win-win results; by the inconsistent policies[66] (which results in high unemployment and in extremely

[65] The study signed by by Mechthild Baumann, Astrid Lorenz, Kersin Rosenow - *Unintended Effects of Immigrations Policies for Governments and Migrants: Conclusion***,** is published at pp. 273-285.

[66] *A sample of inconsistent policy: strengthening the external borders vs regularizing illegal good migrants situation, like in Spain 2005-2007.*

low salaries) in receiving countries. They have to face the unintended effects, sometime dramatic or even tragic for them and they do it.

d) The heavy border controls have not limited effects on migrants determination to get in the receiving countries; they only make more difficult and dangerous the journey of migrants . The smuggling market flourishes on such bases.

e) The unintended effects (of the increasing the migrants flow and of the inconsistent migrants policies) are the unintended alliances: the migrants alliances – discovered in Morocco -; the alliances among Lampedusan and Tunisian migrants in Lampedusa island against the Berlusconi Government; the "Sanctuary movement" in US . The trends of the alliances movements are to the development. What is pending is the effectiveness of protection of illegal migrants by the Human Rights agreements.

B.

The political message of the conclusions is entirely expressed in the final words of the book: it is to imagine, to get public support, to pass and to enforce "… alternative solutions for a more human immigration policy, that should take into account the active agency of migrants as well as the multilayered interests of their social and political environments".[67]

V. The Final Remarks from the analyst's perspectives

The final part is proving its reason in the formal geometrical design of the book and in the architecture of ideas. The geometry proposed is impressing, especially in the context of the literature on migrations suffocated by the simple *Reports* on the phenomenon without an explicit epistemological approach, without a final synthesis of the arguments of the thesis defended in individual studies. The harmony of ideas results from a consequent use of the main concepts; from the similar directions followed in field researches; from the same philosophical perspective in "reading" the general trends of our times (migration is a general and an increasing phenomenon- in 2050 , the migrants collections around the world will be quite the same as the EU population) with increasing dimensions and inter-culturalization and inter-solidarities will develop); from the similar way of

[67] **Op. cit.** p. 285

interpreting the findings – the attachment to multiculturalism.

The book covers and underlines as the main messages: *Open society to the mobility! Open policy to the desirable reality! Stop to support politically the fortress policy around the countries of destination for migrants!*

If this book would be an interactive one, or a fluid one, two major parts could be added to illuminate the general context and to make the book more "rewarding" for the readers' interests. Maybe even the two parts would transformed the text in more useful for decision makers and decision takers.

The first part to be added, according to the analyst's opinions, is to open the *Content* to the new issues as: *Adverse and Perverse Effects of the Migration phenomenon; The material, cultural and political life without the people in international mobility in the country of origin*; *The brains' international recruitment at home and abroad and to their results*; *The general migrant flows destinations and their mobility; The migrations international market and its trends in the Crisis.*

The mobility of the brains - "the economic interests on brains' drain and brains' gain" retain – on the migrants market , where emerging economies compete seriously, could be seen as adverse effects to horizontal mobility to EU or in US, from the point of view of sending countries officials and population at large. The mobility of unskilled and low skilled migrants – the economic interests threatened by such flows and the burdening of the social systems of - could be seen also as a set of adverse effect of from the point of view of receiving countries officials and population.

The Trafficking of Human Beings, the Child trafficking, International Prostitutions networks, the Trafficking of organs, of Drugs, of Arms … - phenomena strongly associated with illegal migrants routes, and sometime vested in the economic migrants clothing - are also seen as adverse effects. What it is important they are seen as adverse , both by the sending and receiving countries' officials, buy the regular population. Except mafias, which is seen it as an opportunity to big money, all agree that the borders should prevent the mafias penetration and protect the honest people . The question is if the increasing popularity of borders fences is it to become a feature of borders' future and if it is targeting the commonly identified threat?

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The book – entirely - is to be recommend for successive readings and for intensive meditations to the topic. It is about us, about the context which we live in.

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Bryan Fanning, Ronaldo Munck (eds.) *Globalization, migration and social transformation: Ireland in Europe and the world,* Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 245 pp., ISBN: 978-1-4094-1127-7

Review by Marius I. TĂTAR

This timely collection of research reports explores the interplay between migration, social transformation and identity reconfigurations within the context of an increasingly globalized world. More specifically, the book focuses on the processes which so rapidly shifted Ireland from a relatively peripheral country into a leading European economy and afterwards, since the global financial and economic crisis started, into a place of economic hardships and rising unemployment, especially among immigrants. The book examines not only the reasons why the *Celtic Tiger* faced several reversed flows of international mobility in less than two decades (from mass emigration to mass immigration, and back to emigration) but also the demographical, political, cultural and economical effects these migration processes had and have on the Irish society.

The book is divided into three inter-twinned sections which analytically display different dimensions, moving from the global to the European, and then to the national contexts of migration. Part I, *Global and diasporic settings*, encompasses five studies related to the integration of Ireland into the "global circuits of finance production and trade" (p. XIX), how the appurtenance to the global economic networks changed the international mobility flows, and how these migration processes in turn increased ethnic diversity, reshaped identity and promoted a "veritable cultural renewal" (p. 4) in a country once portrayed as "mono-cultural and mono-ethnic" (see p.4). This section starts with the chapter of Ronaldo Munck, *Ireland in the World, the World in Ireland,* which features the general migration and globalization debates with the case of Ireland. The chapter by Caitriona Ni Laoire addresses the pivotal role of return Irish migrants in redefining the boundaries of belonging and how studying their life experiences can

contribute to a better understanding of the ”complexities of insider-outsider relations in Irish society” (see p. 32). On the other hand, Nicola Yeats illustrates the shifting demand-supply balance on the globalized health care market by analyzing the case of labour force which migrated from and to the nursing sector in Ireland. The chapter by Diane Sabenacio Nititham, examines the means (especially Catholic church gatherings) by which Filipinos in Ireland “enact a sense of community in response to complications associated with immigration status” (see p. 61). In the last study in this section, Irial Glynn compares the open emigration memories in Ireland that “could be referenced by outsiders” with the more “exclusive” emigration memory in Italy, arguing that these two different types of emigration memory had an impact on the subsequent immigration debates in the two countries (see pp. 76-77).

The second part of the book, *European settings,* focuses on the European voting rights, integration governance and official discourses on migration. This section starts with a chapter by Jo Shaw outlining the framework for electoral rights for EU citizens and how such voting rights for residents in the Irish local elections, for instance, could be perceived as a learning laboratory which precedes a possible naturalization and integration of EU and non-EU legal residents in Ireland, as full members of the polity. An application of Foucault’s concept of *governmentality* in analyzing the Irish integration policy of immigrants is the core of the chapter elaborated by Brenda Gray. Thus, migrants can be conceived both as “productive figures of global capitalism” and as a “threat to national security and social cohesion” (p. 104) and this influences immigration policies and official discourses. In his chapter, Bryan Fanning places the Irish migrant integration into the wider context of European policies on integration, assessing the degree of convergence between the two. Further on, Gerard Boucher finds a contradiction between official discourses on managing migration bounded at the national level on the one hand, and discourses on economic globalization and European integration which directly link with the global and European levels, on the other hand.

The final section of this book points to immigrant experiences of African, Eastern European, Brazilian and Chinese communities living in Ireland. Theophilus Ejorh argues that African immigrants to Ireland share a similar racisms experience with other African immigrants living in other western countries. The relatively low responsiveness of the Irish political parties to non-citizen residents, including

recent immigrants from Eastern Europe and Africa, which have voting rights in Irish local government elections, is the topic analyzed by Bryan Fanning, Kevin Howard and Neil O'Boyle. The next chapter by Kevin Howard illustrates the outcome of an "archetypal moral panic" (see p. 169) by the case of the "criminalization of East Europeans' fishing and dietary practice" perceived as a threat to Ireland's coarse fishing stocks (see p. 181). On the other hand, Brain McGrath and Frank Murray critically explore the advantages and disadvantages of different dimensions of social capital (both bonding and bridging) in the dynamics of adaptation and adjustment among new immigrants. The last two chapters of the book present migrants' interactions with media systems. Gavan Titley and Aphra Kerr explore the case of Polish migrants and the media transformation in Ireland, while Rebecca King-O'Riain examines media perspectives on Chinese migrants in Ireland.

Examining and comparing issues of immigration, identity, integration and diaspora, the case studies presented in this book aim to shed light on the social transformations which occurred in Ireland, "a social and economic laboratory over the last 10 to 15 years" (see p. 9), broadening our understanding on how states and societies respond to challenges of mass (in and out) migration, in a globalized context.

EVENTS

Trafficking of Human Beings Workshop (THB) - Call for Applications

The Research Centre on Identity and Migration Issues, Department of Political Science and Communication, University of Oradea (www.e-migration.ro) welcomes you to the international workshop: ***The fight against trafficking of human beings in the EU: promoting legal cooperation and victims' protection***, that will be held on May 23th -24th , 2013 in Oradea, Romania. The workshop is part of the project with the same title, financed by the European Commission through Prevention of and the Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union – Directorate Generale Home Affairs.

The main topics of the workshop are:

1. THB in today Romania
2. THB in the EU and international context
3. Institutions fighting against THB
4. Victims' protection: prevention, assistance and social reinsertion

By this conference, The Research Centre on Identity and Migration Issues is continuing its previous series of events in the field of identity and migration, trying to bring together the scholars and specialists involved in the research of these issues, to consolidate the partnerships established with researchers from Romania and abroad and to find future directions for cooperation and new research opportunities.

Proposal submission: Proposals (including a paper title and a 250-300 words abstract of the proposed paper) should be submitted by email as MS Word

attachment both to popirinamihaela@yahoo.com and contact@e-migration.ro before **March 1st**, 2013. The papers presented at the conference will be published in the conference volume. Several selected papers could be published in the Journal of Identity and Migration Studies (see www.jims.e-migration.ro).

Fees: The conference fee is 25 Euro (100 lei) and has to be paid directly to the organizers before the conference. The fee covers the conference materials and publication of the papers. The accommodation and meals are in charge of participants (the organizers will provide information concerning more types of accommodation).

The registration form and the preliminary program of the conference are available on the RCIMI' website www.e-migration.ro.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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