JOURNAL OF IDENTITY AND MIGRATION STUDIES

The Journal of Identity and Migration Studies (JIMS) is an online review published semi-annually under the auspices of the Research Centre on Identity and Migration Issues – RCIMI, from the Department of Political Science and Communication Sciences, University of Oradea, Romania.

Director
Lia Pop, University of Oradea, Romania

Editor-In-Chief
Cristina Matiuta, University of Oradea, Romania

Deputy Editor-In-Chief
Marius I. Tatar, University of Oradea, Romania

Editorial Board
Gabriel Badescu, Babes-Bolyai University, Romania
Bernardo Cardinale, University of Teramo, Italy
Radu Cinpoes, Kingston University, London, UK
Ioan Horga, University of Oradea, Romania
Alexandru Ilies, University of Oradea, Romania
Zaiga Krisjane, University of Latvia, Latvia
Jan Wendt, University of Gdansk, Poland
Luca Zarrilli, University of Chieti-Pescara, Italy

Assistant Editors
Ioana Albu, University of Oradea, Romania
Dan Apateanu, University of Oradea, Romania
Alina Brihan, University of Oradea, Romania
Gabriela Goudenhoofd, University of Oradea, Romania
Ioan Laza, University of Oradea, Romania
Irina Pop, University of Oradea, Romania

The responsibility for the content of the contributions published in JIMS belongs exclusively to the authors. The views expressed in the articles and other contributions are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors of JIMS.

JIMS - JOURNAL OF IDENTITY AND MIGRATION STUDIES
Research Centre on Identity and Migration Issues - RCIMI
Department of Political Science and Communication Science
University of Oradea

Address:
Str. Traian Blajovici nr. 2
Oradea, 410238, Romania
Tel./Fax: +40 259 455 525
E-mail: jims@e-migration.ro; contact@e-migration.ro
Website: www.jims.e-migration.ro

Copyright © JIMS, 2015. No parts of this publication can be reproduced without the written permission of the editors.

ISSN 1843 – 5610
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## THEMATIC ARTICLES: COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES AND THEIR METAMORPHOSIS .......2

- How Collective Identities affect Political Interest and Political Efficacy among Migrants, Frank REICHERT .................................................................2
- The Transformation of National Identity and the Remembrance during Post-Authoritarian Transitions: case studies of Spain and South Africa, Patryk WAWRZYNISKI, Anna RATKE-MAJEWSKA, Joanna MARSZALEK-KAWA ....................19
- The normative concept of labour citizenship as a determinant of the global value of economic migration, Giovanni DI LIETO .................................................................33

## RESEARCH ARTICLES .................................................................49

- Concerns about Violent Crime in France: Does Immigrant Status Make a Difference in Public Perceptions of Safety?, Viviana ANDREESCU .................................................................49
- Accumulating Transnational Social Capital among the Greeks from the former Soviet Union: Education, Ethnicity, Gender, Eleni SIDERI .................................................................69

## BOOK REVIEWS ............................................................................88

- Richard Marback (editor), Generations. Rethinking Age and Citizenship, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2015, review by Cristina MATIUTA .................................................................88
- Lorena Stuparu (editor), Individual identity in the context of globalization. Studies and interviews, Craiova: Aius, 2013, review by Gabriela GOUDEHOOFT ........91

## NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS ................................................................97
THEMATIC ARTICLES

COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES AND THEIR METAMORPHOSIS

How Collective Identities Affect
Political Interest and Political Efficacy among Migrants

Frank REICHERT

Abstract: Predicting cognitive politicization variables (i.e. political interest and internal political efficacy) often relies on the same models that predict political behavior. However, social psychology researchers have discovered further determinants, in particular with regard to minority groups: collective identities, which may be moderated or mediated by collective maltreatment and perceived collective efficacy. Therefore, this article considers these variables as predictors of cognitive politicization. Following this line of research, it may thus be assumed that both an ethno-cultural identification with the in-group as well as a national identification with the country of residence positively relate to cognitive politicization with respect to minority groups. A dual identification with both the in-group and the country of residence should be a positive predictor of these variables, whereas a separatist identification as member of the in-group but non-identification with the country of residence should be a negative predictor. These hypotheses are examined using an online panel sample of Turkish migrants in Germany. Although a separatist identification yields negative effects, the other hypotheses are not supported. Conversely, identification with Germany shows negative effects on both criteria. The findings are discussed with particular respect to the importance of sociopolitical integration of migrants.

Keywords: collective identity, collective maltreatment, Germany, internal political efficacy, political interest, social identity, Turkish immigrants
Introduction

For current democracies, the participation of citizens in politics, and particularly of socially disadvantaged people such as immigrants, is important for the legitimacy of political decision-making. It is also commonly understood that people who are more interested in politics and who feel more able to influence political decisions are more politically active. Predicting these cognitive politicization variables (i.e. political interest and internal political efficacy) often relies on the same models that predict political behavior. However, social psychology researchers have discovered further determinants, in particular with regard to minority groups: collective identities which may be moderated or mediated by collective maltreatment and perceived collective efficacy (e.g., Simon, 2004; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). Therefore, these variables may also predict cognitive politicization variables. By using a panel sample of Turkish migrant students in Germany, this article consequently asks whether collective identities are predictors of political interest and/or internal political efficacy and, thus, might indirectly affect political behavior.

Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

Models that predict political interest and political efficacy often rely on the same variables that predict political behavior which, at the individual level, is typically explained by the existence of demographics (e.g., age, gender), resources (e.g., status, income), or social capital (esp. social networks); by the political values and attitudes of individuals; and by political interest and efficacy (cf. Steinbrecher, 2009). Biological variables like, for instance, personality traits (e.g., Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson & Anderson, 2010) or genetics (e.g., Fowler, Baker & Dawes, 2008; Hatemi, Medland, Morley, Heath & Martin, 2007) have also been taken into consideration for the explanation of political participation, but are less relevant for the present study.

Countless studies have demonstrated that especially political interest – often defined as the “degree to which politics arouses a citizen’s curiosity” (van Deth, 1990, p. 278) and which comprises political awareness or attentiveness (cf.
Zaller, 1992) – and internal political efficacy, i.e. the feeling that one is capable to understand political facts and processes and to take political influence (cf. Almond & Verba, 1965; Balch, 1974; Campbell, Gurin & Miller, 1954) influence (socially accepted) political participation in a positive way (e.g., Finkel, 1985; Gabriel, 2004; Hadjar & Becker, 2006; 2007; Krampen, 2000).

In addition to the mentioned “traditional” predictors, however, social psychology researchers have discovered further determinants of political participation: collective identities, which may be moderated or mediated by collective maltreatment and perceived collective efficacy (e.g., Simon, 2004; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). Collective identity means the individual’s sense of belonging to a group or a community. It is based on subjectively shared characteristics and “provides categories by which individuals divide up and make sense of the social world” (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p. 298). Usually, collective identities emerge in groups and through interaction, and Tajfel states that collective identities also have action potential when he writes that social is an “intervening causal mechanism in situations of ‘objective’ social change” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 86).

The work of Simon and his colleagues provides a significant amount of empirical evidence for the importance of collective identities in collective action, while also addressing the role of a dual identification with the aggrieved in-group and a more inclusive, higher-level community, such as the society as a whole (e.g., Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon, Reichert & Grabow, 2013; Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004a; 2004b). Several studies also suggest that national identification is positively related to political interest and internal political efficacy (e.g., Cohrs, 2003; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine, 1999). Shingles (1981), for instance, finds that “black consciousness” fosters political distrust and political efficacy among Blacks in America, while no such correlation exists for disadvantaged white people.

According to Stürmer and Simon’s (2004a) dual-pathway model, collective identification should be part of an affective, or automated, path to politicization. Therefore, it is hypothesized that collective identities correlate stronger with political interest than with internal political efficacy (cf. Strack & Deutsch, 2004, for affective vs. reflective pathways to social behavior). Moreover, it may be assumed that both an ethno-cultural identification with the in-group as well as a national identification with the country of residence are positively related to political interest and internal political efficacy in the case of ethno-cultural minority groups. A dual identification with the in-group and the country of residence could also be a
positive predictor of these variables, according to the politicized collective identity model from Simon and Klandermans (2001). On the other hand, a separatist identification as member of the in-group but simultaneous non-identification with the higher-level community (i.e. the country of residence) should be a negative predictor, as it may either work depoliticizing or radicalizing. Collective maltreatment and efficacy may, however, be mediators or moderators of collective identities, and in particular of a dual identity.

**Sample and Method**

**Sample**

To test the aforementioned hypotheses, this study utilizes data from an online panel of university students with a Turkish migration history in Germany. These students completed online questionnaires between 2009 (independent variables; \( t_1 \)) and 2011 (dependent variables; \( t_P \) [\( P \) for panel]). The focus is on university students because student life typically provides numerous opportunities for politicization. Moreover, university students with a migration history might have comparatively better chances of exerting influence and leadership in the political arena in the future compared to less educated members of their ethnocultural in-group. Hence, investigation into their politicization should thus provide crucial insights into the social psychological determinants of politicization among migrants.

All questionnaires used for this study were written in German and were completed by 463 students initially. For 189 students and 186 students, respectively, data for political interest and internal political efficacy, respectively, were available from subsequent measurements. In the following, aggregated scores (i.e. mean values of the variables across subsequent surveys) will be used as dependent measures.²

**Dependent and Independent Measurers**

*Political interest* was always measured by the item “How interested are you in politics?” (0 = *not at all* ... 4 = *very strongly*; \( M = 2.48, SD = 1.16 \))³, and *internal political efficacy* via three items (0 = *not true at all* ... 4 = *absolutely true*): “I am able to understand and evaluate major policy issues”, “I know a lot about politics and political issues”, and “I feel capable of actively participating in the political process.” (\( M = 2.34, SD = 1.01; \) Cronbach’s \( \alpha = .85 \))

² For more details on the method, please consult Reichert (2013).
³ All statistics given in this section refer to the initial survey in 2009.
Questions that had already performed well in previous studies were used to measure collective identifications (Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010). The participants usually indicated their choice on a five point scale (0 = do not agree at all ... 4 = completely agree). In particular, ethno-cultural identification with Turks was measured using four items: “I feel strong ties with other Turks,” “To be of Turkish origin is an important aspect of my person,” “In general I am glad that I am of Turkish origin,” and “I identify with other Turks.” ($M = 2.34, SD = 1.02; Cronbach’s $\alpha = .82$)

Identification with Germany was measured by five items: “I feel strong ties with Germany,” “To live in Germany is an important aspect of my person,” “In general I am glad to live in Germany,” “I identify with Germany,” and “I feel part of German society.” ($M = 2.55, SD = 0.93; Cronbach’s $\alpha = .85$)

Furthermore, four items were used to measure dual identification as both Turkish and German: “I feel I belong to both the Turks and the Germans,” “Sometimes I feel more as a German and sometimes more as a Turk – it depends on the situation”, “I have many similarities with Germans as well as Turks,” and “I feel well in the Turkish as well as the German culture.” ($M = 2.34, SD = 0.98; Cronbach’s $\alpha = .72$)

Three items measured separatist identification as Turkish in opposition to identification as German. The first two items were: “I often feel more Turkish than German” and “All in all I feel more Turkish than German.” In addition, respondents were presented a horizontal sequence of eleven boxes. Each box contained complementary percentages for Turkish and German ranging from 100% Turkish, 0% German to 0% Turkish, 100% German (with a decrement of 10% for Turkish and an increment of 10% for German), and they were asked to what percentage they felt Turkish and to what percentage German. Respondents then ticked the appropriate box, and their responses were coded from 10 to 0 such that higher scores indicate stronger identification as Turkish as opposed to German. To calculate a single index the scores from the box measure were translated into scores between 0 and 4 (by multiplying the original scores with 0.40) ($M = 2.40, SD = 1.21; Cronbach’s $\alpha = .89$).

Control Variables, Mediators and Moderators

In addition, socio-demographic control variables were measured in order to be included in the statistical analyses: sex (59% women, 41% men), age ($M = 25$ years, $SD = 4.57$), German citizenship (55% no vs. 45% yes), percentage of lifetime spent in Germany ($M = 84, SD = 30$), monthly net income ($M = 452$ Euro, $SD = 396$);
and German language proficiency was measured on a five-point scale (0 = very bad ... 4 = very good; $M = 3.72$, $SD = 0.64$). The political behavior that the students engaged in before the first measurement was also considered as a control variable. The respondents ticked a yes-box for each activity in which they had participated. Eight activities were summed to an index, namely: contacted a politician, actively supported a political party’s election campaign, member of a political party, signed a petition, engaged in a citizens’ initiative, distributed leaflets, boycotted products for political or ethical reasons, and attended a legal demonstration. Eventually, religiosity was also measured by the same scale as collective identifications, because these variables might be correlated with each other (Foner & Alba, 2008; Saroglou & Galand, 2004): “I am a religious person” and “My faith is important to me.” ($M = 2.38$, $SD = 1.47$; $r = .82$, $p < .001$)

Eventually, potential mediator and moderator variables resulting from social psychological research and theory were included in the questionnaires (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Collective maltreatment was measured by four items (0 = do not agree at all ... 4 = completely agree): “Turks are often treated badly in Germany,” “If it were up to some Germans, the rights of the Turks living here would be further restricted,” “I am angry about the treatment of the Turks in Germany” and “The discrimination against the Turks living here often makes me furious” ($M = 2.31$, $SD = 1.02$; Cronbach’s $\alpha = .87$). The questionnaire employed two items to measure collective efficacy (0 = do not agree at all ... 4 = completely agree): “I believe that the Turks living here can exert influence on political decisions in Germany” and “If the Turks living in Germany acted as a group, they could successfully fight against their maltreatment.” ($M = 2.31$, $SD = 1.02$; $r = .33$, $p < .001$)

Predictors of Political Interest and Internal Political Efficacy

Bivariate Analyses

Table 1 presents the bivariate correlations between collective identities and political interest and internal political efficacy, respectively. All correlations are rather weak, but in most cases in the direction we would expect, with an emphasis on the negative correlations between a separatist identification and both dependent variables. Moreover, only these correlations were (marginally) significant.
Table 1: Pearson correlations between collective identities ($t_1$) and cognitive politicization ($t_P$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ID Germany</th>
<th>ID Turks</th>
<th>Separatist ID</th>
<th>Dual ID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.05&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal political efficacy</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.12&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Only two marginally significant correlations occurred (◊: $p < .10$).

Multiple Regression Analyses

Consequently, multiple regression analyses were employed in order to see whether these patterns might change if we control for background variables. We were interested in the additional contribution of collective identifications to standard predictors of politicization. Therefore, socio-demographic variables, religiosity and past political behavior as well as either political interest (if efficacy was the criterion) or internal political efficacy (if interest was the criterion) were included in a first step. In a second step, all four collective identifications were entered. The corresponding variable of cognitive politicization as measured at time one was included in a final step (e.g., $t_1$ political interest was included if $t_P$ political interest was the criterion). This last step would allow to predict changes in the criteria (Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Granger, 1969; 1988).

Mediation and Moderation Analyses

Previous analyses yielded only weak evidence for the statistical relevance of collective identifications in the emergence of cognitive politicization, in particular with regard to political interest. Therefore, another model included collective maltreatment and perceived collective efficacy as potential mediators and moderators. If either of these or both variables were statistically significant predictors of cognitive politicization in the fourth step, a statistical test of mediation was conducted. Interaction variables of $z$-standardized predictors were considered in a fifth step to test for moderated effects (cf. Aiken & West, 2003; Frazier, Tix & Barron, 2004). One interaction variable was used for each identification variable, but these were entered separately for each potential

---

<sup>4</sup> Additional steps in causal analysis were also applied as suggested by these authors.

<sup>5</sup> In cases of significant mediators, the “Indirect Macro” by Hayes for SPSS was used (Version 4.1, 21 January 2011; cf. Preacher & Hayes, 2008) with 5000 bootstrap samples.
moderator. Moderated regression analyses were only conducted for significant interactions using median splits.

**Table 2:** Multiple regression analyses – cognitive politicization ($t_3$) on collective identities ($t_1$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political interest</th>
<th>Internal political efficacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>$t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (female/male)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of lifetime spent in Germany</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Citizenship (no/yes)</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German language proficiency</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past political behavior</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>8.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal political efficacy</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with Germany</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with Turks</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separatist identification</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual identification</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| $Df$ | $R^2$ | $[R^2]_{adj}$ | 171 | (.611) | [.579] | 168 | (.627) | [.596] |

**Political Interest**

Collective maltreatment had a marginally positive effect on political interest ($\beta = .10$, $t(169) = 1.85$, $p = .066$; model step: $F(2,169) = 2.01$, $p = .137$; $R^2 = .62$, $R^2_{adj} = .58$).\(^6\) Mediation analyses revealed a corresponding mediation of identification with Germany ($B = -0.04$, $SE = 0.03$, $CI [-0.11 \text{ to } -0.00]$), that is, the latter affected collective maltreatment ($B = -0.33$, $SE = 0.10$, $p < .001$), which then passed on this effect (Figure 2). No additional mediation was found nor was any interaction included in the fifth step significant, and collective efficacy was also not a significant predictor of political interest.

\(^6\)Significant coefficients given in this chapter refer to the level $\alpha \leq .10$. 

9
Figure 1: Illustration of the interaction effect between identification with Germany and collective efficacy in the prediction of cognitive politicization.

However, if each interaction variable was included separately in the fifth step, then collective efficacy moderated the effect of separatist identification as depicted in Figure 1 (\(B = -0.12, SE = 0.06, p = .045\); model step: \(F(1,168) = 4.09, p = .045; R^2 = .63, R^2_{adj} = .59\)): According to a median split\(^7\), a separatist identification was statistically irrelevant for low collective efficacy (\(\beta = -.13, t(70) = -0.98, p = .330; t_1\) political interest: \(\beta = .46, t(70) = 3.89, p < .001; \) model fit: \(F(15,70) = 9.49, p < .001; R^2 = .67, R^2_{adj} = .60\)). On the contrary, highly efficacious respondents reported higher political interest the less separatist they identified themselves (\(\beta = -.22, t(84) = -2.00, p = .049; t_1\) political interest: \(\beta = .77, t(84) = 7.64, p < .001; \) collective maltreatment: \(\beta = .17, t(84) = 2.40, p = .019; \) model fit: \(F(15,84) = 10.35, p < .001; R^2 = .65, R^2_{adj} = .59\)). The causal control analysis yielded no significance for political interest as a predictor of separatist identification (\(\beta = -.10, t(84) = -1.06, p = .294\), indicating that the identified moderated effect of a separatist identification was a causal one.

Internal Political Efficacy

A similar pattern was found in the mediation analysis for internal political efficacy (Figure 2). Only collective maltreatment was a significant predictor in the fourth step (\(\beta = .13, t(166) = 2.34, p = .020; \) model step: \(F(2,166) = 2.77, p = .065; R^2 = .64, R^2_{adj} = .60\)), and the effect of identification with Germany was mediated by that.

\(^7\)Low collective efficacy \(\leq 2\) vs. high collective efficacy \(> 2\).
variable ($\beta = -0.04$, $SE = 0.02$, CI [-0.10 | -0.01]); path from identification with Germany to collective maltreatment: $B = -0.32$, $SE = 0.10$, $p = .001$). However, the direct effect of identification with Germany did still persist ($\beta = -0.17$, $t(166) = -2.55$, $p = .012$).

**Figure 2:** Illustration of the mediation effect of identification with Germany, mediated by collective maltreatment on cognitive politicization (identification with Germany kept its direct effect in the regression on internal political efficacy).

In addition, moderation analyses also yielded a statistically significant interaction between collective maltreatment and an identification with Germany ($B = -0.14$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .024$; model step: $F(2,162) = 1.46$, $p = .218$; $R^2 = .65$, $R^2_{adj} = .61$). The median split\(^8\) indicated that the latter was of no statistical relevance for students who felt less maltreated ($\beta = -0.12$, $t(75) = -1.36$, $p = .177$; sex: $\beta = .19$, $t(75) = 2.57$, $p = .012$; past political behavior: $\beta = .20$, $t(75) = 2.19$, $p = .032$; political interest: $\beta = .27$, $t(75) = 2.11$, $p = .038$; $t_1$ internal political efficacy: $\beta = .39$, $t(75) = 3.08$, $p = .003$; model fit: $F(15,75) = 9.06$, $p < .001$; $R^2 = .64$, $R^2_{adj} = .57$). Those who felt that their in-group was quite maltreated, however, tended to be less politically efficacious the more they identified with Germany ($\beta = -.21$, $t(76) = -1.86$, $p = .066$; political interest: $\beta = .22$, $t(76) = 2.10$, $p = .039$; $t_1$ internal political efficacy: $\beta = .53$, $t(76) = 5.18$, $p < .001$; model fit: $F(15,76) = 7.87$, $p < .001$; $R^2 = .61$, $R^2_{adj} = .53$). Political efficacy was not a significant predictor in the causal control regression analysis on identification with Germany as a criterion ($\beta = -.01$,

---

\(^8\) Low collective maltreatment < 2.5 vs. high collective maltreatment ≥ 2.5.
\[ t(76) = -0.07, \ p = .949 \], so that we may conclude that we did indeed find a long-term effect of identification with Germany on internal political efficacy in the event of high perceived maltreatment of their Turkish in-group.

Similar to the regression on political interest, we did not find any significant interaction between collective efficacy and collective identities if these were included simultaneously in the fifth step. However, if each interaction variable was included in a separate model as a single predictor, the interaction with identification with Germany was marginally significant \((B = 0.08, \ SE = 0.05, \ p = .095); \ model \ step: F(1,165) = 2.82, \ p = .095; \ R^2 = .65, \ R^2_{adj} = .61\). The interaction with separatist identification was statistically significant \((B = -0.11, \ SE = 0.05, \ p = .032); \ model \ step: F(1,165) = 4.70, \ p = .032; \ R^2 = .65, \ R^2_{adj} = .61\); see Figure 1). Split analyses showed that an identification with Germany was a negative predictor of internal political efficacy among respondents with low collective efficacy \((\beta = -0.24, \ t(68) = -2.26, \ p = .027)\), whereas a separatist identification was insignificant among these students \((\beta = -0.18, \ t(68) = -1.47, \ p = .147); \ sex: \ \beta = 0.17, \ t(68) = 2.34, \ p = .023); \ religiosity: \ \beta = 0.19, \ t(68) = 2.36, \ p = .021); \ past \ political \ behavior: \ \beta = 0.21, \ t(68) = 2.56, \ p = .013); \ t1 \ internal \ political \ efficacy: \ \beta = 0.57, \ t(68) = 5.53, \ p < .001); \ model \ fit: F(15,68) = 12.10, \ p < .001; \ R^2 = .73, \ R^2_{adj} = .67\). The “Granger test” did not yield a significant coefficient for identification with Germany on internal political efficacy \((B = -0.03, \ t(68) = -0.22, \ p = .825)\). Hence, identification with Germany predicted decreases in internal political efficacy among students with low collective efficacy.

In contrast, a separatist identification had a significant, negative effect on political efficacy among students who felt more collectively efficacious \((\beta = -0.25, \ t(83) = -2.11, \ p = .038)\), while this time it was the identification with Germany which did not yield any significance \((\beta = -0.06, \ t(83) = -0.62, \ p = .541); \ political \ interest: \ \beta = 0.28, \ t(83) = 2.66, \ p = .009); \ t1 \ internal \ political \ efficacy: \ \beta = 0.37, \ t(83) = 3.39, \ p = .001); \ collective \ maltreatment: \ \beta = 0.23, \ t(83) = 3.05, \ p = .003); \ model \ fit: F(15,83) = 8.92, \ p < .001; \ R^2 = .62, \ R^2_{adj} = .55\). Political efficacy was not a significant predictor in the causal control regression analysis on separatist identification \((\beta = 0.07, \ t(83) = 0.77, \ p = .444)\), indicating that a separatist identification reduced internal political efficacy if students felt that they were efficacious as a group.

**Summary**

To sum up, collective maltreatment appeared to mediate the influence of an identification with Germany with respect to political interest and internal political efficacy (at least partially): Identification with Germany was negatively
correlated with collective maltreatment which itself was a positive predictor of both cognitive politicization variables. This means that the more students identified with Germany, the less they felt maltreated as a group, and as a consequence, they were less interested in politics and felt less politically efficacious. On the other hand, this also implies that the less students identified with Germany, the more they felt that Turks were maltreated in Germany, which translated into more interest in politics and a stronger sense of political efficacy. However, with respect to the latter, an identification with Germany still retained its direct negative effect: the more respondents identified with Germany, the less did these individuals feel politically efficacious.

Even though collective maltreatment was a significant mediator, it was almost irrelevant in the moderation analyses. In contrast, collective efficacy was a significant moderator: A separatist identification had a negative effect on both criteria given a high amount of collective efficacy, whereas an identification with Germany resulted in decreases in internal political efficacy if students felt that their collective was less efficacious. This means that those students who thought that Turks in Germany had quite some influence and that they could fight maltreatment against Turks if they acted as a collective were less interested in politics and felt less politically efficacious as individuals the more separatist they identified themselves. On the contrary, students who held the opinion that their in-group was not effective as a collective were politically more interested and efficacious the less they identified with Germany.

Discussion and Conclusion
According to the first hypothesis, collective identities should have stronger correlations with political interest than internal political efficacy. This was not supported by multiple regression analyses, although more complex models yielded that collective identities may not merely have an effect on internal political efficacy but also on political interest.

Identification with Germany
In accordance with social psychological research, perceived maltreatment of one’s own collective and the collective’s efficacy as a group are important (e.g., Simon, 2004; van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears, 2008). Mediation analyses yielded that students felt higher levels of maltreatment of their ethno-cultural in-group the less they identified with Germany, and the more maltreated they felt as a collective, the more were they interested in politics. Maybe students with Turkish migration history pursue an individualized strategy of success, and the more they
identify with Germany, are well in Germany and do not perceive deprivation and maltreatment of their collective in Germany, the less there is reason to be interested in politics or to gather information about politics and policies.

Another consequence of an identification with the majority might be lower levels of internal political efficacy, although the mechanism seems more complex in this case. The direct, negative effect of identification with Germany on internal political efficacy may contradict research according to which a national identification with the majority supports politicization (e.g., Huddy & Khatib, 2007) – this might not be applicable in the context of immigration when individuals may hold multiple (national or ethno-cultural) identities, in particular when we also think of the non-effect in the regression on political interest. Moreover, we found the same mediation as with respect to political interest, but the direct effect of identification with Germany remained. However, moderation analyses revealed that this effect persisted only among two groups of students: those who felt that their group was maltreated, and those who perceived their in-group as hardly effective as a collective. Hence, the combination with perceived collective maltreatment and/or collective efficacy could explain the politicizing effect of an identification with the majority out-group.

**Separatist Identification**

A separatist identification was a negative predictor of political efficacy. This is exactly what we hypothesized, but we also expected a direct effect on political interest. However, detailed analyses revealed that a separatist identification was a negative predictor for both measures of cognitive politicization only if students had the feeling that their in-group was highly efficacious as a collective. Hence, when it subjectively seems particularly likely to be able to achieve something as a collective, a separatist identification causes cognitive depoliticization.

Since a separatist identification and the strategy of social demarcation from the majority or “host society” go with each other (see Berry 2001; Esser 1999), this could also imply that classical interest in politics and a general sense of political efficacy are indeed reduced. At the same time, however, the interest in one’s own in-group persists and individuals distance themselves from politics insofar as they hold the view that they would not need politics, because the representatives of their in-group would successfully care about the advancement of their own group. Such a combination could be linked with a particular contempt for and disinterest in the broader societal context: “What do I care what you do; we can still take care
of ourselves.” In sum, this form of collective identification is particularly disadvantageous for politicization.

**Other Collective Identities**

Our analyses did not yield evidence that either ethno-cultural identification with Turks or a dual identification with both, Germany and Turks, would operate politicizing. This result did not change when we inspected the effects of collective maltreatment and collective efficacy as potential mediators or moderators. Hence, this study also adds to research on dual identification as a politicized collective identity and suggests that existing theory (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010) may only apply to political behavior, but not to cognitive politicization. Other research, however, indicates that social capital – especially being involved in certain social networks – could be more relevant with respect to cognitive politicization (Reichert, 2013), and future research should also think about other boundary conditions such as the salience of anti-immigrant policies and the identification with those who fight to change these policies (Wiley, Figueroa & Lauricella, 2014).

**Concluding Remarks**

Social-psychological research on identity supplies a complementary contribution to the explanation of cognitive politicization. Although findings for the role of collective identities in the behavioral politicization and in social movement participation cannot be applied to cognitive politicization in the same way, existing research could be enriched with important insights. Only our hypothesis on the negative effects of a separatist identification was supported by our data, whereas we did not expect a negative effect of an identification with Germany. Moreover, neither an ethno-cultural identification with the in-group nor a dual identification operated in the way which we had expected.

It should be noted that aspects of politics and policies regarding the in-group cannot be neglected when aiming at bringing about a politically interested and competent citizenry. This holds in particular once we consider the negative effects of an identification with Germany in the multiple regression analyses when several control variables were included and which also accounted for the fact that various collective identities are involved in the context of immigration. Furthermore, the political system has to respect the origin of all people because the bond with the minority in-group that plays a certain role for acquiring the preconditions of political participation within the larger society.
However, since internal political efficacy is more often affected by collective identification, it seems that the more conventional political activities are influenced by collective identities in an indirect way (cf. Reichert, 2013). Politics thus must not preach either / or and request sole identification with Germany but accept that this kind of identity may not in all contexts be as positive for engaging people in politics as some research suggests. Yet a very one-sided form of a separatist collective identification in fact appears to be a negative condition of cognitive politicization, which is often understood as a precondition of an active participation in politics. At least university students do not seem to politicize cognitively the more they identify with the majority out-group, or the more they identify with their in-group in a very single-sided way.

References


**Acknowledgments**

This research was supported by research grants from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) to Bernd Simon, Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel (SI 428/13-3, -4). The article summarizes selected findings which have been published by Oldenbourg in German language (cf. Reichert, 2013).
The Transformation of National Identity and the Remembrance during Post-Authoritarian Transitions: case studies of Spain and South Africa

Patryk WAWRZYNSKI, Anna RATKE-MAJEWSKA, Joanna MARSZALEK-KAW

Abstract: The paper discusses a role of the remembrance policy in the reconstruction of national identity during the democratization. It includes unique theoretical consideration of this phenomenon and two case studies: post-authoritarian Spain and post-apartheid South Africa. Presented conclusions are a result of qualitative study of transitional politics of memory which focused on the use of remembrance narratives and interpretations of the past to support an establishment of new, democratic and inclusive identity. Considering these two cases, the paper offers an observation of the domination of future-oriented politics over the remembrance and dealing with the past during the transition.

Keywords: democratization, national identity, remembrance, Spain, South Africa.

Theoretical aspects of the transitional transformation of national identity

The Third Wave of Democratization has caused a commonness of the belief in supremacy of democratic regime within social sciences (Huntington 1991). However, a popularity of this regime does not determine its effectiveness – changing way how political relations are regulated is still dependent on a degree of national identity’s reconstruction and a durability of links between contents of new identity and negotiated, transitional order (Lijphart 1992: 207-208). The establishment of new political realities requires new constitution of civic culture, and new ideas which bonds a community (Smith 1991: 11). It is possible only if an ongoing process of democratization is supported by popularization of modernized cultural interpretations of a group, its origins and future objectives, as well as its exceptionalism (Hodgson 2009, Łastawski 2004: 15, Wawrzyński 2011: 33).
There is no effective democratization without reconstruction of political culture. Of course, the future success of transformation is based on instituting new formal and legal norms of governance and civic engagement (Schattkowsky 2011), but it is also influenced by an outcome of transitional conversion of society's consciousness. This transformation determines shared definitions of community, vision of its future and inter-generational relations, it shapes an obligation to maintain unfulfilled hopes, unkept promises and unrealized dreams, as well as it constitutes understandings of shared values and goals for the future (Wawrzyński 2015). The authoritarian identity cannot be used to inform citizens about attitudes, behaviors and values that are preferred or rewarded in new, democratic conditions.

During a democratic transition, a new identity has to answer three main challenges. Firstly, it has to reflect change of preferred attitudes, behaviors and values (Finkel, Smith 2011: 417). Secondly, a new identity has to satisfy a need for new standards of public sphere and negotiating norms of political behavior (Unterhalter 2000: 72-73). Thirdly, a new identity is key for an establishment of road map for national reconciliation and overcoming past experiences, as well as for defining transitional meaning of the just and the justice (Eze 2004: 763-764, Marszałek-Kawa et al. 2014). Moreover, the reconstruction of community supports main transitional objectives: social inclusion, engagement of all social groups, and consolidation of the principle of equality (Mani 2005: 512).

The post-authoritarian transition in practice cannot be recognized as ended until a new inclusive and reconciliatory identity is constituted and a remembrance is no longer a fuel to the flames of sociopolitical divisions. Patrick Bond (2006: 141) noticed that it is connected with solving a tough dilemma of redistribution of influence and assets in new, democratic conditions, what is essential for both: realization of negotiated settlement and promotion of a new identity within a society (which expects observable benefits from a change). So, the outcome of transformation depends on an efficacy of reconciliation and replacement of antagonistic narratives by new interpretations of the past, a community and an inter-generational agreement (Theidon 2006: 456). Moreover, popularized new contents have to support imagination of the state's future (Crawford 2006: 226, Koczanowicz 2009: 31) and they have to subordinate dealing with the past to an establishment of new community, which is based on hoping (Boyatzis et al. 2013, Robbins, Bryan 2004, Leslie, Finchilescu 2013).

The key role in this process plays government’s remembrance policy which is a strategy of social influence based on narrating and interpreting past experiences (Labanyi 2008). During the transition it has five main objectives: (1)
assessing previous regime, (2) punishing past violations, (3) legitimizing new elites, (4) rewarding heroes of a struggle, and (5) commemorating its victims [Wawrzyński 2013]. So, realization of the remembrance policy enables a government to control a degree, in which an establishment of inclusive community is based on politics of forgetting and society's future-orientation (Dudek 2011: 12-26). Moreover, it is able to regulate shared understandings of a negotiated settlement between new elites and authoritarian authorities, what makes possible both: commemorating of heroic struggle against oppression and granting forgiveness for human rights violators (Horne 2009, Tobin 2010). So, a transitional government has power to manage remembrance – its narratives, symbols and images – which, through collective identity, influences social attitudes and shared values, as well as patterns of preferred behavior and rules of political cooperation. It makes an alliance of power, memory and identity a unique and efficient instrument of government's social influence (Wawrzyński 2015).

It this paper, we discuss relationships between invalidation of an authoritarian identity, a construction of democratic identity and a path of democratization in a context of deep social divisions. Considering draft results of the comparative study on a role of remembrance narratives during the transition, we present links between interpreting past experiences, the democratization, and an establishment of political identities in two countries: post-authoritarian Spain and post-apartheid South Africa during their transitions. Using the qualitative analysis of the politics of memory and the sites of memory approach (Nora 1989), we verify the hypothesis on a significant role of the reinterpretation of past experiences as the justification of a new identity during post-authoritarian transformation.

The transformation of national identity in post-authoritarian Spain

The national identity in governed by General Francisco Franco y Bahamonde authoritarian Spain was based on the exclusion of a part of society (rojos). It was supported by state-sponsored interpretation of the past and manipulations of collective memory which mostly referred to the origins of regime and the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). The Guerra Civil Española was a result of the military coup d'état, that opposed the Second Spanish Republic's democratic government, and that was justified as a protection of the country against the threat of socialist revolution. However, generals' putsch intensified political violence in Spain, and it caused a long-lasting division of Spanish society into two antagonistic
sides: the whites and the reds.

In 1939 the civil war ended with the victory of nationalist generals and the collapse of democratic order. On the 1st April, 1939 General Franco announced his dictatorship which continued for forty years (Beevor 2009, Bolinaga 2009, Moa Rodriguez 1999, Preston 2006, Renzato 2006). The construction of new, authoritarian identity – from the very beginning – was founded on the exclusion of citizens who supported the Second Republic. Franco's government arbitrary divided Spanish society into two groups to maintain political atmosphere of the conflict. The first group included Franco's supporters, recognized by authorities as true patriots and 'real Spaniards', while the second group contained *rojos* (the Reds) who were recognized by authorities as nation's enemies, traitors, and supporters of the 'godless Spain'.

In authoritarian conditions, the Reds became citizens of second category, only because of their political beliefs or their support for legal government (Beevor 2009: 542-547, Romero Salvadó 2013: 136). They were brutally repressed – the number of political prisoner of Francoist Spain is estimated as 500,000 individuals, and the number of causalities after the end of civil war exceeded 200,000 (Beevor 2009: 543-545). Spanish society was divided into the winners and the conquered, and this dichotomy became essential for the authoritarian politics – the guiding rule was to destroy all sides which could be recognized as real or potential enemies of the dictatorship (Ratke 2011: 337).

The exclusive, authoritarian identity was promoted by governmental interpretations of the past – liberal elites (teachers, academics, writers) were replaced by propagandists. The system of education was used to narrate the civil war as a liberation struggle against bolshevik revolution, and to present General Franco as invincible commander (*caudillo invicto*) who defended Spain from traitors. The hatred for the Reds was intensified by emphasis of their atrocities during the conflict, and thanks to forgetting nationalists' war crimes in official narratives – the remembrance of the 'red terror' was used as a groundwork for Spanish consciousness (Beevor 2009: 128-156). Moreover, the international context of the Cold War strengthened a mythical aspect of the civil war, and enabled the Francoist regime to present it as the very first victory of Western country in the struggle against the communism (Ratke 2011: 337, Romero Salvadó 2013: 231-232).

The death of General Franco in 1975 caused a necessity to choose new direction for Spain. There were three main possibilities: (1) progressive reforms of authoritarian institutions – *reformismo*, (2) an immediate democratization of state – *ruptura democrática*, and (3) a continuation of the dictatorship – *continuismo*–
The Transformation of National Identity

JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015

which seemed to be impossible without an authoritarian leader (Marszałek-Kawa et al. 2013: 8, Corona Ramón 2010, Sanchez Soler 2010, Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Muñoz 2007). The fragile economic situation of country, the development of terrorist organizations, and the fear of another violent, internal conflict contributed to the popularity of vision of progressive democratization based on reforming authoritarian institutions.

Also, this choice strengthened the cooperation of King Juan Carlos de Borbón (designated by Franco in 1969 as his successor), the moderate opposition lead by Adolfo Suárez, the first democratic prime minister of post-authoritarian Spain, and reformatory wing of Francoist regime. This alliance made possible a dialogue of political, civic, economic, social and cultural elites and negotiations of the settlement which could be gain social acceptance (Barrera 2002: 82-83, Clemente 1994: 167, Peña González 2013: 462-474, Morán 2009). The final result of this cooperation was the 1978 Constitution of Spain, accepted by the Cortes Generales and citizens in the constitutional referendum, and the 1979 Spanish General Elections which ended the democratic transition in this country (Marszałek-Kawa et al. 2013).

One of the main conditions of the national agreement was protection of interests of former regime's officials and representatives. The settlement included 'sunset clauses', based on passing over the past atrocities in silence and the lack of implementation of transitional justice procedures. The establishment of democratic Spain realized through the politics of forgetting was commonly accepted by political and social elites, and it deeply influenced the process of constructing new understandings of the community (Jackiewicz 2013). During the transition and the consolidation of democratic regime, elites recognized two main objectives of the post-authoritarian national identity: the forgiveness without retribution and the establishment of inclusive community.

The first goal was realized by the politics of forgetting and forgiving. During Spanish transition there were no political purges, lustration process or special courts, there was no destruction of monuments or significant change of the topography of memory. However, there were amnesty processes of 1976–1977, which granted amnesty for human rights violators from all sides of the civil war and General Franco’s post-war regime. So, the forgiveness contained not only the Reds, but also the Whites and authoritarian wrongdoers. After liberation of all political prisoners, in 1977 the government guaranteed absence of judicial institutions which may be used to punish crimes committed by state's officers and agents during the dictatorship (Ratke 2011: 337-338). Moreover, the documentation of repressions was destroyed, but its aim was protection of the democratization, not concealing the truth.
Only radical left opposed the reconciliation based on forgetting. They criticized the decision to build new community without punishing human rights violators, exhumations of mass-graces and commemoration of victims of the dictatorship. But, the Spanish society supported reconciliatory interpretations of the past, and it agreed that the price for democracy was a collective amnesia and 'the pact of forgetting' (*Pacto del Olvido*). The cost of stability and freedom was lack of punishment for political criminals and the forgiveness without retributive justice. For almost three decades this agreement was kept by the state, political parties and citizens, regardless their political convictions. The politics of forgetting enabled Spanish authorities to present the society as united in realization of the main national goal: the establishment of a stable democracy (Romero Salvadó 2009: 240).

The democratization of Spain required not only reconciliation, but also engagement of all citizens and all social groups. The establishment of inclusive identity was possible only if the divisive past was not forgotten – instead of remembrance-oriented narratives Spanish authorities promoted future-oriented politics as a new idea for the nation. So, the second goal of transitional identity-construction was realized by a political turn into the future and a promise of better tomorrow. All main political parties recognized that essential are: development of the economy, accession to the European Communities and strengthening international position of Spain, as well as they agreed that realization of these goals was possible only if the future not the past was the basis of new, democratic identity (Ratke 2011: 338).

Considering the case of transitional Spain, we state that the use of government's remembrance policy in a process of national identity's reconstruction had two main aspects. Firstly, it included the strategy of reconciliation without retribution, based on forgiveness of violent and divisive past. Secondly, the essence of Spanish democratization was construction of common vision of the future, based on hoping and future-orientation of politics, not dealing with the past and punishment of human rights violators during the dictatorship.

The transformation of national identity in post-apartheid South Africa

Alike in the case of Franco's Spain, the South African identity during the apartheid was established on a basis of social conflict (Adam, Giliom 1979). Already in 1920s, prime minister James B.M. Hertzog presenting his vision of the South African nation stated that its members can be only white citizens who share
Afrikaner values – so, the community (*die volk*) was constructed thanks to the introduction of racist ideology and the exclusion of Black majority, limitation of its rights, and using it as a slave labor (Welsh 2000: 396-397). Besides the racialism, the Afrikaner identity was established in terms of the belief in inevitability of the clash between European and African civilizations and the conviction that only white domination can protect Afrikaners from the Blacks' violent retribution. With the collapse of colonial world, South Africa became the very last stronghold of the European power in Africa, what caused consolidation of the racist identity and Afrikaners' contempt for other groups: the Natives, the Indians, and the Coloured (Wicomb 1998, Ramsamy 2007, Ruiters 2001).

Cynthia Kros (2008: 108-109) stated that the Afrikanerdom was constituted by national narcissism and the fear of Black majority. The identity was characterized by an essential dichotomy: on the one hand, it included remembrance of heroism and sacrifice, but, on the other hand it promoted violence, greed and persecution of other human beings. It was constituted on both protestant virtues as diligence, humility or responsibility, and racial prejudices, biases or hatred for the Black majority (Giliomee 2003: 13, Kros 2008: 112, Evans 2010: 309, Chipkin 2007: 59, Goodman 1999: 365). Remembrance narratives and the national mythology played a significant role in preservation of the exclusivity, the superiority, and the exceptionalism of Afrikaners, defending their independence and values against 'barbarians' (Grundlingh 1991: 22, Keegan 1996: 184-196).

Since 1960s and the collapse of separate development program, tensions between Afrikaner nationalists and democratic opposition, including the African National Congress, white liberals and socialists, started a slow erosion of the apartheid regime and its vision of South African nation (Welsh 2000: 11-21 and 43-52). The racist state was protecting itself using mass repressions and human rights violations, but it was not able to survive. However, apartheid policies and laws divided South African society into separate and hostile 'racial groups', defined by the 1950 Population Registration Act. Moreover, in late 1980s identity conflicts between Afrikaner nationalists, democratic movements, the Black Consciousness, and radical left endangered a stability of country and caused a risk of civil war. So, during the transition, new elites had to overcome two obstacles: the absurdity of citizens' segregation and the complete lack of South African national unity (van Zyl Slabbert 2000: 73-74).

The democratization of South Africa is commonly associated with the symbolic role of President Nelson Mandela, the heroic leader and fighter for freedom and equality, who thanks to his moral authority was able to introduce the
project of new, democratic and inclusive identity. Anthony Sampson (1999: 520) called Mandela “the founder of a new nation” who did not forced people to follow his lead, but who inspired them with his own example. Mandela at his inauguration as president stated that his objectives as nation's leader is to built new, inclusive society and to heal the nation after the sore experience of apartheid (Mandela 1994).

The construction and popularization of new South African identity was based on five essential narratives. The first was an image of the Rainbow Nations – a vision of non-racial, inclusive society of equal citizens without distinction of their ethnicity, culture and religion – promoted by Archbishop Desmond Tutu (Møller et al. 1999). The second was a creation of imagined, democratic community based on shared heritage and past experiences (MacGinty 2001: 11). The third was a presentation of South African transition as the final stage of decolonization and the end of European forced domination in Africa, which delivered the empowerment for people. The fourth was a construction of the narrative on peaceful transformation that was a result of cooperation of the whole nation in terms of the equality. The last one was a vision of the reconciliation and fair transitional justice realized in South Africa through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's proceedings.

These five elements constituted new identity, and protected country from a risk of deepening intergroup hostility (Gagiano 2004). The only possible way was the agreement between Mandela's African National Congress and President F.W. de Klerk's reformative wing of the National Party, and the establishment of new political elite which promoted new understandings of the past and new identity (Pheko 2009: 40-42). The observable result of this cooperation was the Interim Constitution of 1994 which emphasized four pillars of new South Africa: the equality of all citizens, the equality of all social groups, the reconciliation and the renunciation of violence, hatred and vengeance. The goal was construction of the non-racial Rainbow Nation, the ideal self of South Africans and the reflection of their hopes (Boyatzis et al. 2012: 155).

The ideology of democratization was based on the hope and future-orientation, Tutu's project of the Rainbow Nation was a vision of reconciliation and unification of South Africans based on Christian values (Haws 2009: 481). Both, Tutu and Mandela emphasized that this process was not possible without the forgiveness and the renunciation of vengeance, which were sources of the hope for future (Evans 2010: 309, Haws 2009: 486-488). And this hope was used to popularize the idea of Rainbow Nation – a common chance for equality and non-
racial community of all South African citizens – which became the most important political narrative of Mandela-lead democratization (Nagy 2008: 101, Dwyer 1999).

The promotion of new identity was supported by the healing process of reconciliation through truth, based on peaceful transitional justice procedure: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Leebaw 2001: 267-271). The main goal of the process was presentation of norms and values which had been violated during times of apartheid (Leebaw 2001: 283). However, the introduction of amnesty procedures did not caused inclusion of former wrongdoers – against Mandela's hope, Afrikaner nationalists were not interested in joining new, non-racial community, but they maintained their identity based on own mythology and interpretations of the past and they separated themselves from the rest of society (van Zyl Slabbert 2006: 57-63, van der Merwe 2010: 314-316).

During the South African democratization the remembrance policy was reduced to a strategy of new identity's implementation. Dealing with the past was recognized as a topic which could strengthen ongoing political conflicts and increase a risk of violent struggle, so new elites decided to minimize its impact on the transition by promotion of the hope and the future-oriented politics. The establishment of new identity in South Africa cannot be recognized as a full success of Mandela’s government, but after ten years 82% of South Africans expressed their pride in non-racial and inclusive Rainbow Nation (Chikwanha 2006: 4-8). Moreover, James L. Gibson (2004: 53-56) in his 2001 survey observed that 24,9% of all respondents claimed that being South African is their primary identity and 51,9% of them recognized it as their primary or second identity. So, if we consider the starting point of transition and post-apartheid divisions of the society, we may present the South African case as an example of successful establishment of new identity during the democratization.

Conclusion

The democratic transition requires an establishment of new national identity, which supports attitudes and behaviors, preferred in democratic conditions. The post-authoritarian transformation needs a strategy of dealing with the past, but it cannot dominate over future-oriented politics. The essential aspect of transition is construction of new interpretations of the national history which supports established inclusive identity, even if it often means introduction of the politics of forgetting. The need for reconciliation – as it was presented in selected cases – leads to limitation of interest in punishing former regime’s wrongdoers, and
it causes a desire of the new beginning for all, including human rights violators.

In the paper, we considered examples of Spanish and South African democratization considering three research categories: a role of remembrance in identity-construction, a role of transitional justice and dealing with the past in an establishment of new identity and an impact of transitional objectives on contents of this identity. We presented essential elements of authoritarian exclusive identity in General Franco’s Spain and Afrikaner nationalism in apartheid South Africa, and we compared them with democratic identities promoted by a government during the transition.

The results of our inquiry showed that during the transition, governments use both strategies of remembering and strategies of forgetting. On the one hand, new political elites tries to legitimize themselves and to justify their leadership, but on the other had, they focus on reducing political influence of dealing with the past and minimizing a desire for vengeance to avoid a risk of deepening post-authoritarian conflicts. Selected cases of Spain and South Africa offer a valuable image of this process, and they show how in the 20th Century, in two different parts of the world, the democratization caused the reconstruction of national identity and shaped interpretations of past experiences.

References:


Corona Ramón, Juan Francisco. 2010. *Economía y política en la transición y la democracia*. Madrid: FAES.


Horne, Cynthia M. 2009. *Late lustration programmes in Romania and Poland: supporting or undermining democratic transitions? “Democratization”* 16 (2), 344-376


The normative concept of labour citizenship as a determinant of the global value of economic migration

Giovanni DI LIETO

Abstract: This paper outlines the development of the key studies on conceptions of labour, citizenship, and migration, which combine to lay the theoretical foundations of the contemporary global governance in economic migration. The initial concern of this study is to build upon traditional accounts of labour and citizenship in order to develop a link between industrial citizenship and migrant workers’ mobility. Such approach aims at establishing the normative concept of industrial citizenship as a determinant of the social and economic value of human mobility for the purpose of work. This is intended to further the idea that cross-border labour can be not only a pathway to national citizenship for migrants, but also the avenue to the transnational evolution of citizenship in general. The variety of analytical treatments of the concept of labour, citizenship and migration span from ancient Greek philosophy through to the Scholastics and mercantilists, to the forerunners of the classical political economy, and finally to present labour economics, law and political science. Such an interdisciplinary approach challenges the traditional hypothesis of labour as a basic analytical category in which the worker is increasingly invisible, and where the price of labour is regulated through the market in a manner similar to other factors of production.

Keywords: Labour theory of value; Economic migration; Industrial citizenship; Global governance of migration; Transnational labour citizenship; Cross-border labour mobility.

Normative developments in the labour theory of value

The concept of labour as a normative source and as a determinant of social and economic value does not appear in ancient literature. It was only in the Middle Ages that labour assumed a distinct analytical role as one of the sources of an ethical, but also practical, theory of value.

In Ancient Greek philosophy, Aristotle only conceptualised labour as deriving from the notions of *poiēsis* (production, making) and *praxis* (doing,
action). Life was *praxis* and slaves, or those who worked for others, were involved in *poiēsis*. Only *praxis* was entitled to full participation, membership and identity within the political, economic and cultural spheres of the polity (in other words, to citizenship).

On both the subjective and objective levels, the theory of value in labour can also be traced back to Aristotle. The Greek philosopher was the first to speculate over the logical linkage of labour (or product, *ergon*) with trade (or equivalent exchange, *catallaxis*). Aristotle went further in arguing that a common measure was the precondition for commercial association, as the exchange of needs (*chreia*) would bring the contracting parties together. However, he could not find a common measure for things that were dissimilar, for instance a shoe and a house for a builder and a shoemaker respectively.

This is because the very concept of labour as an abstract category did not exist in Greece, nor later in Rome. The ancient economy was inclined to reason in terms of use and value, as it was the object of the work that mattered, not the labour of the producer. Under the Roman mentality, activity (*officium*) by full citizens (*cives*) was not considered labour, but rather a productive manifestation of leisure (*otium*). This approach always prevented the ancient Romans, as for the Greeks before, from conceptualising labour as a distinct measure of value, let alone recognising that there was a distinction between free and slave labour, since the latter did not have to be valued in the same way unless it was hired out to others.

Certainly, in the later Roman Empire there were aspects of labour law present in relation to the contractual hire of menial and slave labour, and the legal concept of *specificatio* conferred rights of property under certain conditions to those who

---

3 See further on Aristotle’s Book V of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as commented by Theocarakis, N. J., *Nicomachean ethics in political economy: The trajectory of the problem of value*, in History of Economic Ideas, 14 (1), Fabrizio Serra Editore (Pisa, 2006) at 9–53
transformed raw materials into a new product (*nova species*) by their own labour.\(^5\) However, neither a hypothesis of labour as one of the possible explanations of value, nor any analytical treatment of labour as a distinct conceptual category, emerged until the 13th century under Scholastic philosophy.

At that time, philosophers such as Albert Magnus and Thomas Aquinas wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle, adding a second basis for value, namely the factors of labour and expenses.\(^6\) *Labor et expensae* were offered as a possible measure of what should constitute the just price (*justum praetium*) in commercial transactions.\(^7\) The Scholastics ultimately believed that the just price of a thing should reflect the common estimation of the community, such that those who produced it and those who bought it preserved their status (*dignitas*) in the divinely ordained social hierarchy.\(^8\) This implied a purely ethical theory of price determination within a static economy, not suited for the later development of a dynamic economy based on trade, in which merchants were required to save their immortal souls and their profits altogether, justifying even usury as remuneration for labour (*stipendium laboris*).\(^9\)

Subsequently, mercantilist and natural law theorists argued that a utility and scarcity theory of value existed alongside a cost and labour theory. However, a proper labour theory of value eventually developed only under the influence of Locke’s theory of property, and it became a prominent part of what is known as the classical political economy.

Based on the concept of *labor et expensae* persisting in natural law philosophy, the labour theory of value became more articulate, as the price of things was meant to “usually have a Regard to the Pains and Expenses the

---


\(^9\) Le Goff, J., *Your Money or Your Life: Economy and Religion in the Middle Ages*, Zone Books (New York, 1988) at 73.
Merchants and Traders have been at”. Nevertheless, in the classical political economy, non-market factors (such as the dignity and fame of the artisans, and the needs of the contracting parties) were still largely contaminating the labour theory of value in terms of scarcity (indigentia) and utility or difficulty of acquisition. Furthermore, the role of labour was seen as a dimension of production, rather than used to explain value.

John Locke, often seen as the originator of the labour theory of value, when arguing for a right to property, affirmed that labour “puts the difference of value on every thing”, and that “of the Products of the Earth useful to the Life of Man 9/10 are the effects of labour”. In the post-mercantilist period, theories of a natural price of labour emerged, thus advancing the notion of a self-organised economy mediating through the market between different classes of people. Hence, the principles of exchange needed an explanation in terms of demand and supply, measured only by ‘arguments of sense’ (i.e. ‘number, weight or measure’). Other authors went further in affirming that “Industry and Labour are the only real Riches, ... Money therefore being nothing more than a Certificate of Labour”.

As a medium of exchange for other labour and any commodities, labour was also seen as “more proper to be made a measure of value” than money, “thus the riches of a country are to be valued by the quantity of labor its inhabitants are

---

15 See Meek, R. L., above n 12.
16 Petty, W., Political Arithmetick (1690) edited by Hull, C., Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 1899) at (1) 244.
able to purchase, and not by the quantity of silver and gold they possess”.\(^{18}\) Following the early theories of exchange within the general concept of value as a ratio composed of scarcity and utility, labour (‘fatica’) could be seen as the main determinant of scarcity, and thus the “sole object that gives value to things”.\(^{19}\)

In the classical political economy, propounding the idea of labour as the single determinant of value required major analytical efforts to demonstrate how a labour theory of value might work in a capitalist economy.

Adam Smith was the first to link goods exchange to labour value by asserting that wealth depends upon what one can command from the labour of others. In other words, in a capitalist economy there is division of labour and each worker must rely on the labour of others by acquiring goods through exchange. The analytical hurdle was that, despite the assertion that labour is the measure of the value of everything, the exchange value of commodities was still measured by traders in terms of money. Another issue was the difficulty to equate and measure types of labour differing in skill and hardship. The answer was found in the market prices and quantities that imputed value to underlying labour, which was comparable between time periods and relatively permanent. However, Smith argued that labour only determines the exchange value of things in an ‘early and rude’ state of society where, for instance, “beaver and deerskins are exchanged in a ratio inversely proportional to the labour time required to hunt and skin them”.\(^{20}\) Once, however, we are in a society with capitalists and landlords, profits and rents along with wages must be paid, so that the price of commodities ends up being the sum of the value of the three components. Labour is reduced to reflect the concept that “the real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it”.\(^{21}\) This argument shows its inconsistency, as the value of labour is only imputed, not determining but determined, and as such it cannot be a measure of value.


\(^{21}\) See Smith, above n 20.
A few decades later, David Ricardo reformulated the concept developed by Adam Smith into the foundational part of a consistent theory of value and distribution. To address Smith’s analytical contradictions, Ricardo looked for instance at the agricultural sector, whose commodities were measured in physical units, aggregating both the produce and the cost of production, including wage and rent costs. It was therefore demonstrated that the labour theory of value would apply to “such commodities only as can be increased in quantity by the exertion of human industry, and on the production of which competition operates without restraint”. This meant that the labour theory of value was not to be limited to the ‘early and rude state of society’, but was applicable also to a competitive capitalist economy. Furthermore, it implied the assumption that determination of the level of wages takes place outside the sphere of exchange and production, separating analytically the question of distribution from that of value determination.

Based on these assumptions, Karl Marx moved forward to a philosophical conception of labour as the affirmation and actualisation of the human essence. Labour was seen as “a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature”. While “Labour is not the source of all wealth. Nature is, ... the first source of all means and subjects of labour, as an owner, treats her [nature] as belonging to him [the man], his labour becomes the source of use values, and also of wealth”. Here it is clear there is a distinction between concrete labour (i.e. the technical-material labour process), and abstract labour, to be equalised through the process of exchange. Later commentators argued that, in a commodity economy, exchange value is determined by the distribution of labour, which in turn “is indirectly regulated through the market and the exchange of things”. This argument fits well with the famous Marxist distinction between abstract labour and labour power, which is the potentiality of labour to be realised

---

25 See Marx, K., above n 13 at 15.
in the labour process and purchased (i.e. exploited) by the capitalist. In other words, for the first time in modern history labour (power) was recognised as a commodity.

This became the major point of either attack on or appraisal of the political implications of Marx’s system. However, labour had finally achieved the status of a major analytical concept in the explanation of value.\(^{27}\)

The concept that labour was the sole determinant of value could not be tolerated for long, as it implied the ideologically dangerous postulate that labour has a rightful claim to the full product. A new politically harmless paradigm was found in the economic concept of marginal utility, which involved the labour theory of value only indirectly, as it was empirically based on the direct experience of market exchange and consumption of goods.\(^ {28}\) To the traditional and ‘more philosophical’ taxonomy of ‘agents of production’ including ‘labour’ and ‘nature’, an empirical classification was added that subsequently became conventional: ‘labour, capital and land’.\(^ {29}\) However, in the light of the marginal utility theories, the very notion of agents of production implies that labour alone is not the sole producer of value. In other words, it is not labour that determines scarcity,\(^ {30}\) but instead labour creates value whenever there is scarcity.\(^ {31}\) This shifting assumption marks the beginning of the downward turn of the theory of labour value, increasingly seen as determined solely through the exchange of things in the market, as such expanding the Marxian theory of distribution of labour value but without the distinctive feature of labour power.\(^ {32}\) This completed the loss of the centrality of the concept of labour in the current political economy, a process that started with the commodification of labour and the regulation of its price through the market on a par with all the other factors of production. Following the theories of marginal productivity, which maximised individuals under different situations and levelled the factors of production with commodities, even the very concept of labour was fading away, being substituted by the subjective absence of leisure. This

\(^{27}\)Sweezy, P. M., (ed.) Karl Marx and the Close of His System by Eugen Von Böhm-Bawerk and Böhm-Bawerk’s Criticism of Marx by Rudolf Hilferding, Augustus M. Kelley (New York, 1949) at 1–118.


\(^{30}\)See Galiani, F., above n 19.

\(^{31}\)Walras, A., De la nature de la richesse et de l’origine de la valeur, Furne (Paris, 1832) at 167.

\(^{32}\)See Rubin, I.I., above n 26.
subjective component in the determination of value led the focus of the analytical treatment of labour towards its impact on utility-producing final goods for exchange between trading bodies.³³ Such a view obliterated the agents of production (labour, capital and land) concept in favour of a “space of economic goods”³⁴ where workers’ services and tools were on the same level. In other words, labour was just one more economic good and was considered only in relation to its ability to produce goods that themselves produce value in use (i.e. the utility of consuming a good),³⁵ a concept further renamed ‘derived demand’ in the theory of wages.³⁶

However, before the advent of marginal productivity theories, wages were determined outside the market system, according to the concept of a ‘natural wage’ above a moral minimum reflecting the historical “habits and customs of the people”,³⁷ or, as more recent literature pointed out, as a result of social and power relations.³⁸ Conversely, the concept of marginal productivity ruled out the post-Marxist theories of labour exploitation by assuming that all factors of production were paid their marginal value of use. Accordingly, labour as a factor of production was also to be remunerated according to its actual contribution to the socio-economic system based on production and exchange of commodities.³⁹ The argument that workers must be paid their diminishing marginal product⁴⁰ was assumed not on the “interdependence between the quantity and the cost of production of a commodity produced under competitive conditions”, but rather on

³⁷See Ricardo, D., above n 22 at (1) 97.
³⁹Böhm-Bawerk, E.V., Kapital und Kapitalzins, Fourth Edition (G. Fischer, Jena, 1884- Oxford University, 1921) at 327.
the “change in the basis of the theory of value, from cost of production to utility”.  
This is a theory of marginal productivity of labour that appears to have inspired most of the industry-driven bilateral and regional agreements regulating cross-border labour migration, as it looked at managing migratory flows in terms of diminishing marginal utility and reward of capital. The notion of utility in labour theory conveyed a further analytical alteration through its opposite, labour as disutility, or as the absence of leisure. At the theoretical level, this approach not only related the equation of labour to all other agents of production and its rewards to those of any commodity, but also led to labour being considered as a “special case of the general theory of value” to the extent that the analytical interpretation of labour dissolved into the subjective and immeasurable notion of absence of leisure. 

In the post-war decades, the theoretical basis of neoclassical revisionism (until the 1960s) and later experimental economics focused on the effects of social structures and behaviour on economic structures, thus recognising the worker as a sentient being and not just as an agent of production or utility. However, little analytical development was devoted to the operation of competitive labour markets, as the debate focused on the “strength and effectiveness of competition in actual labor markets”. Therefore, it appears that this approach did not really examine labour as part of a social process, but rather hypothesized a worker outside of the social process, with instrumental rationality and preferences created outside the work environment.

It is true that labour market anomalies, such as wage setting under competitive conditions, and the deviation between wages and the value of marginal product, were explained in light of the openness and indeterminacy of the employment relationship, to be cleared through the lenses of ‘efficiency wages or

42 See Hicks, J. R., above n 36 at 1.
earnings’ with the function of ‘motivating and retaining’ labour.\(^{45}\) Thus, the notion of efficiency wages links to a concept of labour implying an employment relationship based on a wage-effort contract maximizing the worker’s utility function (positive in wages and negative in effort).\(^{46}\) However, industrial relations literature points out that the determination and monitoring of effort is hard and costly to quantify,\(^{47}\) that workers react strategically to control by management, and that the motivation of workers is ultimately linked to issues of trust and fairness, which do not fit well with an instrumentally rational (i.e. opportunistic) worker.\(^{48}\) Thus, in such a labour environment where there is no social scope for workers’ preferences and behaviour, the contractual employment relationship is seen merely as an optimal incentive to make the worker commit to a level of effort otherwise unrealisable.\(^{49}\) This approach contrasts with later research in experimental economics rejecting the notion of instrumental rationality in labour in light of an ‘economics of reciprocity’, implying that a simple contractual arrangement is insufficient to regulate employment.\(^{50}\) This theory has a significant impact on the industrial relations and labour standards spheres of legal systems fostering the collective bargaining of trade unions and the statutory protection of individual employment rights, which are driven by the social interest in protecting the employment relationship from the inherently asymmetric contractual power between employer and employee.\(^{51}\)


The emerging concepts of citizenship at work

T.H. Marshall first introduced the concept of industrial citizenship in the aftermath of the Second World War in his famous account of the relationship between citizenship and social class.\(^{52}\) According to Marshall’s perspective, citizenship in general refers to the membership of a national community of individuals equally enjoying civil, political and social rights. More specifically, industrial citizenship relates to employees having the equal right to engage in a variety of actions in pursuit of improved conditions of employment.\(^{53}\) Only a relatively small body of literature developed the concept of industrial citizenship, however, largely because it was seen as secondary to civil and social citizenship, and it could not be equated to ideas of industrial democracy.\(^{54}\)

The above-mentioned lack of interest in developing the concept of industrial citizenship can be found in Marshall’s account in the first instance. This explains much of the subsequent scholarly attitude in separating the dimensions of civil, political and social citizenship. Thus, in terms of the established framework of rights, industrial citizenship is maintained as a secondary feature at the cultural level, and an anomaly at the normative level.\(^{55}\)

Despite the recent resurgence of legal interest in the issue of citizenship in a globalising world,\(^{56}\) to date, the discussion of workers’ rights raised by the idea of citizenship appears to be confined to a merely aspirational rather than analytical

---


\(^{53}\) See Marshall, T.H., above n 52, at 114.


\(^{55}\) See Marshall, T.H., above n 52, at 14.

conceptualisation. This normative indeterminacy can permeate citizenship with a broad (and vague) range of positive values, such as a sense of identity, inclusion, self-governance, equal membership and entitlement to rights. However, such indeterminacy does not help address the opposing issues of exclusion entailed in the notion of citizenship. Well before the effect of globalisation became visible, a vast body of literature was already able to demonstrate how, in the first place, citizenship is the outcome of political struggles, and consequently, its nature is often affected by racial, ethnic and gender patterns.

Therefore, much of the work on citizenship focused on the criticism and modification of its various dimensions of inequality and exclusion. When structural social changes relating to globalisation and welfare state decline occurred, the scholarly debate about citizenship again conceptualised the related social inequalities and conflicts largely in terms of culture. This approach neglected the more specific context of industrial citizenship and its nexus with cross-border workers' mobility.

---

58 On the inclusive meaning of citizenship for migrants, see for instance: Barbalet, J.M., above n 54, at 99.
63 See further the discussion of “The rise and fall of the welfare state for migrants” in chapter 3.9.
In summary, the literature on citizenship is mainly divided between those who maintain the validity of T.H. Marshall’s scheme, believing that social citizenship is all-embracing and the most desirable form of citizenship, and those who remark that such a concept of citizenship is not gender or racially neutral.

**The transnational evolution of normative theories of labour migration**

A substantial area of literature is also emerging on the global aspects of citizenship at work and migration. Moving ahead of the traditional concept of industrial citizenship, the key theoretical development underlying this study is the recent conceptualisation of “transnational labour citizenship” by J. Gordon. This innovative notion seeks to incorporate the role and views of civil society organisations, including those working on behalf of migrant workers’ rights. By contrast to the state-centric definitions of economic/industrial citizenship outlined above, Gordon describes labour citizenship as “the status of membership in a workers’ organization, and to the act of participation in the decision making processes of that organization, with the goal of improving wages, working conditions, and the dignity of work.” Gordon also adds “a fourth component, identity, as participants come to identify with their organization and with their fellow ‘labour citizens’“.

According to Gordon’s account of transnational labour citizenship, at the present stage only union members are, in practical terms, full industrial citizens. Thus, Gordon’s theory of supranational industrial citizenship conceptualises new purpose-formed unions to accommodate a constant flow of new migrants through a model that would tie immigration status to membership in organisations of transnational workers, rather than to a particular employer or a national union. These memberships would entitle migrants to transnational services, benefits and rights. The creation of multinational and multilevel labour networks would conglomerate the interests of national and cross-border workers equally.

According to Gordon, a successful management of global labour mobility can best be achieved through the implementation of comprehensive and cooperative policies that uphold justice at work for migrants. Ensuring global

---


66 See Gordon, J., above n 65, at 510-511.

67 See Gordon, J., above n 65, at 578.
labour mobility, and its full economic and human potential, is paramount in order to protect the human rights of migrants. The liberalisation of labour migration would entitle migrants to services, benefits and rights that cross borders just as the workers do, promoting transparent recruitment and employment policies essential to upholding the rights of migrant workers.\(^68\)

In the area of migration and human rights, existing studies take critical perspectives on global governance of labour mobility, especially with regard to policies and regimes of temporary and guest work in relation to socio-economic development. For instance, researchers such as K. Hujo and N. Piper focus on the important issue of ‘South-South migration’, despite the fact that migration debates occur mostly in the context of flows from developing to developed countries.\(^69\)

Other studies focus on issues from a migrant rights perspective, such as guest and temporary work programmes leading to the commodification of workers and the privatisation of migrant worker schemes. According to this perspective, such national migrant worker programmes increase the number of ‘forever temporary’ migrants, maintaining barriers and discrimination between guests and residents and substantially privatising immigration.\(^70\)

Moreover, other studies criticise the concept of free trade agreements including provisions on labour mobility, such as deals that allow for a limited number of workers’ categories into host countries on a temporary basis, prompting critics to argue that such deals merely institutionalise commodification, exploitation and international trade in workers.\(^71\)

---

\(^68\) See Gordon, J., above n 65, at 561-578.
\(^70\) Grugel, J. and Piper, N., *Critical Perspectives on Global Governance: Rights and Regulation in Governing Regimes*, Routledge (London, 2007) at 3:41-64; furthermore, this strand of literature may be linked to seminal work framing the discourse on the international governance of migration in terms of reclaiming State’s sovereignty, rather than ceding it, see for instance: Newman, K., *The governance of international migration: mechanisms, processes and institutions*, Migration Policy Institute, Global Commission on International Migration (Geneva, 2005) at 17.
Conclusion

The academic development and practical viability of the research question calls for comprehensive and multi-layered responses that are based on a better understanding of the socio-economic and institutional forces at play in shaping working conditions across different industrial sectors and geographical regions. This study was intended to single out the elements necessary for a sound analytical framework for managing labour migration globally, identifying in particular multilateral and inter-state cooperation, labour market regulation and harmonisation, and effective mobilisation of all concerned social actors.

The variety of analytical treatments of the concept of labour, citizenship and migration spanned from ancient Greek philosophy through to the Scholastics and mercantilists, to the forerunners of the classical political economy, and finally to present labour economics, law and political science. Such an interdisciplinary approach challenges the traditional hypothesis of labour as a basic analytical category in which the worker is increasingly invisible, and where the price of labour is regulated through the market in a manner similar to other factors of production. The vast body of existing literature combining citizenship and migration issues suggests that a key factor driving the management of borderless labour movement schemes will be the composition of migration flows, meaning the evaluation of the timing, duration and frequency of the aggregate of individual migration projects. Also, the migrant workers’ intentions regarding their plans call for a more precise interpretation at the policy making level. In fact, the circularisation of global migration patterns assigns the migrants a major role as vehicles of technological advancement and knowledge transfer, thus recognising migrant workers as investors of human capital rather than commodified agents of production.

The successful management of global labour mobility can best be achieved through the implementation of comprehensive and cooperative policies that ensure protection of the rights of migrant workers. Well-informed choices by migrants, governments, home and host communities, civil societies and the private sector can help realise the positive potential of migration in social, economic and political terms. Academic research has a crucial role in giving society directions for better management of global labour mobility through action-oriented approaches to manage labour mobility for the benefit of all.

Therefore, the main challenge of further studies in this field is to understand whether, how and to what extent a soft-bordered concept of industrial citizenship can be formulated as the foundation for a new deal of labour mobility.
governance, with a view to harmoniously embrace economic migration in the global social contract.

In addition, there are points to be drawn from contrasting current transnational labour arrangements with guest and temporary work programmes across the world, both of which inevitably maintain barriers between guests and residents.

Ultimately, there is scope to go beyond current theories of industrial citizenship to develop the conceptual premise for the establishment of post-national labour networks, conglomerating both national and cross-border workers for a complete, fair, advanced and dynamic approach to migration issues.
Concerns about Violent Crime in France: Does Immigrant Status Make a Difference in Public Perceptions of Safety?

Viviana ANDREESCU

Abstract: The present analysis compares and contrasts groups of natives and immigrants in France in terms of their prior exposure to victimization and their perceived risk of violent victimization based on survey data collected in 2010 from a representative sample of French residents (N=1728). Results show no significant inter-group differences regarding victimization experience and fear of violent victimization. In both subsamples, direct or vicarious victimization, as well as distrust in people in general, are significantly and positively associated with higher levels of perceived unsafety. The inter-group differential effect of several fear-of-crime predictors is also observed and the implications of the findings are briefly discussed.

Keywords: fear of violent crime, victimization, immigrants, France.

Introduction

France is the second largest country in the European Union and its population of 65.8 million people represents approximately 13% of EU population (National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies/INSEE 2013). Different from other Western European countries that became destination countries for immigrants mainly after WWII, during the nineteenth century, France was already regarded as a sanctuary for political refugees and other people in search of freedom and civil liberties. The trend continued during the following decades and by 1931, the foreign-born persons represented about 6.5% of the French population. As a result of post-war industrial expansion a substantial number of immigrants, ready to satisfy the country’s labor needs for low-skilled workers
migrated to France from Italy, Portugal, Spain, and North Africa. Although this trend stopped in the early 1970s after the first oil crisis, family and humanitarian migration continued (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/OECD 2008; Seljuq 1997; Tucci 2010). In 1990, for instance, there were 4.2 million immigrants in France and after a decade of relative stability in terms of migration inflows, starting with 1999, the number of immigrants continued to increase. Based on recent data, in 2010, 5.5 million people were first generation immigrants, representing 8.4% of the total population and 6.7 million persons were second-generation immigrants (i.e., persons born in France to immigrant parents) (INSEE 2011). If in 1990, one out of two immigrants was born in Europe, currently only 38% of the immigrants are born in a European country. About 43% of non-natives are born in Africa and most of these immigrants (70%) are born in one of the North African/Maghrebian countries – Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco (INSEE 2013). Recent data also show that 61% of the children born in France between 2006 and 2008 had two native parents who were both descendants of natives, while 10% had two immigrant parents and 29% had at least one parent who was born abroad or is a descendant of a foreign-born person(Breuil-Genier, Borrel & Lhommeau 2011, 36).

Even if France had a long experience with migration, an immigrant integration policy was formerly defined only recently (OECD 2008). And the recent tragic events in Paris, where seventeen people were killed, as well as the series of hate crimes that followed, suggest that France is currently facing a serious challenge. On one hand, similar to situations registered in other countries (see Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe /OSCE/ODIHR 2012), certain immigrant populations in France are facing suspicion, prejudice, xenophobia, or even hate crimes, while on the other hand, a large majority of the population publicly manifest its discontent with immigration policies as well, increasing the social distance (see Tucci 2010) between the group of natives of French origin and the others, making the immigrants’ socioeconomic integration difficult and negatively affecting the cohesiveness of the French society.

For instance, a public opinion poll conducted in 2011 at the request of the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (CNCDH) on a representative stratified sample of adult residents in France (N = 979) showed that the majority of the residents in France (56%) declared that “there are too many immigrants in France” and 67% of those interviewed contended that many immigrants relocate to France only to receive welfare benefits. Approximately 50% of the respondents said they do not feel at home in France anymore, 44% of the interviewees noted that
immigration is the main cause of insecurity in the country, and 26% of the respondents declared that those who are born in France to foreign-born parents, are not really French. Overall, compared to 2008, public opinion poll data indicated an increase in anti-immigration attitudes. Additionally, approximately 87% of the residents in France considered that racism is a widespread phenomenon in the country, an increase by 11 points compared to 2008. Almost half of those interviewed (46%) declared that Muslim immigrants from North Africa are the most common victims of racism in the country, followed by black immigrants from Africa. Roma people, Muslims, and Maghrebis are perceived by a large segment of the population in France, respectively 72%, 48%, and 35%, as being a ‘different group of people’ in the French society. Results of the face-to-face interviews also indicated that during the past five years prior to data collection, 28% of those interviewed had experienced racist attitudes and discrimination. According to those who were victimized, one’s nationality and one’s skin color were the most common reasons for racist attitudes (Institut d'Etudes et de Conseil /CSA 2011, 6).

Authorities responsible for hate-crime data collection in France are the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights Defender. Bias motivations recorded in hate crime statistics are: race/color; ethnicity/national origin/national minority; citizenship; religion; sexual orientation; disability; gender; political conviction, and state of health and hate crimes are classified in the country as homicide, physical assault, damage to property, desecration of graves, attacks on places of worship, vandalism, and threats/threatening behavior. In 2012, France amended all hate crime provisions contained in its criminal code to include gender identity as a protected characteristic. Although anti-Semitic crimes represent a specific category and are recorded separately, anti-Muslim, anti-Christian and anti-Roma/Sinti hate crimes are not registered as a specific type of bias-motivated crime (OSCE/ODIHR 2013, 109).

Although no official data on anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, anti-Christian, anti-Roma, or crimes motivated by bias against LGBT people were reported to ODIHR in 2012, different non-governmental organizations and human rights agencies recorded a relatively large number of incidents motivated by bias against different social minorities in France. For instance, LICRA, the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism (Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme), reported the case of a series of murders on 19 March, 2012 that included three children and the father of one of the children being shot dead outside a Jewish school in Toulouse. The perpetrator was killed by the police in the process of being apprehended. LICRA also reported a further case of damage to
property against a kosher supermarket. The Jewish Community Protection Service reported 96 incidents of physical violence, including a knife attack against a girl, three attacks involving spraying tear gas in the victims’ faces, an attack by a group causing serious injury to a man, one attack by a group at school against one child resulting in serious injury; one case of robbery and physical assault resulting in serious injury against a Jewish man with significant disabilities; one case of blanks being shot out of a car at a rabbi and his congregation outside their synagogue; 172 cases of graffiti; 71 cases of vandalism and two cases of arson. The OIC Observatory reported eight cases of desecration of and vandalism to mosques, including two where a pig’s head was left outside a mosque and one case where a mosque was smeared with excrement; one arson attack against a mosque; and three cases of desecration of graves, including one incident where 30 tombstones were vandalized. The Association against Islamophobia in France (CCIF) reported two physical assaults, including one against two men, and a serious assault against a girl resulting in her hospitalization; one case of graffiti on the home of a Muslim family; two case of threats with a gun; a case where a Muslim family found a pig’s head in the stroller of their baby; and a case involving a woman’s burka being pulled and ripped. The Holy See (the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Catholic Church in Rome) reported four cases of grave desecration involving over 130 graves and a case of church desecration. The Observatory on Intolerance Against Christians reported one incident in which Christian icons in public places were vandalized; three arson attacks against church property, including one against a nativity scene and two against a church; 12 incidents of damage and/or vandalism to church property, including one incident against a bookstore owned by a church; three incidents of theft of church property; and four incidents of cemetery desecration. Amnesty International and the European Roma Rights Centreported in 2012 an arson attack against the temporary home of a Roma family in Marseille and the NGO SOS Homophobie reported 138 physical assaults, 12 sexual assaults and 255 incidents involving threat and/or blackmail directed at persons belonging to sexual minority groups (OSCE/ODIHR 2013, 57-81).

Nevertheless, although the total number of hate crimes reported to the police in France from 2010 to 2012 remains unknown, according to official hate-crime data, in 2010, out of 2,007 bias-motivated incidents (including defamation and discrimination crimes) prosecuted in France, 562 (28%) crimes received a sentence, indicating that the large majority of the cases (72%) have been dismissed prior to trial (OSCE/ODIHR 2013). Due to differences in methods of recording crimes and also because many bias-motivated crimes remain underreported, especially if
Concerns about Violent Crime in France
JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015

the victim was an illegal immigrant, inter-country comparisons remain almost impossible and it is difficult to determine how France compares to other European countries or other developed nations in the world in terms of the extent of hate-crime offenses.

However, it should be noted that during the two-week period that followed the January 7-9, 2015 shooting spree by three French jihadists that killed 17 persons, including four French Jews at a kosher supermarket, the National Observatory against Islamophobia reported 116 anti-Muslim incidents (e.g., in several towns shots have been fired at mosques and racist slogans have been painted on their walls), a significant increase compared to the full month of January 2014, when there were reported 28 attacks on places of worship and 88 threats. In order to increase security and protect the mosques, a significant number of troops have been mobilized as part of the governmental anti-hate crime strategies (Agence France Press 2015). It should be noted that despite the fact that in France collecting official statistics about the race or religion of the citizens is prohibited by law, based on the average of several recent studies that attempted to calculate the number of people in France whose origins are from Muslim majority countries (see also Pew Research Forum 2011), it is estimated that about 6.5 million Muslims currently live in France, representing about 10% of the population.

Oberwittler & Roché (2013), the authors of a recent study that examined the relationships between the police and adolescents of foreign origin in France and Germany, noted that systematic empirical research on social issues regarding different minority groups in France is lacking, French social research relying mostly on political analyses or a mix of theoretical formulations and qualitative data. Additionally, it is quite difficult for researchers to determine how public attitudes and behaviors vary by ethnic groups because official statistics cannot legally include data on ethnicity. One objective of this analysis is to contribute to the literature on fear of crime by examining perceptions of safety experienced by groups differentiated by their place of birth. The amount of victimization each group has been exposed to will be also evaluated. Moreover, in addition to commonly used predictors of fear of crime, the analysis will observe the effect of ethnicity on attitudes by using African origin as a proxy. Even if the category used here includes persons belonging to different ethnic sub-groups it was restricted by the information available in the dataset structure. Another objective of the paper is to determine if data collected years prior to the lethal attacks recently registered in Paris, France would offer some indication that immigrants’ victimization levels and/or a higher perceived risk of violent victimization might further motivate some
persons of foreign origin to retaliate and socially interact aggressively. Knowing the
immigrants’ perceptions of safety and the factors that influence their levels of fear
is important not only because the perceived risk of victimization experienced by
this particular group did not receive extensive attention from scholars (see
Andreescu 2013), but also because by finding ways to diminish the citizens’ worries
about crime, immigrants’ integration levels, as well as the social cohesiveness and
the community capacity to prevent and fight crime might increase substantially.

Criminal victimization, perceived vulnerability, social context, and fear of crime

In general, most studies that tried to determine why certain people worry
about becoming victims of crime more often than others considered the influence
on perceptions of safety of factors such as: one’s exposure to direct and indirect
(vicarious) victimization, personal socio-demographic characteristics that make
individuals see themselves as being more vulnerable to victimization (e.g., women,
the elderly, the youth, economically disadvantaged individuals, persons physically
impaired, racial/ethnic minorities, etc), and the social environment a person lives in
(e.g., quality and extent of social interactions; level of urbanization; neighborhood
characteristics, etc) (see Halle 1996). Although research on fear of crime is
characterized by a lack of uniformity regarding the way the dependent variable
(fear of crime) as well as important predictors have been defined and
operationalized, a review of the literature (see Andreescu 2013), yet not
exhaustive, shows that at least partial support for the three theoretical models of
fear of crime (Halle 1996) has been documented by research. Although a significant
and positive relationship between experience with victimization and fear of crime
was not always supported by evidence, several studies that examined people’s fear
of crime found that persons who have been victimized or were aware of other
relatives/close friends being victims of crime tended to also express higher levels of
insecurity (Ferraro 1995; Kanan & Pruitt 2002; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Reese 2009;
Skogan & Maxfield 1981; Taylor, Eitle & Russell 2009). On the other hand, persons
less likely to be victimized, such as women and the elderly, were among those who
worried significantly more often about crime than men and younger individuals,
respectively (Chiricos, Hogan & Gertz 1997; De Donder, Verte & Messelis 2005;
Lane & Meeker 2000; Reese 2009; Scott 2003; Taylor, Eitle & Russell 2009; Ziegler &
Mitchell 2003). However, it should be noted that not all studies examining the
relationship age – fear of crime found a significant and positive relationship
between these variables. Similarly, while several researchers (Hough 1995; Jordan
& Gabbidon 2010; Salisbury & Upson 2004; Skogan & Maxfield 1981) concluded that persons belonging to racial/ethnic minority groups tend to have higher levels of fear of crime than the majority of the population, other scholars did not find that one’s race or one’s ethnicity had a significant influence on a person’s perceptions of safety. Results have been inconsistent as well when the relationship socioeconomic status and fear of crime has been examined. Yet, more frequently researchers found that economically and socially marginalized persons tend to worry more about the possibility of becoming victims of crime than individuals who are better educated and more secure financially (Jordan & Gabbidon 2010; Lane & Meeker 2000; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Scott 2003). Although research examining the relationship between fear of crime and subjective or objective health is not extensive, studies that tried to determine if an individual’s mental health and physical functioning are influencing his/her perceptions of safety generally concluded that persons with health problems tend to worry more about crime, a fact that, as Jackson and Stafford (2009) noted, might negatively affect one’s well-being even further by decreasing the fearful persons’ health and by making them more vulnerable to victimization.

Regardless of the fact that research examining fear of crime experienced by the foreign-born is quite limited, prior studies that tried to determine how often non-natives worry about crime found that immigrants tend to express higher levels of fear of victimization than natives do (Andreescu 2013; Brown and Benedict 2004; Kernshaw et al. 2000; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Martens 2001; Perreault 2008), even if, according to statistical evidence, foreign nationals have been victimized, directly or indirectly, at a lesser extent or not significantly more than natives did, as several studies showed (Andreescu 2013; Bell & Machin 2011; Johnson 2005; Perreault 2008). While variations in immigrants’ perceptions of safety in the host country are sometimes shaped by prior experiences with victimization or an already high level of perceived unsafety in the country of origin (Menjivar & Bejarano 2004; Wu & Wen 2014), it seems reasonable to consider immigrants as being part of a socially vulnerable group, particularly in Europe, where an increase in anti-immigration attitudes and bias-motivated crimes has been documented by recent research (OSCE/ODIHR 2013).

Research that examined the influence of the social context on one’s perceptions of safety found that persons living in cohesive and socially organized communities, individuals who tend to trust people in general, also tend to worry less about being victimized (Andreescu 2013; Ferraro 1995; Gibson et al. 2002; Jackson 2009). In contrast, several studies found that residency in larger urban
areas, where social interaction is more superficial and exposure to crime is higher, was positively associated with higher levels of fear of crime (Andreescu 2013; Bankston et al. 1987; Keane 1992; Scott 2003).

Methodology

The analysis presented in this paper uses as a data source the European Social Survey conducted in 2010 on a representative sample of residents in France (ESS Round 5 2010, 2012). This is the most recent available ESS survey that includes information regarding citizens’ worries about violent victimization. The analysis intends to compare immigrants to natives in terms of direct and vicarious victimization and fear of violent victimization. Additionally, several individual-level predictors will be used in multivariate analyses to determine if they affect differently one’s perceived risk of violent victimization when attitudes are examined separately based on the respondent’s nationality status.

The dependent variable, fear of violent victimization is a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent declared that he/she worries some time or most/all of the time of becoming a victim of a violent crime and zero otherwise. The large majority of the fear-of-crime predictors used in this analysis followed the same coding scheme used in a prior comparative study that examined fear of violent crime in United Kingdom (see Andreescu 2013). The independent variables used in this analysis are described below.

Experience with victimization was coded 1 if the respondent declared that in the last five years he/she or a household member has been a victim of a burglary or physical assault and zero otherwise. Interpersonal distrust - a factor of interpersonal distrust has been created through principal component analysis (PCA) of answers at three questions (i.e., Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful; Most people try to be fair or try take advantage of you; Most of the time people are helpful or mostly looking for themselves). The original variables have been recoded so higher values would indicate higher levels of interpersonal distrust. As a result of PCA only one factor has been extracted (Eigenvalue = 1.662; variance explained = 55.3%). The factor loadings varied from .713 to .783. The Cronbach’s reliability coefficient Alpha for this index was .597. Police distrust - the original variable has been recoded and takes values from zero (complete trust in the police) to 10 (complete distrust). Health problems is an ordinal-level variable that measures the respondent’s subjective assessment of his/her health; the measure varies from 1 (very good health) to 5 (very poor health). Perceived discrimination - persons who consider themselves as being part of a discriminated
group as a result of their age, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, language, or religion were coded 1 and the others were coded zero. Economic marginalization – respondents who stated that it is difficult and very difficult to live on present income were coded 1, while the better-off individuals were coded zero. Immigrant status – is a dummy variable, coded 1 if a person was not born in France, and zero if the respondent was a native of France. Household size – this interval-level variable records as a code the number of persons living in the same house. Residency – persons living in large urban areas (big cities) were coded one, while those living in suburban areas, in smaller cities, or in rural areas were coded zero. Gender, a dummy variable, was coded 1 if the respondent was a female and zero otherwise. Age is a continuous variable representing the respondent’s calculated age. Born in Africa – coded 1 if the foreign-born respondent was born in Africa and zero otherwise.

Additionally, because several research studies found that an immigrant’s level of acculturation and fear of crime are significantly related (Andreescu, 2013; Brown & Benedict 2004; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Yun et al. 2010) the present analysis used two measures of acculturation. A foreign-born individual’s level of acculturation refers mainly to an immigrant’s level of integration in the host country, his/her usage of the official language, and the immigrant’s capacity to share the cultural beliefs and the values of the natives in the receiving country (Hazuda, Stern & Haffner 1988). Based on the information provided by ESS5, the analysis used as measures of acculturation the language most often spoken at home (a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent speaks frequently at home a language other than French and zero if the respondent mostly speaks French at home) and the length of time in years the foreign-born respondent spent in France since arrival.

Consistent with a similar study conducted on sample data from United Kingdom (see Andreescu, 2013), it is anticipated that persons who directly or indirectly experienced victimization, residents of large urban areas, persons who perceive themselves as being unable to successfully control potential crime events, those who have lower levels of interpersonal trust and distrust the institution meant to protect them from being victimized, and those who see themselves as being socially and economically marginalized will express higher levels of fear of violent victimization. Additionally, it is hypothesized that immigrants who appear to be better integrated in the host country will worry less about violent victimization than their counterparts characterized by lower levels of acculturation.
Results

Univariate analyses presented in table 1 show that about four out of ten immigrants (37%) and three out of ten natives (31%) in France worry often or very often they might become a victim of a violent crime. As indicated by the independent-samples t tests, there are no significant inter-group differences in the levels of experienced victimization ($t = -0.023; p=.981$) or the fear of violent crime when immigrants and natives are compared ($t= 1.504; p=.133$). Although immigrants appear to distrust people more and police less than natives do, the attitudes expressed by the two subsamples in terms of interpersonal and institutional trust are not significantly different. However, if only 8% of the natives see themselves as being part of a discriminated group, a significantly higher percentage of the immigrants (23%) acknowledge discrimination ($t = 5.714; p = .000$). The proportion of immigrants experiencing financial difficulties (32%) is almost twice higher ($t = 4.651; p = .000$) than the proportion of natives (17%) who cannot make ends meet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Immigrant Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Native Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>$t$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fear of violent crime</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>1.504</td>
<td>.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience with victimization</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal distrust</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.866</td>
<td>.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police distrust</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>-1.428</td>
<td>.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of discriminated group</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>5.714</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health problems</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>-.118</td>
<td>.906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial difficulties</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>4.651</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>51.09</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>49.24</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>1.188</td>
<td>.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential area (big city)</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>7.561</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.546</td>
<td>.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Africa</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years lived in France</td>
<td>33.94</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language spoken at home (other than French)</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be also noted that almost 60% of the immigrants are born in an African country and that even if on average, the foreign-born people spent about 34 years in their host country, more than a third of the immigrants (34%) in France speak at home a language other than French.
Table 2 presents the results of the logistic regression, the statistical analysis used to examine the effects of the selected predictors on variations in fear of violent victimization for the overall sample and separately for the subsample of immigrants and the subsample of natives. Although the effect of one’s immigration status on perceptions of safety could have been assessed using a series of interaction terms, due to the fact that the interpretation of interactions is not always intuitive, separate models have been created for the main groups of interest differentiated by the respondent’s place of birth.

Consistent with the results of the bivariate analysis, the respondent’s nationality does not produce significant differences in perceived fear of violent victimization when controlling for additional individual-level variables. In the overall sample, results show that gender and experience with victimization are the predictors that impact the most variations in perceived safety. As hypothesized, individuals with health problems and those with low levels of confidence in their fellow citizens tend to worry more about crime than, respectively, people who do not suffer from physical or mental impairments or those who live in trustworthy communities. Different from what has been anticipated, age, perceptions of social discrimination, economic marginalization, family structure, or residency did not impact significantly variations in perceived safety. In order to determine if there are inter-group differences regarding the magnitude and direction of the effects the selected predictors might have on the dependent variable two additional models are also presented in table 2.

Both natives and foreign-born people who experienced victimization directly or indirectly are more likely to be afraid of becoming a victim of a violent crime. The odds of being afraid of violent victimization are however increased by a factor of 3 (OR = 3.131) in the immigrant group and by a factor of 2 (OR = 1.979) in the group of natives, suggesting that vicarious and/or direct victimization has a stronger effect on the immigrants’ feelings of safety. In both subsamples, interpersonal distrust is positively and significantly associated with fear of violent crime and the effects are approximately equal (OR = 1.695 for immigrants; OR = 1.505 for natives). In other words, persons with low confidence in people in general, also worry more about crime.
### Table 2: Logit estimates for fear of violent crimes in France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total (N=1728)</th>
<th>Immigrants (N=155)</th>
<th>Natives (N=1573)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>Exp (B)</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-born</td>
<td>.120 (.191)</td>
<td>1.128</td>
<td>.528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced victimization</td>
<td>.693 (.129)</td>
<td>1.999</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal distrust</td>
<td>.422 (.058)</td>
<td>1.524</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police distrust</td>
<td>-.025 (.025)</td>
<td>.975</td>
<td>.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part of discriminated group</td>
<td>.177 (.184)</td>
<td>1.193</td>
<td>.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health problems</td>
<td>.280 (.135)</td>
<td>1.323</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial difficulties</td>
<td>.053 (.145)</td>
<td>1.055</td>
<td>.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>.852 (.113)</td>
<td>2.343</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.000 (.003)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential area (big city)</td>
<td>.256 (.138)</td>
<td>1.292</td>
<td>.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>.033 (.046)</td>
<td>1.033</td>
<td>.481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years lived in France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language spoken at home (non French)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.571 (.291)</td>
<td>.208</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>.124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the effect is positive in both groups, having health problems (i.e., being hampered in daily activities by illness, disability, or mental problems) increases significantly one’s level of fear of violent victimization only in the subsample of natives. Only in the subsample of natives, gender has a significant
effect on perceived safety. While French women worry significantly more (OR = 2.513) about violent victimization than their male counterparts, the difference in perceptions of fear between female and male immigrants is not large enough to be significant. Even if the average household size is comparable in both groups (2.5 persons in immigrant families and 2.4 persons in French-born families), only in the foreign-born subsample there is a significant increase in fear of violent crime with an increase in the number of persons currently living in the same household. While additional analyses (not shown) that examined levels of fear among residents belonging to different age groups did not suggest that age and fear of violent crime are significantly related, it should be noted that with age, immigrants tend to worry more about being victimized (OR = 1.033; p < .10), while natives tend to feel safer, as indicated by a negative, though non-significant relationship age – fear of violent crime.

Additional variables included in the model pertaining to foreign-born residents examined the effects of acculturation on immigrants’ fear of violent victimization. Different from prior research (see Andreescu 2013), this analysis found that individuals (35% of the subsample of immigrants) who speak more often at home a language other than French (which could be considered an indicator of a lower integration in the host society), appear to worry less often about being victimized. As hypothesized, with a longer period of stay in France, the immigrants’ level of fear of violent victimization tends to decrease. Both acculturation effects were, however, not significant. Despite the fact that the variable did not have a significant effect on immigrants’ perceived risk of violent victimization, it can be observed that immigrants born in an African country tended to worry less about becoming a victim of a violent crime than immigrants born in other parts of the world.

Conclusions

For the most part, this study replicated a prior analysis (see Andreescu, 2013) based on data from a national sample of residents in United Kingdom that also examined variations in fear of violent victimization when natives were compared to the foreign-born people. Similar to what was found in UK, immigrants and native French had almost identical levels of victimization. In both countries approximately one in five persons, natives or immigrants, experienced directly or indirectly some form of criminal victimization. Nonetheless, in both countries
immigrants tended to have a higher level of perceived unsafety than natives did, but in France the inter-group difference was not significant.

Consistent with prior research (Andreescu 2013; Ferraro 1995; Kanan & Pruitt 2002; Lee & Ulmer 2000; Reese 2009; Skogan & Maxfield 1981; Taylor et al. 2009; Yun et al. 2010), French residents (natives or foreign-born) who have been exposed to some form of criminal victimization are significantly more afraid of becoming victims of a violent crime. It should be noted that similar to what was found in the analysis of sample data from United Kingdom the effect of victimization on perceptions of insecurity was much higher in the subsample of immigrants than it was in the subsample of natives.

Although the present analysis found strong support for the crime experience theoretical perspective, support for the vulnerability hypothesis was more limited in France than it has been found in the prior analysis of survey data collected in United Kingdom (Andreescu 2013). While in both countries and consistent with prior research (e.g., Chiricos et al. 1997; De Donder et al. 2005; Garofalo 1979; Scott 2003; Taylor et al. 2009), women in the overall sample and in subsample of natives were significantly more afraid of becoming victims of a violent crime than their male counterparts, French women born abroad did not worry about violent crime much more often than immigrant men did. Taking into account the fact that the majority of the immigrants in the population are born in Africa, it is possible that a significant part of the foreign-born arrived in France as refugees trying to escape civil wars or other human rights violations that exposed men and women equally to violence and somewhat may have leveled intra-group gender differences in fear of violent victimization.

Different from results obtained from the UK sample and findings from other studies (see Andreescu, 2013), in France, fear of violent victimization does not increase significantly with age in any subsample differentiated by the respondent’s nationality status. Additional analyses (not presented) that examined variations in fear among different age groups confirmed that age and fear of violent crime are not significantly related in France. In addition, in both subsamples other variables meant to identify groups that according to the literature may feel vulnerable in potentially harmful situations, such as being part of a discriminated group, being an ethnic minority (i.e., born in Africa) or being economically disadvantaged did not impact significantly one’s levels of fear. However, in France as in United Kingdom (Andreescu 2013) or in United States (Taylor et al. 2009) natives with a poor health feel unsafe and are more afraid of being victimized. Interestingly, like gender, having health problems does not appear to influence
Concerns about Violent Crime in France

JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015

significantly variations in fear of violent crimes within the sample of immigrants. It appears that just by having an immigrant status places a person in a position of vulnerability, diminishing the influence on fear of violent crime of other individual-level characteristics. Nevertheless, further research using a larger sample of immigrants might be able to determine if there are internal variations in fear of victimization among foreign-born groups differentiated by additional important characteristics.

As in United Kingdom and consistent with prior research (Andreescu 2013; Gibson et al. 2002; Jackson 2009), support for the integrative model of fear of crime was quite strong in France as well. Even if the effect of the interpersonal trust on perceptions of safety is slightly higher in the group of immigrants, in both subsamples, those who think that people are in general helpful, fair, and trustworthy are also significantly less likely to express worries about violent victimization. Different from other research findings (Jackson et al. 2009) but similar to what has been found in previous analyses of survey data from United Kingdom (Andreescu 2013; Bennett 1994), in multivariate analyses people’s attitudes toward the police did not appear to influence significantly their perceptions of safety in France. In terms of contextual factors, big-city residency does not impact significantly the natives’ or the immigrants’ levels of fear in France. This result differed from was found in United Kingdom, where residency in large urban areas, particularly for natives, was significantly and positively associated with fear of violent victimization (Andreescu 2013). However, taking into account the highly publicized 2015 lethal terrorist attacks in Paris, it is possible that fear of violent victimization expressed by urban residents will increase in France as well.

Regarding the effect of two measures of acculturation (language spoken at home and length of stay in France) on immigrants’ perceived fear of violent victimization, different from what has been hypothesized, results showed that one’s level of integration in the French society does not appear to play an important part in the foreign-born person’s perceptions of safety. It should be noted that on average, an immigrant spent about 34 years in France, a period of time long enough to ensure one’s integration in the host society. Additionally, even if one third of the immigrants interviewed declared they spoke at home other language than French, it should not be inferred that an equally large segment of the immigrant population lacks language proficiency, especially when a large proportion of the foreign-born persons immigrated to France from French-speaking Northern-African countries. Taking into account the fact that many native French people continue to consider the first- and even second-generation immigrants from
Africa, as not being “really French” (see CSA 2011) and that three times more immigrants than natives see themselves as being discriminated (see Table 1 and also Breuil-Genier et al. 2011, 39), it appears that the foreign-born people’s fears of violent victimization are less a function of one’s degree of adaptation to the host society and more a result of perceived anti-immigrant attitudes, documented by several public opinion polls conducted in recent years. Despite the fact that in 2007 it was created in France a ministry meant to ensure immigrants’ integration in the French society and several programmes and policies have been specially designed to increase social cohesion, statistical information indicates that children of immigrants, particularly those of Maghreb and other African origin have much higher unemployment rates and are frequently facing discriminatory hiring practices when seeking employment (OECD 2008; Tucci 2010). In sum, despite its inability to clearly determine why certain people feel at a higher risk of victimization than others, the present secondary-data analysis suggests that direct or indirect experience with victimization and a lack of interpersonal trust can be considered the most important predictors of fear of violent crimes expressed not only by foreign-born people in France, but also by natives.

One objective of this analysis was to determine if data collected five years before the dramatic, but isolated events that took place in France in January 2015, would offer some indication that immigrants’ victimization levels attracted some desire to retaliate and respond to aggressive behavior with increased violence. Despite the fact that bias-motivated crimes and negative public attitudes toward foreign-born people belonging to certain ethnic and religious groups have been documented by research conducted in France in the past few years (see CSA 2011, 2013; France 24, 2012; OSCE/ODIHR 2013), the results of the present analysis showed no difference in actual victimization rates and perceptions of safety when natives and immigrants were compared. However, it should be noted that the group of natives also included persons born in France to immigrant parents and the attitudes expressed by them could have affected the results. More detailed further analyses could try to verify the consistency of the findings presented here by comparing the first-generation immigrants’ attitudes and victimization experiences with those expressed by persons born in France to native parents and persons born in France to immigrant parents.

Referring probably to the 2005 riots in France organized mainly by Arab, North African and black second-generation immigrants that compelled the French Parliament to declare a three-month state of emergency and were considered by many analysts the largest rebellions in recent European history
Concerns about Violent Crime in France

JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015

(see Oberwittler & Roché 2013), an OECD report stated not long ago that the “French society is already paying a price in terms of disinvestment and disaffection by children of immigrants, in reaction to both past and current unfavorable outcomes (OECD 2008, 11).” And, as the recent heartrending events in Paris showed, second-generation immigrants’ involvement in criminal activities can be one of the negative outcomes of ineffective government policies regarding immigrant integration.

Three weeks after the series of attacks that left seventeen people dead in France’s capital city, the French television channel France 24 (2015) announced that the French government launched a new social media campaign meant to discourage potential jihadists from joining Islamist fighters in Syria and Iraq. The French government estimates that about 1,200 French residents are currently involved in jihadist activities and the new initiative is an addition to a 2014 pilot program intended to stop young people from leaving the country for Syria. Although it is premature to assess the effectiveness of the government-sponsored message that in response to jihadist propaganda tells radicals in France and elsewhere that they “will discover hell on earth and will die alone” (see France 24 2015), it is reasonable to assume that as long as the French government will not address more efficiently the root causes of the current issues that risk to divide the French society even further it is unlikely that major changes in public attitudes and behavior will happen. Socio-economic, educational, and mentoring programs targeting disadvantaged young people who are part of religious and ethnic minority groups coupled with novel media strategies meant to temper anti-immigrant feelings and reduce hate crimes in France might have much more lasting positive effects and might be able to help restore institutional and interpersonal trust within the French society making it safer and less vulnerable to external negative pressure.

References


Accumulating Transnational Social Capital among the Greeks from the former Soviet Union: Education, Ethnicity, Gender

Eleni SIDERI

Abstract: The fall of the Soviet Union and the political and economic problems that followed the emergence of the post-Soviet republics forced many women to migration in a period of feminisation of migration due to global economic and social shifts. Following the biography of two ethnic Greek women from Georgia and Russia, the paper traces the transformations of their social and cultural capital based on ethnicity, gender and education into transnational social capital. The paper uses the idea of transnational social capital in order to examine the ways past networks and memberships or skills were reassessed and transformed or even expanded as part of the post-socialist family planning.

Keywords: social capital, migration, Greece, Russia, Georgia

In recent decades shifts in the economy (high rate of jobs in the manufacturing sector, ageing of the world population that increased the need for domestic labour, the improvement of the position of women) have led to a feminization of migration. Women increasingly began to undertake ‘solo migration projects’ with more confidence (Oishi, 2005), and to become bread-winners. In the post-Soviet space where the restructuring of the economy was even more abrupt and sudden, the Soviet ideals of gender equality and the participation of Soviet women in the labour market were integrated into the neo-liberal agendas which forced women to economic survival through adaptability, flexibility and ingenuity (‘feminization of survival’, Hess, 2005: 32).

Education was always an important push factor for migration. Moreover, in relation to gender, education often acted as a legitimate reason that allowed young
women to leave home, or empowered them in order to take the decision to leave. In this sense, it contributed to great extent, to the migration planning of women (Omelaniuk, 2002). As a result, it should be stressed that education is a form of social capital for both families and individual women. But how does this social capital ‘behave’ in the conditions of transnational migration or communities? Does it turn into a transnational social capital and if so, then what sort? How does it interact with wider shift to neoliberalism turn in the capital markets?

This paper stems from a comparative work based on two different fieldwork projects. The former is the result of intensive fieldwork undertaken in Georgia over three different periods: firstly in 2003-2004; in 2008 (one month); and then in brief visits in 2010. It will concentrate on the life story of one woman, Savina, now in her 60s, an ethnic Greek Georgian woman who originates from the Greek-speaking village of Tetri-tsqaro.

The latter stems from my participation in DEMUCIV, a ongoing project of University of Thessaly-Greece which aims at the creation of the city museum of Volos based on oral testimonies. I conducted several biographical interviews among new immigrants (since the 1990s) from Africa, Asia and Europe. The open-ended questions tried to explore their urban memories and their experience of the city. One of the groups interviewed was the Greeks from the former Soviet Union. Lia, a middle-aged ethnic Greek Russian (in her 50s) from South Russia is one of them. The paper will trace the ways that Savina’s and Lia's life choices helped them accumulate different sorts of capital and integrate with different economic and political systems. In particular, I will concentrate on their education, as it seems that the latter played a significant role in their adjustment in challenging conditions.

---

1 Part of the fieldwork research used for this paper was funded by THALIS, an ongoing research programme (2012-2015), funded by the Greek Ministry of Education and the European Union, concerning the development of interactive content for the Museum of the City of Volos, in central Greece. Three research groups based at three academic departments (History Archaeology and Social Anthropology, Architecture, Urban Planning) and two academic institutions (University of Thessaly and Aristotle University of Thessaloniki) collaborate in order to conduct primary historical and anthropological research concerning the city of Volos. I am affiliated as post-doctoral fellow with the department of History Archaeology and Social Anthropology, University of Thessaly.

2 I use pseudonyms for both women.
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ETHNICITY

I define biography in Bourdieu’s terms (2000), as a trajectory stemming from the dual and interwoven relationship between agent and structure. In this framework, Savina’s and Lia’s lives is constructed from their membership of intertwined social networks, such as different ethnic communities, which generated different opportunities and constraints, as well as their own decisions against or despite these constraints. As a result, both the economic determinism and the individualist approaches of biographies, which often overlook the structural prerequisites of the lived experience, have been avoided in order to put the stress on a more cultural and societal history (Paadam and Miller 2006). Savina’s and Lia's lives trajectory, in this sense, are singular, but at the same time, dependent on the major social transformations of their time.

In brief, Savina, was born in late 1940s in a small, ethnically homogenous village in multiethnic Georgia. She moved to Tbilisi and then to Russia for her studies. There, she married a Georgian man who died in the early 1990s. She is the mother of one daughter. When I met Savina in 2001, when I first visited Georgia as an MA student, she was involved in the Confederation of the Greek Communities of Georgia. When I returned to Georgia in 2003, she was the head of a Greek cultural association. In comparison, Lia was born in 1958 in Kazakhstan, were her parents were deported by Stalin in 1942 from South Russia. The family returned to Novorossiysk in late 1960s. Lia studied in another city of Russia in the 1970s and returned to Novorossiysk where she got married. After that, she was involved in the Greek grass-roots in her city. She moved to Greece in mid-1990s and she became involved in the foundation of a cultural association that tries to promote Greek and Russian cultures.

I will use the notion of social capital as a vehicle in order to disentangle Savina’s and Lia's trajectories. Bourdieu (1986: 243) defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”. What is important in this kind of capital is the emphasis on resources found and shared in networks, such as the ethnic communities which played an important role in both these life-stories. Analysing the notion of social capital, Bourdieu underlined how much the latter becomes significant in contexts where there is a lack of economic capital, something that describes the situation in the former Soviet Union. In the ideologically classless Soviet society where capital was centralised in the hands of the Party and all Soviet
citizens enjoyed the same degree of equality and rights, social competition took other forms of expression, for example, ethnic or cultural. My paper will try to first examine the ways in which ethnic membership, through the development of family and community networks, provided alternative resources and thus, social capital for achievement in the Soviet Union. It will then consider the post-Soviet period and the opening of the Georgian and Russian markets, as well of borders. In that context, a new horizon of social relations, for example diasporas, but also of opportunities emerged, transforming the social capital into transnational capital.

But as Dwyer et al. (2006) underlined, Bourdieu puts the stress, in his study of social capital, on the dominant class and the reproduction of its power. On the contrary, Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1996, 2000) shift our attention to less privileged contexts where social capital could also play a significant role through different networks, such as ethnic networks. Ethnic networks, through sharing common norms, social experiences and aspirations, often contribute to the pursuit of social and cultural capital, substituting for the lack of economic resources and capital.

However, stressing norms and behaviours in ethnic communities, described as traditional, as their way to create strong ties among their members-something that these members could capitalize socially later on in their life—overlooks the fact that this stress frequently impedes the development of relations with other communities (Evergeti and Zontini, 2006). Moreover, the impediments were even higher for women. However, understanding community as a bounded group based on specific norms and ties reiterates the idea of community as a single entity which, especially in the field of migration studies, fosters the risk of methodological nationalism, naturalizing ethnicity. The extent to which social capital contributes to the formation of ties in a community is something that should be studied further in relation to individual courses of action, and taking the idea of community as a question to be examined and not as a given. Emphasizing the interwoven relationships of agent and structure within a biography contributes towards this direction.

At the same time, a new definition of capital should be considered. Zhou argued (1992) that we should change our theorisation of capital from something located in specific groups and networks to something accumulated in process nod in relation to different, often multiple factors, such as intergenerational relations, mechanisms of propagation and transmission of certain goals and norms, and the ways these factors can change due to wider political and economic shifts. For example, it is important to discuss Savina’s and Lia's biographies in relation to
different generational factors, but also with regard to the ways it was influenced and transformed by the introduction of capitalist structures after the fall of the Soviet Union, when they opted for strengthening their diasporic ties and pursuing transnational migration. Did these decisions lead to an accumulation of social capital and how did it affect the integration of Savina and Lia as well as their families in the new globalized world?

GENDER AND EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UNION

Savina’s family arrived in Georgia from Turkey, from a place on the Black Sea coast known in Greek historiography as Pontos in the 1920s. Her family first moved into a small village in south western Georgia, few kilometres from Tbilisi, where relatives were already living. Savina proudly remembers her father stressing his marriage to a Greek co-villager. Her father was the eldest son who soon abandoned farming, the main occupation of his family, in order to become a Greek language teacher. For this reason, he left the village after his marriage, and moved to Batumi (south western Georgia), where there had been a Greek language pedagogic institute (Tekhnikum) since the revolution of 1917. When he finished his studies, he was appointed first to a Greek school near his village, but he soon moved to the capital in order to get a degree in Russian literature. He then began to teach Russian since Stalin had closed down all minority schools in 1937.

Savinna’s father grasped all the opportunities given to him by the Soviet Nationality Policy in those years, but at the same time his career path was not irrelevant to the community’s ideas about the ideal of education. Moreover, the Hellinisation project, the dissemination and strengthening of the Greek culture after the foundation of the Greek state (1830s) reinforced the idealisation of education. Education was considered one of the pillars of the modernisation of the nation-state (Gellner, 1983). The closed, kinship based, ethnic Greek villages reproduced these aspirations regarding schooling and education in future generations by transmitting these ideals to their offspring, and closely monitoring their implementation. Mother tongue education was also one of the cornerstones of the Soviet Nationality Policy in 1920s, something that led to a furthering of the development, and appreciation of national cultures. Due to the lack of Greek language teachers, many young male and female Greeks were fast-tracked to teachers’ education in those years. In this way, the communal and state agendas seemed to strengthen each other. As a result, Savina’s father after the beginning of Stalinist oppression shifted to the study of Russian language.
In comparison, Lia’s family came from Trebizond in the first decade of the 20th century, as she states between 1913-1915. The reference to this emblematic city due to its economic and symbolic significance often means origin from the vilayet of Trebizond and not the city per se. They moved to Russia, in Krasnodar Krai, some in Novorossiysk and others in Gelantzik. They were merchants. They were involved in the textile and tobacco trade. Her parents hardly managed to go to school (six years her mother, fewer her father) before the deportation of their families in 1942 (see Popov 2007) to Kostanayska oblast (North Kazakhstan), in the village Karabalik (former Komsomolets). In Kazakhstan, the two young Greeks met and got married. The father worked as a builder, her mother does not work since she has to raise five children.

Lia lived her first nine years of her life in Kazakhstan and went to school for two years in Karabalik. The family moved back to Novorossiysk in 1964. Although the family did not have the educational opportunities that Savina’s family had, Lia’s account underlines how much the family recognized the value of education, especially her mother that she had dreams for further education. Lia believes that that attitude stems from the general appreciation of the society for educated people, people with cultural capital, but also of power and order. In her words, ‘It was the culture [kultura]. We all appreciated the teachers, the medical doctors, the policemen’.

In 1950s, Savina’s family moved from a rural area to Tbilisi in a period of rapid urbanization. The urban population slowly grew (from 42.4% in 1959 to 55.4% in 1989) at the expense of the rural, although the rural population was still large in comparison with other Soviet republics (D’Encausse, 1978). There was also a growing Georgianisation of the republic, outside the recognized autonomous regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This majority facilitated the development of national networks of affiliation. The national homogeneity of the Georgians within their republic raised their chances of acquiring resources and privileges. Lack of access to these distinctive, nationalised/Georgianised networks, as Savina describes below, prevented her from following the career path she used to desire.

‘I had studied like mad. When I went to sit my exams [oral exams before a committee], I was pretty sure that I would get one of the very few places. I answered all the questions but in the end the committee told me that they could not offer me a position in the Academy. I couldn’t believe it. I burst into tears in front of everybody. Afterwards, I learnt who got in. They all belonged to Party families. My dad told me to go to Moscow to study arts there. In Russia there was more meritocracy than in Georgia.'
As Humphrey (1983) states, a wide network of people at different levels of the Soviet hierarchy was bound into a system of reciprocity through exchange of gifts or services. Reciprocity does not, however, mean equality. Access to resources and services depended on one’s position in the networks (Humphrey, 1983; Dragadze, 1988; Mars and Altman 1992; Verdery, 1996; Heyat, 2002). As society was gradually becoming Georgianised participation in these Georgian networks became a difficult thing for non-ethnic Georgians, as Savina describes. Her Greek ethnicity deprived her, at this point in her life, from accessing her desired career. However, Savina does not condemn Georgia in general in her story. Instead, she pinpoints to the Georgian Party families. A privileged Party nomenclature, which according to the statistics of the period (D’Encausse, 1978) was mainly Georgian, seemed to marginalise Savina’s equal opportunities as Soviet citizen. In order to deal with this impediment, she left Georgia and returned a few years later with a degree in chemistry and married to a Georgian. A mixed marriage breaks the continuity of Greek blood which had been undisturbed in her grandparents and parents.

Endogamy was the main ideal of all ethnic groups living in Georgia, especially in rural areas, even after World War Two, despite the scarce evidence (Fischer 1977). However, for the post-war generations living in cities for educational or professional purposes, marriage with other nationalities of the same religion and educational background (Russians, Georgians and Armenians) was more frequent. In this economy of shortage therefore, the allocation of centralised/state resources and their (re)-distribution were based on personal ties and networks.

It would be over-deterministic to present Savina’s mixed marriage only as a social strategy, overlooking the more intimate aspects of marriage. But I believe that her decision was influenced by a context where the Soviet ideology of rapprochement among different nationalities and the ideal of building a new Soviet people created an atmosphere that favoured mixed marriages. They made a reality of the Soviet ideology of the rapprochement of the Soviet peoples: the intermingling of different nationalities. Nevertheless, the existence of these marriages created the conditions for smaller nationalities, such as the Greeks, to participate in networks that transcended the borders of their own nationality. For these nationalities, intermarriage was a way of being included in wider and more

3 Another reason for the popularity among the Greeks of Russian Universities were their education in Russian schools which prevented them from being fluent in Georgian.
privileged networks. These networks were interwoven both in national and family idioms, domesticising the nation and nationalising the family through the identification of nation with a kinship terminology, and by reproducing gender stereotypes (see Sideri, 2007). Women were, in this case, bridges between the ethnic community and one enhancing the opportunity of new social capital.

In the 1970s, because of what the authorities started to call a ‘demographic crisis’, a return to more traditional family values was propagated. Welfare benefits and the child-care infrastructure peaked in the 1980s (Issoupova, 2000) in order to support family planning. During that period, Savina decided to leave her career behind in order to dedicate herself to her daughter and husband. In this way, gender, which in an earlier phase of her life played the role of a bridge between her ethnic norms and Soviet ideology, rather allied with the ideas of emerging nationalism in Soviet Georgia, of which family planning was a central part. Towards the end of the 1980s, ethnic tensions mounted in Georgia. In the 1990s, the Supreme Soviet of Georgia recognised Georgian sovereignty within the republic. The referendum of April 19th 1991 confirmed Georgian independence.

In comparison, Lia, after the family's return in Novorossiysk, continued school. She went for further studies in an industrial city of the Urals. She studied Russian literature, a safe choice for many young Greek girls since it combined higher education with social and gender propriety. Making the comparison with her hometown, Lia underlines that her new place of residence was big, full of opportunities for cultural activities, like theatres and opera. After her studies she returned to Novorossiysk, because her mother insisted and she got a job in the State History Museum, as a guide. She got married, a chapter of her life that she did not to talk much.

Until this point in her life, Lia seems to use her studies as cultural capital in order to advance within the Soviet society. On the contrary, her ethnic ties, played an ambiguous role. On the one hand, Lia considers her appreciation of education as a result of her family's views on this issue, especially her mother's, something that complies with the Pontic-Greek traditions, as discussed in Savina's case, as well as the Soviet ideology for the emancipation of women. However, these family ties defined her decision to return to Novorossiysk after her studies without letting her consider other options. As I underlined, ethnic ties often restrain women from the accumulation of social and cultural capital as independent agents. On the other hand, the deportation that the family suffered in 1942 was the result, according to Lia, of their Greek passports. something that must have strengthened the ethnic ties and awareness of the community. The Treaty of Lauzanne (1923) provided
Greek citizenship and passports to many of the Greek refugees who took refuge in Russia before and after the WWI.

The deportations of 1941-1942 were instigated by the Nazi attacks on the Soviet Union, which generated allegations for cooperation of the local population, especially the foreign nationalities, (non-indigenous according to the Soviet system of division of nationalities) with the Germans. In this wave of deportations, that had the character of preventive measures, nationalities like the Romanians, the Volga Germans, the Greeks and in the end, the Crimean Tatars were deported to Central Asia. However, this historical framework seems to evade Lia's memories which trace the cause of the deportation of her family in their citizenship, a reason frequently used by the Greeks of western Georgiana and Abkhazia who were deported after the war in 1949. The most recent emphasis on the legal proofs of the Greek citizenship which was significant for the recognition of the Soviet Greeks as Greeks by the Greek state must have contributed to Lia's interpretation.

On the other hand, what seems to be a very vivid memory of the years in Karabalik is Lia's good relation with her classmates, the Germans, the Russians, the Kazakhs. 'We had a good time' she says, giving us a glimpse to the birth of the Soviet kosmopolitizm (Humphrey 2004), an ideologically driven, multiculturalism of different ethnicities which replaced the tsarist imperial diversity, based on the Soviet Nationality Policy and the Stalinist ethnic cleansing. The historical contextualization of Lia's memory help us explore the different meanings of cosmopolitanism, which was relaunched in the last decade as a conceptual framework of political membership of human diversity, but also, its dark sides which are often connected to histories of human elimination, like genocides and ethnic cleansing, neglected by the envisioning of a new and less restrained from borders, humanism. Raised in this cultural context, Lia's immigration to the Urals was almost a natural choice in order to enjoy her privileges as Soviet citizen, after the gradual reconstitution of the deported populations since Stalin's death. What seems to change her course of life is the reactivation of her ethnic ties after the collapse of the Soviet Union first by the formation of the Pontic-Greek Association in Novorossiysk and then, her immigration to Greece. Education seems to be used as a means to produce cultural capital and distinction in the former Soviet Union despite the ideology of equality creating hierarchies between ethnic groups and nationalities which antagonize each other for excel and access to limited and centralized resources. As a result, ethnic ties were important, but at the same time, they were regulated through traditions of gender relations that burdened on Lia's and Savina's life.
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL CAPITAL

If diaspora as a term has a long history in the social sciences, transnationalism emerged in the 1990s as something new. In other words, transnationalism seemed to emerge as a framework to perceive human, cultural and capital movement beyond nation-states (Basch et al. 1994). This first attempt to define the phenomenon brings to the surface two things: first transnationalism seems to concern processes widely available to immigrants as a repertoire which could help them develop multiple social relations within a space defined by their country of origin and the host country. Secondly, the space of in-between-ness becomes pre-eminent, as it generates different social fields within which are immigrants with an almost entrepreneurial capacity to “forge” or “build” relations. Since then, the study of transnationalism has moved in various directions and intellectual fields (intellectual cross-fertilization according to Vertovec, 2003), such as global studies, network theory, migration and diaspora theories, (Hannerz, 1996; Smith, 2001; Vertovec 1999; Doreen, 1999; Levitt et al. 2003;).

One of the outcomes of this shift was that our attention was drawn to the fact that, although transnationalism was often considered to be a new context corresponding to the flows of the economic, political and human capital that globalization made possible, it was very much related to nation states and their regulations. In this sense, the study of transnationalism was forced to acknowledge the importance of boundaries, borders and nation-states (Soköfeld, 2008: 211). On the one hand, transnational studies should take into account not only the current socio-economic relations that go beyond national borders but also the historical aspects of the latter, the circulations and the routes upon which modern migrations are taken place. On the other hand, transnationalism should also, without downplaying the importance and ingenuity of actors, take into account the institutional nature that forms this transnational space and its networks, such as the diasporic association where Savina and Lia took place in..

As Olwig (2003) argues the emphasis on identity that connects migrants to their place of origin (even a historical homeland in the Greek case) merged the two notions (transnationalism and diaspora) to some extent. Similarly, Sökefeld (2008) considered diasporas a subtype of transnational communities based on the symbolic, such as cultural traditions, which put the stress on a shared identity dispersed in time and in space. But what this paper tries to argue is that the transformation of these symbols ties into social and cultural capital of the utmost
importance in planning for the two women's family life in post-socialist space of the former Soviet Union.

During the turbulent years before the fall of the Soviet Union, as nationalism was increasing in Georgia, Savina had to face another tragedy: her husband died. The passage from the command economy of the Soviet Union to the open market economy of capitalism was accompanied by political instability and organized crime. Savina stayed in Georgia hoping that her late husband’s professional networks could help her continue his business, the food trade. But gender discrimination obstructed her from remaining in that business field. She became an entrepreneur. She opened a small café which served a few typical Greek dishes. Her family roots were her inspiration. As Savina confessed, she used all the old recipes of her mother and grandmother. She also used her ethnic Greek networks to attract a clientele. But the introduction of a new political and economic ethos generated instability and chaos on the streets. At the same time, the ethnic roots that supported the little café’s existence seemed to become an impediment for the café. As Savina admits, her coffee shop was based on ethnic loyalty, instead of modern management principles. She saw her customers as guests and often did not receive payment.

Similarly, Lia was involved in the formation of a Pontic-Greek Association in her city in South Russia in early 1990s. The association aspired to the propagation of the Greek language and culture. Lia contributed to the organization of exhibitions in the Museum where she worked that depicted the Greek presence in the Black Sea. As Anton Popov discussed (2007) these national-cultural societies thrived in that period in South Russia, as they mediated in all bureaucratic processes involved in emigration of the Soviet Greeks, in the reception and distribution of humanitarian help coming from Greece which often fostered various cultural projects. As a result (ibid: 35), 'The Greek organisations have become channels for the transnational flow of ideas and goods as well as people'. As Dominique Schnapper argued (1999:251) the fact that diaspora suggested fluidity brought it "more in harmony with the values and the spirit of the times than the rigidity attributed to the nation-state".

The idea of a Greek transnation fed the aspirations of the Greek state in the 1990s when the restructuring of the Greek economy (the opening of the banking and financing sectors); the in-flows of immigrants from the South East Europe (mainly Albania) and the former Soviet Union and the opening of the markets in the Balkans generated visions of economic and political hegemony in the region and pinpointed the dynamics of the ecumenical Hellenism over the
narrower horizon of the Greek nation-state. The emergence of a diasporic space in the form of an ethnic Greek civil society in the former Soviet Union as a space of social and political engagement beyond the inter-state system should be considered as one of the by-products of these changes. But as Mary Caldor (2003) argues, there is not one civil society but many, which consist of different groups and agendas. Savina’s work in the charity is a good example of this multiplicity. The charity was sponsored by the Greek state and other Greek agencies, especially US-based Greek NGOs. It produced a place where local actors and intentions met with the political agendas of the historical homeland, but also the agency of other Greek diasporas, generating a much wider idea of a Hellenic culture than the formal national one.

At the same time, engagement with the civil society had not only a symbolic character, but was invested with very practical expectations. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the political and economic plight of Georgia fuelled an immigration wave to Greece as in other similar cases of emigration from the collapsed Soviet Union in the same period, for example, Israel or Germany (Műntz and Ohliger, 2003) and was supported by policies of return (bureaucratic facilitation for visas, education and welfare benefits). In this framework, the engagement in civil society dominated by ethnicity produced the emergence of some privileged gatekeepers who had access to the formal networks of the Greek administration and the other Greek diasporas, the know-how to negotiate with all the complicated processes of repatriation, and information about potential resources of financial help and benefits. These transnational ethnic networks, which were represented as civil society, generated the necessary social capital for Savina and Lia.

The former became head of a Greek diasporic cultural association and she got married a Georgian artist. The latter capitalized her participation in the Pontic-Greek Association by immigration first to Athens, a quite easy process as she remembers and then, to a town of Central Greece where she first worked as domestic labour, but soon, she got married to a co-patriot from South Russia and gave birth to two boys. Now, she is doing an administrative work for a Greek organization and she is engaged in a new cultural initiative, an association that promotes the Greek and Russian historical ties. Lia turned to her ethnic Greek ties at the same period that Savina did as well. However, she lacked the necessary social capital that the latter had due to her husband who belonged in the ethnic majority of Georgia. Moreover, Savina lived in a country where in the 1990s one of the biggest Soviet-Greek communities resided and therefore, it attracted, to greater degree, the attention of Greece both due to the political exigencies and the
geopolitical interest of the Caucasus resulting in the engagement of Savina to a more significant position in the Greek nation-cultural associations of the post-Soviet space. In addition and more importantly, the political plight that generated a massive migration from Georgia to Greece did not apply in the case of South Russia. As a result, more Greeks with similar skills to Lia's were at the Greek authorities disposal.

Due to these reasons and a personal loss, Lia immigrated to Greece and she had to find a job which did not correspond to the cultural capital she accumulated in the previous years of her life since this capital became depreciated due to Cold War stereotypes and misconceptions or ignorance regarding the life behind the Iron Curtain (Sideri 2006). At the same, the difference in the economic infrastructure of Greece and its education system in relation to that of the former Soviet Union made many of the skills and specialities of the Greeks from the former Soviet Union to run obsolete in their new country. Domestic labour was not Lia's ideal work. However, Lia treated this experience as a formative period.

She learnt better Greek and started to appreciate her own strengths and independence. As she admits, 'in Greece, I realized that I am still a woman and have things to do in my life'. Breaking free from family constraints, she rediscovered herself as individual agent. The connection of immigration to women's emancipation, although it should be contextualised, is often underlined (Morokvasic 2003, 2008) since the process of mobility and independent labour often are connected to women's autonomy. However, in Lia's case this autonomy was produced from a job with less cultural capital than the one she left behind in Russia but with more financial benefits in the economic context of that period and access to a new pool of social ties beyond the Pontic-Greeks of Novorossiysk. However, the latter continued to play an important role in her personal life. She got married to Pontic-Greek from Russia and as she confided in me she cooked Russian food and listened to Russian music and spoke Russian at home.

The gradual economic and political improvement of Russia and the corresponding recession of the Greek economy offered Lia an new opportunity. Her Russian background and her university degree contributes now to the improvement of her social position in her town in Greece. Her involvement in the Greek-Russian association which promotes the Russian culture in Greece through cultural activities, for example, a theatrical festival or language courses, is connected to the gradual importance of the Russian tourists and investors in Greece as well as the increase of appreciation of the Russian language as an instrument for a better positioning in the job market in Greece or even for
potential emigration from the country to the Russian speaking world which could result to the accumulation of economic and cultural capital.

Ghodsee, studying capital transformation in coastal, post-socialist Bulgaria among women engaged in tourism, argues (2005) that the transition from a socialist to a capitalist oriented society did not erase these women’s past, but caused them to reassess it in order to adjust to the prerequisites and opportunities of the new system. I believe that a similar process took place in Savina’s and Lia’s case. They managed to transform the social and cultural capital they had accumulated in the Soviet years, multiplying it through the transnational circuits of the post-Soviet period.

At the same time, Savina managed to send her daughter abroad to study. Her daughter attended a Greek university in Greece, studying English literature, because English is an international language. Education is one of the reasons why many young Georgian women emigrate (Melashvili 2008). The opportunities soon emerged in the form of a grant given by the SAE-Americas for Regina to attend a summer course in the USA. Regina then worked for a short-term program of the General Secretariat for Omogenis (special department of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Greek diasporas). Despite the family’s expectations, the programme was not renewed and Regina returned to Georgia where she found a job at a private English speaking college in Tbilisi through her step-father’s relatives, who had connections with the new administration after the Rose Revolution in 2003.

The aggregation of resources through different networks (Greek, Russian and Georgian) could be multiplied through the expansion of these networks beyond national borders and the mobility of actors in and beyond them. Transnational social capital underlines exactly this dynamic and also more fluid increase of capital beyond the national territory which generates actual or imaginary possibilities in terms of life planning. It is gained through networks that extend beyond national borders, such as diasporas, and is invested in various places, for example, the homeland, the host-country or other third countries but also, in time and the economic and social structural transformations take place.

Educational mobility, like other forms of migration, follows certain patterns from developing to more developed or to a fully developed country, from east to west, from non-English to English speaking countries, but it also follows global economic shifts which signify today an emerging reverse process from West to East and local economic and historical interconnections, like the ties of Greece to Russia. In Regina’s case, this migration was connected to the transnational social
capital that was accumulated by her mother in previous years. Savina’s contacts with the Greek diasporic space, and not only the more restricted national space, helped Regina to immigrate first to Greece, by facilitating the bureaucratic procedures and giving access to information about the possibilities of educational grants, and then to the US with funding from the Greek-American community. Similarly, Lia teaches her two sons Russian, 'we all speak Russian at home', as she says, because 'you never know how things turn in the future'. Moreover, as she started up teaching Russian, she confides in me how an adult student of her found a job in a Greek island within a Russian wealthy family due to the Russian classes she took. She herself makes plans for the development of a small family business in the sector of cultural tourism between Greece and Russia. Her participation in the association will help her accumulate the necessary social capital.

It seems that cultural capital, in the more institutionalized form of educational qualifications, according to Bourdieu (1986: 243), is relatively more transmutable to economic in the market economy of globalisation that shifted to the third sector and favoured the feminization of migration. Western education and moreover, US-education, increased the value of Regina’s educational credentials in the job market both in Greece and in Georgia since it indicated, according to Waters (2005, see also Collins, 2008), “fluency in the English language as well as less obvious qualities, such as confidence, sociability, cosmopolitanism and possession of valuable social capital”. Moreover, the reshaping of the Georgian economy that fostered the privatization of traditionally state-dominated sectors such as education, gave Regina the opportunity for a prestigious job in a private college in Tbilisi with tuition for elite students. Despite the connection of education to the democratization of societies and efforts to combat poverty, it is also connected to elite reproduction and social inequalities and supporting or even deepening hierarchies in post-socialism (Mandel 2002, Mihaylova, 2004). It is not insignificant that Regina’s placement in the college was supported by the Georgian relatives of her step-father’s side. Post-independence Georgia strengthened the value of Georgian networks, but of those networks which were well-placed in the new political scene in Tbilisi. Political and economic differences deepened in the city after the independence, something that provoked the reactivation of older networks in Regina’s case, as well as her transnational capital.

At the same time, the learning of the so-called less well known languages, like Russian seems to privilege Lia and her students in the shrinking market of Greece providing them extra job opportunities within the country or abroad. In this framework, Lia from a labour migrant turned into a cultural broker of a capital that
becomes more and more popular in Greece privileging her in-between position between Russia and Greece and making her reasserting her Russian cultural background by instrumentalising it though her involvement in the association, a reverse process to what happened in her life in early 1990s. To conclude, Savina and Lia took part in an emerging transnational public sphere that seemed to be created due to the political shift and new structure of a global system and the reposition of nation-states within it by trying to transform themselves into transnations through different ways, such as double citizenship, diaspora politics. At the same time, older forms of identification such as ethnicity and its networks still take part in the reshaping new hierarchies.

Savina’s and Lia's experience entailed a space of individual inventiveness and innovation as well as a space of social networking in a transnational sphere produced by deep and sudden political and economic shifts. Savina and Lia appeared determined to pursue personal and family needs and interests which could improve her everyday life through networks that in the past were forbidden or not needed (contacts with Greece and other Greek diasporas), but with the same ingenuity and adaptability. In this sense, old practices, developed in the Soviet period of political and social action, were interpreted, as Shami (2000) argued, through the new imageries of global and transnational networks, generating in their turn new expectations and possibilities.

Although Savina herself did not emigrate from Georgia, her involvement in this transnational space intensified her accumulation of social capital and gave her daughter the opportunity to develop cultural capital in terms of educational skills and diplomas. On the contrary, Lia's emigration to Greece made her renegotiate her ethnic ties gaining in individual agency, but without eliminating their influence. In both cases, the process of accumulation various forms of capital is continuous intra-generational and connected to wider political and economic structural transformations. In the cases studied, this process of accumulation produces a path dependence of mobility and encouraging the undertake of new ventures often rooted in older experiences and networks.

Transnational social and cultural capital is tightly entangled with the production of economic capital in the conditions of neo-liberalism, where culture, knowledge and social relations are highly commodified and quantified by global markets. However, these types of capital are fashioned in collaboration with older categories of membership, such as ethnicity, gender expectations, and inter-generational relations, especially in a young open market such as Georgia, Russia and to certain degree Greece, where the public and the domestic are still highly
Accumulating Transnational Social Capital
JIMS - Volume 9, number 1, 2015

interwoven. As a result, transnational social capital is flexible and highly convertible in neo-liberalism, but is still well connected to the social-cultural traditions of the past. What seems, though, to stand out is the proliferation of possibilities and imageries that augment engendered individual ingenuity.

REFERENCES


Citizenship is one of the most important attributes of the people in a state, by which a person become a full member of that state. The debates on citizenship in recent decades highlights the importance to achieve a balance between rights (civil, political, social) and responsibilities. Thus, there is a need to supplement the passive acceptance of rights with active manifestation of responsibilities and virtues, including civic and political participation, economic independence, politeness. A good citizen is that one who exercises his rights and responsibilities in a balanced way (even if definition of responsibilities is more difficult than that of rights, that are most often established by law).

The book *Generations. Rethinking Age and Citizenship*, edited by Richard Marback, enrolls in debates about citizenship and its aspects related to age, ethnicity, gender, social status, occupation, exploring how citizenship is experienced temporally by age and how membership in a particular generation influences the experience and identity of citizenship. The book is organized into four sections, examining the relationship between generations and citizenship in past and present.

The first section - *Age, Cohort and Generations*, including four essays, shows that young people do not share equally in their hope for rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Peter Levine, in the first essay (*Civic Renewal. Theory and Practice*), accentuates the benefits of civic engagement as a tool for addressing most serious social problems in our society today, characterized by sclerotic institutions, corrupt government, weak political movements and a polarized public. Civic engagement, as a combination of deliberation, collaboration and relationships (involvement in common actions, developing trust, loyalty and mutual hope for our fellow citizens, reflecting on what we have done together) is a path to reform rules and become influential. In the next chapter, Jane Fiegen Green describes how children of foreign nationals (American
Indians, Armenian and Mexican Americans, Pakistani Britons), in nineteenth-century New England, have a greater expectation of assimilating into a new culture while hanging on to their familial culture. They do not treat citizenship as a passive status conferred by the state, but as an active participation in the community’s ongoing development. Amy Grey, in the third chapter, shows how Presbiterian Church was involved, in the 1850s, in incorporating populations into the American Union, in developing the sense of citizenship among Indians, in establishing stronger connections between Native Americans and the State. John W. Hink Jr., in his essay *He Wants to Take Them to Russia! American Courts and the Battle for Birth Citizens during the Cold War*, addresses the issue of citizenship as birthright, raising the question whether the rights of a child born in the United States are infringed upon if their undocumented parents are deported to the country of origin.

The second part of the book- *YoungAge, Globalization, Migration*, including three essays, broaden the understanding of citizenship in the age of migration and globalization. The first one, written by Saeed A. Khan, examines the notion of citizenship as it relates to Pakistani Muslims in Great Britain and specifically British Pakistani youth for whom Great Britain is their country of birth, domicile and nationality. At the same time, cultural, emotional and familial connections to Pakistan shape their perspectives on identity and belonging. The second essay, of Enzo Colombo, explores how children of immigrants enrolled in high schools in northern Italy conceive and speak about the citizenship. Based on 115 narrative interviews with girls and boys between sixteen and twenty-two years-old, the article tries to find how they react to the perceived opening and closing of Italian society and how they face the problem of inclusion and participation. Children of immigrants are elaborating a new idea of citizenship that mixes admittance, allegiance and involvement. The last essay in this section, written by Pauline Stoltz, also deals with the issue of children’s citizenship, in the context of post-conflict processes, issue that is only very slowly taken seriously and requires much more consideration.

The third section of this book- *Generational Disparities and the Clash of Cultures*, comprising three articles, shows us how one generation’s experience in relation to another generation contributes to our overall understanding of citizenship. Thus, Yuki Oda, in the first essay, investigates the Mexican American repatriation in the 1930s and the problem of Mexican-born children, showing that US nationality legislation regarding foreign-born children during the 1930s was an “immigration problem”, associated with exclusion of Asian immigrants and Mexican American repatriation, affecting the next generations. The second essay in this section refers to the South African experience in the years since the end of apartheid, while the last one
explores the issues of French citizenship from a historical perspective, the distinction between citizenship and nationality, the rooted stereotypes regarding racial inequality and how the younger generations of Arabs in France struggle to assert their identity against the identity of an older generation.

The last section - Later Life, Civic Engagement, Disenfranchisement - treats the participation of older people in the civic life of their communities. Using data from a survey of African American elders, the first article examines the influence of traditional predictors of participation, such as socio-economic status and political efficacy, and the influence of several underexamined factors that are more prevalent among elderly, namely health-related factors and mobility, for drawing a picture of what serves to encourage or depress political participation as individuals age. The authors suggest that declining participation in old age is not inevitable. Many traditional predictors of participation affect the elderly population in much the same way that they affect the general population. The elderly still can participate and want to participate, especially in social environments where they are asked to participate. In the second article, Jessica C. Robbins-Ruszkowski investigates “active aging” as citizenship in Poland, based on ethnographic research in two cities in Western Poland. Retired Poles find solace and regain a sense of worth and location within community by cultivating social relationships and taking care of their families. In the last essay, From Personal Care to Medical Care, Tamara Mann describes how a political strategy for senior citizens was set up in the United States in the 1950s. The conversation around the problems of old age grew and a policy solution came to dominate the debate and establish the parameters of civic engagement for seniors.

Taken together, the essays of this volume represent valuable contributions in investigating citizenship issues, through their attention to age, aging and generational differences. As Jessica C. Robbins-Ruszkowski and Richard Marback assert in the concluding chapter, the book makes a phenomenological turn in citizenship studies, advancing the view that “thinking in terms of generational awareness of citizenship best conceives the essence of what it is to be human, what it is to live out our lives from youth to old age in an ongoing process of discovering, asserting, sharing, and at times rejecting and reformulating our civic bonds with each other” (pp. 320). Addressing the study of citizenship from an interdisciplinary perspective, the book broadens our understanding of what it is to be a citizen.

Review by Gabriela GOUDENHOOFT


An important research hypothesis visible due the philosophical and epistemological approach is the one that individual identity became the more problematic, the more modernity tends to define the individual in a dual perspective: both as subject and object of knowledge. Invested from the beginning with a symbolic power, individual identity became more and more prominent in the public and political life.

Given the discourse on identity or on own existence which seems to be inherent to everyone, the discourse of informed intellectual could be a reliable source in an area as political science is or political philosophy. A „cultivate’ self-perception could be also useful in any attempt to present the contemporary Romanian spiritual climate.

Lorena Stuparu’s study on identity (pp.21-48) assumes the idea that the very special place where identity is crystalized depends on the way self-perception or selfhood meets others perception of being. Notwithstanding the logical principle of identity, the space where individual identity is built is not a immutable one but a space of an eventual dialogue between the image that one has about oneself and the image of
others on the subject. This criteria of identity crystallization became inherent to the nowadays discursive space. Though, according to Francesco Remotti, cited in the study, the concept of identity has a conventional nature, being totally dependent on our decisions, not staying somewhere waiting of being discovered, but “built” or “invented”, like in a narrative way as Paul Ricoeur also stated, or built by denying and reinventing as difference like in poststructuralist vision.

Tackling the problem of identity Lorena Stuparu finds as necessary not only a presentation of the liberal or neoliberal philosophy but a comparatist binomial liberalism-conservativism, where it is to find a perspective of liberty as a genuine expression of selfhood, assisted by a rational control of behavior (Flathman), or in opposite way, a perspective where the society is prior to the individual, starting from Aristotle’s thinking and continuing with the modern conservativism, conceiving individual liberty conditioned by the existence of home, place, society.

Narrative identity, in an phenomenological and hermeneutic approach, assume the human being “able to say” (Ricoeur), the human being who tells himself to the world, in a context where the narrations are activity of expressing and exteriorizing self-consciousness in a process of self-remembering like in Plato’s philosophy or like in Kant’s idea of recognitio, where “identification” it is “establishing an identity relation between a thing and another one”.

By building a narrative the human being became self-consciousness and also able to make himself known by others. There is a dialectical motion of idem and ipse, like Hegel suggested the dialectic of “identity and otherness”, confronting the public and the privat space of being.

Contemporary Romanian research on the philosophy of identity are facing, according Stuparu (p.35), a journey to a particular nebula, where one can notice recovery attempts of Interwar age models or abandonment of some disturbing patterns such as Romanian communist false identity.

Another challenge for the selfhood in contemporary world it is the self-emerging from a private space out of its personal boundaries and linking to the national and the global sphere, shaping a national identity and a global one (p.39). This process involve civic terms, the idea of citizenship as belonging to a polis, or to a supranational entity as European Union is and has to fight the cleavage between West and East visible even on discursive layer. This challenge induce a paradigm shift, because contemporary European crisis of legitimacy and of identity at least it’s greeted by Romanian and by the East, generally speaking, with a high openness to a political and cultural Europeanization, with a fast adaptation and assimilation of the values of Economical Europe, Political Europe, Social Europe (p.43). There are still some nostalgic thought,
against a quasi-unanimous “chorus of European integration”, readable in an old westernization wish and in a today Eastern consciousness, where human identity is fighting for survive under the pressure of so many global influences. The nostalgia of a post-political world (Pierre Manent), the promises of a saving Europe for the simple citizen in search not of one’s identity, but of a dignifying existence are features of the current approaches on individual consciousness for an “timeless human being”, paradoxically captive in a temporal dimension.

Ana Bazac’s study introduces an epistemic perspective on identity, according to the idea that building an image is a response to a logic necessity (49). So the rationale of building identity relies on the same functional principles as math’s laws, or more generally on an ontology of the real.

Maybe not the easiest but the more fecund way to tackle identity is through linking it to worlds in terms which is particularly cognate: “national identity and culture”, given the fact that “the national identities are cultural and social determined” (p.61), “identity and mediation” because human being creates its own needs through multiple mediations, “identity and action” because identity involve the effort of emerge one’s boundaries towards other’s, “the dialectic of closeness and outlying”, the relationship between globalization and identity etc. The last one raise a special issue, the one of massification, which is a challenge and even a dissolution of selfhood, because masses are related to the idea of multiple while selfhood relates to idea of singularity.

The idea of temporality is valued also in the study of Adriana Neacsu, bringing back to the public interest the vision of I.D. Gherea, related to Bergson reflection on the “pure duration”. In order to solve the problem of individual identity, Gherea conceived our aggregate mental life as a process running continuously (p.72), but related to the “rational kingdom of the unconsciousness”, to the “inner self” having one’s “own duration” – the key concept for understanding individual identity.

An interesting approach it is to be found in Georgeta Ghebrea’s study on a special group, youth, Romanian 1989 Generation and after, with a specific social identity. According to Van Dijk “...ordinary people are more or less passive targets of text or talk, e.g. of their bosses or teachers, or of the authorities, such as police officers, judges, welfare bureaucrats, or tax inspectors, who may simply tell them what (not) to believe or what to do” (p.88). The author uses the critical discourse analysis to explore the latent content and the social control keys, concluding there are some discrepancies between the latent content of employment policies and youth employment aspirations. Also she found a positive correlation between the level of education fostering awareness and the socio-political development which promote empowerment, civic and politic mobilization (p.101).
The layer occupy by the European identity, an issue continuously debated is the object of Gabriela Tanasescu’s study, trying to crystallize an operational concept of European identity beyond the multiplicity of national or regional loyalties or the plurality of individual identities. Is there a European identity as a conceptual layer or only at an argumentative level? Is there a philosophy of European identity? Which is the official position of European institutions and which the theoretical contribution of European thinkers? This are some questions the author try to answer in her study. The author synthetized and reassessed perspective of European identity definition agglutinating “the Greek concept of individuality”, “the Roman concept of justice”, “the biblical concept of person”, “the distinction between Good and goods”, with respect to the Christian heritage, the Greek one and the Roman heritage. On the other hand the European crisis of identity came into sight not only by the failure of European Constitution but also through the “crisis of the continental utopia of perpetual growth” (p.111) or through the cleavage between the savage capitalist Anglo-Saxon model and the “obsessive social model” promoted by EU members like France or Germany.

The current approach on identity is made considering the importance of communication, relation, dialogue and not least the informational society. Hanging between national and supranational, cultural and multiculturalism, identical and different and struggling in finding new ways and instruments for legitimize the European action, could create a fragmentation in the idea of European identity. Some functionalist solutions as the “constitutional patriotism” promoted by Habermas could be a basis of European identity in a liberal logic (p.123), but towards a democratic recourse the acceleration of the integration process would question the choice for a “more Europe” versus “a better Europe (p.131).

Liliana Popescu is tackling a particular issue in her study, the Moldovan identity the cultural orientation of this Eastern country towards Europe and its political orientation towards the EU. Issues as citizenship, ethno-national identity, civic identity and civic nationalism are issues covered in the study, with a critical perspective, considering even the critical outlook of some scholars that the Moldovan identity could be a root fallacy in the context of public discourse. However Moldova’s situation is split between politicians and Government’s political aspiration vis-à-vis an eventual accession in the EU and Government’s performance in providing welfare, good services, quality policy for people.

The final text is written by Gabriela Blebea Nicolae, a fresh perspective on the academic dialog with the world abroad, made possible through the activity of the New Europe College and the amazing journey “over the seas” of a Romanian experiencing liberty.
The second section of the book is bringing together interesting ideas of prominent Romanian intellectuals, interviewed by Lorena Stuparu and Gabriela Tanasescu. Mircea Flonta, for instance emphasized a lack of the Romanian public life: the absence of a genuine dialogue culture, amid large discrepancies between East and West. He pointed on the identity bench-marks: rationality but also religious feelings, culture and civism, patterns of relating to otherness, national or ethnic solidarity and provincial and regional identities and also consequences of ones choices in a challenging world: solitude, dissociation, indifference, selfishness.

Alexandru Surdu underlines the lift between ethnic and national consciousness in multinational and multiethnic states, where sometimes conflicts on cultural, religious, political, social, professional cohabitation occur sooner or later (p.181). But civic consciousness edifies beyond this differences, because it suppose respect for legality and political legitimate order. The Romanian philosopher expressed some doubts on the possibility of a supranational identity, as the European identity pretends to be. An identity card can give rights but not necessary a proper consciousness.

The relationship between self and otherness, the reflection on and in other mind contributes to crystallize individual identity according to Gheorghe Vladutescu. The national and supranational identity are linked to the philosophy of culture conceptualization but is based and totally dependent on the layers preexistent: supranational identity depends on national identity and the national one is based on individual identity (p.186). So a boycott of self cannot help in constructing a European identity.

Alexandru Boboc, chose to talk about identity from a perspective of the “European spirit” forwarding in a global era. With a Latin linguistic derivation, the term “identity” it is to be found in the principle of identity and has a remarkable interpretation in Heidegger philosophy of das selbe where the formula “A = A” couldn’t be considered as containing two terms in an equality but one and alone, a self-identity (pp.189-190). But in order to be defined, “identity” needs the support and the relationship with the “difference”, the two terms being in an indwelling correlation. The Romanian philosopher proves confidence in the natural human reason, showing that the European spirit will always be associated with humanism, in a context of unity affirmation through difference.

Aristide Cioaba fills another side of the very complex approach of identity, in the book, the political identity of the post-communist Romania, with a normative reflection, including the ideology of the social state as an instrument of political legitimacy. Both on national and supranational (EU) layer, the identity and legitimacy are interconnected conditions of maintaining political regimes, concurrent with a political consensus and
with a public and continuous public attachment with the values particularly with the values of democracy (p.213).

The values topic was reached also with Constantin Nica, who appreciates that beyond the existence of several “identity series”, the social values (cultural values, political ones, moral, national legal, religious etc) embedded in the “spiritual memory” of every people define identity as a virtue and pattern of relating to higher concept as Good is. Political parties have an important role in crystallizing social values and the European parties should do in order to achieve a supranational legitimation.

As the book editor, Lorena Stuparu stated, the research was based on a transdisciplinary methodology and using a comparatist approach on political theories (p.242) in deciphering several key concepts as self, individuality, identity on specific layers: individual, national, supra-national, universal.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Viviana ANDREESCU, PhD, is an associate professor in the Department of Justice Administration at the University of Louisville, USA. Her recent research focused on social justice issues (related to social and cultural minorities, such as Appalachians, ethnic and racial minorities, immigrants, and sexual minorities) and cross-national comparisons of victimization, fear of crime, and public attitudes toward the police. Contact: v0andr01@louisville.edu.

Giovanni DI LIETO graduated in Law in Italy, where he practiced as a solicitor for a short while. He soon moved into the international trade and logistics sectors while covering various corporate roles across Europe, the USA and Asia. Living and working across the globe sparked Giovanni’s ambition to develop scholarship in the socio-legal area of cross-border human mobility. In 2014 Giovanni completed a PhD in law at the University of Otago. He is based in Melbourne, where he is a lecturer in law at Navitas College of Public Safety.

Gabriela GOUDENHOOF, PhD, is Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and Communication Science, University of Oradea. Email: gabrielagaudenhooft@yahoo.com.

Joanna MARSZALEK-KAWA is affiliated to the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland. Contact: kawadj@box43.pl.

Cristina MATIUȚA is Associate Professor at the University of Oradea and head of the Department of Political Science and Communication. She teaches in the areas of Civil Society, Political Parties and Theory and practice of democracy. She is Jean Monnet professor in the field of Active Citizenship, Identity and Democratic Governance in the European Union. E-mail: cmatiuta@uoradea.ro.

Anna RATKE-MAJEWSKA is affiliated to the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland. Contact: anna.ratkemajewska@gmail.com.
Frank REICHART, PhD, studied educational science, political science and psychology at the University of Technology Dresden, Germany. He worked at the Institute of Social and Political Psychology at the University of Kiel, Germany, where he also received his doctorate. Later he worked at the German National Educational Panel Study (NEPS) at the University of Bamberg, Germany, and was Operational Manager in the Central Coordination of its successor, the Leibniz Institute for Educational Trajectories (LIfBi). Now he remains affiliated with LIfBi while he conducts research as a Visiting Fellow at the University of Sydney.

Eleni SIDERI, PhD, graduated Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Department of French Language and Literature where she also completed a Master Degree in Sociolinguistics. She completed a PhD in Social Anthropology at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Currently she is teaching at International Hellenic University, Thessaloniki Greece at the MA programme Cultural Studies of the Black Sea and she is doing a post-doctoral research among different new immigrant communities in the city of Volos (central Greece) in order to explore their urban memories (University of Thessaly, Dept. of History, Archaeology, Social Anthropology, DEMUCIV project).

Patryk WAWRZYNISKI, MA, is affiliated to the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland. Contact: patryk.wawrzynski@gmail.com
GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS

Manuscripts will be accepted with the understanding that their content is unpublished previously. If any part of an article or essay has already been published, or is to be published elsewhere, the author must inform the Journal at the time of submission. Please find below the standard requirements that have to be fulfilled so that your material can be accepted for publication in JIMS:

- The ideal length of an article (written in English) is from 4 000 to 8 000 words, including a 200-word abstract in English, keywords, and a very brief autobiographical note or resume
- The number of bibliographic references should be within reasonable limits
- The inclusion of tables, charts or figures is welcome in support of the scientific argumentation
- All articles should be presented in Microsoft Office Word format, Times New Roman, 12, at 1.5 lines, and will be sent to the e-mail address jims@e-migration.ro and a copy to contact@e-migration.ro mentioning "Manuscript Submission: [TITLE OF ARTICLE]"
- Book reviews are welcomed to be published in JIMS, but no longer than 2000 words
- Contributions are welcomed at any time of the year and will be considered for the next issues
- The editors reserve the right to edit the articles or to modify/eliminate some fragments, observing the original sense.
- The extensive use of a too technical language or mathematic formulae should be avoided
- Footnotes (no endnotes);
- References and bibliography (Chicago Style of Citation).

For more details please visit the Guidelines for Authors page on the website of JIMS at: http://jims.e-migration.ro/Guidelines-for-authors.php